The Iraqi insurgency appears to be making another concerted effort to deter foreign governments from establishing diplomatic missions in country. Attacks on foreign diplomats are nothing new in Iraq. We have seen this in the past with attacks on the Jordanian embassy and the UN Special Mission in the summer of 2003, the Turkish embassy and International Red Cross headquarters in October of 2003, and the Australian embassy in January of 2005.
In the past few days, Al Qaeda has taken credit for the kidnapping of the newly appointed Egyptian ambassador, the charge d'affaires of Bahrain's diplomatic mission was injured in a kidnapping attempt, and Pakistan's Ambassador narrowly escaped death after his convoy was ambushed. His bodyguards fended off the attack.
While al Qaeda has not taken responsibility for the attack on the Pakistani and Bahraini diplomats, the timing of the events indicates either they are directly responsible or cooperated with allied insurgent groups to carry out the mission. The tight spacing of these events fits al Qaeda’s profile of multiple (and nearly simultaneous) dramatic high-visibility operations, and they were designed for political shock value.
Ed Morrissey of Captain's Quarters argues that al Qaeda has miscalculated by attacking Arab and Muslim diplomats, and "they threaten to turn Arabic governments from positions of benign neglect to active and deadly opposition to AQ and its supporters. No government will blithely allow its envoys to become targets for Islamists, no matter how sympathetic they might be." The primary targets of the attacks are not the Muslim governments, however, but the Iraqi government.
Al Qaeda wants to demonstrate to foreign governments Baghdad is not safe to send their ambassadors, as well as deny the Iraqi government the prestige and legitimacy that is conferred with the establishment of foreign embassies (the Taliban government of Afghanistan was never viewed as legitimate, as only Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates recognized them as such and established diplomatic ties, which left them isolated from the world).
The leaders of Egypt, Pakistan and Bahrain are considered false Muslims by the Islamists, and the governments are considered illegitimate puppets of the West. Egypt has ruthlessly suppressed Islamists within their border, and Pakistan has killed or captured well over a thousand al Qaeda operatives since 9-11. None of these countries have troops in Iraq, nor will they be inclined to send any to fight the insurgency in Iraq despite attacks on their diplomatic missions. There is little political will and public support within these countries to do so. Security for diplomats and embassies will no doubt be increased, but this hardly means these Muslim countries will join the fight.
Al Qaeda has misjudged every political move in Iraq, and there is little reason to doubt they have made yet another mistake. Al Qaeda can only be successful if nations withdrawal their missions due to targeted violence, or the threat of violence. If countries decide to press forward and upgrade their diplomatic relations, al Qaeda will be handed yet another defeat, just as they were unable to stop the election, the transition to the interim government and successfully conduct mass attacks on US bases.
Here's to the confusion of our enemies.
Where the hell are the Iraqi guards? Are the Iraqis unable to distinguish foreigners with Saudi or Syrian accents? Something's fishy here and it ain't ice cream.
I second Mark's toast. Geez, they couldn't even bump off a few ambassadors simultaneously. We're a long way from 9/11, folks, and these yutzes definitely look like the second string.
Replacing top-tier folks with second and third stringers has serious consequences over time (Google "Marianas Turkey Shoot" sometime). I would imagine one of the assessments being used involves a sense of how many second stringers are making al-Qaeda less competent vs. how many quality first-stringers are being created (combat experience alone won;t do this).
Trent forwarded some interesting stuff the other day, too, noting that Muslim governments, who are NOT eager to welcome back another set like the Afghanistan jihadis of the 1990s, are starting to imprison returnees... this may also be part of the motivation behind the attacks on diplomats, as prison swaps are also a time-honoured al-Qaeda tactic.
See StrategyPage's Welcome Home, Your Jail Cell is Waiting
And, apropos of your article yesterday about Saudi terrorists in Iraq...
The level of coordination of these attacks and the apparent intelligence which allowed them to occur concerns me.
Were these attacks simply a matter of careless diplomats who allowed themselves to fall into a pattern (and therefore made the attacks "easy")?
Or does al queda have HUMINT in place inside the new Iraqi government which will support similar attacks in the future?
Fightin' Aggie:
I'd suggest the following:
In short, don't let yourself get too riled up over these developments.
Look closely at the disorganization within the individual attacks rather than the chronological coordiation among them. The unpleasant reality (for al Qaida and the rest of the 'insurgency' supporters) lies here.
The media will miss that cold hard reality every time. You should not.
Aggie,
To add to USMC_Vet's comments, in one case a diplomat did not follow practice security. Read the entire article on the Bahraini diplomat's follies
and:
Despite the stupidity of the diplomat, the 'gunmen' still couldn't complete their mission. al Qaeda certainly didn't send their best and brightest, or this is the best they had to offer.
...or...
The above referenced may have been nothing more than an improptu attack on a target of opportunity...unplanned, uncoordinated...and well advertised by the Diplomatic Plates. (Remember also that the Mansur District was home to Saddam's cronies once upon a time.)
THe Bahraini diplo may haev simply been like found money...except that the Jihadis who 'found the money' in the street promptly dropped it down a sewer drain.
That remains a possibility.
I agree that this is a great development in terms of causing things to swing in our favor.
Seeing how it has come on in such a flurry (or at least news about it has), I believe this strategy, if you can even call it that, was very much planned.
Gives you a pretty good indication of the kind of bozos who run al Qaida. Maybe we should keep bin Laden on the loose. After all, Napoleon said "never interrupt your enemy while he is making a mistake."
Bahrain has just made the number two man the ambassador.