Winds of Change.NET: Oil Infrastructure: The Next Terror Target?

December 7, 2004

Oil Infrastructure: The Next Terror Target?

by Joe Katzman at December 7, 2004 2:36 AM

Armed Liberal linked to some good articles yesterday. Global Guerillas and even the Christian Science Monitor have run a number of analysis pieces, noting that the recent attacks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia may be preliminary or "shaping" attacks for a more sustained assault on Saudi infrastructure.

As Terror's Next Target explained back in January 2004, there's a lot to recommend this view - and Gal Luft noted that the consequences could be immense:

"...About two-thirds of Saudi Arabia's crude oil is processed in a single enormous facility called Abqaiq, 25 miles inland from the Gulf of Bahrain. On the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia has just two primary oil export terminals: Ras Tanura - the world's largest offshore oil loading facility, through which a tenth of global oil supply flows daily - and Ras al-Ju'aymah. On the Red Sea, a terminal called Yanbu is connected to Abqaiq via the 750-mile East�West pipeline. A terrorist attack on each one of these hubs of the Saudi oil complex or a simultaneous attack on few of them is not a fictional scenario. A single terrorist cell hijacking an airplane in Kuwait or Dubai and crashing it into Abqaiq or Ras Tanura, could turn the complex into an inferno. This could take up to 50% of Saudi oil off the market for at least six months and with it most of the world�s spare capacity, sending oil prices through the ceiling. "Such an attack would be more economically damaging than a dirty nuclear bomb set off in midtown Manhattan or across from the White House in Lafayette Square," wrote former CIA Middle East field officer Robert Baer."

This is especially serious if the oil market is losing its shock absorbers - a critical economic role that the Saudis have traditionally played. Meanwhile, we know that Islamic radicalism retains a strong foothold in Saudi Arabia. We also know that it's hard to protect this kind of infrastructure.

So, why haven't these attacks happened yet?

I'm going to advance a couple of possible reasons. I'll note that even if I'm right, Global Guerillas and Gal Luft's projections may still come to pass. Enemies do not always act fully rationally. They may also choose to risk great loss if the perceived gain is there, or if they are in desperate straits. Nevertheless, if one is prioritizing threats, one needs to understand the forces keeping the current system stable as well. These may include considerations such as...

Bite not the Hand that Feeds Thee

Let's start with the most elementary reason forestalling attacks in Saudi Arabia: self interest.

We know that many wealthy Saudis contribute to Islamic "charities' that are actually fronts for terrorism. We also know that this is an important component of al-Qaeda's financing. Finally, we have reports that the Saudis are not cooperating all that hard to shut down those flows, and/or may be unable to do so in any case given the extent to which their own security apparatus has been penetrated by al-Qaeda.

So, if the money tap is still on, where is it really coming from? It comes from Saudi oil, of course - shut off the spigot, and let the results ripple through the Saudi economy, and many of the millionaires who had been giving money suddenly become a lot more concerned about making their payments on their gold-plated toilets.

Al-Qaeda knows and understands this.

So do the Saudis, of course; indeed, this realization has driven Saudi policy on a number of levels. Unless they're literally in a do-or-die situation with no other viable choice, don't expect full cooperation from the Saudis. Why would they remove their own security blanket, in view of their hideous economic vulnerability? As Dan Darling notes very convincingly, the Saudis' double game will be alive and well for the forseeable future. Gal Luft's chilling scenario is why.

'Blowback' Isn't Just for Americans

The laws of unintended consequences apply to all actors, and all players in the war on terror have constraints that limit their actions.

It may be possible to "shape" the Saudi situation so that attacks on infrastructure are seen as part of a war against the House of Saud, and not an attack on all Saudis. On the other hand, that infrastructure underpins the entire Saudi economy, and miscalculation on al-Qaeda's part could have horrific political consequences.

