Operation Thunder has temporarily put a dent in the car bombings in Baghdad. Mohammed from Iraq the Model provides a situation report based on the local Iraqi media, and states "The last 24 hours or so resulted in arresting some 300 terrorists and suspects in addition to confiscating amounts of weapons." The number of arrests stemming from Thunder is well over a thousand. The insurgency appears to have pulled up shop and moved north, executing a series of four attacks directed at Iraqi security forces. The Coalition is conducting an offensive in Tal Afar, and as mentioned last weekend, an additional 4,000 US troops have deployed to the Mosul – Tal Afar region. This is twice the amount of men used in Matador and New Market combined.
James Janega of the Chicago Tribune reports on the scarcity of US and Iraqi troops available to secure the Anbar province. He Estimates 4,000 Marines are patrolling about 30,000 square miles of territory. For good or ill, the strategy in the Wild West of Anbar appears to be one of establishing distinct garrisons in locations such as Qaim, Haditha and other locations, patrolling the territory, conduct search and destroy missions at opportune times when targets and threats materialize, and waiting for Iraqi security forces to train up and deploy to fill the security needs of the region.
Michael Schwartz of the Asia Times states the rise in the use of car bombings (a quick look at the numbers) as a tactic of choice against police and civilian targets is working against insurgency. Mr. Schwartz is no 'neo-con or Iraq hawk; he writes for MotherJones.com, mind you. The insurgency has abandoning idea of infiltrating/co-opting local police as Coalition shifted tactics by deploying troops from outside regions, and the car bomb attacks are alienating large segments of the population.
But there is another aspect to these attacks that is even more symptomatic of a shift in the resistance strategy: the targeting of police and police recruits. While these attacks have occurred in the past, they have now become the key weapon in the resistance struggle against Iraqi armed forces, replacing one that was almost its direct opposite.Before the current campaign, most of the resistance attempted to co-opt, rather than defeat, the Iraqi police and National Guard. The patterns were simple: when police and the national guard were stationed in cities, the resistance would cooperate with them in enforcing criminal law, delivering criminals to them and avoiding armed conflict, except when they participated in campaigns against the resistance itself. When the US called on local Iraqi forces to fight the resistance, the resistance would issue an appeal for the Iraqi armed forces to defect or abandon their posts and melt into the population. In virtually every important confrontation police stations were abandoned to the resistance, Iraqi units deserted and went home rather than fight other Iraqis, and some even joined the resistance and fought the Americans. The most highly visible of such cases occurred in the two battles in Fallujah last year and the confrontations in Sadr City, where the US could not mobilize any Iraqi units except those from the Kurdish areas.
This strategy was more successful than preventing the recruitment of police and national guards, since it created a "Trojan Horse" supplied and trained by the US that was frequently an ally and almost never the enemy. In Mosul, for example, US reliance on the local police allowed the resistance to take over the city (during the battle of Fallujah, when the US forces were otherwise occupied) with almost no fighting. A force of 3,000 policemen simply melted into the population (except those that joined the rebels) and left their weapons and supplies behind.
This new car-bomb strategy will therefore hurt the resistance whether it succeeds or fails. Any reduction in the size of the army will be more than offset by the antagonism to the resistance among the surviving forces, definitively undermining the "Trojan Horse" strategy.
So why have at least some elements of the rebellion abandoned the co-optation strategy? The most important answer lies in changes in US policy for deploying Iraqi military forces. Until last fall, the US recruited local residents for the local police force and assigned army units with matching ethno-religious backgrounds to local patrols. That is, they recruited Fallujans to police and patrol in Fallujah, Ramadans in Ramadi and Sadr City residents in Sadr City. When this was not possible, Sunnis were assigned to Sunni areas; Shi'ites were assigned to Shi'ite areas.
The adaptation of the Coalition in Iraqi force deployments demonstrates the recognition of shortcomings in past policies and the adaptability to the situation on the ground. Mr. Schwartz predicts the use of outside Iraqi security forces in local areas will lead to a rise in sectarian strife, a fair conclusion. Time will tell, but the Iraqi government has been successful at suppressing the desire for Shiite and Kurdish elements from retaliating against the Sunni butchers.
