Why TSAT Is Thought to be Necessary

During 1991's Desert Storm operations, the U.S. military discovered that not only were they lacking in communications capacity, what they did have didn't connect very well. After September 11, experts learned that tremendous amounts of available information within and beyond the Defense Department required adequate connections among its various providers and users. Operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other battlefields of the Global War on Terror have further demonstrated the U.S. military's increasing reliance on high-tech communications and real-time data from UAVs, naval assets, and soldiers on the ground.

If bandwidth is becoming an important bottleneck in battle, went the question, what is the U.S. military to do?

Very shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) initiated a Transformational Communications Study to accelerate the delivery of advanced capabilities with state-of-the art technology to the field. The study was led by the National Security Space Architect (NSSA), and used the NSSA's Mission Information Management Communications Architecture as a springboard. It looked at many options, and assessed current plans.

The study concluded that the US. Military's existing program plan would not meet forecast communications requirements. It also suggested that there was a window of opportunity to provide an architectural framework for a compatible communications system across the Department of Defense and the intelligence community - one that could increase U.S. capabilities by a factor of ten.

Those conclusions, plus ongoing experience in the Global War on Terror and new technology developments like UAVs, helped shape the Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA). At present, all of the U.S. services are making future acquisition plans that are dependent on the capabilities the TCA umbrella program is expected to provide.

The TSAT program is envisaged as part of the TCA, providing its space-based "anytime, anywhere" bandwidth backbone.

The Big Picture: TSAT and the Transformational Communications Architecture

The TSAT Program is actually just one node in a broad spectrum of programs known as the Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA), version 1.0 of which was approved by a Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum (JROCM) on October 23, 2003.

TSAT's status as one of a constellation of communications initiatives offers opportunities for synergy, but it also creates complications. The U.S. military, intelligence community, and NASA satellite constellations operate independently, and each of the three communities is responsible for securing the funding for its own satellites. While their programs are designed to be compatible with each other, priorities between these groups sometimes differ. In addition, the separation of funding and lobbying means that technical elements designed to work together may not be funded synchronously. For instance, while the Defense Department manages the TSAT, the U.S. intelligence community is working on the optical relay communications architecture, and NASA manages the tracking and data relay satellite system (TDRSS-C).

This is part of the task facing the newly-formed Transformational Communications Office.

Communications satellites come in three flavors: narrowband systems like IRIDIUM that suffice for voice transmissions but lack bandwidth, wideband systems for sending large amounts of data, and protected satellites that are 'protected' against jamming and nuclear effects. TCA v1.0 makes use of all three.

The TCA envisions a Global Information Grid (GIG) that includes the Wideband Gapfiller System (WGS or next generation wideband), the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS or next generation narrowband) scheduled for launch in 2009, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF next generation protected, a.k.a. Milstar III) to be launched between 2008-2011, an Advanced Polar System for various strategic missions, and the Transformational Communications Satellite (TSAT) system that could be launched from 2013 as a major upgrade, instead of deploying AEHF #4 & 5.

These programs are all organized around the lifespan of the current Milstar II satellite constellation; the Pentagon is highly confident that they will remain capable through 2014, but after that confidence diminishes.

What Is TSAT?

TSAT is intended to provide internet-like capability that extends high-bandwidth satellite capabilities to deployed troops worldwide, and delivers an order of magnitude increase in available military bandwidth. Using laser communications intersatellite links to create a high data-rate backbone in space, TSAT will be one of the key enablers for the American vision of Network Centric Warfare.

A visual image from a UAV that would take 2 minutes to process with the Milstar II satellite system would take less than a second with TSAT. A radar image from a Global Hawk UAV (12 minutes), or a multi-gigabyte radar image from space-based radar (88 minutes), would also take less than a second with the TSAT network. Best of all, the recipient can be on the move with a relatively small receiver, anywhere in the world.

As Military Information Technology explains, TSAT users fall into two broad categories: high-data rate access users and low-data rate access users. The high-data rate access provides a data rate of 2.5 gigabits to 10 gigabits per second through laser communications. However, only 20 to 50 or so of these links would be available, and they will most likely be dedicated to major intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets in space and in the air.

Others on the low data-rate end can still use about 8,000 simultaneous radio frequency (RF) data links, which will provide connectivity to strategic assets and tactical users as well as the aerial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. The high data rate platforms have drawn the most attention, but the ability to covert high data throughput into thousands of RF channels is likely to prove equally important.