Right now, al-Qaeda has 3 major strongholds, and possibly 4:

Pakistan's "tribal lands" in the west and north, esp. Waziristan. This area holds many jihadis, but is under greater pressure from the Pakistani government since assassination atempts on Musharraf.
Iran, as Dan Darling has noted here before. Iran is a more secure sanctuary than Pakistan, as the state is friendly. Greater leeway for training and forging coperative links with other global terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah is also possible, and this base is of critical importance to al-Qaeda's efforts in Iraq, which are supported by the Iranian government.
Saudi Arabia. This location doesn't have as many jihadis, but it is a financial and religious centre for al-Qaeda. The old truce under which Saudi Arabia ignored al-Qaeda and they left Saudi Arabia off the target list has frayed, but it is not wholly broken. Calls to Saudi Arabia from Beslan and other incidents suggest that Saudi Arabia may remain an important command center. Most important of all, it is the centre of gravity for Wahhabi ideology and its promotion abroad.
Chechnya may be a fourth hub for al-Qaeda, as it seeks to extend its influence in the oil-rich Central Asia region via a pan-regional Islamic front.

Iran is a state sponsor, but a potentially fickle one. Counting on them over the long term is unwise. al-Qaeda's base in Pakistan is under pressure, but they will proably be able to resist successfully as long as the madrassas keep churning out tribal jihadis as guardians and cover. Chechnya is largely its own war, and though Central Asian al-Qaeda are found elsewhere (Chechens & Uzbeks in Pakistan, for instance) the vast Russian front means that the Chechens are not being used as external al-Qaeda shock troops to the extent we've seen from, say, the Algerian GSPC et. al.

Now...

Who financies many of those Pakistani madrassas, and makes Islamism an economically viable lifestyle and career choice there? Whose money has helped to spread Wahabbi Islamism to countries in SE Asia like Indonesia, Malaysia, et. al., and thereby created a base for terrorist recruitment? Whose money pays for many of the Islamist front organizations in the west like the AMC, MSA, et. al.? Where does the Chechen money trail lead (other than to the Chechen mafia)?

What happens if you take away that religious and monetary underpinning, by essentially declaring Total War on the Saudi state and causing it to rethink its alliance with Wahabbism as a matter of necessity?

The result isn't just disaster on the Saudi front - it's disaster on a number of fronts, as al-Qaeda's engine of terror and hate begins to sputter for lack of fuel. If Saudi Arabia turns off the money and ideology tap in retaliation, even a takeover of the country and al-Qaeda 'victory' just leaves the oil system open to attacks from the Americans - and risks a massive humanitarian disaster as the foreigners who actually run most of the key infrastructure leave. Either way, the money tap remains firmly off and global promotion of al-Qaeda's ideology takes a huge hit. Opium production and other illicit activities won't make up that shortfall.

Taking actions that may unite large portions of Saudi society against al-Qaeda in a perceived life or death struggle is not something al-Qaeda will undertake flippantly. It's possible in scenarios like a breakdown of command & control that somehow leaves a very capable local cell entirely on its own with abundant resources; or a situation in which al-Qaeda is so desperate for relevance that it will undertake any risk; or a situation where it feels its only viable strategic option is to open an additional front via a Saudi Civil War.

There may be other viable scenarios... but they are not mainstream cases for a functioning al-Qaeda organization. Not yet.

Security Still Matters

Finally, there is security. Protecting pipelines is close to a hopeless task, though there have been some recent advances. Refineries and shipping points, on the other hand, are easier to protect against catastrophe. Strong perimiter guards backed by sophisticated sensors, missiles with shoot to kill orders, etc. are all viable options. Al-Qaeda's Saudi operations have shown that they can mount coordinated attacks involving a number of people, but not against heavily-defended targets.

As long as failure is a real possibility, al-Qaeda has to consider a worst-case scenario in which a failed attack creates most of the blowback effects, but none of the benefits. This complicates their planning.

Conclusion

Taken together, I believe that these considerations make a serious infrastructure attack of the kind described by Gal Luft and Global Guerillas unlikely. Too many complications, too few good options.

Al-Qaeda is strongly engaged in Iraq, somewhat engaged in Chechnya, suffering reversals in Algeria, and facing mixed results in SE Asia (Dan Darling adds a few more quick updates). That will be more than enough to keep them busy, without opening a Saudi front that has the potential to collapse several of their global foundations at once.

