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August 19, 2005Living On The Slopes of a Volcanoby Armed Liberal at August 19, 2005 5:55 AM
Ted Barlow extends the arguments I believe JC and Chris were making (guys, if I'm wrong, I apologize and would be very interested in where your argument branches from Ted's) in their comments to this post criticizing Frank Rich. Ted's (long, worth reading the whole thing) post breaks down as follows: 1) There are 4 likely outcomes in Iraq, 3 of them bad and one unlikely. 2) Things in Iraq are not going well; they may be going horribly - the data isn't great - but at core, the level of violence isn't declining, public order isn't increasing, the political process is moving in the wrong direction. 3) Declaring victory and coming home leads to a certain bad outcome. But that has to be balanced against the reality of our situation. He sets out a metaphor:Imagine a village living in the shadow of a live volcano. Serenity is not an appropriate response to the threat of an eruption, but neither is a program of virgin sacrifice. Neither steely-eyed resolve nor spine-stiffening prose poems about the nobility and admirable selflesness of the virgins will do much good.4) The only way out - given current troop levels - is a draft, which isn't going to happen. So he's stuck looking for a positive outcome, which brings us back to "may as well pull out now since we're going to lose anyway." I mean, who wants to be the last soldier to die in Iraq? Somehow, I still see things very differently (what a surprise). First, I have a somewhat different interpretation of the expectations going into the war. I always expected - even before I decided that I supported this war - that it would be long and hard, and that the one significant risk we took wasn't military, but political - that:We don't get to ‘declare victory and go home’ when the going gets tough, elections are near, or TV shows pictures of the inevitable suffering that war causes. The Marshall Plan is a bad example, because the Europe that had been devastated by war had the commercial and entrepreneurial culture that simply needed stuff and money to get restarted. And while we're damn good with stuff and money, this is going to take much more, and we're going to have to roll up our sleeves, work, and be willing to sweat with this for some time.And I'm genuinely puzzled how educated, intelligent folks - folks like Ted - who have read and understand history look at the inevitable muddles committed by our troops, their officers, our political leadership, and the President and weigh them so heavily. Here's Ted: The folks I'm quoting above are very critical at Donald Rumsfeld, who has amply earned it. Rumsfeld should have lost his job much earlier for his role in prisoner abuse scandals, for his lack of planning, and for his unsuitable arrogance...The litany of error - bad planning, prisoner abuse, military arrogance, political timidity - wraps much of the opposition to the war. It is to say that "It's not that I'm against the war; I'm just against this war, because it's being so badly prosecuted." But as I've asked before, compared to what? I've read moderately deeply in history, including the history of wars from the Peloponnesian through Vietnam. Lincoln's leading general (McClellan) wanted to settle the war, and undermined his strategic direction in the hope that he could make room for negotiation. The first American battle with the German army in World War II (Kasserine Pass) was a rout - we were routed. War is, above all, the providence of error. People seem to make a lot of mistakes in war, and because these mistakes are written in blood, they are more visible than the mistakes we inevitably make as city council members setting policies for side yard variances. Let's make it simple - we've all read Catch-22 with it's deadly accurate descriptions of the lunacy, folly, and avarice that were part of the U.S. military in World War II. Most veterans of the war that I knew found a core of truth in that book. Does that mean we were fated to lose? Obviously not. Does that mean we shouldn't have fought the war? Obviously not. If, at the beginning of the war, you had said that it would take ten thousand casualties to take Baghdad, do you think the reaction of the American public would have been vastly different? I have two sons over 18, one of whom continues to plan on a path through the military. I'm deeply aware of what those casualties mean. Will we solve the problem of having enough troops? We have to. We should have started three years ago, and the failure to do that - the failure to make it clear to the American people that this was more than a war we'd watch on CNN (until the series comes out) while we went about our daily lives - remains the stupidest thing that the Bush Administration has done. Can we solve it? Here I'll point out that Ted is disingenuous when he says that we supporters of the war blame the media overmuch. He calls it "flailing against a stab in the back