A. Heather Coyne, the chief of party of US Institute of Peace activities in Iraq, pens an opinion piece in the Christian Science Monitor titled Far from media focus: steady democratic progress in Iraq (hattip Austin Bay). Ms. Coyne states that while the media appears to be all over the map with respect to the situation in Iraq, the progress towards democracy in Iraq has been one of steady, behind the scenes progress. Her analysis is not viewed through rosy glasses alone, she recognizes the obstacles that remain in both the security and political realm.
Take the security situation, for example. The threat has not decreased, nor have the insurgents lost their will or capability to inflict damage. But behind the headlines of the recent spate of attacks, the step-by-step approach is gaining momentum. Iraq is producing new police and military forces that are gradually winning the confidence of the people they serve - so much so that the public is providing more and more valuable information on insurgent activity. That enables the weapons cache seizures and high profile arrests that then increase public respect for the forces, which helps with recruiting and decreases support for the insurgents. While the media continue their longstanding tendency to focus on the most dramatic and destructive events - the capture of a terrorist, a deadly attack - the real story changes too gradually to make headlines: the steady stream of volunteers at recruiting stations that bit by bit brings force numbers up to significant levels, the increasing numbers of tips to the police, the growing sense of public ownership of the newly trained forces.
Ms. Coyne provides examples in the political realm as well (see additional examples from MilBloggers Major K. and Chuck).We again return to the intrepid bloggers of Iraq the Model to provide one of those underreported successes that can change the landscape of Iraq. The Iraqi Assembly has agreed to disbanding the militias of the political parties and suggests integrating them into the national army and other security services. This should go a long way to quell Mr. Schwartz's fears of pending sectarian violence, but don't count on it.
Iraq the Model:
"Generally speaking, Baghdad looks quieter these days "
I will accept that as evidence of improvement in OUTPUTS. I look forward to more.
"The most highly visible of such cases occurred in the two battles in Fallujah last year and the confrontations in Sadr City, where the US could not mobilize any Iraqi units except those from the Kurdish areas. "
Is this true?
liberalhawk,
Yes & no.
During Fallujah I, The "Fallujah Brigade' Melted away. The Iraqi battalion and accompanying police and special forces units that faught in Falluja II fought well.
There also were some successes and failures in Sadr City. Mr. Schwartz's characterization of these events as complete failures by the Iraqi forces is innacurate.
Please forgive me if this posting seems inappropriate. I need a favor from Conservative political blogs. If you have a moment, please read this posting on my blog, and then let me know when I can return the favor. Thanks.
http://nickiegoomba.blogspot.com/2005/06/nickie-goomba-is-asking-favor.html
Bill:
Schwarz seems to be saying that the upsurge in car bomb attacks represents a change in strategy on the part of Iraqi insurgents and only a small amount of the bombings are attributable to Zarqawi and other non-Iraqi terrorists. This is a real departure from everything I have read on car bombers and other suicide attacks. What little data was available after the fact indicated a large proportion were foreigners probably because the Iraqi insurgents were less willing to blow themselves up. I wonder where Schwarz got his data from to make statements such as this: "It is this growing isolation of Zarqawi that makes the car-bombing offensive all the more significant. It is being carried out by elements of the resistance who do not traditionally target civilians. And while they are not targeting them in this campaign, neither are they attempting to avoid civilian casualties."
He also implies that the attacks are becoming sectarian: "Another, more immediate, indication lies in the fact that virtually all of the car bombs are directed against primarily Shi'ite armed forces. In fact, the bombings tend to be in Shi'ite areas of town (where Shi'ite recruits or police congregate) so that the civilian victims are also Shi'ite. While such targeting is "logical" in some abstract sense, the attacks are inevitably seen as anti-Shi'ite." It has been overwhelming obvious to me at least that Shiites have always been targets for the apparent purpose of creating violent factions in Iraqi. So this is nothing new. Why Schwarz seems to think it is is a mystery to me.
Hello PeterArgus,
It seems very clear to me Mr. Schwartz is attempting to minimize the participation of al Qaeda in the suicide bombing attempts. I strongly disagree with this and the data does not seem to support his views. I linked to and cited his article for several reasons: he is in the opposition to the Iraq war; I want readers to see the alternative views; and while I do not agree with all of his points, I think the crux of his argument - that suicide bombs are alienating the Iraqis - is correct based on everything I have read. I expected questions on segments of his article.
I fully agree on the sectarian violence issue. We knew this was official al Qaeda's strategy since Zarqawi's memo to bin Laden last year. Mr. Schwartz seems to be blaming this on the Baathist factions of the insurgency and giving al Qaeda a pass, without looking at the origins of this strategy and the members who are executing it.