With that said, Global Guerillas and Gal Luft are on to something.

If you want to look at a troubling scenario, take out a map and look at Russia's pipeline infrastructure, which also serves much of Central Asia. It too is highly optimized and lacks reserve capacity - indeed, lack of pipeline capacity is already an economic issue for oil companies operating there. It's incredible length is almost impossible to protect, and cutting in in certain places would seriously lower its output sharply.

For al-Qaeda's pan-Islamist front in Chechnya, curbing Russian oil production would simply weaken a key enemy, crippling its economy and thus raising the cost of fighting the Chechen insurgency by several orders of magnitude. This creates no economic risks for al-Qaeda; indeed, the resulting jump in oil prices would be very positive for their Saudi and Arab financiers. The situation would also create issues for the USA, by forcing it to become involved in a diplomatically difficult game involving a major, nuclear armed power who may not appreciate American involvement.

Other than triggering a likely genocide against the Chechens - which is a big propaganda plus from al-Qaeda's point of view - there are no downsides here.

Which is why, if you want to contemplate infrastructure attacks that would make the world take notice, lift your eyes from Saudi Arabia. And look north.

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"Oil Infrastructure: The Next Terror Target?"

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Comments

#1 from Dan Darling at 3:20 am on Dec 07, 2004

LOL, I'm in the process of typing something up on the topic. Give me a couple hours and I'll have something on that front ;)

#2 from praktike at 3:20 am on Dec 07, 2004

Note sure about Iran, but I'll give you a few more strongholds to ponder: Iraq, the Horn of Africa, the Niger delta, Algeria, the Fergana Valley, the Pamirs, Baluchistan, Kashmir, the Yemeni border regions with Saudi Arabia, parts of Qatar, Xinjiang, Quetta, Peshawar, Dubai.

#3 from jinnderella at 3:43 am on Dec 07, 2004

Joe, that is a great analysis-- and I agree that the Saudi/Al Qaeda symbiotic relationship is tricky to maintain as a stable system. That is why al Muqrin had to go. I think he was hung out to dry for excessive zeal.
Al Qaeda does bite the hand, but must be careful not to take too much blood.

#4 from Joe Katzman at 3:49 am on Dec 07, 2004

Praktike,

Not referring to strongholds, but to critical central hubs that would have major global effects on AQ if removed.

Quetta and Peshawar are part of one, Baluchistan may or may not be, and Kashmir is a theater of action for the NW Pakistan hub.

Yemeni area may effectively be part of the Saudi hub.

Others not critical in a global sense to AQ.

Algeria may once have been a hub like this, esp. WRT Europe, but doesn't seem to be as big a deal any more owing to losses and close pursuit. Dan?

#5 from John at 4:45 am on Dec 07, 2004

I'll go along with your putting Yemen "in the Saudi hub", sort of. Yemen is a fairly large country, with a lot of chaotic stuff going on, for a variety of reasons. But UBLs family did originate in Hadramaut (in SE Yemen), and the Yemeni-Saudi border area is pretty much the realm of bandits of many stripes.

I'll differ, though, with your analysis concerning not shutting off the oil for reasons of self-interest. The Saudis have close to $1 Trillion invested around the world. That money already exists and is not dependant upon future oil flows. If even 1% of that money were to be donated, AQ would have more money than it's ever had before.

Shutting off the oil flow isn't going to hurt the Al-Saud, nor is it going to hurt the middle class very much. But the economic impact will assuredly affect the lower-class fundamentalists who make up the majority of Saudi citizens, as well as the moral support for AQ.

If the goal were simply to punish the country, there are easier ways: the entire water supply for Riyadh (excepting a few deep wells) comes through three, above-group pipes from the desalinization plants in the Eastern Province. Were those to go, Riyadh would be a ghost town within three days. That wouldn't cripple the country, but it would surely cause enormous damage to Al-Sauds as protectors of society.

But the cost to the demographic that AQ needs would still be very high. Probably too high.

