The Threats: Stingers

The FIM 92A "Stinger" is a portable American anti-aircraft missile that can be carried by 1 or 2 people. Donald Sensing draws on his military background to give us a detailed rundown, including what it can do and the difference between the versions produced in the 1980s and the missile today. See also this excellent HowStuffWorks.com backgrounder on How Do Stinger Missiles Work.

Even back in the days of Duran Duran, Stingers were very effective against Russian aircraft in Afghanistan. A couple hundred Stingers from that conflict remain unaccounted for, however, and Maj. Sensing (ret.) also talks about some experiences with that problem and how serious that threat is.

How could the Stingers have gone missing in the first place? Well, it was a war, and keeping track of Stingers dispersed among guerilla groups at necessarily-unknown locations is barely possible even in theory. In practice, most of the Afghani Stingers (and indeed, most of America's military aid to the Afghans, period) were funneled through Pakistan's ISI intelligence agency. They in turn often worked through Gubdullah Hekmatyar, a radical Islamic warlord currently based near Herat, Afghanistan.

Hekmatyar remains cozy with the Iranians, is thought to have al-Qaeda connections, and was recently the target of a failed US attack via a Predator drone's missiles. That's pretty good for means and motive. The only question left is opportunity.

It should be noted that Stinger missiles are not the only threat of this type. They may not even be the most likely.

Another possibility mentioned in the news reports is the less capable Soviet SA-7 "Strela-2" missile, like the one found near Prince Sultan Air Base. This missile was widely distributed during the Cold War, and is believed to have found its way into the hands of more than one terrorist group during that period. while Cold War vintage SA-7s may not have operational electronics any more, it should be noted that licensed and knock-off versions have also been produced in China (HN-5), Egypt (Ayn as Saqr) and Pakistan (Anza 1-3 series). Thus making SA-7 variants probably the easiest and most likely anti-aircraft missile for terrorists to acquire.

In "Some SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles were built for self-activated firing," Donald analyzes the likely effect of an SA-7 on commercial airliners, notes that a special version used by Soviet Special Forces has remote-firing capabilities, and explains how they work:

bq. "A Strela-Blok missile would be a real danger in the US." he concludes. "It could be emplaced in darkness, days ahead of time, and the terrorists would be miles away when it fired."

Not exactly cheery reading.

The good news is, procedures for dealing with a threat like the SA-7 are logical and doable. Even if the threat never materializes, treating it seriously will be a good security drill for all concerned.

Subsequent versions of the SA-7 have been produced, of course, including the SA-14 "Strela-3" and the next generation SA-16 "Igla-1 and SA-18 Igla missiles. These are more threatening due to their capability, and far harder to defend against. Fortunately, these missiles were and are far less available to potential terrorists.

Finally, there's also a possibility that the intelligence tips re: a terrorist attack using shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles are correct, but the target's location is not. More on that tomorrow.