from the press." Well, you know, it's funny. There is such a thing as public sentiment, and it is both innate and actively shaped. After two years of a media-driven picture of the war as immoral and hopeless, somehow we find that et lá! The public support for the war is declining! After two years of demonstrations at high schools and colleges against military recruitment, military recruitment is hard. I'm not surprised that the media has shaped public sentiment, I'm surprised that it has been so ineffective at shaping it. I'm surprised that anyone is enlisting, and that every member of the House isn't demanding immediate withdrawal lest they face the wrath of the voters in fifteen months. Yes, this is going to go on being hard and unpleasant. But again, compared to what? Compared to letting sanctions collapse? (And I'll skip over the cheap but satisfying shot of pointing out how many of those who bitterly oppose the war also opposed sanctions - which they now point back to as a perfectly good way to keep Saddam from getting too belligerent) Compared to watching as Saddam allied himself more deeply with fanatic Islamists who really do believe they can conquer the West? There's a simple difference between Ted's position and mine; he sees this war as living on the slopes of a volcano - as facing a situation where we are helpless (he does acknowledge that sacrificing soldiers in wars sometimes wins them, while sacrificing virgins to volcanoes doesn't guarantee protection from lava - but in writing, that's called "having it both ways" - he makes his point, and then in an aside, sets it down and explains that he really didn't mean it). I'll suggest that he Google Vestmannaeyjar, Iceland. Sometimes even people living on the slopes of volcanoes fight hard enough to win. We can too. So when JC accuses me of ignoring the litany of bad news, no I'm not. And while I'm sometimes tempted to wade in and talk about what I think is being done wrong in Iraq (and there is a fair amount), I'd rather use the limited attention granted me to try and get us to do the one right thing. Stay. Oh, forgot to mention this. Ted points out (in his litany of disaster) that "The mayor of Baghdad was deposed by an armed Shiite militia, and we just shrugged." Let's go to Juan Cole (yes, I do read him, his analysis is usually silly, but he does present info that I don't see elsewhere):Meanwhile, Jaafari has thrown his support behind the ousting of Baghdad mayor Alaa al-Tamimi by SCIRI. SCIRI won the Baghdad provincial council elections last January and therefore has the right to appoint its own mayor. Often in contemporary Iraq, incumbents put there by the United States or its proxy interim government have refused to leave when ordered to do so by the winners at the ballot box, and Tamimi was one of those who had ensconced himself, apparently with a private guard. The change of mayor therefore had to be accomplished by the elected governing council through a kind of coup whereby Badr Corps (the paramilitary of SCIRI) occupied the mayor's office.Heh. As they say... Tracked: August 20, 2005 3:53 PM
Disastrous war - compared to what? from Secular Blasphemy
Excerpt: It is conventional wisdom that the Iraq war has been badly executed.
Comments
#1 from JC at 7:51 am on Aug 19, 2005
Armed Liberal, Thanks for addressing this again, as you said you would. Taking from your first point - "But as I've asked before, compared to what?". This is imporant as it is a point that you raise again and again, that somehow all the criticisms are based on an unrealistic understanding of reality - that war should be "perfect". But here's the answer - "compared to the conduct, execution, and operations ofGulf War I, and compared to the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan". In both of the above circumstances: a. The United States worked from a clear, plain, and honest plan, that was understood by the US populace . So - guess what? There IS quite a difference in competency in the execution of Gulf War II. For Gulf War II a. The hyped objective was that Hussein was a threat to the United States and we needed to deal with the "weapons of mass destruction". Not to mention, the administration cynically using the War and preparations for the war to divide americans. So it is simply dishonest to say "look at the history of war - mistakes happen". We had a clear examples of forming coalitions to deal with threats against the world - and we didn't follow it. Your "mistakes happen" is simply a granting of license, without accountability. That's the first point. Back to the question of my original post - What does winning look like, to you? What does losing look like, to you? Seriously. I've asked this twice before, and you've said "good question", but what are your PARAMETERS for a win? Your parameters for a loss? No vague stuff - hard numbers. When you work on managing an IT project, there are deliverables you are responsible for, right? I have to ask again - what does "win" mean? Specifics, please.
