I see the always-insightful Praktike has a some comments up to my own remarks about the "root causes" of terrorism and Chechnya. It's really good, like most of his writing, so I thought I might reply to it in public (a frequent habit of mine for regular readers of my blog) and see what everybody else thinks.
To begin with, let me answer Praktike's question:
I don't quite know who these alleged people in the punditocracy are who think solving the I-P problem alone will "end Islamic terrorism," but whoever they are, they're clearly wrong.
That's quite true, but it is a view that is unfortunately held for a vast number of people, ask anybody what needs to be done to end Islamic terrorism and I guarantee, particularly in Europe, that 9 out of 10 pundits will say or at least act as though ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will settle the issue once as for all. It has become more or less conventional wisdom in large segments of academia (dare I cite Juan Cole as an example on this one?) as well as the foreign policy establishment and even accepted, at least in propaganda form, by al-Qaeda itself.
It would certainly help, but terrorism is a multifaceted problem.
Indeed and I have a big problem with what I view as the over-emphasis on Israeli-Palestinian conflict over say those in Chechnya or Algeria or Kashmir or Mindanao as radicalizing factors in creating terrorists.
If anything, I would argue, the evidence suggests that the above-listed conflicts are more of a factor than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for a whole host of reasons, not the least of which being that most of the European nations where many an erstwhile mujahid hails from these days are extremely vocal to the point of shrill with respect to condemning any and all Israeli actions. The European media and commentariat is even worse, with the majority of both pundits and the general public as a whole having adopted the Palestinian side of the story.
This shift towards the Palestinians and away from the Israelis has been well-documented here and on any number of other websites by individuals of all ideologies over the years to the point that it is now all but indisputable. So I have an extremely hard time believing that any self-professed Islamic radical would look on the situation in Europe over the last few years and not come to the conclusion that the momentum is definitely with them when it comes to Israel-Palestine. I have no intention of examining why this occurred (this has been done elsewhere), but the fact remains that it has and would likely have more than moderated the rage of any Islamist towards their home governments for support of Israel and indeed the shift away from railing against European governments for supporting Israel towards carrying out various acts of violence against European Jews would seem to support this conclusion.
Understand, I am not at all trying to whitewash the role of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in forming a radical Islamist mindset; it's very existence would strike many radicals of the truth of Qutb and other Islamist philosophers' writings about a worldwide conspiracy against Islam. That said, it becomes very clear just based on the histories of the hundreds of European al-Qaeda members who have been arrested to date that the plight of the Palestinians was not a high priority for them. None of them, near as I can tell, made much of a serious attempt to go to Gaza or the West Bank to fight alongside the Intifada (Reid's mission was surveillance, not operational) - the IRA got there ahead of them, for God's sake. Similarly, no support seems to exist among the European al-Qaeda for the large number of legal and illegal Hamas or Islamic Jihad front organizations that exist on the Continent. Simply put, helping the Palestinians does not appear to be a high priority for these guys, a fact that the US might well consider highlighting for propaganda value.
Contrast this to Chechnya. Take a look at the various cells that were described by the Norwegians and you'll see the following:
- GSPC leader Merouane Benahmed was trained in Chechnya.
- The entire "Chechen network," as the name implies, was trained made up of Algerians trained in Chechnya and sent back to France to carry out attacks there.
So in 2 of the 4 cases that the Norwegians chose to profile the trail led back to Chechnya - this is also true in the case of Ridwan al-Issar, the spiritual leader of the Hofstad Group that murdered Theo Van Gogh. This isn't just regurgitation of Russian propaganda (which I am routinely accused of doing whenever I write on the Chechen conflict) either, all of this is coming from European government sources. Nor are Mr. Benahmed or the Chechen network isolated incidents - European jails are filled to the brim with any number of convicted or accused terrorists who have been to or assisted with the jihad in Chechnya. Indeed, for those who remember Azzam.com, the late and unmourned al-Qaeda homepage prior to 9/11, there were two main English sections: the jihad in Afghanistan and the jihad in Chechnya.