The whole TSAT system will include TSAT Space Segment (TSAT SS) satellites, as well as integrated ground stations and networks. For instance, the $2 billion TSAT Mission Operations System, (TMOS) is part of the TSAT program, and also has wider applications.

TMOS: TSAT's Ground Component

The TMOS network will give the U.S. military's overall Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) the ability to act as a broadband, on-demand global Internet based on IP, incorporating key emerging network technologies like quality of service provisioning and bandwidth guarantees in the bargain. TMOS is expected to provide operational and network management for the TSAT Space and Ground communications segments, connecting the USA's future TSAT SS ultra-high-bandwidth satellite backbone into the US military's evolving Global Information Grid.

Troy Meinke, the Air Force TSAT program manager, explained it this way to Military Information Technology:

"Basically, TSAT is the overall system. The satellites are part of that, the ground segment is part of that, and TMOS is part of the overall TSAT system."

The critical part of TMOS will be writing nearly 5 million lines of software code, which accounts for about 80% of program development. To try and avoid software development problems that have plagued other large space programs, the US Air Force has enlisted experts from the Software Engineering Institute. The TMOS program also includes the development of a network operations center (NOC) and operations management center, as well as the related hardware.

Overall, the TMOS network will give the U.S. military's overall Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) the ability to act as a broadband, on-demand global Internet based on IP, incorporating key emerging network technologies like quality of service provisioning and bandwidth guarantees in the bargain. TMOS will provide circuit/packet mission planning and policy management, external network coordination, network operations and management, key management, and Situational Awareness-Common Operational Picture in a secure environment, fully incorporating cyber-security.

As Trip Carter, advanced programs manager for military satellite communications at Raytheon, put it to C4ISR Journal:

"In the future it could be cost prohibitive to do so once networks are out there and established and deployed. Lots of transformation systems emerging today and the time to achieve interoperability is now."

The Pentagon says that awarding TMOS early decreases TSAT program risk by providing an integrating construct for network architecture and design, and allows the awarded contractor to begin work on formal network interface definitions and specifications. Earlier in the competition, Raytheon spokespeople had also noted that TMOS stations could be built before the satellites are launched in 2013, and used in conjunction with existing resources as part of the Global Information Grid Bandwidth Extension project.

The majority of TMOS' ground-based functionality is scheduled to be up and running approximately a year prior to launch, so that MILSATCOM can test the TMOS network and prepare it to work with the TSAT SS satellites. The hope is that the winning contractor can begin incremental deployment of the network around 2008, then build up to support the planned 2012-2013 launch using a spiral development process, adding incremental features and tests at each "mini-release" point.

Contracts for the TMOS segment of the system involved $3 million each to consortia led by Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and Northrop-Grumman for preliminary research. Lockheed's consortium then went on to win the $2.02 billion TMOS contract in January 2006.

AEHF and Lessons Learned for TSAT

While they may be inferior to the TSAT SS, Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Milstar III satellites will provide over ten times the capacity and six times higher data rate transfer than that of the current Milstar II satellites.

The AEHF's phased array antenna is being developed by Northrop-Grumman, and will direct radio frequency beams electronically rather than moving reflectors mechanically. The uplink phased array antenna will connect the AEHF spacecraft with ground terminals, while minimizing jamming effects and the possibility of signal intercept by enemies. The steered agile beams will allow AEHF satellites to connect more areas simultaneously with highly protected channels, and it will do so faster than Milstar.

As a result of multiple factors, however, including the U.S. NSA's failure to provide cryptographic solutions in time, AEHF is currently facing a 12 month schedule slippage, and a significant cost increase over previous projections. DID has covered some of the issues associated with current U.S. satellite programs generally, and has also done a comprehensive round-up of AEHF Milstar III contracts that shows the key issues and their effects on program costs and schedule.

This slippage has forced Congressional notification, and it is also forcing a number of changes. Some of them are seeping into the TSAT program as well, as it incorporates AEHF lessons-learned into its acquisition strategy.

