A great deal of media speculation has been made in recent days concerning the issue of Iranian ties to 9/11. Rightfully so.
Until now, being "hawkish" on Iran has been generally perceived as the exclusive province of the hated neoconservative movement. The US and European foreign policy establishments are certainly allergic to the concept, seeing this as one of the harbringers of the long-feared apocalypse should President Bush be re-elected. With a great deal of rather unlikely punditry now agreeing with Doug Feith's take on the issues of both Iranian and Saudi Arabian ties to al-Qaeda, I'm cautiously optimistic that by 2006 or 2007 any number of people may also agree with Feith on the subject of Iraqi ties to al-Qaeda. But perhaps that's too much to hope for.
In any case, Newsweek has the scoop on Iran, (and an interesting follow-up) courtesy of the U.S. 9/11 Commission and other sources.
Now, I've been quite critical of both Isikoff and Hosenball on a number of issues relating to Iraq and al-Qaeda. Even so, I'm more than willing to give credit where it's due and say that they did a damned good job on this piece. It ties together all of the major threads with respect to a possible Iranian connection to 9/11.
Ramzi Binalshibh, it seems, was among those al-Qaeda operatives who profited from Iran's wonderful immigration policy (see more here) at the behest of a sympathetic general in the IRGC.
You'd have to dig around quite a bit to find the name of that particular general, which is why I'm more than happy to do it for you: it's Ahmad Vahidi, the former commander of Qods Force. They're the elite of the IRGC, and answerable only to Ayatollah Khamenei. Vahidi, who is now one of Iran's deputy defense ministers, has had ties with Ayman al-Zawahiri going all the way back to the 1980s when he was leading the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ).
Vahidi is far from alone. As just about anyone familiar with the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution will tell you, Iran actively sponsored both the EIJ and its fraternal twin Gamaa al-Islamiyyah against first Anwar Sadat and later Hosni Mubarak, as part of an active bid on the part of Khomeini to destabilize the Egyptian government. As a result, when these two groups and their leaders (incl. "Blind Sheikh" Omar Abdel Rahman from the 1993 WTC bombing) joined al-Qaeda, those who were known VEVAK assetsthey brought their ties to the Iranian military-intelligence establishment with them. Ties that have endured to this day.
At least one former VEVAK officer has talked publicly about these matters. He now goes by the name "Hamid Reza Zakiri," and first showed up in an interview by al-Sharq al-Awsat. As Newsweek notes, he later appeared at the trial of Hamburg cell member Abdelghani Mzoudi. According to this story from the Washington Post, European intelligence was able to verify most of what Zakiri had to say.
I've spent - quite - some - effort - keeping - track - of - his - claims. If they are true, they would seem to more or less verify just about everything that Michael Ledeen has been writing about and over the last several years about the Iranian ties to al-Qaeda (and largely been ignored or villified for). Indeed, his revelations would go even further to assert at least tacit Iranian complicity as accessories to 9/11.
In other words: yes, Virginia, Iran is a terrorist state. But are they in league with al-Qaeda?
Consider this: even if Zakiri's claims are 100% false, it wouldn't change anything I wrote in my previous analysis: the small fact that the majority of the surviving al-Qaeda leadership is currently based in Iran and operating freely, claims of their being in custody by the Iranian government be damned.
One other point I want to make is that pursuing dialogue with the Islamic Republic is a lost cause at this point, because Khamenei and Rafsanjani do not want to negotiate. They want what they have always wanted, and what Iran has consistently pursued over the last 35+ years: a global war against the West and for the expansion of radical Islam, centered in but not confined to the Middle East, through their long-standing status as the world's #1 state sponsors of terrorism. Their Great Game sees diplomacy only as a way to buy themselves time, in order to build what they believe will be a foolproof shield against retaliation.
The Europeans have had dialogue and economic ties to Iran to boot over the last several years, completely unimpeded by the perfidy of neoconserative conspiracies. Somehow, all of that talking doesn't seem to have restrained Iran from continuing with their nuclear weapons program. Or restrained al-Qaeda from bombing Madrid on 3/11.
The ultimate mastermind of that particular attack, Amer Azizi, is in Iran too by the way.
Oh, and faster. Please.
I don't think you get a lot of disagreement on Iran, as being one of the true threats in the region. From someone who in no way, shape, or form, believed the claims about Iraq ties to Al-Queda, in the nuclear capability of Iraq, in any way that Iraq was a threat to the US - all the ways that the current government mislead/lied/exaggerated the threat of Iraq, those same claims to Iran ring true. But again, what are options? And not a reactive "we'll bomb them" - a real analysis of the options available?