#6 from Brian H at 7:24 am on Dec 07, 2004

Another economic(s) factor to be taken into account is the supply/demand price curve. As supply drops, price rises, and the net profit of the suppliers is not hurt as much as the volume drop might suggest. Of course, the other suppliers would have a much greater windfall, but the Saudis wouldn't lose anything like half their net income if they lost half their output.

#7 from lewy14 at 10:55 am on Dec 07, 2004

Joe,

You make a good case as to why OBL et al will refrain from shutting down the source of their gravy train.

Such a good case, in fact, that it begs the question: how can anything approaching �Victory� over the Islamists be achieved unless we ourselves shut down this gravy train? As long as control over those items of critical infrastructure which you enumerate remains with those who fund the terrorists, how much progress can really be made? And how can we effect this removal without destroying the prosperity (and hence the security) of this country but the entire world?

As long as we now have Kevin Drum�s kind permission to discuss oil as a strategic and legitimate interest, perhaps we should be collectively exploring the ramifications of this dilemma�

#8 from Joe Katzman at 8:42 pm on Dec 07, 2004

Lewy - short answer to your question: we can't. To win the war, Islamists need to be separated from the revenue that funds their activities.

Wahabbism without oil revenues = the Amish of the Islamic world.

The question is how to separate them from those revenues, and when. For the reasons above, we know the Saudis will not cooperate fully unless al-Qaeda raises the stakes so high that there's nothing to lose. Which would pretty much have to mean that the stakes were the lives of most of the ruling class (dead at home, or a near-certainty of assassination in exile) and the imminent ruin and/or lives of large sections of the population - and there was, somehow, no longer any possible way to deny this.

On the other hand, invading and occupying the oil fields creates a large backlash of its own. Threatening the ruling classes of every Arab state directly isn't something one does unless one is prepared to take them all on. And you'd also be handing them the Mecca/Medina thing as a rallying cry.

So it's not practical in the near or even medium term unless, again, events force this course as somhow a "least bad" outcome. Like, say, and al-Qaedist takeover of Saudi Arabia. Even then, it's probably strategically better to destroy the oil distribution infrastructure rather than occupy it.

So, what to do? Try to make slow progress, while setting the stage for faster progress and action later and keeping some contingency plans ready to go. I'd:

Concentrate on other Islamist states that are closer to gaining nuclear capability, or pursuing WMD capability and have a history or stated intent to use it. They're an immediate problem, the Saudis a long term one.

Pull any military forces out of the Kingdom (done), and rebase them in an arc that surrounds Saudi Arabia (done). Just in case.

Accept the reality of limited cooperation from the Saudis, but never like it. Thank them, but don't whitewash for them any more and call a spade a spade. Think tanks, op-ed columnists, and bloggers are good for getting that latter message out, as they're unencumbered by diplomatic constraints.

We've also got to address the quasi-corruption among government officials and diplomats. Prince Bandar's "pay them tomorrow for support today" program needs to have a big wrench thrown in it. Maybe two.

Push for internal reforms that weaken the power of the religious establishment, or add democratic constraints. This will give us a chance of a better outcome that happens peacefully.

Along those lines, do what we can to intensify the Saudi Shi'ites' sense that they shouldn't be second class citizens (a democracy in formerly Sunni-dominated Iraq with Shi'ites as the power figures ought to help). There are a lot of Shi'ites on the oil-producing east coast. If it comes to that, a secessionist movement among them could prove very handy.

Prepare for a long goodbye, al-Saud style.

And if we need to send a much stronger message at any time, we send them our most serious warning: Ambassador O.J.

#9 from mary at 3:14 am on Dec 08, 2004

Concentrate on other Islamist states that are closer to gaining nuclear capability, or pursuing WMD capability and have a history or stated intent to use it. They're an immediate problem, the Saudis a long term one.

Influenced by Saudi extremism, the Sudanese government and their determination to force the population to live under Islamic law has resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths. Saudi-sponsored Islamist terrorists around the world are slaughtering innocent people every day.