Bill:
I agree with you on the point you made and it is a good one. It seems like a lot of people have been pondering the meaning, if any, of a suicide-bombing campaign which is about anything but "winning hearts and minds". They all agree that it is most probably counterproductive for the insurgents. My question was really just a request for information: does Schwarz know something we don't? And judging from your response it seems like he is winging it on the two points I raised.
Thanks for your response.
PeterArgus,
Any time, and my apologies if I misunderstood your question. Mr. Schwartz seems to be "fixing the intelligence" on some issues to give the appearance of a popular insurgency and minimal al Qaeda participation. Whodathunkit?
"The Iraqi battalion and accompanying police and special forces units that faught in Falluja II fought well.
There also were some successes and failures in Sadr City."
yes I knew that. I meant was it true (ive seen it claimed elsewhere as well) that they (the units that fought well) were all Kurds?
Suicide bombing campaigns have always occurred as security in an area improved. It is a fairly effective techinique to intimidate the local police force. The US cleans out an area, sets up a local police force, suicide bombers hit the police force, local police force becomes blind,deaf and dumb, terrorists move back in.
It has been repeated over and over again. The recent difference is that the IP/IA have stayed in place.
IMHO the Association of Muslim(Sunni) Scholars is screaming because the size of their real support base will become apparent as the predominately Sunni area's have effective security.
liberalhawk,
I do not know the breakdowns. My understanding is that the special forces and police battalions are not made up of Kurds exclusively, and these units participated in the operations. I can't find the article at this time (still searching) but it was on the commander of an Iraqi special forces unit (he is a Sunni) and it indicated the unit was a mix of Sunnis, Kurds and Shiites. This unit fought in Fallujah II and I believe in Sadr City as well.
James Janega's piece reminded me of garrisons in the Old West.
So long as US/Iraqi forces are not penned into their camps, but instead maintain a steady (if not increasing) pace of patrols, ambushes, S&D missions, etc., it would seem that they are likely to have as much success as the US Cavalry did against the Indians.
No, that doesn't mean there won't be battles, or even disasters (such as the Fetterman Fight), but I have to wonder whether the analogy isn't appropriate, especially if, off to the side, is massive airpower and heavy forces, ready to provide support?
Lurking Observer,
I think you made an excellent historical analogy that has not occurred to me. The addition of air/UAV combat power gives the outposts additional punch. From my varied reading, the units are not tied down in based but are able to patrol with success (the recent find of the huge underground complex is but one example). Also, Strategy Page indicates that the locals are being warned to police their communities or it will be done for them, and warns the Iraqi Army is preparing to move in.
That and some additional info tells me it's time for another post.....
I've also posted about the recent operations in Baghdad and Anbar province at my blog. This may be the final push necessary to defeat the organized Sunni-inspired insurgency.
If so, then the Iraqi phase of the Global War on Terror will pretty much be over. What next? That's what future entries at my blog will cover. (Shameless plug #464)
I'm having a dickens of a time squaring Mr. Roggio's upbeat and subjective assessment of the terrorist war in Iraq with the only means of which I am aware to accurately make such assessments. That would be, pardon the term, "the facts." While reported (and certainly) underreported) casualty rates do not necessarily reflect the increasing or decreasing success of a war, they can be valid indicators. By that measure -- as it applies to U.S. troops, Iraqi troops and Iraqi civilians -- Mr. Roggio's assessment seems well off the mark.
Would you mind commenting on Howard Fineman's most recent piece saying that he'd received a letter from a high-ranking U.S. officer who said he doubted we were going to succeed in Iraq? Thanks.
sdm,
So you must think we lost WWI, WWII, Korea, etc. based on the casualty rates, right? Perhaps you might want to compare our casualty rates to the enemy's? Or are you not into the body-bag game? Try looking at the big picture. And no doubt your opinion, and your opinion alone is objective.
Salt Lick,
When Mr. Fineman releases the name of his "unnamed source" then I will comment on it. And I have no doubts some high ranking officers do think we will fail in Iraq. I'd love to hear their arguments presented, not just a "we're going to fail".
