First, to Bergner ...

While I don't agree with his conclusions, I do think that his analysis of European-Iranian relations is right on the money.

DURING HIS RECENT TRIP TO Europe, President Bush sent mixed signals about U.S. policy with regard to Iran's development of nuclear weapons. At one point he dismissed the prospect of military action as ridiculous; immediately after, he emphasized all options were on the table; then at another point he suggested there might be "convergence" between U.S. and European views on how to address the problem. If the president seemed to be all over the lot, that may be because the policy choices with respect to Iran are complex, and none is without its drawbacks.

That's true, but it's also true that most of Bush's message was pretty consistent if one looks at his rather "nuanced" view of the situation. What he dismissed when he was in Europe was the apparently widespread belief among the EU chattering classes that the US is just waiting for an excuse to go after Iran militarily. We aren't and no serious figure in the US is calling for the sacking Tehran anytime soon because of the inherent difficulties of such a military venture. That said, we are currently faced with the rather unfortunate situation in that Iran has chosen to harbor the surviving al-Qaeda leadership, provide significant logistical and operational assistance to elements of the Iraqi insurgency, and is believed by everyone, the Europeans included, to be developing nuclear weapons. This puts the US in a rather uncomfortable situation in that while we do not desire to deal with the Iranians militarily, sizeable elements appear to feel otherwise, at least by proxy, when it comes to fighting the US. So far, these proxies have been far enough away from the centers of Iranian power that the mullahs have been able to engage in a good cop/bad cop approach to the situation or (post-OIF) obfuscate to the effect that any reports of the mullahs being up to good are just more bad US intelligence or deliberate propaganda being put out by either dubious exile groups or those evil neocons with their visions of empire for the benefit of Israel. This, in effect, has given the Iranian hardliners a virtual blank check with which to support the killing of Americans, a point that I believe I noted when I discussed the elephant in the room back in November. Such policy decisions by the Iranian government are not consistent with having a peaceful relationship with the US.

As far as the Europeans are concerned, Bush seems all for anything that'll get him results on the issue of Iran. Negotiation was what made Qadaffi fold and if the Europeans can get the mullahs to do the same, I'm sure everyone reading this will be of the opinion that it's a Good Thing. The problem is, and this is the same problem that a lot of people had when it came to diplomacy with respect to Iraq, that there is a point where diplomacy solely for its own sake or for the specific purpose of stopping a US military strike becomes worthless as far as its original goal is concerned. And while I recognize that it is now a staple of anti-war mythology that Saddam was contained pre-OIF, the fact of the matter is, as Ken Pollack noted over the course of his mea culpa in The Atlantic for The Threatening Storm, that the sanctions simply were not working. If the same is true of any formal agreement that we or the Europeans sign with the mullahs, then what is the point of having it? Or is process now seen as a diplomatic end in and of itself.

Currently we are pursuing a "good cop, bad cop" option. While France, Germany, and Great Britain negotiate directly with Iran, the United States stands to the side. Washington endorses the negotiations, supports the European trio, and hopes the negotiations might find an opening to end Iran's weapons program in a way that is verifiable. Indeed, there may even be a thought that the occasional American statement that "all options are on the table" will strengthen the European negotiating position.

The idea is to make sure that the Iranians are aware that the US is not willing to tolerate them becoming a nuclear power with the current Jonestown regime running the country. To that end, the Europeans and the IAEA serve as an acceptable sideshow while the US works out inter-government differences and comes up with a stable and coherent Iran policy.

What are the likely consequences of this scenario? First, the negotiations will fail. They will fail because, despite claims to the contrary, Iran is not seeking a peaceful nuclear energy program. Iran has no need of such a program, and its actions to date are not consistent with that end. Iran is seeking to develop a nuclear weapons capability, and there is nothing the European trio can offer it to compensate for the perceived security benefits nuclear weapons would bring.

I tend to agree, but there is always hope that Rohani and Rafsanjani will see reason. There is also always hope that I will win the lottery, but I don't plan out my financial future on that basis and I don't think that the administration is either. I also disagree with Bergner's assessment that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons simply as a means of deterrence against the Great Satan. That's certainly part of it, but all of their actions to date would seem to indicate that they want to use that deterrence as a base from which to expand their involvement in places like Iraq. The Shi'ite populations of western Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia's eastern province would also no doubt look quite attractive for Iran from the perspective of many of the more radical hardliners. And let's not even get into the question of what a nuclear Iran would mean as a new base for al-Qaeda ...