Why did we invade Iraq again? When Iran was the truer threat?
Did the administration make a typo error??
Incompetent idiots...
Lots of options, JC. My favorite would be to go for a nuclear-free ME. Perhaps that's fantastical, but it's worth a shot. Of course, diplomatic isolation and/or sanctions would be a logical starting point.
In any case have to do a few things before we consider escalation.
One: the first thing we need to do is do a hardheaded analysis of whether there really is, as some claim, a viable pro-democracy opposition. If it's a bunch of students with headbands who just want to have sex, well, we ought to ask ourselves whether we want another Tiananmen Square. The CFR says there isn't one; I haven't seen a comprehensive case made to the contrary. Nor, frankly, have I seen any convincing evidence that the US is in fact capable of helping such a democracy come about in the region. It seems like the powers that be in Iran are fairly well entrenched.
Two: we need to be figure out how much time we have. Today Israel is saying 2007. Heck, they even acknowledged that diplomacy has set Iran back a bit.
Three: we have to evaluate whether we're willing to toss Iraq away. Because the Shi'ites there aren't going to align with us. Now, I imagine that Dan would say that taking away Iran as an instigator of trouble in Iraq will have a salutory effect, but I doubt it. Ditto for Afghanistan. What will the Tajiks do?
Four: what's our exposure in Saudi Arabia? Bahrain? After all, the oil industry is staffed with tons of Shi'ites, and/or it's likely that it's infiltrated with AQ sympathizers. If the Darling/Ledeen terror masters thesis is accurate, doesn't that suggest that messing with Iran may be tantamount to cutting off our oil and wrecking our economy? Will Kazakhstan's fields come on line in time? What about the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline?
Five: do we have the forces?
Six: Is Israel ready to invade southern Lebanon again? Syria?
Seven: Is this stuff about AQ even accurate?
Etc.
I don't think there's any likelihood that we go into Iran half-cocked.
One other point: how credible, really, is Asharq al-Awsat? Is it waging a disinformation campaign on behalf of some princes we know?
Perhaps.
JC:
I think that what you're running into is a fundamental disagreement on premises here in our respective epistemologies. If there was no al-Qaeda connection to Iraq, I would oppose the war there too. I also think that a good many of the claims concerning alleged perfidy on behalf of the administration were more or less shot to hell as far as intellectual consistency in this regard,
My "Who do we bomb" remark was intended as a response to a comment by Armed Liberal that was in of itself a response to a statement by Ygleisias.
Praktike:
Good points, let me reply in numerical order:
1. The CFR favors engagement with Iran as their solution to the current situation. As I noted, Europe has tried this and it didn't stop 3/11. The CFR engagement plan assumes that the ayatollahs can be negotiated with to reach a compromise. The problem is, like I noted above, that Rafsanjani doesn't want to negotiate with us - he wants us dead or at the very least, ejected from the Middle East.
2. How much time we have depends on who you ask. The Iranians have learned from Osiraq and have taken steps to ensure the survival as well as secrecy of their nuclear program. To be quite honest, I'll say that you hit it right on the head when you more or less pointed out that all of these timelines we keep hearing about are essentially diplomatic myths. If Rafsanjani wants to, he can probably pump out a bomb. Period. And I think we can both agree that this is a problem.
3. This is Professor Cole's opinion, but I would respectfully submit to you that Ayatollah Sistani is quite aware of who was trying to knock him off this spring and who was more than happy to bankroll the Mahdi Army - consider it something a little bird told me. If we play it right, I would say that Sistani, who does command a great deal of authority among the vast majority of Iraqi Shi'ites, would assume pretty much same the role he did during the Sadr Revolt on a larger scale. Remember that if the Qom-based Khomeinists fall, the An Najaf school of Shi'ism will almost certainly win out in the larger battle for the heart and soul of modern Shi'ite Islam. I'd be more worried about SCIRI than anything else.
As far as the Tajiks go, Ismail Khan will likely attempt to come to the aid of his patrons, but the others can be bought off easily enough.
4. Ledeen has compared the terror masters in respect to how they view one another to be roughly equivalent to the mafia. The same is true in the case of Iran and Saudi Arabia (or at least, the elements within both governments that support al-Qaeda), with al-Qaeda playing both ends against the middle. I don't want to make it sound more centralized or controlled than it actually is, except in the sense that they all hate us and coordinate in order to realize that ill will.
