Recent Gulf Terrorism in Perspective, Part 2: Egypt and Oman

Having discussed Terrorism in Kuwait in yesterday's series, today's segment will focus on recent terrorist-related activities in Oman and Egypt. While not part of the Gulf region, any terrorist-related activities that occur in Egypt must be watched with great interest given the nation's importance as the center of Arab culture and the home of a significant number of bin Laden's senior lieutenants over the course of the last decade.

Backgrounder: Al-Qaeda in Egypt

This backgrounder is exceedingly incomplete, as Islamist-related violence has been taking place in Egypt ever since the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981.

• Bin Laden created the nucleus of his initial terrorist coalition by merging two major Egyptian terrorist groups with his own, first establishing operational cooperation between al-Gamaa al-Islamiyyah and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in 1989 when the Egyptians assisted him in taking control of the Afghan Arab infrastructure in both South Asia and overseas. It is believed that bin Laden first explained his "America first" strategy to Ayman al-Zawahiri and his brother Mohammed during the late 1980s in Afghanistan and the early 1990s in Sudan. Some members of al-Zawahiri's faction objected at the idea of shifting their focus from Egypt to the US, but al-Zawahiri ultimately prevailed.

• Both Egyptian groups were formed in the late 1970s in opposition to President Anwar Sadat.

• With Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman in prison in the United States, al-Gamaa al-Islamiyyah's leadership is made up of Rifa Ahmed Taha and his lieutenants Abdelaker Hammad, Mohammed Shawki al-Islambouli, Mustafa Hamza, and Osama Rushdi. Ever since the incarceration of the Blind Sheikh, bin Laden has cared for his children and promoted them to senior positions in his organization for symbolic effect, gaining him a great deal of prestige among Rifa Ahmed Taha, Mohammed al-Islambouli, and Mustafa Hamza.

• The Egyptian Islamic Jihad is led by Ayman al-Zawahiri outside of Egypt, while Abdul al-Zumar commands those in prison.

• Al-Zawahiri's faction of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad is known as Talaa al-Fatah - the Vanguards of Conquest.

• Both Egyptian groups initially saw their merger with al-Qaeda as a union of convenience towards achieving their long-term goals of Islamist revolution in Egypt but later had their local objectives submerged by bin Laden's ideology of global jihad.

• Pre-9/11, Egyptians held up 60% of al-Qaeda's senior leadership positions.

• Egypt is the main pivot for the spread of Wahhabism and Salafism in the Middle East world due to the influence of its popular culture on the rest of the region and the three fathers of modern Salafism are all Egyptian.

• Because of their secretive nature, neither Egyptian Islamist group refers to itself by name, instead adopting other terms like Takfir wal Hijra, the Islamic Liberation Group, al-Najun min al-Na'ar, etc.

• The merger with the Egyptian terrorists brought al-Qaeda years of experience in terrorist operations and greatly enhanced the power of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.

• Constant feuding and in-fighting between the two Egyptian groups is the primary reason that they have been unsuccessful in achieving their goals of assassinating President Hosni Mubarak and other senior Egyptian government officials. Bin Laden's efforts at easing these divisions were hampered by the death of his military chief, Abu Ubeidah, who had been his primary agent towards promoting reconciliation between the two groups. Gamaa al-Islamiyyah, for example, still refuses to accept Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman as its spiritual leader on account of his blindness and has long believed that al-Zawahiri wields two much influence over bin Laden. As al-Gamaa is the larger of two Egyptian groups and has suffered less losses to the Egyptian government in recent years, it has been the most reluctant to align itself with bin Laden. Nevertheless, Gamaa al-Islamiyyah's external leadership did heed bin Laden's 1998 call to arms against the United States, if for no other reason than because it moderated their need to address the growing internal debate over the legitimacy of carrying out attacks inside of Egypt.

• From 1992 to his death in 1994, Gamaa al-Islamiyyah leader Anwar Shaban received financing from bin Laden to set up terrorist training camps in Bosnia to train prospective jihadis to fight the Serbs and their allied paramilitary groups. All of Shaban's jihadi recruits received 1,000 Saudi riyals as pocket money.

