Juan Cole musters all of his dismal enthusiasm for the Heroic Iraqi People's Army:

Most of the violence in Iraq is being undertaken by Baathists or Iraqi nationalists ... We historians don't believe in the great man theory, unlike the Bush administration. Zarqawi leads a social movement of several hundred persons, if he exists at all. If he is killed, the social movement will just go on.

"Social movement", ha ha ha. "Historians", ha ha ha ha.

Could the logic be any more reactionary? Zarqawi might not exist at all, Cole says - but if he does exist, it's apparently impossible for him to go to Syria, because Syrian Baathists are afraid of "Sunni Fundamentalists". (Even possibly nonexistent ones who waver between life and death.) But if Zarqawi's very existence is in doubt, how does Cole even know he's a Sunni? And if "Sunni Fundamentalists" are so piddling in number compared to the awesome "Iraqi nationalists", then why are the Syrians so afraid of this theoretical individual?

Cole has got all the bases covered, he thinks: Zarqawi can be real, not real, alive, wounded, dead, in Syria or not in Syria, "it doesn't matter". He can't be wrong no matter what. But let the administration venture an opinion on one of these possibilities and Cole will jump out of the bushes with his charges of lies, propaganda, and distortion.

So if the Bush Admin. thinks Zarqawi is real, he must be a fable. If they think he's dead he must be alive, and if they think he was in Syria he must be elsewhere. But if Cole is wrong in any of these assessments, it doesn't matter, because he was against the whole deal to begin with. This is the Infallible Contrarian Theory of History.

Finally, since it is Bush who must frequently explain that OBL is not the whole ball game, I don't think it's fair to accuse him of believing in the Great Man theory. Obviously the University of Michigan doesn't believe in it either.

This would be a great time to go back over the theories that Deep Throat was a composite figure, wouldn't it?

Big Man theories look like the present day version of conspiracy theories. They're grist for the rumor mill, and remember these journalists/columnists have to write something to sell to the public. It's not reason to take comfort when the 'mot' of the day fits the needs of either side.

Well, Glen, given that the insurgency quieted down for a bit after the capture of S.H. but then roared back to life last April, I tend to think that Dr. Cole is right that a capture or kill of Z will have little effect on the Iraqi unpleasantness. There are lots of Ba'athists who are no longer running the show but want to be. As long as these guys remain, there's going to be an insurgency.

To be sure, "we historians" are quite partial to conspiracy theories involving Zionists and/or Israelis and/or Jews and/or neocons.

If the administration was really in the clear on it's influence and use of pre-war intelligence, why did Pat Roberts stop the 2nd half of the Intelligence Committee's report from proceeding? It's sad when friendly senators have to do a pre-emptive whitewash.

I don't believe it's so much stopped as it is delayed for at least the foreseeible future. And given that absolutely none of the charges that have been loudly and widely bantered about bore out in the first phase of the investigation (and, as I said, the absence of proof of wrong-doing is in and of itself evidence of a conspiracy) I can certainly understand their reasons for doing so.

Look, I'm not trying to draw the thread too far afield here, but whenever an investigation into something is short-circuited, it's almost never because of an abundance of innocence on the part of the entity being looked into. Roberts's decision is prima facie evidence that there's more than a little substance to the fact that the administration looked for any reason to go to war. As time goes by, other evidence has surfaced backing this up; for example, in the past few weeks alone both the Downing Street Minutes and the disclosure of Bolton's role in wrongfully removing Jose Bustani from his arms-control position. Roberts and the White House know the score, so they won't let anything approaching an unstacked deck examine the facts.

I don't consider this hijacking the thread as long as the discussion remains civil, but let me just point out again that a lot of the anti-war mantras about intelligence being deliberately manipulated by the administration simply didn't pan out in the SSIC report. If you look at just the terrorism section of the report, for instance, and compare it to what was being alleged in the press and even more so in anti-war circles, a lot of stuff simply that was being parroted around simply didn't pan out. Hundreds of CIA analysts were interviewed, for instance, and not one of them made anything resembling claims that they had been forced to alter their conclusions by the administration to support the case for war.