For instance, as a result of its AEHF Milstar III failures, National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01 is being revised to include information assurance readiness from agencies like the National Security Administration (NSA) as a critical factor at key decision points in space systems development. NSA, with community-wide support, is also attempting to establish a new space cryptographic research and development program to develop core information-assurance technologies that will be available for integration by new space programs, thus reducing concurrent development risk. More details regarding the AEHF program, measures taken, and TSAT can be found in this C4SIR Journal article: "First Launch of Advanced Communications Satellites Slips."

Other TSAT project approaches also derive from past experience. The decision to procure the ground-based TMOS separately from the TSAT SS satellites, for instance, is designed avoid some of the problems experienced with systems such as Wideband Gapfiller and the AEHF satellites which have their own specialized and incompatible ground systems. Another advantage is that the US military won't be forced to compromise between the development of the network and the development of the satellites as it selects vendors. With TMOS, the satellite component will be a router within the network, working with other systems and tying in with the whole concept of the TCA's Global Information Grid.

Which brings us to the associated question "which satellites will they be?" as we look at the TSAT program's looming issues and decisions.

TSAT: Program Issues & Decisions

In FY 2006, the US military will make a major decision: whether to limit the acquisition of the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) communications satellites in favor of developing a newer generation of laser-linked satellites, known as the Transformational Satellite Space Segment (TSAT SS).

The AEHF program is running over cost and schedule, but it incorporates more mature technologies. TSAT promises dramatically greater bandwidth and processing capabilities and is considered integral to DOD's efforts to network all of its weapon systems, but there is much less certainty as to how much the system will cost or when it can be delivered because critical technologies are less mature. Ultimately, the question facing the Transformational Communications Office is whether the TSAT program can successfully integrate leading-edge technologies in time to provide its advertised capabilities, or whether AEHF satellites with just 1/20 the bandwidth capacity represent a safer bet that is guaranteed to deliver something to a bandwidth-starved military.

The reality of space programs is harsh, and unbending. They cannot use the standard 'fly, fix, fly...' development approach because the vehicle is placed in orbit. Which means the Air Force has just one shot to be successful. This changes one's risk calculus, and one's systems engineering overhead and methodologies as well.

A General Accounting Office (GAO) report published in December 2004 faced this issue squarely. It recommended that TSAT be delayed until its critical technologies, such as laser optics, high-speed router and security algorithms, are more mature. Most of these technologies were rated at technology readiness level (TRL) 3 or 4 by the GAO, which translates as technologies in the study stage with some laboratory tests. The GAO also pointed to a lack of backup technologies for critical systems such as laser communications.

In response, the TSAT program took steps to address some of those gaps. One step was moving the launch date back from 2009 to 2012, in order to give technologies more time to develop. For instance, Lockheed Martin said recent developments in laser communications and space-qualified Internet protocol routers mean TSAT has a better chance at success. Another step was to award risk reduction contracts to study alternatives, refine the expected development path, and beef up preliminary research in key areas. These alternative possibilities include options that may sacrifice certain features for more proven alternatives.

A September 2005 GAO advisory noted improvements on the technology front, but integration remained a concern. As one Senate source told Aviation Week, integration of the technologies "can be a technology in and of itself, and hard to do, and that's where a lot of our space programs have failed."

Nor is that the only reason they have failed.

US House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee Chairman Terry Everett [R-AL] openly wonders: "Can the current acquisition system accommodate the risks associated with the current business model and actually produce what it promises?" When the deployment horizon is a decade out and end of service life is 35-50 years in the future, changing requirements can be hard on a program. Especially in a field exploding as fast as electronics and networking. That horizon itself can lead to serious problems with requirements creep - as ranking member Silvestre Reyes [D-TX] has noted: "We get started using a Volkswagen frame and then all the add-ons ... just completely overwhelm what we started with." Pedro Rustan, director of advanced systems and technology in the National Reconnaissance Office, concurs and adds that rigid requirements and budgetary compartmentalization plus a lack of program contingency funds are a recipe for trouble.

What we're seeing here is an age-old conflict between new technologies, which always involve a certain amount of risk, vs. an approach that sticks with mature technologies. Procurement approaches in need of reform exacerbate both the need to take the risks associated with the new new thing, and the level of the risk that results when one does so. It is not a pretty picture, and it can be found throughout the US military space programs. Barring sudden reform, however, decisions must be made within the environment one has, not the environment one wishes we had.