When the talks fail, what then? Will European negotiators acknowledge that negotiations were insufficient to deter Iran, and move toward economic or political sanctions? No, they won't: The negotiations are not a means to an end, they are the end itself.

I suspect that that's how the EU establishment sees the negotiations, at any rate. Judging from the European commentariat, a lot of the European chattering classes regards these negotiations as being the main barrier between Iran and the evil Bushitleretardictator. While it's nice to know that the EU (and how many Americans, one wonders?) regards the United States under Bush as being morally equivalent if not worse than Iran under Khamenei, Europe does have a rhetorical Achilles Heel that Bush would do well to exploit: human rights.

As DoctorZin wisely noted sometime ago:

Europe and the UN have a long history of advocating human rights. Europe has tied increased trade with Iran to improvements in their human rights record. European leaders advocacy for Human Rights in Iran bought them popular political support at home at very little cost.

If the US makes Human Rights in Iran a centerpiece of its Iran policy, the EU and the UN will have to support it. Russia and China would find it difficult to oppose it.

I'll admit that I'm a little less sanguine that DoctorZin about getting or Russia and China to shift their Iran policy on the basis of human rights, but I think that more or less the strategy he lays out is a pretty good one with respect to changing European attitudes on the issue of Iran. One of the reasons that Europe has turned so starkly against Israel over the last decade or so is because the Palestinians and their supporters have successfully shifted the dynamics of the debate away from the issue of Palestinian terrorism to the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people. I'm not agreeing with this approach, just noting that has been successfully "sold" in that fashion to the majority of the European public to the point where views of Israel are so distorted that it is now widely seen as one of the greatest threats to international peace and is routinely conflated with either the Nazis or South Africa under the apartheid. By studying how this shift in opinion was accomplished, the US can successfully duplicate it with respect to Iran and use it to serve our own objectives.

In many ways, I think that this approach will be a lot easier for two reasons. The first that what we are exposing here is not propaganda, just about everybody who has spent any time in blogosphere studying the issue of Iran is aware of the gross human rights abuses that have been committed by the Iranian security forces and their attendant brownshirts like the Hezb-e-Ansar against student protesters. Imagine just for a moment what would happen if stories like what happened to Zahra Kazemi and countless others over the years received the kind of scope and attention in Europe that the average Israeli incursion into the Palestinian Territories does. By broadening the number of individuals who are familiar with the true character of the Iranian regime, the US can work to create and maintain popular pressure on European governments desirous of sacrificing their own self-declared commitment to human rights on the altar of greater economic ties. That, as I said, is the first reason that I feel this approach will be successful in Europe.

The second is that, for a variety of idiotic reasoning that I'm not going to spend much time expounding on, a majority of Europeans appear deeply terrified of the idea that war (at least when initiated by Western governments, the Third Worlders can apparently kill one another with ease) can accomplish anything positive. There was a brief pause in this kind of mentality after Beslan when the entire continent watched Basayev's followers initiate the cold-blooded massacre of over 300 innocent schoolchildren, but it has since reemerged. With the exception of some post-democratic elements however, (like the nut who wrote in the Guardian that Ukraine's Orange Revolution wasn't about democracy but rather just the difference between whether it was a US or Russian puppet state) the majority of Europeans seem to support the idea of regime change in various nasty states around the planet as long as it doesn't involve those icky militaries. By embracing support for regime change in Iran (such as via the referendum process), the US can explain its objectives with Iran to the Europeans in such a way that it completely sidesteps all the knee-jerk anti-Americanistas on the Continent.

We will then see the second consequence of this option: European governments will argue that only the United States can offer the security guarantees that might tempt Iran to end its program, and therefore America should not absent itself from the negotiations. Iran will point out that leaks about U.S. war planning, deployment of aerial drones, and alleged Special Forces activities all confirm its need for self-defense. It will be said, again, that America faces two kinds of adversaries--those with nuclear weapons that it does not invade, and those without nuclear weapons that it does invade. Under the "good cop, bad cop" option, Iran's weapons program continues, Western unity is strained, and Iran lays the blame on a party not even present at the negotiations. In all, not such an attractive option.