Let's be clear of one thing from the outset, Mr. Roggio. I am a Vietnam veteran. I want the U.S. to succeed in Iraq. Now that we've established my bona fides, let's recall that I was careful to note in my original post that "casualty rates do not necessarily reflect the increasing or decreasing success of a war, they can be valid indicators." Am I to presume from your rant, as opposed to a reasoned response to my question, that you are unable to defend your rose-colored assessment by countering facts with facts and merely want to scream at me? This is a favorite trick of people on both the left and right when confronted by someone who wants to have a serious discussion.
sdm,
Thank you for your service. I am a veteran as well.
Let's be clear, I saw nothing in your initial comments that demonstrated you wanted to have a serious conversation, just merely a dismissal of my ideas with nothing to back it up. I responded to your posting in the manner of respect that it deserved. I've posted on Iraq quite often. Instead of accusing my posts as being wrong as a whole, try being more specific, like telling me exactly what facts are wrong. And please present your facts. I've yet to see them. All you stated is that casualty numbers show we are losing. What casualty numbers? How does this mean we are losing?
If you want to have a serious discussion, you had better be prepared to bring more to the table than what you have stated so far.
Bill -- Thanks, I too, wondered about that "unnamed source," but the gist of the argument struck me as possibly having merit. The unnamed officer's theme was that we were not going to be able to implant democratic principles into Iraq because the soil for it isn't there. They don't have the history like we do. No common law tradition, no John Locke, etc, etc. The guy was apparently saying once we leave, things will implode/explode. I'm not sure that ***possibility**** suggests we're going to fail. Maybe our best option is to just stick with the program.
I only asked your opinion because you seemed well informed. I thought you might know things that made Iraq different than most of the Third World dirt cultures in Africa that revert to despotism any time democracy raises its head. I know about that first hand. I was in the Peace Corps there.
Salt Lick,
Actually, my response to you was unfair and I apologize. Newsweek and unnamed sources struck a nerve at the time I wrote that. I did read the article, btw, and of course there is merit in this. We're going to be in Iraq for quite a while, I have no doubt about that, and that's the difference. I've seen a lot of good progress with the negotiations at the national level with creating the government, settling issues with the constitution, etc. I've also seen anecodtes of what is going on at the local level from the milbloggers. I think the Middle East is a step above the "Third World dirt cultures in Africa", and Iraq can eventually have success just as is seen in South Korea if we are there to help.
No problem, Bill. The tone of e-mail is often hard to read.
The South Korean example is one I hadn't thought of. And I guess Japan is another.
Maybe one day even France.
Bill,
Thanks for this analysis. Aviation Week has been running a series of articles for over a month on our use of new aerial surveillance platforms, that are communicating real time with ground command. That new capability may offer an explanation for how such a small force can patrol such a large area. They can 'see' the bad guys. Aviation Week suggests such comprehensive imaging and analysis networks are turning ground forces into 'smart' forces, like 'smart bombs' which usually hit what they are aimed at. Any thoughts?
Tony,
The UAVs and datalinks definitely help with observation and strikes but nothing beats boots on the ground to gether intel, make a presence, etc. In what I believe is the current posture in Anbar these devises are extremely helpful, but to acheive victory US and Iraqi forces have to pound the ground.
sdm,
In war casualty rates often go up just before victory.
Both sides get desperate.
Think battle of the Bulge WW2. A casualty disaster.
In these kinds of things the side with the most bottom wins.
Your bottom rubbed raw in 'Nam? Mine too. I'm going to ignore the pain and focus on victory.
Bill,
I posted (http://www.mandelinople.com/2005/06/fresh-from-korangate.html) about the "anonymous" letter yesterday. I think there is a huge gap in people's grasping of the WOT. There is this assumption that the WOT and Iraq are two separate entities, the same mistake they made about Vietnam and the cold war. It is part and parcel the stategy of the MSM and the democrats. For example, we know there were long standing al Qaeda/Saddam ties, yet it is STILL reported that there were none. I really think we'd have more success if people understood that like Africa and Sicily in 1943 were part of the war against the Nazis, so too is Iraq part of the overall WOT. Bush hasn't done a good enough job of communicating. That's his fault.
There has been much good out of Iraq. I had a Sgt. Major who was in Iraq twice come to my classroom to speak to my high school students. He tells a far more positive story. And he was on dozens of patrols: Ramadi, Fallujah I/II, etc. He spent most of his time in "Indian country", i.e. the Sunni Triangle. And he ahs very good things to say. But he's just a Sergeant Major, that's all.
Rob