The bottom line remains. Mature technologies are less risky over the short term, but they limit innovation and may lack enough "upside" to meet longer-term needs. As an earlier DID article noted, if the goal of the current set of satellite systems is bleeding edge dominance for reasons of planning or policy, then given the requirements of space launches, the GAO's findings throughout the TSAT program are what one would expect as the price for having that capability potential.

Will the US continue to make that choice, and pay that price? Late 2006 - early 2007 will be a key go/no-go decision time for the TSAT's position within the overall Transformational Communications Architecture.

A decision to build AEHF #4 & 5 would indicate a feeling that TSAT was not going to be ready in time. That decision would then force a cascade of other decisions:

• Should the Department of Defense ask for an overall budget increase to pay for the additional AEHF satellites?
• Should it reduce other programs elsewhere to pay for them?
• Or should the DoD take the money out of the TSAT program in the short term, and stretch the TSAT program's timeline by funding it over a longer period?

Removing funds from TSAT delays the program further, and may increase its overall costs. That could require even more AEHF launches over that lengthened time frame in order to keep pace with front-line needs. The rising costs of TSAT can even become a self-fulfilling prophecy, tipping the cost/benefit balance even further toward deploying last-generation solutions. Something like this dynamic can already be seen in the F-22 Raptor fighter jet program, for instance. In addition, when we're talking about IT investments, each older satellite launched entrenches older architectures and so reduces future flexibility.

These dilemmas may be common to most cutting-edge military projects, but that does not make them any less formidable. Fortunately, as we've seen in the AEHF lessons learned section, the integrated nature of the Transformation Communication Architecture's programs can be a help as well as a hindrance.

Conclusion: TSAT's Competitors - and Its Fate

There is little question that high-bandwidth capabilities will be needed on the front lines, and soon. Network-centric warfare is here. Will the network it requires be there for America's military over the next 5 years? How about the next 25 years, which is the required planning horizon?

Making that happen won't be easy. Some failures and setbacks are inevitable. Yet there is little question that TCA is coming. One key issue is how well the Transformational Communications Office can leverage the failures into valuable lessons that help other TCA projects and programs succeed. If they're up to these challenges, the TCA still won't be a complete success and probably won't be on budget, either - but it will be good enough, overall, to meet many of its promises and make a big difference on future battlefields.

In the life and death arena of military purchases and global geopolitics, that would make the TCA's costs money well spent.

Which leads to our final question: will TSAT SS be part of that network?

One of the assumptions that's worth thinking about is whether the budget for TSAT will continue to be there. Consider current US budgetary realities, the ongoing and unpredictable cost of a global war, the coming "maintenance overhang" for worn out equipment, outside events, and finally a wide array of under-funded Pentagon programs that reaches far beyond just the space field. Trent Telenko is right to point out that under those circumstances, a $15-18 billion satellite network that could cost $20 billion or more in the end and won't be ready for another 10 years is a prime target for program cuts.

In terms of long term trends, Trent also notes that that narrowband satellites and MARTS-type high-altitude blimps for theater communications, wideband AEHF satellites for mission-critical high-bandwidth transfers like UAV video, encrypted communications via commercial satellite carriers, and laid fiber-optic cables for strategic communications are all beginning to appear on the scene.

Every one of these components is already deploying, and both the US military and global economic forces will continue to add to their availability. As such, one can also expect every one of these infrastructure pieces to become more prevalent in the coming years. Throw in the possibility of finding new ways to leverage existing systems, and this constellation definitely represents a potential "incremental competition" threat to TSAT.

Which is why another key issue for TSAT and TCA is how well the Transformational Communications Office and its programs are documenting their assumptions about the future, checking them periodically to ensure that those assumptions are still valid, and building upgradeability and flexibility into their platforms and plans so they can cope with changes to those assumptions. In other words, they'll need to be good at all the things Motorola didn't do with its disastrous IRIDIUM global cellular network, which ironically now carries narrowband traffic for the U.S. military at bargain prices.

Could TSAT share IRIDIUM's fate at an even earlier stage, shot down by a creeping incremental set of competitors even before it launches? It could. Could TSAT continue to improve, and turn out to be an expensive but important program success story? It could. Some of the choice between those fates lies in the hands of its contractors and managers. some of it lies in the upper reaches of the Pentagon. Some of its fate, however, lies entirely outside all of their hands.