• While the Egyptian Islamic Jihad has been heavily damaged by the mass incarceration of its members by Egyptian authorities (over 8,000 members were arrested during the 1980s), the group nevertheless attempted to assassinate Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi and Prime Minister Atef Sedky. It is also believed to have murdered author Faraj Fodah, who supported the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, in June 1992.

• An al-Qaeda hit squad backed by the Sudanese government attempted to assassinate President Mubarak’s motorcade in Addis Ababa in June 1995, but he managed to escape unharmed. The attack, known within al-Qaeda as the Egyptian Operation, was planned by Gamaa al-Islamiyyah leaders Abu Ubeidah al-Banshiri and Abu Yassir. Ibrahim Ahmed Mohammed travelled to Ethiopia twice during the planning phase of the attack and al-Qaeda took care of finances and security for the assassination squad’s leader Mustafa Hamza, himself a senior employee of bin Laden’s Wadi al-Aqiq company in Sudan.

• In September 1995, Gamaa al-Islamiyyah carried out a car bomb attack near the Crotian police headquarters in Rijeka, killing 1 and wounding dozens. The attack was intended as retaliation for the September 1994 arrest and extradition of Egyptian Gamaa leader Talat Fuad Kassem, whose status within the al-Qaeda leadership was comparable to Ayman al-Zawahiri.

• To placate the concerns of the Egyptian groups, al-Qaeda has launched a number attacks against the Egyptian government including the June 1995 assassination attempt on Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia and November 1995 suicide car bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad, the killing of 58 foreign tourists in the Luxor Massacre in 1997, and the ongoing attacks on Coptic Christians in the Minya, Assiut, and Sohag governorates.

• Following the assassination attempt on President Mubarak, international pressure began to grow on Sudan to expel bin Laden, followed by upscaled US military assistance to Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia when the Sudanese government was unwilling to bow under pressure.

• Rifa Ahmed Taha held one of the most secretive positions within al-Qaeda prior to his 2001 incarceration - it is his duty to oversee the completion of the global jihad in the event that bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are killed.

• Egyptian Islamic Jihad member Ahmed Ibrahim al-Najjar has told Egyptian authorities under torture and in court that bin Laden had begun research on chemical and biological weapons, purchasing germ and biological substances that could be made into weapons at low cost, including E. Coli and salmonella. For example, a Czech firm was willing to provide al-Qaeda with botulinum at $7,500 a sample.

• 94 Gamaa al-Islamiyyah operatives were arrested inside Egypt in November 2001. Their cell, al-Waad, had planned to assassinate public figures as well as carry out bombings and sabotage public facilities. The group had also sent funding and weaponry to Chechnya, according to Egyptian court documents.

• Mohammed Najeh, the intelligence chief of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, was arrested in Pakistan fleeing Afghanistan and extradicted to Egyt in March 2002.

• 54 Hizb-ut-Tahrir members, including 4 Britons, were arrested in a crackdown in Cairo, Giza, and Alexandria in April 2002. According to the Egyptian court documents, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir members all had ties to al-Qaeda.

• In an effort to defuse domestic Islamist sentiments, in June 2002 Egypt rearrested Salah Hashem, a founding Gamaa al-Islamiyyah member who broke with the group over the decision to assassinate with Anwar Sadat. For the better part of the next two years, Hashem served as the representative of the Egyptian authorities in negotiating a formalized agreement with the domestic wing of Gamaa al-Islamiyyah.

• The first fruits of the Egyptian government's efforts came in April 2003, when Gamaa al-Islamiyyah’s jailed leadership issued a statement urging Islamists not align with al-Qaeda.

• Extremely indicative of the new tone was Gamaa al-Islamiyyah leader Karam Zuhdi’s declaration that Anwar Sadat was a martyr to al-Sharq al-Awsat in July 2003.

• In return for Zuhdi and other former Gamaa al-Islamiyyah leaders’ renunciations of violence, Egyptian authorities released nearly 1,000 members of the organization from prison. Yassir al-Sirri and Hani al-Sebai of the group’s external wing, however, labeled the move a sell-out.
  In an effort to sabotage the reconciliation efforts between Zuhdi and the Egyptian government, hardline members of Gamaa al-Islamiyyah attempted to assassinate Gamal Mubarak along the Cairo-Alexandria highway.

