I'm going to start the ball rolling by including a couple of useful references for people interested in studying the kind of thing Gen. Cartwright is trying to do.

No case analogy is perfect, but Buckman Labs is a good case study of someone who tried to do similar things - and largely succeeded.

• Interview with Bill Buckman
• Fast Company article
• Buckman Labs' Knowledge Nurture Online Library contains pointers to a number of relevant materials.

But this is more for our readers than anything that might be useful to the General. He probably heard of Buckman Labs a while ago.

So... readers,

• What are the keys to Gen. Cartwright's success?
  
• Your thoughts from personal organizational/ military experiences et. al. on how these sorts of initiatives either work or don't? Stories to share, perhaps?

• Any tips to offer from your own blogging experience about managing blog networks/teams, or getting good comment environments going? (I posted Hosting Good conversations Online a while back - obviously, it helps to be a 4-star who can demand answers, but managing the results makes a difference and this is where NCOs and officers can really help)

• Where are all these trends this stuff going? Any special pitfalls to watch out for?

Have at it...

The 800 pound gorilla in the room here is that there are too many officers in the military, creating too many levels of command between the guys with the idea the guy who okays the idea. The officer enlisted ratio was 12-1 during WWII, 6-1 in 1990, and 5-1 now. With so many officers running around trying to figure out reasons to justify their bureaucratic existence, inevitably some of them will stand in the way of expert dialogue between a GO and, say, a Gunnery Sergeant with a good idea.

Or, just continue doing things the way they're done today. Hey, if it ain't broke, don't fix it.

f

My dad, a captain in the 42nd "Rainbow" Division, and his sargeant, returned to our family business after WWII and ran it using the chain of command that saved their lives during the war. I'm a child of the 1960s. I saw their chain of command sometimes fail.

So I operate using the chain of convenience -- that means use the chain of command until it doesn't work, then make sure the people who need to know, do know. After all, the people in the trenches are the front line of management.

Gad. dad s/b Dad. Sargeant s/b sergeant. Blogging leads to typos.

This is both new and very old. The new part is obvious, but Cartwright is using citizens' media to recreate what Creveld has called the commander's 'directed telescope' - a means of getting timely, specific information independent of the normal chain of command. That goes back at least to Napoleon, and has certainly been making the intermediate commanders nervous just as long.

The commander's telescope is largely seen as a mechanism for exception handling, to drag in tech jargon: Periodically check that your routine information reflects reality, and touch a specific reality quickly when it is esssential to success. Infusing citizens' media into a military organization may ultimately change things like span of control, but I don't think you can infer it from this particular bit of news.

"this would be an astonishing statement from any high level manager in any large organization."

As Joe noted, many large organizations have realized the benefits of "flattening" the heirarchy, especially in fast-moving industries like hi-tech (but they are all fast-moving now). Fast Company and Inc. have always been good sources for case studies and anecdotes about these changes in corporate culture. Even the HBR will acknowledge it once in a while. :-)

Let's not lose sight of something here. The blog in question is a C2 (Command and Control) blog, according to Timmer's original post. There's a lot of expertise at all levels at STRATCOM, with people who get paid to present their cases forcefully to people who may be too shocked to listen. People just trying to fill a square on an OER don't last long. ADM Lawton Childs had a very similar feedback policy as 2nd STRATCOM, and ADM Richard Mies was also proactive about getting information. They work in a command with a non-existant margin for error. The policy is scary? In nuclear command and control, every policy is scary. The only priority is to get it right.

As a former commander, I can tell you that this attitude is NOT out of place in the professional military. The answer is all that matters, just as the general stated. The people who progress are the one with the right answers most of the time.

D'oh! It was Henry Childs, not Lawton Childs. ADM Childs had a pronounced resemblence to Patrick Stewart, and in a flight suit it was almost impossible not to think of him as Capt. Picard. Not the kind of guy you think of as having a first name other than "Sir".

the very fact that a general feels he has to go outside the chain of command to get answers tells you just how screwed up the military is at the moment.

If a general can't get an answer from his direct subordinates to a question, its time for the general to kick some ass. If the general wants to know what those in the lower ranks are thinking, he should gather a bunch of them at random, and talk to them in confidence.