Basically, my point (the substance of which I suspect Praktike likely agrees with) is that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict occupies an exaggerated position of prominence as a factor in the creation of terrorists. Yes, it is a factor in the radicalization of Islamists, but if you want to know where they are being trained in the techniques they will eventually use to carry out attacks in the West, the answer lies in places like Chechnya, Kashmir, Iraq, Mindanao, South Thailand, etc.
The question then becomes whether policy-makers are interested in preventing Muslim radicalization by dealing with the issues that contribute to such things (i.e. Israel-Palestine) or in putting an end to the places where they're actually receiving training (i.e. Chechnya).
In my view, the latter unquestionably takes precedence over the former in this regard which is why I'm more worried about Basayev's successful expansion of the Chechen jihad into Dagestan and Ingushetia than I am about whether Israel assassinating Sheikh Ahmed Yassin contributed to Islamic radicalism when it comes to creating terrorists. Yassin's death may have angered a lot of people, but it's Basayev's success that is going to lead to more terrorism in the long run.
Please note that I am not saying that we should ignore either the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or condone Putin's gross mishandling of the Chechen war. As I noted post-Beslan, his policies there have been worse than brutal, they've been ineffective and are only making Basayev's success that much easier.
The Afghan and Chechen veterans who have returned to Europe, for instance, have operated as roaming free agents, recruiters, and ideological leaders--as in the case of Afghan Arab Abu Hamza of the notorious Finsbury Park mosque, the place where Richard Reid of failed shoebombing fame became radicalized.
That's a very "Burkean" (Jason, not Edmund) view of things, whereas I for a variety of reasons am far more partial to the "Gunaratnan" opinion that this stuff is a lot better organized and inter-connected than many observers are willing to give it credit for.
Which is why I tend to reject much of this "free agent" stuff. Abu Hamza, for example, was an al-Qaeda recruiter on good terms with the senior leadership and served as the fatwa writer of the week for any of bin Laden's lieutenants who needed theological authority to carry out their murderous activities - GIA, Islamic Army of Aden, Basayev's Chechen Islamists, etc. I don't think that he qualifies as a "free agent" by any means - he's nothing but a bought-and-paid for lieutenant and fatwa banker for bin Laden.
As to Chechnya proper ...
From what I can tell, the situation in Chechnya and nearby Ingushetia is deteriorating, and the killing of Aslan Maskhadov doesn't look like the solution. The Chechens have already named a new leader who is alleged to be a Basayev puppet, so it's hard to see how this is an improvement. The Chechen problem is by no means a simple one, but Russia's policies in the area have been on the whole been brutal, incompetent, and downright stupid. I wish there was a way to make Putin see that without making him feel threatened.
Agreed. Ingushetia's been falling apart ever since the "Ingush Mujahideen" appeared last summer with Basayev's sacking of Nazran, with Dagestan already heading down the same road. Whether or not Basayev's ability to expand his operations into these areas was due in part to the tacit support that Maskhadov gave him, I can't say, but I would be tempted to say that Maskhadov wasn't a factor here because he had generally opposed carrying out attacks outside Chechnya due to his (correct) belief that while Moscow might be persuaded to one day part with Chechnya there was no way they would give up the entire North Caucasus.
As for Maskhadov's successor Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev, he was the head of the Chechen Sha'riah Court which would seem to place him in Basayev's camp if this is the same body that was issuing rulings justifying what took place with the Moscow theater seige and Beslan, to say nothing of Basayev's "Black Widow" suicide bombings. The Russians are claiming that Sadulayev is a Saudi Wahhabi who entered Chechnya with at least four al-Qaeda leaders back in the mid-1990s (Omar ibn al-Khattab, Abu Walid al-Ghamdi, Abu Hafs al-Urduni, and Abu Omar al-Saif respectively), while Chechen spokesmen are saying that he's a Chechen non-Wahhabi.
I don't have anything on the guy other than his name, rank, and that he was listed as one of the "wakhabit (Wahhabi) ideologues" who escaped a Russian assassination attempt in Argun back in August 2003. Regardless of his theological views, the running assumption seems to be that Basayev has fully consolidated his control of the conflict and that the death of Maskhadov ended any chance of a negotiated peace to the Caucasus.