5. No. Which is why pro-democracy efforts in Iran become even more critical IMO.
6. You'd have to ask them about that. Contrary to popular myth, AEI is hardly an extension of the Israeli government in DC. But any action against Iran will have to make room for a reckoning with Hezbollah.
7. Yes. And more to the point, there is not anywhere resembling this disagreement on this one that there was with respect to Iraq.
8. Al-Sharq al-Awsat is a reasonably reliable paper like al-Hayat or al-Quds al-Arabi, which makes it nothing short of phenomenal by Arab press standards. They're being leaked this stuff by reformist members of the Iranian government who (rightly) view Khatami as a sell-out and recognize that the hardliners are in the process of wiping out their movement as an organized political force inside Iran. But then, I don't believe this stuff simply because it got printed up in al-Sharq.
As far as Saudi disinformation is concerned, there's a good chunk of that floating around these days as well. But the fact that the Saudis want to call attention to Iran's own ties to al-Qaeda in order to take pressure off their own don't mean that both countries aren't kneck-deep in this stuff on any number of levels. I'm sure it'd all make sense to Machiavelli or the Byzantines ...
Six: Is Israel ready to invade southern Lebanon again? Syria?
There were hints about an IDF incursion in to Hezbollahland to take place late last year. Alas...
Israel needs to help democracy take root in Syria before they can do much in Iran. I'm afraid too many in the US believe Israel will take out Iranian nukes, so the US doesn't have to (can free ride).
I'm also afraid of the Israelis really doing it.
On praktike's point 5, do we have the forces, they are on the ground in Iraq right now. Iraq won't disappear if the US forces relocate to Iran; the Iraqis in control now, will be even more in control. Yes, martial law in Fallujah and possibly other hot spots.
But wasn't it SCIRI that came to Sistani's aid? I don't see how striking at Iran won't cause a problem with the Shi'ites. After all, they had a major problem with the Iran-Iraq war, which is why several of the elder Sadrs were killed, no? And I hardly feel like Sistani or his colleagues in An-Najaf would want the United States to be the arbiters of a theological dispute.
Another point to consider is that the sectarian divisions within Islam tend to become temporarily less important when the US starts getting involved.
Me and my cousin against the stranger, and whatnot.
The Badr Brigades, which are SCIRI's military wing, only sided with the Ansar al-Sistani or the Thulfiqar Army (two ad-hoc Shi'te militias that formed in response to the violence perpetrated by the thugs in the Mahdi Army) in Karbala and An Najaf after it became clear that Sadr's initial "mass uprising" had failed. I'm saying that they weren't helpful, they were, but I also think that it is important to keep in mind that SCIRI's loyalties/patronage lie with a different branch of the Iranian government than do Sadr's, hence what we basically have is a very bloody outgrowth of Iranian domestic politics inside Iraq.
I don't think that you can reasonably compare the Iraq-Iran War to any type of US military intervention against Iraq. WMDs were used indiscriminately by both sides, trench warfare was revived, child soldiers, et al. In addition, I very much doubt that any US-backed Iraqi government, the current strongman allegations against Allawi aside, would be anywhere near as bad as far as oppressing the Iraqi Shi'ite population. Saddam Hussein fine-tuned brutality against both the Shi'ites and the Kurds to a particularly nasty degree that one would have to try very hard to match or even exceed.
I'm not saying that Sistani or his colleagues would welcome a US-led war against Iran, far from it. They didn't welcome a fight against Sadr either (which led to all of the theory that Sistani had masterminded Sadr's uprising), for example. However, the role that they assumed during the Sadr revolt is likely to be analogous to what they would do in the event of any US confrontation with Iran. At the very least, he is quite aware that Iran wants him dead or at the very least removed from the field of play and that they were complicit in the death of al-Khoei.
Finally, on this one:
"Another point to consider is that the sectarian divisions within Islam tend to become temporarily less important when the US starts getting involved.
Me and my cousin against the stranger, and whatnot."
I readily agree with this, though I would tend to take it even further to include Arab nationalists and any number of other ideologies that, for whatever reason, wish us ill will.
Dan: Salient points, indeed. So what, are our options? This is what I'd like to see happen on our part. Full-up insidious memetic engineering attack. TV and radio, and publications. But be subtle, don't confront the principles of Islam head on. How can a war of words be percieved by the mullahs as an attack? Muslim interest in science and technology is an insertion vector for us. Create literature and music that is not stictly qu'ranic recitation and study of the Qu'ran. Showcase female reporters and female performing artists. Create and support a film industry, make dvds and video accessible. Gosh, there's tons of stuff we could be doing. Are we doing any of it? And can we do it quickly enough?
