Strategypage.com has a good entry on its site on the FBCB2 (Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below System) "Blue Force Tracker" and how the 3rd Infantry Division used the “Lite version” in Iraq. The bottom line is what one American soldier in this system knew, the whole American force knew.
Playing the electronic game TACOPS can give you a feeling for this. When scouts spot the enemy, a symbol is placed on the game map. This “God’s Eye view” of the enemy allows you to move your whole force against the unit that was spotted.
Had trucks in the 507th been equipped with FBCB2, the whole Jessica Lynch episode would have been avoided, as they would have had both an idea where they were, and better yet, an idea where the enemy was so they could avoid him. This has been the subject of intense discussion in design conferences for the FMTV for 2005/2006 deployment with the possibility of an earlier design cut in given the additional budget funding.
The link and the text of the 12 August 2003 post (which will scroll off) is below:
August 12, 2003: One of the outstanding new pieces of equipment to appear in Iraq was an item called "Blue Force Tracker." To most users, reporters and troops, this item appeared as a computer mounted inside of vehicles that showed maps of the battlefield and icons displaying the location of all friendly units currently in the area. The real name for this computer system is FBCB2 (Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below System). "Blue Force Tracker" was basically a "FBCB2 Lite," an unfinished version of the final FBCB2 (which has been in development since 1996.) FBCB2 is a more ambitious version of an earlier idea to use small radios to be carried in each vehicle and infantry platoon. The "locator" radio would periodically send an encrypted signal that would identify the unit and its location. Then came the World Wide Web, GPS and cheaper (and smaller) satellite communications equipment. Thus was born FBCB2, which used all of those technologies. Users could load maps from CDs onto their vehicle computers and rely on the satellite link and their GPS to track the location of everyone in real time. For troop commanders, this would be a major breakthrough. Having all the needed maps available on the computer saved a lot of work and confusion. This was because different scale maps were used for moving long distances (say, 1:100,000) or when fighting in an urban area (1:25,000, as you want to see every street and building). In a fast moving battle, a commander and his driver spend a lot of time mucking about with paper maps. There's also a lot of "imagery" (aerial photos) available, and it's easier to distribute these on CDs and keep them in vehicle computers, than in a map case. For the Iraq campaign, FBCB2 was a critical advantage. The "FBCB2 Lite" system was rushed into service, and over 3,000 systems were operating in Iraq. FBCB2 has been undergoing field tests for the last few years, and the 4th Infantry Division, which was supposed to land in Turkey, was the first division equipped with the system (for testing purposes.) But the 4th Infantry was the only unit that was trained and experienced with the FBCB2. Everyone else got a quick course of instruction and off they went. FBCB2 proved it's worth again and again. This was especially true during the days of sand storms. Units of the 3rd Infantry division advanced through the sand storm, and successfully outmaneuvered regular and irregular Iraqi forces and defeated them. The Iraqis were surprised as American armored vehicles came out of the blowing sand, with guns blazing. FBCB2 made it possible, as American scouts (often just one vehicle) went out and identified where the enemy were holed up. Other units then used the digital maps and aerial photos on their FBCB2 screens to move through the sand storm and attack. The Iraqis quickly discovered that if one American saw you, a coordinated attack would follow shortly. This was demoralizing for those Iraqis who got away, and spread the word. The Iraqis didn't know about FBCB2, but did have a fear of American military technology, to which they ascribed almost magical powers. By giving every troops commander, down to platoon (at least in mechanized units) access to all this information, "digital battle command" became more than a buzz word. Despite some problems with FBCB2, most commanders raved about it's usefulness. And this was the "lite" version, without all the features that helped with logistics and other support functions. There were problems with FBCB2, some of which could have been avoided. It was unavoidable that there wasn't much bandwidth for sending large amounts of data over the satellite system. There was limited satellite communications capacity for the 3,000 FBCB2 systems in use. Sending files, or pictures was too slow to be useful during combat, and position updates were often dangerously slow. The interface for instant messaging and the use of graphics was generally considered cumbersome. Some of the commanders noted that most commercial computer games had easier to use interfaces than FBCB2. But poor interface design has long been a problem with software designed for military use, especially in the army. This has been changing over the last decade, but the trend is just hitting the FBCB2 development crew. Given the amount of criticism, much