#2 from Chris at 9:13 am on Aug 19, 2005
A.L.- Well, I wasn't necessarily thinking along the lines Ted lays down, but I don't have a whole lot to argue about with what he says (with the sole exception of the "mayor of Bagdhad" thing, which you did a fine job of correcting.) That said, I'm more or less in agreement with JC's response above regarding your "compared to what" question. I'll also try my own spin on an answer, which goes as follows: Yes, every war in history, and damn near every major and minor human endevor since the dawn of time, has seen mistakes. Mistakes happen, mistakes are inevitable, even with the best of intentions. But the thing about mistakes is, you can keep making them over and over again, or you can learn from 'em, and stop repeating them. And thus far I've seen more of the former from the Bush admin than the latter. You point out mistakes - big ones - that the US made in the Civil War and WW2. However, what came to mind when I thought about those mistakes was that those errors were relatively near the beginning of the respective wars, where the US started at a strategic disadvantage, then learned, adapted, and made up ground until it was able to end things decisively. In comparison, the war in Iraq has happened in reverse - we started from a position of strength, but we've been worn down since, and the end of conflict has gotten progressively more muddled. And while it's true that we have learned some lessons in Iraq, and implemented some new strategies, our enemies seem to be learning and adapting faster than we are. That's the wrong side of the learning curve for us to be on, and while you can certainly excuse Bush for any individual mistakes that happened on his watch, this kind of big picture problem is absolutely something that the President should be working hard to fix, or should have fixed already. Again, I see no evidence of either. As for your complaints against the media, I'm unconvinced, partially because of this argument Kevin Drum made recently, and partially because, even assuming the media is a fifth column (which, again, I don't buy) Bush should be able to counter it much more effectively than he has been using the power of the bully pulpit. But we may not be able to productively argue much more about this than we already have. And as for your repeated assertions that "we have to" find a way out of this... I dunno. If I honestly believed, as you've repeatedly said you do, that we only have the choice between wholeheartedly supporting the Iraq war and inevitably moving towards a middle-Eastern genocide, then I suppose I'd be a die-hard Bush supporter too. But I don't believe those are our only options, and what's more, I know that sometimes a positive, can-do attitude doesn't solve all problems; sometimes you just can't get there from here, no matter how hard you try. I think Hilzoy's recent post on defeatism (specifically the anecdote about the insurance stuff) over at Obsidian Wings provides some useful perspective on this, too. While I'm at it, I suppose I should go beyond just carping at the Bush admin, and give my own thoughts on how I hope this'll all turn out. I'm actually heartened by indications that Bush is starting to back off of the idea of a classically liberal, secular democracy running a unified Iraq - if I actually believed it was in the power of the US military to create such a thing, I'd be arguing "stay" too, but I don't. I think there's an excellent chance that Iraq will fracture into Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite zones, each of which'll have varying degrees of democracy and stability, and I hope that we'll be able to gradually withdraw while still lending enough military, economic, and political support to Iraq to prevent the inevitable friction between those zones from becoming an outright bloodbath. That configuration of events would have its own problems, but I think it's politically and logistically feasible, better than having Saddam still around, and about as good a victory as we can currently get. And that's all I got for now. Thanks for a hearfelt response to my earlier comments, AL.