Ditto me, Dr. Ledeen, faster please! :-)
jinnderella:
What we need, right now, is to adopt a policy regarding Iran at least as aggressive as that which we had regarding captive nations in the Soviet Bloc section of Europe during the Cold War. There are plenty of Iranian expatriates as well as any number of people inside the country more than willing to work with us in this regard, why not help?
There is also another factor that needs to be considered, that being that according to Grand Ayatollah Sistani and other ranking Iraqi Shi'ite clerics, the idea that the clergy should run the government first established by Khomeini is heretical. That view is already there, but it needs to get the biggest microphone we can find to shout it from the rooftops inside Iran. One of the ways that the mad mullahs maintain their rule ideologically is by advancing the proposition that Khamenei's will should be equated with the will of Allah. I think that such a view has gone unchallenged theologically in Iran long enough.
An-Najaf radio and TV, anyone? Beamed into Teheran?
Works for me.
praktike: Amen!!!
Dan: yesyesyes-- IMHO, one of the real reasons we beat the 'old adversary' was computer access. Russian mathematicians are awesome-- look at where the Journal of Differential Equations is published-- but without PCs they had no applications-- If we could only give every Iranian family a PC with internet, and the skill to use it, our problems would be instantly solved. Look how fast memes change here-- the Syrian musicians story is an excellent example.:-)
"according to Grand Ayatollah Sistani and other ranking Iraqi Shi'ite clerics, the idea that the clergy should run the government first established by Khomeini is heretical"
There are many other schisms in Islam that can be creatively exploited. Are there Qu'ranic scholars at AEI working on this?
One dilemma for the Iraqis and for us (not sure who really calls the shots on this) is just how open to make the Iraq/Iran border.
On the one hand, you have numerous reports of the Iranians using occassions such as Ashura to infiltrate Iraq. And then, of course, trying to destablize the country.
On the other hand, you have the opportunity for Iranians to get a taste of freedom, if that is in fact what is or will be the case in Iraq. Then, the theory goes, they will export all of this back to Iran. Additionally, the revenues accorded to Najaf will strengthen it as a center of Shi'ite learning and theological influence.
Velayat-e-faqih loses legitimacy over time.
There are some assumptions involved here, of course.
One is that the next few months will meet the test laid out by Sistani here. If things go downhill in Iraq, I don't see how it will have a positive effect on Iran.
Another assumption is that the influence will run West to East rather than the reverse. It sure seems to me like Sistani has taken an active role in influencing events in Iraq. Sure, his interventions have been fairly limited and, arguably, constructive. But has his quietism been tactical to date? How much does it stem from conviction rather than circumstance? Is this a harbinger of things to come?
Still another question is how important the distinction is between having the clergy play a direct versus indirect but powerful role in the state. Cruise through Sistani's handy Jurisprudence for Dummies and you'll see what I mean.
The provision that the Iraqi government shouldn't do things that contradict Islam, it becomes clear, means that it shouldn't do things that contradict what how the Najaf clergy interprets Islam.
Although, in fairness, he does seem kind of flexible. See here for some examples. I like this section:And he seems willing to fudge things:
Try to figure that one out. The dude would make a great lawyer.
praktike:
"Try to figure that one out. The dude would make a great lawyer."
No, a great memetic engineer! :)
In order to spoof the receptors, one make small, incidious changes. IMHO, Sistani is quite brilliant. :)
OK, I should note that he's basically an Islamic judge, which is sort of like a lawyer.
But memetic engineer, now that's another thing entirely.
praktike:
Thanks for the link on al Sistani's jurisprudence. It's very encouraging. I've been wondering how the Iraqis could construct a modern society without usury (lending money at interest) and this gives me the answer: they'll equivocate their way around it.
No problem, Dave. Here's another good one.
You'll be cheered to note that making an exorbitant profit is makrouh, but not haraam. Selling dogs is haraam, but not if they're hunting dogs. Commercial monopoly and price gouging are haraam, but it's not clear what formulas are used to calculate monopoly. So there is a fair amount of wiggle room for the canny entrepreneur.
jinnderella:
AEI has Koranic scholars? If this true, I've never encountered one of them during the several months I've spent here. Don't get me wrong, we have some very good people doing work on Islam and democracy, but I've never seen anything resembling a traditional Muslim scholar here ...