of it provided by combat officers who have degrees in computer science, or are just heavy users of commercial software, we can expect a new, and much easier to use, graphical interface for FBCB2 soon. Getting " FBCB2 Lite" into use in time for the Iraq campaign was a group effort. A lot of generals agreed that FBCB2 was ready for prime time and it would be worth the extra effort to get the system into the hands of the troops headed for Kuwait, and the Iraq campaign. Hundreds of technicians and engineers hustled to get the equipment working, installed and kept working through three weeks of combat. While somewhat overlooked, this was an extraordinary effort, and it paid off big time.This proves something I said earlier in "US Military -- Back To The Future" about the effect of digital networks on American combat power. The American advantage in combat effectiveness over the rest of the world is going to be growing at an increasing rate for very little marginal investment. We will genuinely be able to do more in combat with fewer forces. However, as Iraq’s occupation shows, winning in combat isn’t winning the war. The future of the American military is…PARAMILITARY. That means more boots on the ground, not less. The people filling those boots are not going to be combat arms soldiers. Military Police, Civil Affairs, Signals and Construction Engineers, among others, will be the people we have to recruit for the mission. The only question is about these new paramilitary formations be when do we raise them and what the proportions will be between long service American military professionals, American military reservists, American citizen draftees, foreign sepoys, and locals raised to run their country after we leave. Update: Stephen Hardesty, "The Ministry of Minor Perfidy" has a related comment on US military technical trends. Hafnium explosives, anyone?
Tom Clancy rides again!
Communications technology is going to be the force multiplier for the near future. The Landwarrior system, undergoing tests now, will push this kind of technology down to the individual soldier, and streamline the process of calling for air and artillery support. A primary requirement for a production Landwarrior system is something like the blue force tracker. The mechanized forces have had the equivalent, IVIS, for a few years now - but imagine what some airborne troops could do with that and a fat pipe connection to the people in the planes with bombs.
I remember reading that when they first introduced IVIS (Inter Vehicular Information System if I recall correctly) it gave a 5x effectiveness boost to troops with it fighting against otherwise identically equipped troops without it.
When we have soldiers with that, and the shooting around corners OICW, very small numbers of American soldiers will be capable of destroying much more numerous enemies through their ability to rapidly develop coordinated swarming assaults.
This is the latest on Light forces digital data communications from Dunnigan:
August 14, 2003: While the FBCB2 "Blue Force Tracker" computer systems were a great success in Iraq, they could only be used in a headquarters or in a vehicle. The light infantry units (82nd and 101st Airborne divisions, 173rd Airborne brigade and Special Forces) had many of their troops on foot most of the time. Even before the Iraq campaign, development work was done on modifying commercial equipment for use by light infantry to perform some of the FBCB2 functions. What they came up with was an iPaq 3970 Pocket PC with Wi-Fi networking, 256 megabytes of memory and voice (telephone) capability. Attached to the iPaq were GPS and modem as well as a camcorder battery (that lasted 12 hours). The entire unit weighs 2.5 pounds and was renamed the Commanders Digital Assistant. The CDA functions like FBCB2, but only locally (within the network of CDAs that are within Wi-Fi range, about 300 meters, of each other.) But because each CDA has GPS, the effect is the same as FBCB2. Senior commanders had Panasonic Toughbook CF-34 laptops. These 3.8 pound units are waterproof and built for use in harsh environments. They have the same commo capabilities as the CDAs, but an 8.4 inch screen, a 4.3 gigabyte hard drive and CD drive. Some paratroopers took CDAs with them when sent to Kuwait, trained with them for six weeks and then took them into combat in Iraq. The troops didn't have to use the equipment in combat, as they were just testing it when they shipped out But using it a lot showed that it made a difference in the field. The army plans to use more powerful handheld computers to create a CDA that has nearly all of the FBCB2 capabilities. Special Forces are interested in this as well, as they often travel light. While the Special Forces also take light vehicles with them on many missions, and thus could carry a laptop based FBCB2 unit, there are times when they need something even lighter.
This is a passage out of the "US Military -- Back To The Future" post I think bears thinking on in light of the 3rd Mech having the FBCB2 (Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below System) "Blue Force Tracker":
"...the key variable in future American military operations aren't platforms or precision guided munitions, but network bandwidth connecting intelligent people. The bigger and faster the sensor/shooter/C3I network, the nastier and deadlier it becomes.
