It's a tangential issue, but I'm curious about your views on the 1994 Mashad bombing. As I understand it, Iran officially blamed this on the MKO, but floated the idea that Ramzi Yousef was involved as well, and now B. Raman has even thrown Zarqawi into the mix as a possible co-conspirator, although he should have been in jail in Jordan at the time. It's conceivable he played a role like the blind sheikh, who even while in jail in New York managed to have communications passed on to the outside world. But I'm wondering if this is all just Iranian blarney.

I've tried to track down the source of the allegation that the Mashad bombing was the work of Iranian intelligence itself. The closest I've come is a 1999 briefing by NCRI, the US representative of the MKO, which quotes the imprisoned journalist Akbar Ganji. Ganji was a former intelligence officer in the Revolutionary Guards who joined Khatami's faction, and exposed a series of murders in late 1998 as the work of professional assassins. The deputy intelligence minister, Saeed Emami, was ultimately blamed, and he either killed himself or was murdered while in captivity; then Ganji's main source, Khatami's deputy Saeed Hajjarian, was almost assassinated, and finally Ganji himself was sent to jail (along with many other journalists) for insulting the Supreme Leader, or some such crime. I believe Ganji's problems were also precipitated by an article in 1998 hinting that Rafsanjani was involved with Emami's clique, just as Rafsanjani was preparing to stand in an election.

As I understand it, even the intelligence minister conceded that the 1998 murders were committed by regime agents. However, this allegation that the regime also carried out the 1994 bombing is a rather dubious one. Why would they bomb the shrine of the eighth imam? It could be that Ganji really believes this; or that he's just playing politics; or perhaps he's being quoted out of context.

I'm unclear on why he's a member of "Al-Qaeda" or not is particularly relevant. If he's a vile murderer, as seems likely, and he's operating in an area controlled by the USG, which, sadly, he seems to be, then a rational USG would try and kill him, right?

Whether he's Bin Laden's drinking buddy or not would seem to be rather less important.

I agree with T. J.

It's not like they get membership cards or that they can belong to one and only one group.

It sounds a bit like he leads his own offshoot, semi-independent group but with greater or lesser frequency links up with the wider "Al Qaeda" network.

A bit like some local/regional charity organization that gets a lot of grants from the Red Cross. Or whatever.

If so, whether he's "in" Al Qaeda is pretty much semantics. Is the local charity "part of" the Red Cross if 30% of its funding comes from the Red Cross? Maybe not. 70%? Maybe. Where do you draw line? And, who cares?

The point is that people who simultaneously (1) insist on a minimally-drawn definition of "Al Qaeda" AND (2) adhere to a this-war-is-only-against-Al-Qaeda philosophy are seriously misguided and most likely are tailoring their rhetoric mostly for the sake of avoiding wars (US-initiated). You argue against them by arguing against (1) and (2) not by proving that Zarqawi is "in" Al Qaeda, which such a person will never accept if he can at all possibly help it.

I think Blixa hits the point precisely. As some politician said recently, you don't care which crime family a guy is in, you go after him. Why is this anything other than a smokescreen problem for folks who would rather die than fight, and don't want to admit it? I think Dan should spend his considerable talents on pointing out the absurdity of the argument that Blixa has delineated, rather than wasting it on a sideshow.

Peoples' point here that we should go after Zarqawi regardless make sense to me.

As to why Dan spent the time.... Part of the issue is that Zarqawi was in Iraq before the war, pretty obviously with Saddam's blessing, so his connections to al-Qaeda assume a certain level of relevance.

Dan's points about Zarqawi issuing orders that are obeyed by Al-Qaeda members, and helping to kick-start al-Qaeda cells et. al., are pretty persuasive to me. If this stuff is true (the automatic caveat that goes with all intelligence), then Zarqawi is very obviously much more than an affiliate.

Which brings us to the next issue, and that is the importance of the battle of Fallujah in the overall War on Terror. That's Zarqawi's base, and so pressing on to victory there assumes an importance that goes beyond whatever one thinks of Iraq. Zarqawi's presence may also alter U.S. tactics - he's a slippery fish, and they may have to modify their plans in order to lower his odds of getting away.