#3 from Jim Rockford at 9:44 am on Aug 19, 2005
If you look at the predictions for utter chaos, defeat, and "quagmire" ... right before the fall of the Taliban by ALL the major media including Sy Hersh, you'll see that Afghanistan is not that different than Iraq. No nation other than the US contributed significantly to Afghanistan, and no nation today has done much. The French famously mocked a US request for more helicopters by (in a meeting with the French Foreign minister) offering a toy one. NATO dug in it's heels and demanded "conflict resolution" and "proof" that Osama bin Laden was mastermind of 9/11. As a practical matter even if NATO wanted to help there they had no men, arms, or supplies, and no means to move them to Afghanistan. Internally, ANSWER, Moveon, Joe Biden, Michael Moore, most of Hollywood opposed the Afghan War as did the media, and nightly stories about impending disaster were the norm until Kabul fell. Afghanistan is not that different from Iraq. It still remains today what it was before (and as Iraq remains): a violent, primitive, superstitious, pre-modern, tribal hell-hole where women and minorities of all kinds are brutally oppressed by social custom and tribalism if nothing else. Bush 1's refusal to move into Baghdad and depose Saddam left an aftermath where those who could have asserted leadership and progress in a post-Saddam world were killed. Iraq is such a brutal mess precisely because Powell and Bush 1 preferred "realpolitik" and wanted to kick the can down the road to later generations of Americans. Well, that bill for deferred problem solving has come due. Saddam killed most of the people who could have stopped or at least lessened the violence. While Bush 1 and Powell and Scowcroft and Baker and the rest of the Wise Men nodded approvingly. As for now, I refer you to bin Laden's 1996 declaration of War: But your most disgraceful case was in Somalia; where- after vigorous propaganda about the power of the USA and its post cold war leadership of the new world order- you moved tens of thousands of international force, including twenty eight thousands American solders into Somalia. However, when tens of your solders were killed in minor battles and one American Pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu you left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you. Clinton appeared in front of the whole world threatening and promising revenge , but these threats were merely a preparation for withdrawal. You have been disgraced by Allah and you withdrew; the extent of your impotence and weaknesses became very clear. It was a pleasure for the "heart" of every Muslim and a remedy to the "chests" of believing nations to see you defeated in the three Islamic cities of Beirut , Aden and Mogadishu. I say to Secretary of Defence: The sons of the land of the two Holy Places had come out to fight against the Russian in Afghanistan, the Serb in Bosnia-Herzegovina and today they are fighting in Chechenia andRunning away is NOT an option. Arguing about shoulda, woulda, coulda on Iraq is at this stage, pointless. You can read binnie's statement above, it's 9 years old and STILL valid today. Cut-run isolationism will only encourage every single jihadi, would-be jihadi, and those thinking of helping in some way jihadis, to kill Americans, right here in America. You'd simply prove bin Laden right in every particular that counts. OK, thanks for the clarifications...I'll have a window to answer at more length later today, but here's a gloss: 1) I think our policies in Afghanistan were brilliant,in that they avoided the 'big footprint' which the Russians used and which triggers the visceral reaction from the territorial and hardened tribes. It's not a policy that would have worked in Iraq, both because there was a powerful state apparatus (army, security forces), and because a substantial portion of Iraqis don't live underthe control of tribal authorities with whom we could bargain. 2) GW I was a simple army-on-army war - all we had to do was defeat his army and kick it out of Kuwait. I've wondered on and off for a year what conditions would have been like if we had gone all the way to Baghdad - would they be as they are now (don't think so) or would it have been much, much easier (today, that's what I think). I think we are learning in Iraq, from the folks I talk to in the military over there. The question is whether the overall 'high-level' strategy - to buy space and time for the formation of Iraqi government and military forces, and to persist along that path in the face of stumbles - is the right one. I think it is; I don't think major changes in course in that regard are useful. But it's something I ought to chew over and maybe write a bit about. How's that? A.L. There are two particularly vile arguments that keep coming up around this war, and every other war since Vietnam (yes, including Afghanistan). The first vile argument is that the cause is lost, and we must therefore withdraw and save what we can. By presuming a lost cause, and counseling retreat, the arguer seeks to make certain that the cause is lost. Since we have not won (yet), we must be losing, and since we must be losing, we must already have lost, and since we have lost, we must withdraw now. But just because we don't see the victory already accomplished does not imply that