In Rwanda, we saw how the spread of hate could cause the deaths of hundreds of thousands. Saudi-sponsored hate is their WMD, and it�s already killed more people than any nuclear weapon.

Wahabbism without oil revenues = the Amish of the Islamic world

That's true (although the violent Wahhabi cult is more like the Jim Jones group). Many Muslims have contempt for puritanical Wahhabi beliefs. The only respect Saudis get is the respect they buy. Al Qaeda isn't the only Muslim group that hates the House of Saud.

Our continued 'alliance' with the Wahhabis alienates potential moderate allies, who dream of liberating Mecca and Medina from Saudi rule.

Like Europe during WWII, a fascist movement is growing in the Middle East. Like Germany, the KSA isn't the only source of the problem, but it is the largest. Although some Europeans saw fascism as a means of gaining power, they were willing to abandon it when they saw that it was losing the war.

Our reluctance to confront our Saudi allies shows the Islamic world that the Wahhabis are the 'strong horse' in the Middle East. We can't maintain this alliance and win the war against terror.

#10 from Joe Katzman at 3:36 am on Dec 08, 2004

OK Mary, I get your concern. But I've laid out the constraints for all 3 key players in this little pavane - the Saudis, al-Qaeda, and America.

You're in charge in America. What's your proposed solution?

#11 from mary at 3:50 pm on Dec 08, 2004

Joe - Glad you asked - I wrote a version of this before the Iraq war began. Sadly enough, I really thought that this was our 'real' plan to fight terrorism in the Middle East. I couldn't believe that Saddam was the only target.

...

I wouldn�t support a unilateral invasion of SA. Since Saudi-funded paramilitaries currently threaten most of the non-Wahhabi world, we should be working on building up alliances to fight them.

We could begin to build alliances by being honest about what we�re fighting. Then, we should start another 9/11 investigation, this time to look into the real causes of the attacks � the international alliances that make up al Qaeda. It would be a short investigation, because we already know about the Saudi/Iranian alliance, and Saudi funding of terror. Just before the results of the investigation are publicized, Saudi assets in the US should be frozen.

SA has a weak army. The only allies they have are the ones they�ve bought. They, like other terror supporting states (Iran, Syria) are vulnerable that way. Their official military forces are pathetic. They hope that we�ll attack them one at a time so they can follow their usual strategy of bogging us down in individual, long, insurgency-plagued occupations. If we could gather the allies, we�d have to remove the Islamist threat the way you�d remove a hornet�s nest � all at once.

If we froze Saudi assets in the US and elsewhere, confined attacks to the Saudi government, not the holy places (Mecca, Medina) and allowed all allies to share the oil wealth, we could build a force that was strong enough to act quickly against a weakened target.

If we gave Israel a chance to take potshots at the (hopefully not yet developed) Iranian nuclear reactor, and Syria (where Baathist and other insurgents are currently hiding), at the same time, and if we could encourage Europe to crack down on their known terrorist cells, also at the same time, we could reduce the possibility of terrorist response.

The media tells us that 'radical Islam' has supporters among the Muslim population. Right now, we allow bin Laden and Islamist states to appear to be powerful. Like the European fascists before WWII, they use this to extort support through violence and the promise of giving power to Muslims that they couldn't achieve through democracy. When the Islamists come under an effective attack, they can expect as much popular support as Saddam received.

There are some hardcore paramilitaries who would fight with al Qaeda and there are a lot of leftist/Islamist paramilitaries based in Europe. They�re at war with us now, and they will be at war with us if we attack their state support.

We�re already fighting them, and our current combination of soft diplomacy and urban guerrilla street fighting is a very losing strategy. There is no reason to sacrifice so many innocent lives in the vague hope that we can pressure them to change.

They don�t hate us for our freedoms and they don�t hate us for our foreign policy. They hate us because, like the Thousand Year Reich, they believe that they have the philosophy and the money that will allow them to dominate the Middle East, and maybe the world. We�re in their way. It�s war and we need to fight it.

#12 from Mike at 10:43 am on Dec 22, 2007

please let me know if anyone hears about more sabotage like this & in the US.
Thanks
Mike