General Adnan Thabit seems to be playing something like this role... leader of the anti-insurgent commandos, creator of the popular TV show "Terrorism in the Grip of Justice", which shows captured insurgents confessing to their crimes, as well as a former general in Saddam's army and a Sunni.

He (and his troops) are profiled in today's NYT magazine by Peter Maass. You can read it here

So I've made the big time! Woo hoo. Thanks to Joe & AL for posting this, but mainly I wanted to point to a new Peter Maas article in the NY Times magazine. (pointed out to me by Praktike) Maas writes about two ex-Baathist, largely Sunni, "Special Police Commando" counter-insurgency units led by General Adnan Thabit. The Maas article goes into quite a bit of detail, and deals with a lot of the issues that I was wondering about, along with some others, like un-American levels of brutality by the commando units (with American soldiers having to look the other way).

As Praktike says, definitely a must-read. The more I'm learning about the situation, the more I think the authorities are doing most of what they reasonably can. I don't think the Shiites will be short-sighted enough not to find a role for ex-Baathists like Adnan & Naqib & al-Halafi & Muther (all mentioned in the Peter Maas article). I expect the Shiites and the ex Baathists will work together, if grudgingly, especially after the last few days of violence.

Which gets to the larger question of where the insurgents are coming from, how many are there, how much civilian support they have among the various tribes & factions, where they're getting their explosives from, and how to stop them. All stuff which I don't know very much about, and have nothing in particular to say, except good luck to the good guys.

You're absolutely right. KPS Gill is an amazing leader - but note that he was a commissioner of police, and believed that he was basically doing his job. He's not a politician, and never ran for office.

The dynamics behind the actions/motivations of a career politician and a member of the domestic security apparatus are fundamentally different.

That is an important difference between KPS Gill and Sheikh Yawar.

Also, as much as I admire KPS Gill, he often used extra-judicial measures to win the war against terror in Punjab, and must have killed a number of innocents as well, but not intentionally, and in small numbers. This is an aspect of successful counter-insurgency methods that the Iraqis and Americans cannot afford to be queasy about.

>"as much as I admire KPS Gill, he often used extra-judicial measures to win the war against terror in Punjab"

I'm not saying you're wrong, but FWIW, Gill denies this. This is from a 1997 rediff chat:

"Buddy (Wed Jun 11 1997 21:12 IST)
MR. GILL I HAVE HEARD THAT YOU DIDN'T SPARE EVEN AN FRIEND OF TERRORIST OR A PERSON WHO EVEN ONCE MET THAT TERRORIST..WOULD U PLS. COMMENT....

K P S Gill (Wed Jun 11 1997 21:18 IST)
Buddy: What you have heard is a calumny. When we found that quite a number of terrorists were continuing to engage us in gun fights, we took a conscious policy by telling them: Come and surrender before and we shall take a lenient view of what has happened. Thousands surrendered. These were active terrorists, not their friends. Although there are certain text books on terrorism which advise this course of action, fortunately I did not learn my work on the anti-terrorist front from any text book. The death of terrorists caused me as much anguish as the death of my policemen and officers."

RV -- I'm sorry I think the terrorists will be crushed only by killing them all (there seems to be a very limited number of them). The terrorist strategy is to kill enough people, and destroy enough infrastructure, to make Iraq ungovernable and allow them to shoot their way into power after forcing the Americans to run away. The Mogadishu strategy writ large (or Lebanon, West Bank/Gaza/Intafada, etc).

It had worked before in circumstances where Western powers were not really interested in paying a full bloody price, and the terrorists are figuring this will work again, the Former Regime Elements thinking it's their way back to Saddam 2.0; the Jihadis figuring it's the way to the new Caliphate. Neither seems realistic but then neither was Japanese kamikaze attacks at Okinawa (the war was already lost then). Just like the Japanese figured to kill enough Americans to negotiate favorable terms for themselves, so too do the Sunnis now.

Ultimately, the Shia will simply tire of being tolerant (by the standards of the Middle East) and will unleash a bloodbath that will solve the problem. The Sunnis seem married to this strategy and don't see their dangers. I don't think anyone can function to bring them out of this until it's too late and their own community starts to horrifically suffer. Right now they seem to have convinced themselves they are winning their attrition war (stupid when you're only 22% of the population but then, that's the Middle East and it worked for other minorities such as the Alawites of Syria).

a very limited number = all sunni arabs

The easiest way to crush the insurgents is to kick out the Americans but the party that controles the goverment (Iran) doesn't want that to happen because that would free the Americans up to treaten Iran

Consider this chain of reasoning -

1. The Sunnis fear that without something to restrain them, the Shia and the Kurds will massacre them all. They have the ability and they have the motivation.

2. The US is a restraining force - wholesale massacre is not a forseeable US policy, despite what anybody thinks over on Democrat Underground.

3. THEREFORE, it is in the Sunni interest to keep American occupation forces in Iraq.

4. If Iraq is peaceful, the US forces may leave.

5. The Shia and Kurds will then be free to conduct their extermination program.

6. So to prevent #5, it is vital to prevent #4.

7. THEREFORE, a program of low-level atrocities will continue, with the aim of keeping the US in, not driving it out.

Just idle speculation, of course.

I have seen counter-insurgency firsthand and the only effective method to combat it is removing popular support. This is a Sunni insurgency with some foreign jihadis thrown in, the key is getting the Sunnis to stop supporting or ignoring the insurgents. This is a campaign we are winning as tips are increasing and more insurgents are scarfed up. My friends have indicated the number of actionable tips has increased steadily and they think this latest wave of attacks is due to fear of capture.

Roublen is absolutely correct that now a Sunni must stand up and say "STOP! This gains us nothing. We now own our country, let's govern peacefully with our Kurdish and Shia brothers". He is also correct that this person should have military or police credibility and not clerical or administrative. Not to demean KPS Gill, but Buford Pusser in a dashiki clearing out the bad guys would be right on time.

Fun stuff people and excellent reading.

Cordially,

Uncle J

Military Matters

Sorry, but finding KPS Saddam should have been solved before March 2003. That is, of course, if it really was all about spreading democracy. Surely, someone here can point me to the definitive "How we'll get the Baathists to play nice and accept minority status" in one of the thoughtful spread-democracy blogs before the war. No?

Sistani and Shia leadership have done an amazing job keeping their flock on the leash and managing us. But too many have too much to lose. It's going to get alot worse before it gets any better.