Praktike:
I think that the best solution to the Iraqi border is better security as far as preventing Iranian infiltration is concerned. I think you'd agree that you don't need to be carrying large amounts of anti-aircraft weapons and explosives if you're traveling on a pilgrimage to Karbala or An Najaf ;)
I concur that the US needs to work with Sistani, though I would note that even outside his conditions he states that the legitimacy of the new Iraqi government is derived from the people through the democratic process, i.e. he's not a theocrat.
The thing about Sistani that would lead me and most of people I know who have been to and from Iraq to conclude that he isn't out for power have to do with the fact that unlike the Hakim brothers or Sadr he has been fairly content to pontificate on the finer points of Shi'ite spirituality from Karbala and An Najaf rather than raising his own army and seeking to carve out some kind of political power for himself. That the Ansar al-Sistani and Thulfiqar Army were disbanded as soon as Sadr collapsed at his request speaks well of him, IMO.
My understanding is that there is a good chunk of "wiggle room" to be found in much Sistani's theology.
praktike - "Another point to consider is that the sectarian divisions within Islam tend to become temporarily less important when the US starts getting involved." This is quite curious historically: during the crusades Muslim victories or approaching victories (due to maneuvers) often disappeared as the Muslim side would disintegrate back into people looking after local advantage against other tribes. Similar things happened during the Ottoman period as well.
Oscar- no need to go back that far. Just look at Afghanistan in the 90s. But most of the fighting wasn't about fine-tuned differences on Islamic jurisprudence.
I'm not familiar with any pundits who disregarded Saudi ties to Al Qaeda. Nor am I familiar with any who would be shocked at a close relationship between Al Qaeda and Iran. So whatever Feith's claims were in respect of S.A. and Iran, they don't make his claims about Iraq any more credible.
I think what you mean to say is that pundits who insisted Iraq was not a significant source of terrorist threat to the United States are now saying that Iran likely aids (or has aided) the terrorist threat to the United States. Are these two beliefs in contradiction somehow?
As usual, penetrating analysis Dan. You truly typify the vision logic of Wilber's centaur level.
But....
Dan, Dan, Dan. Quds Arabi--reasonably reliable?
It's the the most virulently anti-American, pro-bin Ladin, pro-Saddam major daily in the mideast and its editor, Abdul Bari Atwan, is reviled by moderate Arab journalists.
If you mean reliable in the sense of being consistent in its agitprop then you would be correct.
I submit that it certainly doesn't deserve to be mentioned in the same breath as Sharq.
I'd like to give the Abha-based, Saudi daily Al-Watan a plug. It may be a Saudi paper but it's constantly pushing the veil (see: Jamal Khasshogi or Qenan Al Ghamdi), so to speak.
Andrew:
Last I checked, Juan Cole was still regarded as a resident "expert" within lefty circles and is regularly quoted in media outlets as as an expert. He believes the whole Iran/al-Qaeda connection is nothing more than an elaborate ruse concocted by the neocons, my boss included, so that Israel can reclaim southern Lebanon. Does he count?
Failing that, I would mention Daniel Benjamin, who knows a lot more about the world of international terrorism than Cole ever will.
My main point in bringing all of this up is that the idea that Feith's Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group would do some very good and outstanding research on Iranian or Saudi ties to al-Qaeda, research that was every bit as much opposed by the analysis (rather than the counter-terrorism wing of the CIA, which also believes the stuff about the Iraqi ties) wing of the Agency as anything that they've ever said about Iraq.
Robert:
Actually, I consider al-Quds al-Arabi fairly reliable in the sense that it's actually a fairly good place to go to if you want to keep track of radical Islamist movements, though I definitely should have clarified that. After all, al-Qaeda knows who it's friends are.
People quote Ken Wilber here?? Hmmm, gonna have to look around this space a bit more...
Some of the authors do too, JC....
"KSM and Binalshibh have confirmed that several of the 9/11 hijackers (at least eight, according to Binalshibh) transited Iran on their way to or from Afghanistan, taking advantage of the Iranian practice of not stamping Saudi passports. They deny any other reason for the hijackers’ travel to Iran. They also deny any relationship between the hijackers and Hezbollah."
p. 241
Heeeeeeeeeere's Rafsanjani!
What? Us? Support terrorism? Never.
I think Rantburg had probably the best commentary on some of the recent comment by the Iranian minister when he said something to the effect of, "Who knew that 9/11 was going to happen?" when asked about the hijackers crossing into Iran.
Fred Pruitt's response was, "That's what we'd like to know."