Moreover, Roberts isn't alone in having access to all this information. There are a lot of Democrats are on the SSIC and if they wanted to push the investigation forward they almost certainly could. Failing that, they could always go public with what they know. The fact that they aren't doing so is, if nothing else, enough to make a counter-claim that they know just as well as anybody in the White House what's there and they know that there isn't enough (or, dare I say, anything, as has been the case with previous accusations) to get into a major fight over.

Sam

are you saying that its wrong to assemble more supports for your decision after you have made it ?

I do that all the time, how about you ?

You could call that "fixing the facts around the policy"

And after the invasion we find mass graves of kids, and pet tigers made fat on kidnapped 14 year old school girls after they lost their value as sex toys. Plastic shredders used to make humans into fish food, and generally discover the killing fields of babylon.

The left throwing invectives themselves at us depict themselves as amoral creatures deserving contempt, as well as nuts.

Behold the leftist jihad against the good and the decent.

Syria has an interest in failure in Iraq, Asad and his klan knows that success in Iraq spells their doom.

Its interesting to note, that it dont have to, even Saddam could have remained in power if he had opened up his county.

But even Saddam thought that the risk of standing trial for crimes agaist humanity or death was better than opening up the secrets of Iraq.

Which shouts loudly at all except the nutbar moonbats and their foil hats.

Asad is maing a similar mistake, he too, thinks the secrets of Syria are too important to risk the inevitable exposure freedom on his border would bring.

This too, shout loudly to all, except the moonbats.

At its root, this is what they have against the Jews in the ME, their blooming desert, clean city kosher food affluence and democracy shine the spotlight on Arab failure.

There are a lot of Democrats are on the SSIC and if they wanted to push the investigation forward they almost certainly could.

Since roughly half of the Democrats on the SSIC voted to authorize the war, perhaps the Democrats are not united on this one. For instance, there was a certain awkwardness when Sen. Durbin of Illinois voted against the word because the intelligence wasn't convincing enough, while his colleague, Sen. Kerry said the intelligence was convincing. Implicit in this difference of views is that some Senators feel that they were fooled and some of their colleagues agree.

But, Dan, why should the Democrats alone have to push for the report to be finished (and, as everyone knows, even if they do it never will be)? What is Roberts' objection here? The goal of the committee was to examine 10 areas of prewar intelligence, and as Rockefellar says, "we completed only 5 in this report." That is a halfway, unfinshed job. Furthermore, it's cerainly in the national interest to see how the Pentagon, OSP, and OVP produced and interpreted pre-war intelligence, and to see how they interacted with the CIA.

It's also, in light of the events of the occupation, certainly in the national interest to see those groups assessments for post-war Iraq, because that issue can't be seperated from the pre-war decisionmaking. Same with Ahmed Chalabi and every other manner of direct stovepiping (Curveball, etc.).

If Roberts wants to claim, as he did at the release press conference, that "Finally, the committee found no evidence that the intelligence community’s mischaracterization or exaggeration of intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities was the result of politics or pressure," I simply don't see, first of all how he can make that claim if he stopped the process into its verification, and, secondly, if it is true why he wouldn't go ahead with the 2nd half.

You can even see evidence of that at the very same press conference, when he said "Fifth, the committee concluded there was a failure by intelligence community managers to adequately encourage analysts to challenge their assumptions, to fully consider alternative arguments, to accurately characterize intelligence reporting and to counsel analysts who had lost their objectivity." If Roberts is willing to concede that, well, does it sound unconnected to 2nd half? No, it sounds quite integral.

So, again, it just seems obvious that the SSIC could not be allowed to investigate the 2nd half of its mandate because its findings would be damaging to the administration to a degree they simply will not accept. Roberts' pre-emption was damage control that sacrificed an analysis of the national security and intelligence policy processes for political expediency. Roberts got leaned on to shut the thing down, and he delivered.

And one other thing; it's not as if these issues were covered by the Iraq Intelligence Commission either, because their charge was fundamentally the same as what the SSCI actually produced. The IIC didn't look at OSP, OVP, just CIA. Not unimportant, but not even close to getting the whole story.