Dan, fantastic work. Thanks.

Agree with TJ and Blixa.

BTW, Dan, I think you mean "as much of a rival as Zawahiri was."

In any case, I think the best way to think about Zarqawi is as a cannibalizing agent. He clearly collaborates with AQ when it helps him, but he's also competing for funding and recruits at the same time. He's trying to take over, but he needs Bin Laden's money and support during the transition period.

He's more hard-core than Bin Laden in his appetite for random ultra-violence, and he has less rhetorical appeal. I'd say that ultimately, he's less dangerous than Bin Laden because he isn't trying to speak to a broader Muslim audience (in terms of grievances against the West), he's just a pornographer of violence.

pretty obviously with Saddam's blessing

Actually, I think that is far more controversial than Zarqawi's links to Al Qaeda. Notice that the charge that the Ansar al Islam's #2 or #3 guy was Mukhabarat, which I believe came from the Kurds, has been dropped.

praktike--_he's just a pornographer of violence_
Do I need to remind you? Pornography sells.

TJ, Blixa, praktike-- the reason it's important is network theory, performance metrics, and emergent doctrine analysis.

Thank you Dan, awesome analysis. You do realize that you'd be worshipped as a god in the blackworld?

jinn,

Fair enough but anyone willing to take a "network theory" approach to Greater Al Qaeda (unless they were an idiot) would not begin by drawing a minimally-circumscribed definition of Al Qaeda which one is either "in" or "not in", in the first place. In other words, to those people this question is moot (or, silly); they're already sold, they're ready to stipulate that Zarqawi has some nonzero "Al Qaeda coefficient", at most they'd haggle over what it is.

For the record, the purpose of my previous post was not to argue that Dan shouldn't have done this work or made this post. I welcome and respect Dan's efforts on these matters, if only because I'm way too lazy :)

Blixa,
"Fair enough but anyone willing to take a "network theory" approach to Greater Al Qaeda... "
Well, that's part of the New Terrorist War-- we need new paradigms and performance metrics, and it seems Dan's one person doing it, not mired in anachronistic tradional warfare metrics.

Hmmm, perhaps, we can use Fuzzy Subset Theory to calculate membership, and relative memetic distances between individuals-- jus kiddin' :)

TJ, Blixa, praktike-- the reason it's important is network theory, performance metrics, and emergent doctrine analysis.

Well, yeah, but from a "should we kill Zarqawi" perspective, it doesn't matter too much, does it? But yeah, if you want to roll 'em up, this is vital.

I agree with a couple of the above posters - this is useful only for trying to discern the shape of things. Belonging to some other terrorist group is no way to hide.

Which is one of the things John Kerry keeps hammering that is irritating. Osama is N_O_T the whole ball game. Al Queda isn't either.

Do we know where Zarqawi was 2002-March 2003 btw?

Mitch:

There are apparently a lot of different views about who carried out the 1994 Mashhad bombing and why. As far as the Iranians carrying out the bombing themselves, that is one school of thought. As far as why they would do such a thing, I don't even pretend to understand all of the complexities, in-fighting, and considerable overlap between domestic and international politics that goes on in Iran. There's also an entirely legitimate school of thought that the Iranians tried to use Sadr to stir up US action against the Imam Ali Shrine as a means of shoring up domestic legitimacy for the Iranian regime.

T. J. Madison:

I'm unclear on why he's a member of "Al-Qaeda" or not is particularly relevant. If he's a vile murderer, as seems likely, and he's operating in an area controlled by the USG, which, sadly, he seems to be, then a rational USG would try and kill him, right?

It's important and relevant because you need to get an accurate assessment of your enemies and if OIF proved anything it's that having accurate assessments are quite key to how you approach situations.

John Davies:

It's not like they get membership cards or that they can belong to one and only one group.

You're quite correct, which is why a jihadi can be an al-Tawhid, Ansar al-Islam, and al-Qaeda member all simultaneously. The divisions between the groups that make up the International Front are ultimately a matter of semantics.