This seems to be the consensus view in Europe, as well as in certain quarters of the US if the Post story is accurate. Bergner seems to have been quite prescient in anticipating this development:

There are now calls for the United States to move to a second option, which we might call the "united front" option. Here the United States would join France, Germany, and Great Britain and engage directly with Iran. But what could Washington offer that the European trio could not? The United States maintains ground forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan and considerable naval assets nearby. Perhaps a security guarantee from the United States would assuage the anxieties of the Iranian government. But such a pledge would be completely unwise, given the many other issues--including support for terrorism, interference in Iraq, and the Iranian regime's human rights record--that animate U.S.-Iran relations.

And that's the rub, isn't it? If the US offers Iran a guarantee that we will never use military force against them if they formally agree not to develop nukes, the regime is still free to support anti-coalition forces in Iraq, harbor the al-Qaeda leadership, support Hezbollah, etc. The end-result of such a guarantee would be to more or less formalize the current status quo with respect to Iran as permanent, which I will be quite honest in saying that I don't think that anyone who is at all familiar with the character of the hardline elements now universally acknowledged as being in ascendance inside Iran desires. But hey, I guess that what the Iran-supported Zarqawi network did in Hillah yesterday looks pretty good from the perspective of the folks over in Brussels ...

Moreover, to assume that Iran's quest for nuclear weapons has to do with the current force posture of the United States in the region is to forget that Iran has been pursuing nuclear weapons for at least 18 years, since long before even the first Gulf War. And it is to ignore that Israel, Russia, and Pakistan all possess nuclear capabilities in the region. The consequence is that "united front" negotiations would also fail. What's more, since the United States, if it joined direct talks with Iran, would immediately become the senior negotiating partner, American diplomacy would be blamed for the failure.

I'm sure that this would be the spin coming out of the same quarters that are now urging the US to accept the European initiative, but I don't think that such a view would pass muster among anybody who's been following the situation. Moreover, my own opinion is that the Iranians are quite likely to sign some kind of formal agreement with respect to nuclear weapons, only for them to violate it later at a time and situation more of their choosing. Any Iranian violation, after all, can be justified within the context of their Legitimite Fears™ of US invasion.

What then? Would Europe be more willing to adopt follow-on sanctions against Iran as a result of a perceived failure of collective U.S. and European diplomacy than it is as a result of the failure of its own diplomacy? The question answers itself. The "united front" option would permit the continuation of Iran's nuclear program and foster disagreement over follow-on measures among the allies.

I think that a kind of Iranian human rights awareness campaign similar to those that have been conducted quite successfully on behalf of the Palestinians could easily result in pressuring the EU to impose sanctions on the mullahs. The issue then becomes what kind of sanctions we can convince them to impose and to what extent, i.e. no Iraq-style cheating.

This suggests a third option, which we might call a "united front with pre-agreed follow-on measures." Under this option the United States and Europe would agree in advance on a set of consequences to ensue if negotiations failed to dislodge Iran from its position. For example, they might agree that if negotiations had not successfully concluded within six months, the United States and Europe would jointly press for economic sanctions against Iran in the U.N. Security Council.

This implies that the Europeans would be willing to undertake so drastic a measure, the evidence for which I think has been rather lacking of late.

It is difficult to believe that Europe would commit itself to such
a course of action, especially if the United States were in a position to judge what amounted to a successful negotiating outcome. Europe might surmise that Russia or China or both would block action by the Security Council in any event. Thus, for the "united front with pre-agreed follow-on measures" option to be meaningful, Europe would have to commit itself in advance to join in sanctioning Iran with or without the blessing of the Security Council. This would require Europe to overturn its long-standing views on the U.N., and to do so in an instance where Europe alone would bear most of the new costs, as the United States already has sanctions in place against Iran.

Pretty much. On the other hand, the European public appears conscious enough of human rights concerns that I think that this is the one area where we can hammer them to the point where they'll be willing to give up at least some of the economic benefits that they derive from their close ties with the mullahs.