And, again, there's a reason for it.

SamAm, the Downing Street Memo does not actually support your claim for it. The memo - once actually read - actually reflects the administration discussing the practical aspects of the decision. And it doesn't reflect an administration that is making up a WMD issue, as several points in the memo actually contemplate the political costs if Iraq uses WMD against the attacking troops.

Like so many things in the history of the Iraq war, the anti-war memes are mostly mythology.

Quoting Dearlove,

"It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran."

Really, can that be at all disputed? No. The decision to go to war was made well in advance of the administration's public moves. And if you look at the response of both the Blair and Bush administrations, neither has come close to engaging on the issue in regards to the specific assertions.

The notion that Iraqi WMD threatened the security of the United States and its allies, the prime public rationale for starting the war, is belied by many, many data points, and is not seriously contested today. Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction. I would leave with one point in regards to that, because it is the freshest in my mind right now; the several weeks delay in sending US military teams to secure sites across Iraq where we believed either weapons or dual use technology to be located. Not the actions of a government even 10 percent as worried as it claimed to be.

SamAm, you are misrepresenting the arguments that the Bush administration made. A common action as has been noted here so often before.

I notice you try to claim that the administration wasn't really worried about WMD but you don't quote the section of the memo that expresses concerns about the risks of having Iraq use WMD on attacking troops. Selective quotation - its such a damning thing don't you think?

It also amuses me that the most damning thing you can find in the memo states that the Bush administration was ... oh, the horror ... planning. The opinion on the "evidence" is that of the memo author and isn't at all significant.

The bottom line is that the Downing Street Memo is something that - when looked at honestly - does not present anything at all like the smoking gun that you wish it did. The claims for it are really all misrepresentations.

That, in the context of a war started ostensibly for reasons regarding WMD, the British military was concerned about the use of WMD either against them, Kuwait, or Israel isn't surprising. But what is surprising, and what slams home the fact that the threat of Iraqi WMD 1)was trumped up before the war and 2) did not materialize on the field of battle for the reason that there was no actual substance to the threat is the admission, in the minutes, and confirmed by events in the past 2 years, that Iraq lagged behind North Korea, Iran, and even Libya in their WMD capabilities. No one disagrees with that today. But this wasn't something that smacked the world over the head one day in the summer of 2003; it was suspected by both the United States and the United Kingdom before the war. And if that fact had been admitted publicly by either government, we would not have gone to war.

Furthermore, the Bush administration was not "just planning," as anyone familiar with the Pentagon's strategic planning process can tell you. The machinery behind the invasion was clanking along far ahead of the public face the administration presented. The upshot of that is that the national debate on the subject, the congressional and UN action, and our conferences with nations that did and did not end up supporting the war took place under fundamentally false pretenses. The administration acted like there were ways in which a vast array of possible US actions could be taken, while in fact they had decided there could be only one. In a democracy, that is a surefire way to lose a war. It's wrong, flat wrong. It's also a fast way to lose the trust of other nations. The United Kingdom, for example, will not for some time be able to support us militarily in any undertaking that's controversial. They don't even look to be staying in Iraq as long as the US, if you've seen the news out of Basra re; Iraqification of security and moving forces to Afganistan.

And as for Richard Dearlove, he was only the head of external security agency of our nation's closest ally. That doesn't make him right, but it does make his assessment worth listening to, especially because, from what the past 2 years have shown, he got it more right than most others.

SamAm:

The Democrats should have to push for the report because they're the ones who are claiming (at least to their activist base) that there is cover-up because their conspiracy theories haven't panned out. I also tend to take issue with your interpretation of Roberts's claims, especially given that there is a whole host of information at least with regard to the terrorism section of the SSIC report on the topic of how the various intelligence agencies interacted with Feith's people. Bottom line: it wasn't what all the anti-war folks had been claiming.

And dare I suggest that what "seems obvious" to you does not strike me as the same? I have no problem with putting the final report off given that the only stuff that would appear to have been left out is yet another attempt for the Democrats to play Ahab to Feith's Moby Dick. There remains little if any acknowledgement that the overwhelming (dare I say, the totality?) of claims that were made against the administration with respect to intelligence manipulation at least as they applied to the CIA simply were not true or supported by a bipartisan congressional investigation.