But blogs are the wrong way to try and get any information in a military environment, period.

p.lukasiak... the very fact that you find the idea of a leader going outside the chain of authority for answers surprising, tells us how little experience you have in anything approaching real workplaces or organizations.

This is not only normal, it is what truly effective leaders do in ANY organization. It also happens all-too infrequently, in any organization.

Good for the General.

he should gather a bunch of them at random, and talk to them in confidence.

So he flies from Washington to Cheyenne Mtn., then to Alaska, then to Bremerton, and back? Or he jerks a bunch of people from those places at random and flies them to Washington for 24 hours?

Ever played "telepone" as a kid? That suggests that asking direct subordinates for answers that enlisted men are more likely to have isn't always a brilliant way to do business. Even if everyone's well intentionted and totally honest (big assumption), that doesn't mean the answer you get will be the one the guy at the bottom actually gave.

From my point of view, regarding some of the issues posted in this blog, I see the general's need and why he wants what he wants first hand. I was enlisted, finished college, and am re-entering with a commision in few months. When I lead my platoon into combat, I am going to want unaltered messages to know the status of my men, the platoon, and the mission at hand. I cannot think of a better way of doing things, although, yes - as an officer moves up the chain of command in the ensuing years, it would be a true test of his commitment, but isn't this why we do what we do? Because we care about our job, our way of life? I'd like to think so. Sounds to me that the general wants to know what's going on at his lower levels of command, because he cares about the status of these smaller units, so that the mission may be accomplished nothing wrong with that, general. I have promised myself that no matter what happens, I will commit fully (part of which is unconditional caring) to my profession, which is to be commanding troops.

Mission Focused Strategic Communication

Joe,

I've thought about this considerably re various organizational structures. I'm in law enforcement that operates in a para-military style model.

I understand where the General is coming from. Sometimes the chain of command is reluctant to tell the commander their best assessments of the situation. They don't want the "spotlight" to shine on themselves that has career path consequences. They sometimes take the path of least resistance and agree with the commander's opinion/assessment. Some become very "risk adverse" for fear of being wrong and fail to take risks when tactical advantages present them without ironclad approval from the chain. This is detrimental to the success of any organization in achieving its mission.

I'm sure many here have read Victor Davis Hanson's writings. In short you must engage the enemy continuously. You must take risks to exploit tactical weaknesses, as the battlefield is fluid. Yes you will fail. You must quickly learn from your mistakes and change/adapt tactics accordingly. You must keep the pressure on and keep the enemy off balance.

My son is in the Air Guard and we went to his graduation. From his comments I learned one unique thing the military has learned over the years in operational commands. At least in the Air Force the wing has a command chief master sgt. This is the senior NCO who has the most working knowledge of the wing and it's mission readiness.

The wing commander has full access to the chief. This is a reality check for the wing commander to assess info received from his subordinates. Subordinates can't blow too much smoke and when they have some hair brain program/scheme to implement, the wing commander can ask for the opinion of the chief on how it will affect the mission readiness of the wing.

The sharing of intel/info in the GWOT is crucial to our success. Domestic LE intel/info is very hierarchical in nature. The structure is as horizontal as a volcanic "cinder cone" in a landscape of many cones. I coined a term for the sharing of intel/info horizontally Mission Focused Strategic Communications. Domestic LE is very reactionary by nature and is ill-equipped to deal with the reality of an embedded asymmetrical enemy.

These concepts are further developed in an essay:

The Traditional Law Enforcement/Criminal Justice System Paradigm Is Ill Prepared to Fight this War On Terror

Link Here

Link Here

OK - I'm done know. This should add considerable fuel to this discussion. Bring it on! :--)

Not being in the military now, I have no references, but I know it used to be the main problems and concerns of the "Troops in the Trenches" had to do with:

Lack of materials
Delay of materials delivery
lack of personel
Delay of personel delivery
Non functional material
Non functional personel
Contridictions of efforts
Efforts not coordinated

Some of these a four star might be able to lend a hand solving, but most will have to be passed up to congress and Sect of Def. for money and for policy.

So I don't see much use in it, as congress can't get anything done and a lot of people don't like the Sect. of Def.

At all.

Papa Ray
West Texas
USA