the victory will not be accomplished. The Union, for example, was not winning in 1863, after three years of war. The Allies were not winning in mid-1918, though by avoiding defeat in the German summer offensives, they ended up winning in late 1918. The second vile argument is that "no one should be the last soldier to die in a lost cause". This is in some ways worse than the "lost cause" argument. Once there has been one soldier's death, there must logically be a last soldier to die. Retreating, embracing defeat, does not change that, it merely renders the deaths of all of the soldiers meaningless. It is for the living to make meaningful the sacrifices of the dead, and were we to simply withdraw, as we did in Vietnam, we would be making their sacrifices meaningless to the nation, meaningful only to those whose primary goal is to hobble America, to defeat America, or to drive the Republicans out of office. And unlike in Vietnam, this would be compounded by the fact that the jihadis can come here to fight us - they already have; that's how we got into this war in the first place. On the point about the media, I do not see how anyone can conclude other than two possibilities: the media don't care if we win or lose, or the media prefer that George Bush lose even if that means the US losing as well. By their own statements, many of the most influential journalists and editors are strongly against the war, or strongly against President Bush. The media's coverage is almost unceasingly negative, often seeking out the most negative interpretation of events - to the extent of ignoring stronger counter-evidence in favor of (in some cases) invented supporting evidence - and consistently tolling the bells of doom. It was, what, the day before the fall of Kabul that we were told we were destined to lose? A week before the fall of Baghdad that we were told we were destined to lose? The media is a constant refrain of loss, doom, failure and horror - with little to no coverage of positive events, positive trends, stories of heroism by our soldiers or by Iraqi or Afghani civilians, troops or police. As AL said, it's remarkable that under such a sustained and consistent propaganda campaign we have any support left for the war. "You point out mistakes - big ones - that the US made in the Civil War and WW2. However, what came to mind when I thought about those mistakes was that those errors were relatively near the beginning of the respective wars, where the US started at a strategic disadvantage, then learned, adapted, and made up ground until it was able to end things decisively" Civil War: The Crater- July 1864, 5300 union casualties, 1100 CSA Brice's Crossroads- June 1864, 2610 union casualties, 495 CSA WW2 Market Garden- Sept 1944, 18,200 allied casualties (more than 10,000 KIA) Note that most of these disasters occurred in one day and managed to rival the casualties inflicted during the entire occupation of Iraq has in 2.5 years. A bad day in WW2 meant 800 men drowning in a training exercise, a bad day in Iraq means a dozen marines killed. Horrible either way, but hardly comparable.
#7 from AMac at 3:31 pm on Aug 19, 2005
The "Volcano" analogy is a fine example of lazy thinking. There are no intelligent, responsive adversaries to consider when confronting natural phenomena. No feedback or OODA loops. The volcano is; it will do what it will do. In contrast, the situation in Iraq doesn't exist in a vacuum, and our civilization's opponents aren't remotely comparable to pumice. Jihadis have long-term objectives; they will continue to modify their plans as circumstances evolve. For them, the crucial circumstances are the results of what we do. For us, the same thing, in reverse. Fortunately, we have clear insight into jihadi plans. Their inspirational texts are published, e.g. Sayyid Qutb's books. And jihadi success depends on mobilizing the sympathy and support of the ummah, meaning that their leadership wants to, and has to, clearly explain their philosophy, strategy, and tactics. See, for example, Jim Rockford's quote of OBL in #3, above. In his WoC posts, Dan Darling provides extensive quotes from, and commentary on, other International Islamic Front material. But to Ted, our enemies are an unstoppable force (volcano), and our polity are akin to feckless idjits (virgin-sacrificing villagers). I am sure Ted is familiar with Sun Tzu's work, but he shows no appreciation of the principals discussed in The Art of War. An analogy of my own: discussing Mideast Strategy according to Ted's framework is like allowing a Chamberlain back-bencher to set the terms for a debate: The Crooked Timber post that A.L. is reflecting on quotes Greg Djerejian, Orin Kerr, Frederick Kagan, and other critics of the Bush war effort. The heft and rigor of their concerns are better appreciated in the absence of the cited post's context.
#8 from davebo at 3:48 pm on Aug 19, 2005
Some excellent points. Some I disagree with. And sorry to have to say it, but some serious fantasy. Especially.. "After two years of a media-driven picture of the war as immoral and hopeless, somehow we find that...." Is Al Jazeera suddenly "the media"? Are you referring to news or editorials? I've just noticed this, but I've got a bit of a busy morning. I'll try hard to respond to your thoughtful criticism soon. If I don't, feel free to email, AL.