• With the publication of Tafgirat al-Riyadh (the Riyadh bombings) and Nahr al-Zikiriyat (River of Memories), Zuhdi and the other Gamaa al-Islamiyyah leaders attempted to reason with any remaining hardliners on the need to renounce violence.

• Jose Padilla is believed to have served as al-Zawahiri’s representative at a meeting of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad underground in Egypt in March 2002 under the name Abdullah al-Muhajir, but was expelled by the Egyptian authorities after they became suspicious of his activities.

• Montasser al-Zayat, al-Zawahiri’s former Egyptian lawyer, halted plans to expand the printing of his book, Ayman al-Zawahiri, As I Knew Him after receiving death threats from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad underground.

• Saif al-Wahid, the son of al-Qaeda leader Saif al-Adel, was tortured to death by Egyptian authorities in November 2002. Al-Wahid was captured in Afghanistan, where he served as a military commander within Brigade 055, and extradicted to Egypt along with his mother and sister, who are still in Egyptian custody.

• In January 2003, Egyptian authorities arrested 43 members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad who were planning attacks on the United States and Israeli embassies intended to coincide with the start of a war in Iraq.

• On April 8, 2003, an Egyptian military unit angered over Egypt's support for the war in Iraq briefly attempted to seize the Palace of the Republic and force Mubarak to resign before being ruthlessly suppressed by the Egyptian Republican Guards and all evidence of the attempted coup suppressed. Al-Qaeda involvement in this coup attempt should not at all be ruled out.

• In December 2003, Egyptian authorities arrested 5 Russian students at al-Azhar Islamic University for involvement with the Chechen and Dagestani Islamists led by Abu Walid al-Ghamdi.

• In an effort to prevent al-Qaeda from launching attacks on Egypt in February 2004, the Egyptian government opted to retry Ayman al-Zawahiri’s brother Mohammed.

• During the Pakistani military operations in Waziristan in April 2004, Egyptian authorities arrested the children of Egyptian Islamic Jihad members Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, Murgan Salem, and Midhat Mursi to deter the organization from launching retaliatory attacks in the event that al-Zawahiri were killed.

Why I think al-Qaeda was the culprit of the Taba bombings

I should note before I begin that there is a difference of opinions among analysts as to who exactly was responsible for the Taba resort bombings, with some analysts pointing to al-Qaeda and others to the Palestinian groups as the possible culprits in the resort bombings. I am fairly certain, for example, that myself and fellow WoC contributor Colt are going to disagree on this one, so readers can see where our analysis diverges and come to their own conclusions.

The primary reason why I tend to lean in the direction of al-Qaeda as being the ones responsible for the Taba attacks are as follows:

1. The main claims of responsibility that have come in thus far for the attacks are all terms that one would associate with al-Qaeda: International Islamic Front, Jamaa al-Islamiyyah al-Alamiyyah (World Islamic Group), the Brigades of the Martyr Abdullah Azzam (bin Laden's mentor), Jaish Mohammed - Military Wing of the Palestinian Resistance, and the al-Tawhid Islamic Brigades. While this is by no means definitive as Jaish Mohammed and Abdullah Azzam could easily be pseudonyms for Hamas, within which Azzam is well-regarded, the most credible claims (al-Tawhid) thus far appear to lean in al-Qaeda's direction in my opinion.

2. While Egyptian authorities appear to be denying any ties to Palestinian or international terrorist groups and in some cases blaming the United States or Israel for the bombings, senior Israeli government figures have identified the Brigades of the Martyr Abdullah Azzam as being part of al-Qaeda's global network of terrorist cells.(1)

3. Only one member of the cell that masterminded the Taba attacks, Ayad Said Salah, has been identified as being a Palestinian national - all of the other suspects are Egyptian.(2) While there are Palestinians who have known to have been trained by al-Qaeda, no Palestinian terrorist group has ever utilized non-Egyptians in an operational capacity before. The statement by the Egyptian government did identify Salah as a "religious fanatic" with ties to terrorist groups active in the Gaza Strip, but it should be noted that al-Qaeda itself is known to be active in Gaza.(3, 4)

4. The Egyptian government has a vested interest, both due to its efforts to establish and maintain a truce with Gamaa al-Islamiyyah as well as its entirely realistic concerns regarding the tourist trade, not to want to create the perception that the domestic violence of the 1990s is returning, hence the government's decision to detain as many as 3,000 in the wake of the bombings in order to thwart any further attacks that may have been planned in the Sinai.(5)