As to your claims that the US government knew that there were no WMDs before the war, to be quite frank no one in government has been alleging this, even the people for whom it would certainly politically advantageous to do so. Ergo, by the same logic you utilize in order to "prove" that Roberts was leading a cover-up of the SSIC investigation disproves what appears to be one of your own core fides.

The report is unfinished, and will never be finished, despite the mandate agreed to by the committee. It's not a conspiracy theory to suggest a cover-up is at work, it is in fact the simplist and most logical conclusion; a sidelined investigation doesn't happen out of an abundance of innocence on the institutions skating by, but because of the damage which would result from the work being completed. There is a great deal of history regarding the run-up to the war that has specifically avoided scrutiny, by both the SSCI and the IIC (Chalabi, OSP, OVP, the accurate INR reports, among others were never looked into the way the CIA was. Why are they so deserving of exemption? Are they not relevant to our intelligence gathering process?). These issues have not been resolved. The CIA was never the intelligent branch most responsible for the information that led up to the war, no doubt why it has recieved the most scrunity in the aftermath. The entire "alternate" intelligence operations were set up because the administration believed (and specifically in regard to the public relations campaign) the CIA to be too conservative in its estimations (but of course the CIA wasn't conservative enough, even though it had at the time quite good reasons to be so, especially in regard to Iraq's status in the hierarchy of rogue states). That fact has never been addressed by either the congress or the administration. The cherry-picking, the browbeating, the stovepiping, the Team B-ism, none of it has been reckoned with, all of the problems the administration and the report laid at the feet of the CIA were found in greater extent in the other, "political" operations, and the analysis of the CIA itself remains fundamentally incomplete, if less so than in comparison to its brethren.

This was a strong-arm move out of a very justified fear of what an investigation that didn't have huge blinders slapped on its purview would turn up. It's not a principled move, and, now that the election has come and gone, it can't even be defended on reasonable partisan grounds. An intelligence community that eludes bipartisan congressional scrutiny is one that will willingly fail America in the future just as it has in the past.

SamAm:

It's a conspiracy theory insofar as you are postulating that a conspiracy took place to cover up evidence and even further expanding that theory to allege (or at least strongly imply) that the US government never believed that there was any threat posed by Iraqi WMDs.

As far as your list of what has avoided scrutiny, many of the topics you raise are addressed in the SSIC report. Chalabi and the INC are discussed, as is Feith and Cheney's visits to the CIA that detractors of the war continue to claim occurred in order to manipulate intelligence, a belief not supported by the evidence in the report. All of these were addressed in so far as they related to the charges of manipulation of intelligence in the SSIC report. Bottom line is that nothing was found to support all of the allegations that had been flung about beforehand.

As far as your claims:

bq. The CIA was never the intelligent branch most responsible for the information that led up to the war, no doubt why it has recieved the most scrunity in the aftermath. The entire "alternate" intelligence operations were set up because the administration believed (and specifically in regard to the public relations campaign) the CIA to be too conservative in its estimations (but of course the CIA wasn't conservative enough, even though it had at the time quite good reasons to be so, especially in regard to Iraq's status in the hierarchy of rogue states). That fact has never been addressed by either the congress or the administration.

No offense, but a lot of what your stating here, in particular with your claim that the CIA never the intelligence branch responsible for the information that led to the war simply is not the case. Powell's case at the UN, which was pretty much the embodiment of US PR efforts, is chronicled in detail in the SSIC report and the overwhelming majority of it came from the CIA.

As far as the alternative analysis was concerned, that was done primarily by Feith's people and none of the conclusions it reached, right or wrong, didn't filter into the public statements of anyone in the administration. If you go back through the SSIC report and compare it to public statements by administration officials, you'll see the basis for just about everything that was conveyed to the general public, in many cases in the plain text of the report itself. So whatever conclusions the OSP reached (and I'll be more than happy to defend their terrorism research, but that's a discussion for another time ...) they clearly weren't relevant to the public case for war.