#10 from PD Shaw at 4:00 pm on Aug 19, 2005
Looking at Gulf War I through rose-coloured glasses. a. The United States worked from a clear, plain, and honest plan, that was understood by the US populace. The war was initially sold to the American People as a war necessary to preserve American's strategic oil interests and partnership with Saudi Arabia. This incited cries of "No Blood for Oil!" Popular support for the war only came about after Kuwait staged a p.r. campaign around the lie that Iraqi trooops were pulling babies out of incubators in Kuwaiti hospitals and letting them die on the floor. At this point, the justification for war shifted to human rights abuses and the threat of WMD. Quick success papered over these issues. b. The goals were clear. See above. The reason the public supported the war was not the reason for the war. Note that the outcome of the war addressed the strategic concerns, not the humanitarian ones. c. U.N. resolutions for the objectives were granted. True. d. Multi-lateral forces were engaged in a much larger manner. 75% of the forces were American (compared with 85% today). Some nations were offered economic aid or debt relief to join. Arab support for the coalition began to weaken as soon as the conflict was joined. e. A much larger contribution from "the liberal order" of nations that can contribute, contributed . . . True. But is this much more than saying France (and perhaps Canada) didn't join? f. The move into both was done with the reluctant (and in many cases active) assent of the neighboring countries. The only real difference is Turkey. Jordan supported Saddam. Syrian support waivered after it got what it wanted (Lebannon). Iran gave Iraq assistance. What this really appears to come down to is that the U.S. was unable to obtain U.N. support, French (and perhaps Canadian) support and the support of Turkey. Is that a reason not to go to war? It would also be well to remember the revisionists have been hard at work ever since GW1 claiming that Hussein was surrendering and that the fighting was unnecessary etc. The apologists will always go out of their way to assign the best intentions to the bad guys and the worst motivations to America. From AL's Normblog interview: Here’s my take: the enemy in Iraq is impatience. People seem to think that because as time goes on, and they see more splintering and fracturing of parties and other representative groups in Iraq, and violence not coming down, it's a lost cause. I was there in March, and I was there in July. In March, the mood of the place was downright peaceful for the most part (please don't quote me stats for casualties in March, I was there, I have a brother in law serving in Ramadi, and I have Iraqis that I work with, I'm well aware). Everyone was still riding high off from January elections, there was a great sense of unity in the country. While not so in July, (a mere 3 and a half months difference) I think we have to keep it in perspective. What did people expect? Anyone who knows the culture and what they’ve been dealt knows that this one was going to take a LOT of time. The question really comes down to, what are we willing to risk, and what do we believe is at stake? And that’s where I see people split. One of the travesties of Gulf War 1 in my mind is that it led the public to believe that we were, from then on, going to be able to fight wars with minimal sacrifice of life. In my mind, Gulf War 1 was about equivalent to the days of OIF/stage1. Storm Baghdad in record time, overthrow the regime......it's what we didn't do in 1991, sticking around, that is costing lives. It cost hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives when we didn't do that. After Sept 11, we had a reason to believe that it could cost thousands of ours as well, if we didn't stay when we went. I’m not referring to the WMD argument, I’m trying to make the “if we don’t back up what we start” argument. For decades now, we’ve been like the parent that says “you do that one more time….” and then says it again, with no consequences. That leads to certain expectations, and more “testing” of resolve. What happens if you had to get to “3” with littlest guy AL? Consequences, right? I listened to Michael Yon on WRKO radio from Mosul the other night. He said the only thing that angered the troops there is when they hear "they're not winning". Deuce Four says it simply isn't true (and this is in one of the 3 top hot spots in the country). Progress is slow at times, but it IS being made. And it's going to go through rough spots. That’s what progress is. A series of mistakes and ingenuity, hopefully we learn from the mistakes as we go, but we don’t just quit. My nephew, whom I held as a baby, cheered on in soccer, counseled in high school and have loved unconditionally for 22 years, has joined the marines. He has chosen to risk his life in the interests of our country. He understands those risks, he made his choice with eyes wide open. He was not hoping for tuition assistence and a signing bonus and he did not join expecting he could avoid combat. He joined the marines.