5. One of the reasons that the Palestinian groups like Hamas or Islamic Jihad have been able to maintain "good press" in the Arab world and convince Arab governments to allow their infrastructure to operate unhindered has to do with the fact that for all their bombastic rhetoric, Hamas and its sister organizations have made a very deliberate strategic decision to maintain their focus on carrying out attacks on Israel and in the Palestinian territories. To carry out an attack in Egypt against the tourist industry (!) would almost certainly result in the Egyptian government cracking down on the flow of illegal weapons into the Gaza Strip as soon as it was determined that a Palestinian group had chosen to carry out attacks inside of Egypt - a consequence that, from the perspective of Hamas's Gaza and Syrian leadership, would not be worth the potential propaganda and fundraising gains from staging a major operation outside of Egypt.

Egypt Status Update

While the initial Israeli and Egyptian investigations into the Taba bombings were hindered by slow evidence and the fact that many of perpetrators fled the scene on foot, in recent weeks Egyptian authorities appear to have begun making a breakthrough in arresting the key culprits.(6) The first signs of this breakthrough occurred in late October 2004 when the Egyptian Interior Ministry announced that through the arrest and interrogation of 5 suspected Egyptian terrorists it had been learned that Palestinian Ayad Said Salah and Egyptian Suleiman Ahmed Saleh Fulayfel were perpetrators of the attacks who were killed during the course of the bombings and had ties to an unidentified "Islamic group" in the Gaza Strip.(7) The Interior Ministry further stated that Salah, believed to be one of the masterminds behind the attack, had a criminal past in the Gaza Strip that included a rape conviction but had turned to religious fanaticism in reaction to the deteriorating situation the Palestinian territories.(8) All 5 Egyptians arrested in the attacks were believed to fairly low-level players, however: Mohammed Ahmed Suweirky was a dealer in stolen cars, Ihab Mahmoud Eid Mosbah was one of his henchmen, Hamdan Salameh Salem al-Ahmar provided the attackers with detailed information on the tourist camp sites, Mohammed Gaiz Sabah Hussein worked in the Central Sinai Irrigation Department and provided explosives and timers to the attackers, while Mohammed Abdullah Raba Abdullah owned a metal workshop in El-Arish where the car bombs were made.(9) These 5 arrests, however, were all the progress that Egyptian authorities were able to make in the investigation until the beginning of this month.

Following a reaffirmation from the Sinai Bedouin tribesmen to assist the Egyptian government in the investigation in December, leading to a clash at Ras Sudr that killed 3 Egyptian policemen, suspect Mohammed Abdel Rahman Badawi, and a bystander.(10, 11) Another recent clash in Ras Sudr between Egyptian security forces and nearly 100 Bedouin believed to be harboring suspects Mohammed Ahmed Saleh Fulayfel and Hammad Gumaa left both suspects, one police officer, and an unidentified number of Bedouin dead, with three police officers wounded.(12, 13) Bullet casings, automatic weapons, and hand grenades were reportedly found on the suspects' bodies.(14) This is unfortunate, as it will likely make it more difficult for investigators to definitively discover the affiliation of the Taba bombers.

Ultimately, the open source information on the Taba bombings remains extremely scarce, likely due in no small part to the desires of the Egyptian government. Until more information becomes available however, the debate over Taba is unlikely to decrease over time.

Oman Backgrounder

Note: Oman has largely been spared by the ravages of Islamic extremism over the course of the last decade as a result of the country's religious demographics. A majority of Omanis are Ibadis or followers of Abdallah ibn Ibad and as the Library of Congress country study on Oman explains:

Ibadism is an outgrowth of the Kharijite movement, a variant form of Islam practiced by descendants of a sect that seceded from the principal Muslim body after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in A.D. 632. Kharijites reject primogeniture succession of the Quraysh, the tribe of Muhammad, and assert that leadership of Islam, the caliphate, should be designated by an imam (see Glossary) elected by the community from candidates who possess spiritual and personal qualities. Ibadi leadership is vested in an imam, who is regarded as the sole legitimate leader and combines religious and political authority. The imam is elected by a council of prominent laymen or shaykhs. Adherence to Ibadism accounts in part for Oman's historical isolation. Considered a heretical form of Islam by the majority Sunni Muslims, Ibadis were not inclined to integrate with their neighbors.