The Norwegian report you refer to is based on Petter Nessen's Ph.D. dissertation submitted for the cand. polit. Degree at the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo in January 2004. By the author's own account, "the analysis is based mainly on the press coverage of the investigations and trials of the terrorist cells." Press coverage is known to be subjective at best,so I think we can take at least some of the findings with a grain of caution.
The story about the planned Chechen attack on the Russian Embassy in Paris was heavily promoted by the FSB, and it tends to fall into the category of stories that have been circulated jointly by Russian and French security services in the interests of "Franco-Russian co-operation in the war on terror", whatever that may mean. I would submit that it falls into the same category as those promoted by the inventive Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere. It's noteworthy that Bruguiere has been in the forefront of those striving to prove that Chechnya was a training ground for Al Qaeda even before September 11 2001 - a conclusion that Russian security forces are apparently desperate for the West to believe.
Just how much credence should be given to French "intelligence" on the war on terror is a matter for debate and speculation. The close co-operation of the French and Russian security services should also make us pause and consider.
David McDuff:
In other words, the Norwegian stuff is based on comprehensive coverage of open source information. In the absence of closed source data, that's about the best that we yokels can hope for.
Well, if the French were provided information by the Russians that enabled them to thwart a terrorist attack (or vice versa) I'd certainly classify that as being cooperation worth promoting. Also, if you look at the French claims I think you'll see that they're coming from people a lot higher up the food chain than Bruguiere. As for Russia wanting the West to believe that Chechnya was an al-Qaeda training ground, it looks from here like that claim in of itself has held up pretty well, though I expect that you'll disagree.
Consider what? These statements weren't made to convince anybody outside of France, they were almost entirely for domestic consumption to justify the arrests. If the French claims about the Chechen connection don't hold up under scrutiny, then the government is going to look like a fool in court since those claims are key to their case. Moreover, the Chechen network is simply the most recent and egregious example of jihadis who have been arrested over the last several years who have either fought in or supported the Chechen jihad. Was all of Azzam.com's highlighting of the fighting there just Russian propaganda as well, for example?
The problem with this paradigm is that it begins with the (reasonable) assumption of Russian mendacity but then takes it to extremes that I think are completely unwarranted given the available evidence. It's as bad as what the Russians do when they read US intelligence or even about US politics - take the worst possible interpretation of the evidence and then go from there.
Dan Darling: As for Russia wanting the West to believe that Chechnya was an al-Qaeda training ground, it looks from here like that claim in of itself has held up pretty well, though I expect that you'll disagree.
As I've argued before: judging by its actions, the Russian Federal government apparently needs and wants Chechnya to be an Al Qaeda training ground, and is doing everything in its power to turn it into one. It has just killed the last moderate Chechen leader with whom it might have been possible to open negotiations, and is bent on a military solution to a conflict that can only be settled by political means. Once again, the question arises of why this should be so.
While I would not call Maskhadov a "moderate", I agree there are no current Chechen "separatists" with whom Russia can negotiate a peace.
You must keep in mind, however, this is exactly what Russia wants. Putin will not act in any way which might seem to legitimize a Chechen leader or movement in general. Putin is creating a self-fulfilling prophesy - this is a war on terror and nothing but. He cannot make the "mistake" Yeltsin did by negotiating a peace and legitimizing a separatist movement as a fight for ethnic freedom and national independence by a fledgling republic. Besayev is cunning, but not very intelligent. That is the sort of enemy Russia wishes to have n Chechnya.
Joel: Besayev is cunning, but not very intelligent. That is the sort of enemy Russia wishes to have in Chechnya.
Just for the record: according to Shabalkin's latest press conference, Basayev doesn't count for much any more (he is "resting"), and Sadulayev is now "Wahhabist Number One”. Again according to Shabalkin, Sadulayev is “the inspirer of all terrorist acts on the territory of Chechnya and Russia”.
I guess that makes Sadulayev the enemy.