The really interesting thing to see is what happens when the 4th Mechanized (Mech.) Infantry Division's land combat data system comes into use and we then add "Land Warrior" infantry to it. We are talking a half an order of magnitude increase in combat network size compared to the heavily touted theater air power networks of the Iraq war from the 4th Mech's combat vehicles alone. Combat infantry added to that bumps it up to a full order of magnitude larger.
The American Army's love affair with vehicle-mounted .50 Caliber M2-HB machine guns has made for very unfair close combat firefights between Americans and everyone else since 1944. Ask the Wehrmacht what the fifties mounted on 3rd Army M-8 Greyhound armored cars did during the pursuit after Falaise. The "Ma-Deuce" has been the U.S. Cavalry's version of the mounted lance for several generations now. Yet that was nothing compared to the kill ratios the 3rd Mech had in Iraq. The 3rd Mech went through the Iraqis like the Martians went though the British Army in H.G. Wells "The War of the Worlds." There are some good organizational reasons for this. Yet those reasons can be applied to every combat division. This begs the question just what is the fully networked 4th Mech going to be like in combat?
In aerial combat, "situational awareness" is a great combat multiplier until you have to close the range to engage. AMRAAM missiles kill lots of bad guys at range but closing with Sidewinders is the only way to be decisive, especially in a politically/tactically constrained rules of engagement fight. Then it gets down to who has the initial advantage, with the best trained and experienced pilots, and with adequate equipment.
What will these networked land combat units be like before they "go into the merge" of close combat firefights? Robotic micro-UAV "point men" 300 yards ahead and 50 yards above human point men are going to make for very "situationally aware" line platoons and extremely "unfair" close combat firefights. Add this to GPS-based fire support, loitering drones, airborne sensors, JDAMS, and modern body armor and our infantry is "...going to make Caesar's legions look like combat-ineffective girly-men," to use a quote from a friend of mine.
He also said, "We will literally be able to fight at ludicrous odds - not just outrageous odds - and triumph nearly bloodlessly," to which I have to agree.
I am of the opinion that this phenomenon is a logarithmic progression that the American military is only just beginning to climb. The reason we are light-years ahead the rest of the world in conventional military power is that we have invested enough in people and technology that we have gotten past an inflection point on the military effectiveness curve for the use of modern information systems. It is going to take very little more marginal investment on our part to obtain vastly increased and selective killing power."
Trent is right.
LandWarrior is just the first crude prototype. The next step will be the Objective Force. Imagine soldiers wearing body armor with micro-actuators that can enhance personal strength, monitor biological systems and even selectively apply pressure to manage bleeding until a medic arrives. Imagine personal area, local area and theatre area wireless networks that link officers, ncos & enlisted to one another and to aerial and ground unmanned vehicles (robots), including things like antitank launchers that can fire on voice or radio command. Imagine weapons that allow the commanders to see what the soldier sees ... especially if s/he is out on recon or a special ops mission ... and make a go/no go decision based on that plus sensor data plus other info coming in from tiny robots in the air and in the enemy's towns ....
Bandwidth is an issue. So is the weight & use life of batteries.
Re: combat arms vs. special ops vs. paramilitary, many of those distinctions will blur over the next decade.
BTW, at West Point, all of the cadets are required to take several info / computer technology courses. In their freshman year they are shown Land Warrior & oriented to the concepts for Objective Force. There's a full FBCB2 setup for them to learn on now. & every year there is a cyberwarfare competition between the service academies, monitored & judged by the NSA. About 1/4 of all the cadets at West Point have joined the student chapter of SIGSAC (the ACM special interest group for computer security). That's roughly 1000 future officers & every year when one class graduates, the incoming plebes join at a similar rate.
The foreign cadets I've taught are blown away when they see this stuff.
Reading this, and reflecting on various stories I've heard, it seems to me that DoD is aiming more and more towards PFM as a form of warfare.
"Any technology, sufficiently advanced, is indistinguishable from magic."
In an extreme example, as the deadline expires, Saddam tells his generals of his intent to fight, and his head explodes. All but the most fanatical would be terribly shaken by that. At this point, it is no longer a question for Sun Tzu, but for Niccolo Machiavelli.
With a PFM campaign (not unlike GWII), a few units are made to believe in PFM (being put to rout in the process). These believers come in contact with other units, tell their tales and units dissolve. Remaining units are made to believe until everyone accepts the power of PFM.
Where this runs into trouble is when the fighting stops and the population starts to realize that it wasn't PFM after all. The real power that won the day - the belief in PFM - is effectively removed from the battlefield.