Blixa:

I agree, but let me augment your points slightly:

1. The strict construction of al-Qaeda as encompassing only those terrorists who are personally sworn to bin Laden would exclude Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the man who masterminded 9/11. Anybody want to seriously argue that we should adopt such an inane standard?

2. I agree completely, which is very likely what I think the people who are leaking these views to the press have in mind. I don't think that they seriously want the US to adhere to a "this-war-is-only-against-Al-Qaeda philosophy" so much as they are attempting to undermine the rationale for the current Iraq conflict.

This doesn't change, however, the fact that Zarqawi is, objectively speaking, an al-Qaeda leader, which is why the US and British governments classified him as such in their pre-war intelligence inquiries. If you want to take issue with that, you can argue with them, not me.

praktike:

In any case, I think the best way to think about Zarqawi is as a cannibalizing agent. He clearly collaborates with AQ when it helps him, but he's also competing for funding and recruits at the same time. He's trying to take over, but he needs Bin Laden's money and support during the transition period.

I don't think we have enough information available to assess that objectively. For example, aside from the 9/11 commission's surface views and a few anecdotes that have come over the years, we really have no idea as to how various al-Qaeda leaders relate to one another or see themselves through the perspective of their larger agenda. If he was really a serious competitor to bin Laden, why wasn't he eliminated in Afghanistan when he had the opportunity to do so?

He's more hard-core than Bin Laden in his appetite for random ultra-violence, and he has less rhetorical appeal. I'd say that ultimately, he's less dangerous than Bin Laden because he isn't trying to speak to a broader Muslim audience (in terms of grievances against the West), he's just a pornographer of violence.

That depends on your definition of "dangerous." The GIA under Antar Zouabri was "less dangerous" to the GSPC under Hassan Hattab during the same period in terms of actually toppling the Algerian government. They were still responsible for thousands of civilian deaths before their threat subsided.

Actually, I think that is far more controversial than Zarqawi's links to Al Qaeda. Notice that the charge that the Ansar al Islam's #2 or #3 guy was Mukhabarat, which I believe came from the Kurds, has been dropped.

Eh? Rohan Gunaratna, who opposed the war and doesn't regard US claims of Iraqi ties to al-Qaeda, is firmly convinced that Abu Wael was a Mukhabarat agent. So are Jonathan Schanzer, Michael Rubin, and Ken Pollack, the first of whom is one of the few counter-terrorism experts to have actually interviewed captured Ansar al-Islam detainees on the subject. They also told him that Zarqawi was an al-Qaeda member, in case anybody's curious. The nature of the dispute is whether or not Abu Wael was a known Mukhabarat agent who acted as the group's liaison with the Iraqi regime or a Mukhabarat agent sent in by Saddam Hussein to take over the group and subvert it for his own nefarious ends.

jinnderella:

Blackworld?

Dan- the reason I brought up Abu Wael is because he wasn't mentioned in any of the reporting on this latest request to Cheney. Maybe, as you say, the discussion about how it doesn't make any sense for Saddam to affiliate himself with an organization that was dedicated to his overthrow gets at the Abu Wael question implicitly.

Praktike:

The reason that Abu Wael wasn't mentioned with respect to the request submitted by Cheney is because, according to both my own understanding of the document and people I've talked to, it zeroes in on the question of Zarqawi rather than Abu Wael. Rumsfeld gave a pretty candid summary of the document while at the CoFR: it goes back and forth on Zarqawi and provides a pro and a con side on whether or not he was involved with the Iraqi regime, but it refrains from drawing any hard conclusions.

To the bureaucrats (though I still maintain this is just a matter of semantics), whether or not Saddam Hussein aided Ansar al-Islam is a separate question to whether or not he aided al-Qaeda.

Like I said, Schanzer, who is the only person I know of who has interviewed Ansar al-Islam detainees on the subject, is pretty firmly convinced that the Abu Wael stuff holds up. So is Gunaratna, who is very highly regarded in the CT field, though as I noted he takes issue with US claims with respect to Iraqi ties to al-Qaeda. But even he doesn't dispute that Abu Wael was a Mukhabarat agent, he just disputes his capacity.