In Chester's recent "Sinking Feeling" post about Iran, he threw in this very interesting excerpt from a history of The Great War (WW1):

"In 1915, whatever British strategists may have intended, the eastern front was the major theater because the Germans had decided to make it so. During the course of that year the German armies in the east inflicted such drastic defeats on Russia that her Western allies began to doubt her capacity, and even more the will of her government to carry on the war at all. It was the need to relieve the pressure in the east that compelled the French and the British armies to continue their offensive on the western front. There was no longer any expectation of a strategic breakthrough leading to a major decision: the object now was to pin down the German forces and exhaust them. It was a strategy determined by the French High Command, and one into which Kitchener allowed himself to be drawn only very unwillingly. But if he did not do so, he feared, not only the Russians but even the French (who had already suffered over a million casualties) might be tempted to make peace. It was at this stage that the truth broke in on him that one has to make war, not as one would like to, but as one must [emphasis added]."

Just so, and this is also true of "long fuse, big bang, high priced" weapons programs like TSAT. Necessity will have its day, and events will intervene - and on top of it all, the USA is at war. Like so many other US weapons programs, TSAT is now afloat on the tides of war, politics, chance, and change. Will it go under in the end, or come to safe harbor?

My prediction: TMOS will expand over time beyond its present scope, and will emerge as a key link and provisioning service for the USA's future military satellite and communications architecture. TSAT SS, on the other hand, is in for a much rougher ride. I'd give it even odds of cancellation by 2011 as US military recapitalization and budgetary realities hit, to be supplanted by continued growth around the "incremental alternatives" of blimps, fiber optic cable, et. al. described above.

We shall see.

(Coverage of this program will continue to be updated on an ongoing basis at Defense Industry Daily. See esp. the next section for ongoing events, contracts, reports, etc.).

TSAT: Timeline and Recent Developments

Lockheed Martin and Boeing have won a total of $514 million each in risk reduction contracts for the TSAT SS satellite system, in hopes of making a forced Plan B unnecessary. Meanwhile, the $2 billion TMOS ground-based network operations contract was awarded to a Lockheed-led team on January 26, 2006.

See the DID article for a full set of TSAT-related contract awards, related reports, and milestones, under the heading "TSAT: Timeline and Recent Developments."

Additional Readings & Sources: TSAT Background & Analysis

• Military Information Technology (June 13/05) - Satellite Transformation

• C4ISR Journal (March 2005) - TSAT Ground Network Promises Increased Data Flow

• National Defense Magazine (June 2004) - Expanding Communications

• SIGNAL Magazine, (February 2003) - Synchronicity Drives Transformational Communications: New space technologies offer a quantum leap in capabilities - if they work together

• GlobalSecurity.org - Transformational Communications Study

• Aviation Week's Aerospace Daily & Defense Report (Oct 24/05) - GAO Opinion Of TSAT Technologies Improves In Interim Report

• Space Review (Sept 6/05) - TSAT: unobtainium urgently needed. "If the space systems procurement people want to rebuild some confidence in the project, they might want to consider rethinking what they mean when they say 'risk reduction.' "

• Government Accountability Office report #GAO-05-570R (June 23/05) - Defense Acquisitions: Incentives and Pressures That Drive Problems Affecting Satellite and Related Acquisitions. Highlights the issue if technological maturity vs. future "headroom" capacity. See also GAO page.

• DID (April 29/05) - U.S. Satellite Program Delays & Costs Defended, Criticized. Includes excerpts from and links to the GAO Report #GAO-05-155 (Jan 28/05) - Technology Development: New DOD Space Science and Technology Strategy Provides Basis for Optimizing Investments, but Future Versions Need to Be More Robust), as well as details re: the new strategy and responses from members of the military.

• USAF AIM Points (April 4/05) - High stakes for high-tech war

• Marco Caceres of The Teal Group in American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics (AIAA) Industry Insights (Jan. 2002) - Military satellites: The next generation

Additional Readings & Sources: Related Programs

• Government Accountability Office report #GAO-04-858 (July 28/05) - Defense Acquisitions: The Global Information Grid and Challenges Facing Its Implementation. DOD plans to spend at least $21 billion through 2010 to build a core GIG capability. GAO was asked (1) to describe the GIG, including the concept, key acquisitions, and implementation and (2) to identify significant challenges facing DOD in implementing the GIG.