Ironically, that historical oversight appears to have been a blessing in disguise over the last 20 years. However, Oman does have a 25% Sunni population based in Sur and the area in and around Dhofar that could presumably serve as recruiting grounds for al-Qaeda and like-minded Sunni Islamist groups.

• The 9/11 commission report stated that members of bin Laden's Islamic Army Shura (the initial ruling council of the International Islamic Front prior to the 1998 reorganization) included members of Omani Islamist groups.

• Hambali ordered Kuwaiti Canadian al-Qaeda member Mohammed Mansour Jabarah to travel from Bangkok to Oman in order to enter Saudi Arabia and meet up with the al-Qaeda leadership there. In March 2002, Jabarah traveled to Oman where he was arrested and handed over to Canadian authorities.

Oman Status Update

While the details of the Omani arrests are still extremely vague, what is known is that prior to the Eid al-Adha festival up to 300 arrests were made against unspecified "terrorists" who were said to be planning attacks in Muscat during the festival celebrations.(15) Among those arrested were said to be a number of senior political and military officials, suggesting that a coup rather than a terrorist attack may have been in the works.(16) While no explanation or even acknowledgement of the arrests has been provided by the government, media reports have cited security forces as claiming that the arrests were triggered by an arms shipment from neighboring Yemen and that an organized group was broken up as a result of the detentions.(17, 18)

Thus far, the only thing resembling an explanation for the mass arrests has been provided by Middle East Newsline which, quoting Omani officials, claims that those arrested were Pakistani and South Asian Muslims who had entered Oman from Iran.(19) While most of those entering Oman through Iran were seeking employment in the Gulf, a number are believed to be criminals or Islamic insurgents.(20) If true, this would seem to further confirm statements by US officials that Iran remains a transit point for Islamic extremists but it would seem to contradict earlier statements that the arrested included prominent politicians and military officials. One possibility is that attacks were being plotted by members of the political-military establishment and that Pakistani and South Asian extremists may have been brought in from outside to serve as a "muscle" for a possible terrorist attack or coup in the Sultanate.

Conclusion

There remains a great deal that needs to be understood about both the Taba bombings and the Omani arrests, neither of which can be definitively tied back to al-Qaeda at this stage. More information needs to be released by Oman, Egypt, Israel, or the US in order to get a better perspective of what is now taking place, harkening back to President Bush's initial statements on the war on terrorism that its battles would be "seen and unseen."

Endnotes:

1. Bushinsky, Jay, "Al Qaeda presses toward Israel," Washington Times, December 14, 2004.
2. "Egypt announces arrests of Sinai bombers," Jerusalem Post, October 26, 2004.
3. ibid.
4. Gunaratna, Rohan, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, Columbia University Press, New York, 2002, pp. 150-151
5. "Egypt detaining 3,000 over Red Sea resort bombings," Financial Times, December 1, 2004.
6. Wilson, Scott and Moore, Molly, "Egypt Inquiry Slowed by Lack of Evidence," Washington Post, October 23, 2004.
7. "Egypt announces terror arrests," Daily Telegraph, October 25, 2004.
8. ibid.
9. "Egypt announces arrests of Sinai bombers," Jerusalem Post, October 26, 2004.
10. "Sinai tribes make security pledge," Reuters, December 20, 2004.
11. "5 killed in battle with Egypt bomb suspects," Reuters, February 2, 2005.
12. "Four Egyptian police wounded in Sinai gunbattle," Arab Times, February 5, 2005.
13. "Two Sinai Bomb Suspects Killed in Gun Battle," Al-Jazeera, February 6, 2005.
14. ibid.
15. "Hundreds reportedly rounded up in Oman," United Press International, January 26, 2005.
16. ibid.
17. "More than 100 held in Oman security crackdown," Middle East Online, January 27, 2005.
18. "Oman arrests 300 suspects, seizes arms: report," AFP, January 26, 2005.
19. "Oman flooded by infiltrators from Iran," Middle East Newsline, January 30, 2005.
20. ibid.