And the SSIC report said that the pre-war data on Abu Wael, which Powell mentioned (though not by name) at his UN speech was screened by all the relevant US intel agencies.

OK, so I read this, but I still don't understand why we wouldn't have heard more about it if it were true.

As for this ... "Colonel Saadan Mahmoud Abdul Latif al-Aani, aka Abu Wael, should be number 56."

... has that happened?

Out of curiousity, where would Gunaratna have gotten his information? He didn't even mention Zarqawi in his book.

Praktike:

I dunno, but then I haven't been in touch with Schanzer or anybody in a position to contact him since August. If that changes, I'll let you know.

As for Gunaratna, yes he does mention Zarqawi in his book on p. 229 as one of the al-Qaeda leaders still at large. He also works very closely with a number of governments, which means he'd be in a pretty good position to know such things.

Dan,

"Anybody want to seriously argue that we should adopt such an inane standard?"

Of course not, but there are plenty who disingenuously advance such an inane standard, at least when they can, even if they do so inconsistently. And by inane standards ("didn't swear oath to OBL" for example) we may end up being forced to admit that, ok, if that's what AQ means, then Zarqawi "isn't in" AQ. What I'm trying to lay the groundwork for is saying, If that's your standard, then who cares?

"This doesn't change, however, the fact that Zarqawi is, objectively speaking, an al-Qaeda leader, which is why the US and British governments classified him as such in their pre-war intelligence inquiries. If you want to take issue with that, you can argue with them, not me."

Oh I don't take issue with that at all. I think what I take issue with is the idea that if there's someone out there with such a strict definition of AQ that Zarqawi doesn't qualify, that this discussion is worth having with that person. Such a person obviously has other priorities besides sincerely learning who's in AQ.

This discussion would be worth having with people who don't have a silly definition of AQ, or who are into that network-analysis approach, etc., but AFAIK all such people already buy Zarqawi-as-AQ anyway in which case this is preaching to the choir.

Best,

Jason Burke in his book about Al Qaeda is adamant that al-Zarqawi is not a leader of Al Qaeda but of a rival group. Most of his arguments however are the same as those that you present as the evidence against him being part of Al Qaeda. So after reading it all i have to conclude that Burke almost certainly is wrong about this. That makes me wonder about his other opinions expressed in his book of course. For example, he writes that the bombings in Madrid are very different in style from that of Al Qaeda and that the group resposible for it has very few links with Al Qaeda. He thinks they were operating autonomously.

>>It's important and relevant because you need to get an accurate assessment of your enemies and if OIF proved anything it's that having accurate assessments are quite key to how you approach situations.

Ok, that makes sense.

We all have to take our thinking up a few notches.

There are dozens of Jihadist groups in the Middle East, North Africa, Southeast Asia, and they're spreading to Europe and South America.

Al Qaeda translates as "the base," and needs to be thought of as such. The enemy is a network of Islamic fundamentalist groups and individuals and it matters not whether they attain formal membership in al Qaeda. Their goal of killing the infidels (us) both at home and abroad is all that matters.

Is Zarqawi a member of al Qaeda? I don't know and I don't care. He is part of the global jihad against the West and that's all we should care about.

Sadly, John Kerry has no clue about this reality and Bush was far from stellar in pouncing on him over this is the debates. I fear that the Bush administration doesn't get it either.

Well this ought to settle two things: Zarqawi pledges allegiance to Bin Laden. He must still be alive.

Why? Such a declaration could be made to rally the forces even if bin Laden is dead.

Am I missing something here?

Occam's Razor?

Understood ... in ordinary circumstances I might agree.

But I'm not sure that, given the thoughtworld of fanatics whose ideology explicitly encourages lying to the kaffir and whipping the faithful into a killing frenzy, the razor shaves in this case.

I haven't a clue whether bin Laden is alive or well, but I personally don't find the website reference very convincing as proof he is.