So this third option turns out to be a pipe dream, predicated on the hope that Europe would ever adopt economic and/or political sanctions against Iran, over and against the procedures of the U.N., in response to a perceived failure of American diplomacy. While musing on this cascade of unlikely events, moreover, we might remind ourselves that there is no evidence that the imposition of joint U.S. and European economic sanctions against Iran would cause it to terminate its nuclear weapons program.

I agree that at the present stage that it's a pipe dream, but I think that there is a more immediate concern that we need to have our intelligence guys and the Europeans figure out just how close they believe that Iran is to having a nuclear bomb. I don't want to be dealing with the kind of reports like the statements by German analysts on the Iraqi nuclear program back in 2002-2003 when it comes to framing policy. The more time we have before they get the bomb, the more time we have to negotiate, pressure, et al. with the mullahs. This also gets into other policy issues like whether or not we have to rely on the MEK informant network that the Iraqi Mukhabarat used for its own purposes or whether we can regenerate our own asset network inside the country.

Is there no other option short of invasion? There is a "military strike" option, which would consist of a strike against all known and suspected Iranian nuclear weapons development facilities. In the wake of such a strike, the United States would no doubt be condemned for riding roughshod over European and world diplomacy and for taking Iranian lives. A military strike could also alienate a great swath of moderate, and especially younger, Iranians who are inclined to be friendly toward the United States and in whom we repose hope for the creation one day of a more decent, secular regime in Iran. Moderate Iranians may oppose clerical rule, but they do not necessarily oppose an Iran with nuclear capabilities. Losing the natural affection of these people would be a genuine setback.

The problem is that Iran isn't Iraq in the 1980s and that the mullahs learned from Saddam Hussein's failure with respect to Osiraq by spacing their facilities out all over the country so as to make them next to impossible for any attacker (with the Israelis in mind) to neutralize with a single attack. My concern isn't pissing off the Europeans (the majority of them already appear to think that the US is planning to attack Iran at the first opportunity) as it is whether or not such a strike would be effective and whether or not losing the support of the majority of the Iranian population is worth such a gambit.

You see, the primary concern that the US has with Iran becoming nuclear is not that we don't feel that Iran should have nuclear weapons as much as it is that we don't think that the Iranian government should have nuclear weapons. This is an important distinction that a lot of people don't seem to understand, but there is an objective reason why you and I don't wake up in the morning scared to death about the possibility of a nuclear Germany, Japan, or Australia. All three of these nations could very easily build nuclear weapons if their governments desired to do so, but the reason that very few people in the US are worried about them either doing so or becoming a security threat to us if they did is because the nature of the governments that all three of those governments have. You get a reasonably sane government in power in Tehran (or Pyongyang, for that matter) and I think you'll find that a lot of US concerns about Iran and its nuclear program tend to evaporate.

Bergner concludes with this recommendation:

A "military strike" option is thus fraught with risk for the United States from friend and foe. It does, though, have one critical difference from the other options examined here: If it were executed properly, it would eliminate or seriously retard Iran's nuclear weapons program.

I'm skeptical as to how far we could retard it, as it strikes me as the likely outcome of such an attack would be to shore up domestic support for a regime that would almost certainly redouble its nuclear efforts to deter any future US military strikes. In other words, a slightly less developed version of what we have right now with a lot more popular support behind it.

Now that we've dealt with that option, let's find out what all the anonymous sources think we should do ...

The Washington Post article on US options for Iran

As I said at the beginning of the post, I have very little doubt that the statements made by various officials in this article were done with the intention of influencing Friday's meeting. This doesn't make them untrue, but it is something to keep in mind as you read the article:

The Bush administration is close to a decision to join Europe in offering incentives to Iran -- possibly including eventual membership in the World Trade Organization -- in exchange for Tehran's formal agreement to surrender any plans to develop a nuclear weapon, according to senior U.S. officials.

Okay. I'm a little vague on the formal agreement, however. Do we get any actual tangible guarantees to that effect, or do we just get a signed document and trust in the good will of Khamenei and the ayatollahs? If so, is such an agreement worth the paper that it's printed on?

The day after returning from Europe, President Bush met Friday afternoon with the principal members of his foreign policy team to discuss requests made by German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French President Jacques Chirac in particular. More discussions are expected this week, but the White House wants to move quickly to finalize a list of incentives to offer Tehran as part of European talks with Iran, officials said.