David McDuff:
I am quite capable of believing that a combination of Russian brutality and ineptitude is responsible for Chechnya's presence as an al-Qaeda haven. As for why Russia went after Maskhadov and has done so even though he was demonstrably not responsible for the actual terrorist attacks on their country, my guess would be that Moscow (correctly) believed that Maskhadov was the guy with popular support and that the resistance would soon collapse in the event they crushed him. As for the fact that Russian counter-terrorism operations are having the exact opposite threat, much the same has been offered with respect to the US's own strategy for the war on terrorism as well as those of India and Israel respectfully. For example, Hizb-ut-Tahrir is growing like wildfire despite Karimov's frequent brutal attempts to stamp it out in Uzbekistan. All I am suggesting here is that there are other interpretations for the Kremlin's actions other than the type of sinister scenario that you seem to envision. When conspiracies have occurred at Moscow's behest (Iraq, Ukraine, Abkhazia, etc.) they are generally pretty transparent things for those of us watching at this vantage point, which is why I see violence and ineptitude as being the more likely explanation.
As for Basayev, he was reputed to be undergoing medical treatment until quite recently IIRC. Assuming that's accurate, he could well need time to recover which would explain his lapse for the moment. If I were Moscow, I would be going after Abu Hafs and Abu Omar al-Saif since they are reputedly the al-Qaeda moneymen behind the whole Chechen jihad.
Joel:
Maskhadov is a "moderate" in the same sense that Khatami is - his status is only defined in relation to the truly depraved nature of the people around him. As for Chechnya, I honestly think that Putin needs to figure out what exactly he wants there, since so far he's been attempting to maintain it as part of the Russian federation under a rogue's gallery of inept strongmen backed up by Ramzan Kadyrov's private army. If the Chechen conflict is supposed to be kept on going so as to serve as pretext for the reintegration of Georgia into Russia, I would say that the repeated attacks on Moscow proper ended any usefulness in that regard.
I would also tend to disagree with your assessment of Basayev, seeing how he's been able to expand the field of battle from Chechnya to the point where he now has nearly as many Ingush or Dagestanis fighting under him as he does Chechens. By turning his fight against Russia from separatist to Pan-Islamic, he has a force multiplier that still has a great deal of capacity for growth and he knows it.
The European media and commentariat is even worse, with the majority of both pundits and the general public as a whole having adopted the Palestinian side of the story.
Uhm, than you see a different European media than i see. But it is true that the Palestinian side has more impact
a:
That probably came out a lot snarkier than I had intended, but my main point was that for a variety of reasons the Palestinians are definitely winning the battle for hearts and minds.
Dan,
I agree with your assessment of Maskhadov as a moderate in the terms you have expressed above. I believe he is less "moderate" than Dudaev was, however.
I am not certain we really disagree on Besayev - semantics aside. With regards to Ingushetia, Dagestan, etc - those areas are ripe for separatist movements, pan-islamic especially. Soviet policy of colonization of White Russians to the area and ethnic "de-colonization" certainly did not create any loyalty to Russia.
Yeltsin was trying to hold on to resource rich areas of the former union, but Yeltsin was always more of a realist - thinking back especially to the Gorbachev days as an example of that. Putin is doing - I am not sure what. It seems the KGB "thuglife" approach to policy is hard to shake - and when you bring the ethnic superiority complex many "White Russians" have been instilled with during the Soviet era, there is a whole added dynamic. That's a big reason why, in the Winds of Change monthly Russia brief, we describe Russia as an enigma. :)
I think you are correct in that but Europe isn't yet where it will end and has still very deap links to the Israels goverment.
ps. Could you produce a link to an explanation why Europe is moving in that direction
Why is Europe endorsing a view that results on Jews being mass-murdered?
For one thing, this time it's economically sensible. The question you should be asking is 'why isn't Europe more hostile to Israel'?
So what is the answer for that then
Well, the EU needs as much trade as it can get. Israel is a market for European goods. But don't underestimate European hostility. They give billions to the PLO. They've sent intelligence personnel to train them up, and want to send troops to protect them. And Israel will invite them to send troops at some point, so the EU doesn't need to rush.