• Crosslink Magazine (Winter 2001/2002) - Future U.S. Military Satellite Communication Systems. Excellent overview and very informative graphics.Covers planned systems to 2010.

• TelecomWeb ViaSatellite.com articles. See esp. "The Military Sector: Doing Business With The Decisionmaker" [Part I | Part II]. Part I describes current US satellite programs and trends within the TCA's framework, while Part II focuses more on the doing business aspect.

• GlobalSecurity.org - Milstar-3 AEHF

• DID (Jan 16/06) - Lockheed Gets $491.2M for AEHF Satellite 3 and Launch Support. DID explains the AEHF program in depth, and adds a history of over $4 billion worth of AEHF-related contracts that clearly describe some of the issues the program has faced, their financial impacts, and some of the new system's capabilities.

• C4ISR Journal (January 4/05) - First Launch of Advanced Communications Satellites Slips. About the AEHF.

• GlobalSecurity.org - Wideband Gapfiller System

• DID (Nov 22/05) - 3 Wideband Gapfiller Satellites to Get Pedigree Reviews. The Pedigree Review rigorously audits all critical components and subsystems, and is designed to help ensure that the satellite will work fully in the "one chance to get it right" environment that characterizes space-based equipment. DID also adds links to analysis and data re: the WGS program itself.

• DID (Nov 4/05) - Pentagon's Global Broadcast System Matures. What do you do when bandwidth is tight, and you want to take the load off of your satellites but still get large files out into the field? Enter GBS, whose future is linked to the Wideband Gapfiller....

Additional Readings & Sources: TSAT-Related News

• DID (Jan 30/06) - Lockheed's Team Wins $2.02 Bn TSAT-TMOS Contract. This $2.02 billion cost-plus award fee contract is for the TSAT's ground-based Mission Operations System (TMOS). Raytheon and Northrop-Grumman has also received research funds

• C4ISR Journal (Jan 20/06) - Congress Gives U.S. Air Force Half of T-Sat Budget Request

• KTHV, Little Rock, AK (Oct 18/05) - NE Ark Technology Company Wins Contract. Space Photonics' contract was for laser communications work.

• DID (July 15/05) - $53.8M for Steerable Laser Communications Systems R&D

• DID (July 15/05) - AMU A Bright Spot on the Satellite Horizon. This little program did a lot to bring down the cost of TSAT, AEHF, et. al.

• GovExec.com (July 13/05) - Subcommittee raps space program costs, delays

• MarketWatch (July 13/05) - Lockheed satellites face delays unless government comes through. Refers to the AEHF Program, and NSA issues getting the required cryptography to Lockheed.

• Boeing Release (July 7/05) - TSAT SS Completes Major Design Review

• Lockheed Martin Release (July 6/05) - Lockheed Martin Team Successfully Completes Key Design Milestone For Transformational Communications Program. Contains useful details re: the ISSDR process.

• Military Information Technology (June 13/05) - Network of Nations. Describes the U.S. military's role as a satellite communications supplier to allies in Iraq.

• DID (April 28/05) - U.S. Air Force Updates Space Acquisition Policy

• EETimes (April 6/05) - Raytheon demonstrates software for T-SAT Ground Stations

• USAF News Release (Sept. 3/02) - Transformational Communications Office Formed

Additional Readings & Sources: Related Analysis

• DID (Oct 10/05) - Australia Details Plans for Network Centric Warfare. Contains links to many of DID articles about NCW, and its implementation in various countries.

• Dartmouth college, Tuck School of Business - Learning from Corporate Mistakes: The Rise and Fall of Iridium (see also PDF version). A compelling cautionary tale from the corporate sector that illustrates the perils of not re-examinaing and challenging one's assumptions in the middle of the process. Motorola did not. Result: Iridium's market didn't need it any more, but Iridium didn't have the bandwidth to do much else. Motorola took a $1 billion loss, and Iridium became one of the 20 largest bankruptcies in US history.

• Clay Shirky's "Permanet, Nearlynet, and Wireless Data" offers some useful insights as well, though it's important to remember that unlike corporate executives, militaries really do need connectivity anywhere as a life-and-death matter and this changes some of the dynamics involved.

• Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute - Using the Technology Readiness Levels Scale to Support Technology Management in the DoD's ATD/STO Environments. Includes the TRL scale.