Okay, so basically the Euros made a series of requests for us to help them out and Bush seems to be weighing his options as far as what we can do to assist them on the off-chance that the Europeans can persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions.

The new willingness to engage, even if indirectly, marks a significant change from a position that Iran deserved no rewards for actions it is legally bound to take under terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But Bush's talks last week convinced him that a united front -- in offering carrots now and a stick later if Iran does not comply -- would be more effective, U.S. and European officials say.

I suspect that's their hope, anyway. Remember, this is all being leaked with the intention of influencing whatever Bush actually decides to do come Friday. All the same, my read was that things went well enough for him in Europe (with the exception of his bizarre meeting with Putin in which he was accused of orchestrating the firing the CBS news reporters for Rathergate) that Bush wants to assist them in their efforts to engage Iran diplomatically and wants to know more about what his options are on that front.

"The reason we're comfortable considering this tactically is because strategically, when the president was in Europe, he found them solid on the big issue: that Iran can't have a nuclear weapon. Having found them firm on the strategic issue, he's more willing to consider the tactical aspects with the Europeans -- including how do we work with them and what can the Europeans offer that we would be part of it," said a senior State Department official speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitive diplomacy.

Assuming that these agreements by European leaders are genuine, it's a positive indication that the adults are still at least theoretically in charge on the Continent. I'm not opposed to this whole idea that there has to be some give and take in the negotiating process with Europe, that's how politics works after all. What I'm a lot more fuzzy on is just what Europe is willing to give up in order to ensure that Iran doesn't becoming a nuclear power.

The White House discussions have importance on several levels. During Bush's first term, the administration was deeply divided over what to do about Iran, effectively leaving the White House without a formal policy. The debate ranged from adopting the Iraq model of promoting government change to the North Korean model of containing a government and creating incentives to use in diplomatic talks on disarmament.

The folks who leaked this info out seem to be of the opinion that we now have (or will after Friday) an Iran policy, I take it. I'll forgive my skepticism on this one, because I think they're reading far too much into the fact that Bush is willing to make a tactical shift in the interest of short-term gains as meaning that they've won the policy debate.

Now, the administration appears willing, at least in the short term, to hold out the prospect of tentative engagement with Iran down the road to get the Islamic republic to cooperate in limiting its nuclear energy program -- and ensuring it is not subverted for military use.

My understanding is that we were open to at least some form of engagement with Iran from 1997 until May 2003 when Iranian-backed al-Qaeda terrorists killed US nationals in Saudi Arabia. In that instance, engagement failed and I tend to be somewhat skeptical of it working now that everybody agrees that the Bad Guys inside Iran are running the show.

The White House meeting also reflects an interest in demonstrating to the Europeans that the U.S. effort to heal the transatlantic rift extends beyond tone to substance -- over the issue that most urgently and widely divides the allies.

"The meetings in Europe were really good, not just atmospherics," said a second senior administration official who requested anonymity. "We are past the point of grousing about the process or each other and we're now grappling with the issues: how to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon and how to deal with its behavior."

I'm glad to hear the Europeans were so receptive, I must have missed it with all those stickers of Bush's face on Belgian toilets and Romano Prodi's claim that the foreign policy disagreements from 2003 endured. My only concern here is that the whole crux of this stuff is how much the US needs to yield with respect to what I see as a deeply flawed European approach, nobody seems to be mentioning what all the Europeans are willing to give up ...

U.S. resistance to proposals by Britain, France and Germany, which are leading the disarmament talks with Iran, proved to be counterproductive, U.S. and European officials said, because they often made the United States, rather than Iran, appear to be the odd man out diplomatically.

A view discussed in the Standard article I highlighted above. I think that Bergner's assessment of this mentality is pretty accurate as well.

In talks after Bush's reelection late last year, British Prime Minister Tony Blair pressed Bush to join or endorse the European approach, according to U.S. and European sources.

The biggest selling point, he added, was the argument that charting a common course would help the United States: If talks with Iran fail, Washington would not be seen as the outside player that ruined the effort. There would also then be more options to stand together in punitive steps against Iran, including going to the U.N. Security Council -- a move the United States has long sought.

If that's the case, then my guess is that the administration is considering joining the European approach with the opinion that it is likely to fail. This also seems to imply that the Euros are willing to bend if the issue comes to the UNSC if the US bends on the issue of joining the talks - they may be hoping that Russia or China vetoes any UNSC sanctions, as Bergner noted - making this more on less a quid pro quo.

A united Iran strategy could prevent a repeat of the divisive experience of the U.S. invasion of Iraq over its alleged weapons of mass destruction and its costly impact on transatlantic relations.

The incentives under active consideration are also not major concessions, U.S. and European officials note. "The kind of [economic and political] changes required for membership in the World Trade Organization are very much what we'd want to see anyway," the State Department official said. "So it's not giving Iran something. It's making clear this could lead to that, if they comply."

Yes, but only on the nuclear issue. Do these State Department types truly believe that the nuclear issue is the end-all be-all of our differences with the mullahs?

And even if Iran did fully comply on its nuclear program, it would still take many years to accede to WTO membership because of the time required to radically restructure Tehran's economy, European officials say.

Leading to more process, which as I noted above seems to be becoming regarded as an end in of itself ...

"We're profoundly skeptical that Iran is going to do anything, but we do want to do whatever we can do to help the Europeans succeed," the State Department official said. "And if Iran did comply, there would still be a lot to talk about even at that stage before Iran got WTO membership."

Ah-ha, a sane voice at the State Department! His opinion pretty much reflects that of my own with respect to the European approach and I would infer that there is a great deal of emphirical evidence that has been built up over the last 4 years to support such a position. The Euro approach is good as a stalling tactic while we figure out our strategy, not as a serious solution in of itself.

The European proposal, the U.S. official added, lets Washington take steps without changing its basic assessment of Iran's government. It also allows the president to keep all options on the table.

Like I said, a stalling tactic while we figure out our options ...

The United States is also considering the European suggestion to facilitate Iran's access to spare airplane parts for its aging passenger fleet as well as other unspecified proposals, U.S. and European officials say. The senior administration official said the White House is still working out the "right mix" and timing of incentives.

Okay, but unless they're willing to trot out Saif al-Adel, Saad bin Laden, and Imad Mugniyeh in chains I see very little reason to indulge such proposals. The whole idea of this kind of diplomacy is that it's reciprocal, otherwise we get trapped back into the same one-sided appeasement that the Europeans have been snared in.

Regarding my views and those of Dr. Ledeen ...

Because seemingly every time I post something on Iran a number of people have a tendency jeer and shout that both myself and my former boss Dr. Ledeen favor immediate US military action against Iran. This came up in a number of the Iraqi TV confessions threads and as a result I don't think he'll be angry if I quote him from a comment he made just the other day over at Belgravia Dispatch on this topic.

The relevant excerpts:

"interventionist"? I'm getting a bid tired of this particular falsehood. Was it interventionist to support Solidarity in Poland? Or the Orange Revolution in Ukraine? Or the Lebanese today in Beirut? If so, then yes, I'm an interventionist regarding Iran. But that's not what is usually meant by "interventionist." That word is usually reserved for those who advocate military action, which ... is not my position.

I want my government, and all other democratic governments, to support the Iranian people against the tyrannical mullahcracy. I am opposed to a military campaign. I have said this over and over again ... Is it "interventionist" to suggest that, if the Europeans pull of this latest version of appeasement, they will have demonstrated to the world that there is an automatic reward for starting down the path the nuclear weapons? And it's interesting that neither the NY Times nor the WaPo today mention Bush's public statements on this question while in Europe. He said that Iran had violated its international agreements, and that it was obnoxious to suggest they should be rewarded for it.

Both Dr. Ledeen (from what I understand of his views) and myself do not favor US military action against Iran, immediate or otherwise. My own position is that if al-Qaeda does carry out another major attack on the US that we will have no choice but to intervene militarily, but until we reach that point I prefer regime change through peaceful means as has occurred in any number of other countries in recent years. The failure to acknowledge or accurately represent these views is what I refer to as using the cartoon version of someone's positions (i.e. a straw man) rather than engaging what they actually believe.

To put it another way, is it that extreme of a position not to trust Ali Akbar Rafsanjani?

Oh, and faster please.