#14 from Steve in Houston at 6:14 pm on Aug 19, 2005
"And while it's true that we have learned some lessons in Iraq, and implemented some new strategies, our enemies seem to be learning and adapting faster than we are. " This is the kind of statement that I find bewildering, but at least here it's thankfully couched as a possibility, as opposed to that I see elswhere. What evidence is there that our enemies are learning and adapting faster than we are? There's no question that they HAVE adapted, and they HAVE learned - as anyone but the most naive would expect. But suggesting that the enemy is outperforming our forces - both militarily and politically - is to ignore some salient facts: -- We've dealt subtly and effectively with the Shia uprising led by al Sadr And so on. The above items aren't to say we're tripping through daisies over there; they are to say that we're accomplishing real, concrete things that matter. We couldn't accomplish ANY of them of the enemy was truly quicker and more adaptable than we are. If the enemy were quicker and more adaptable, the entire country would be in open armed revolt. That obviously could still happen, but as far as I can tell, the momentum - as weak as it may be - is in the opposite direction. We should never underestimate an opposing force, but overestimating them is a mistake too, especially as it can lead to despair and fear. I trust our men and women to get the job done over the long haul - but only if they are allowed to do so. It won't be perfect, but it has a chance to be good. Good point Steve. Its a major if common mistake to make out our enemies to be supermen. Every AQ dispatch we capture sounds about like our our MSM, negative and doom ridden. Our enemy has made mistakes and will continue to. Just in the past couple days AQ has changed tactics and started targetting Sunni leaders who are urging participation in voting and the new constitution. This is a major split in our adversaries that we can count on the MSM to miss the importance of. We're not talking about coopted fringe Sunnis that are being attacked. Guys from the Brotherhood of Muslim Scholars were shot at and they are the biggest and most influential Sunni Islamist sect. Retataliation is certain. This may even spur a deal in the constitutional impass.
#16 from JC at 6:28 pm on Aug 19, 2005
There's a lot of worthwhile comments to respond to, but most will have to wait for a later period of time, when I have more sources on which to draw upon. For now, a few thoughts. A.L., your counter-argument - re: Iraq I and Afghanistan, doesn't really engages WHAT I am being critical about. I'll throw another example at you - Kosovo. That particular conflict, while it also had its share of issues, was handled masterfully enough that there wasn't ONE single american death as a result of conflict. I would have loved to have that type of mastery applied to Iraq, wouldn't you? Don't YOU agree that not one american death is something to aspire to, if you can both have no american deaths, AND meet your military objectives? At this point, however, this is only debating mistakes of the past. What matters now is the varius rumblings from a lot of Army experts (and certainly not all) that if we stay in Iraq, with current force levels and rotations, that the 3rd and 4th rotations of combat soldiers into Iraq will shred the Army's effectiveness. That's the important thing. If that is the case, well, we will withdraw significant forces by the end of next summer, no matter the effect in Iraq. I fully expect that by next summer there WILL be a reduction if forces - as much as possible to stave off the concerns of the Army experts, but leaving enough troops to have an impact.(I envision that if Iraq remains at a slow burn, that the plan is that 50K troops will be stationed there indefinitely. That level of force reduction, from what I've been reading, can be sustained with Army forces, without hurting the effectiveness of the troops.) Also, I'll say again - I've asked for measurable deliverables, that are your criteria for success and failure, but like Hamlet, you seem afraid of committing yourself, so you continue to be "decisive" in the abstract, rather than the concrete. While I understand the attration - and even the need - to weave a heroic narrative, bereft of actually committing yourself to concrete deliverables, by doing so, your narrative runs the risk of turning from heroic to Panglossian. To those who disagree about the differences betweeen Iraq 2 - and Iraq I, Afghanistan, and Kosovo, I simply will leave you with this: The strategy of a tough liberal order - that is flexible, nuanced, tough, engages allies, listens to allies, and hammers out a policy that many nations can get on board with and support - THIS strategy - the creation and nurturance of a Liberal Order - has been THE successful strategic defense strategy of the last 60 years. And my claim is that Iraq I, Kosovo, Afghanistan falls within this spectrum, while Iraq 2 falls outside of it. Lastly - there are quite a lot of centrifugal forces at play in Iraq. Certainly the Kurds want a Kurdistan, long-term (which they have effectively had, in an undeclared manner, for 10 years anyway.) So you are left with the following trends - a. Kurds drifting towards their own state (undeclared or not.) Again, I'll ask - what trends are there that look to render a through c above untrue?
#17 from BW at 7:04 pm on Aug 19, 2005
There's been some issues here I'll just comment on briefly. First, the whole thing about the media putting down the war consistently for two years, that's not what I've seen at all and the media here is mostly American. The embed process especially was deemed a huge success by the Pentagon and led to reporting MUCH more sympathetic than the Vietnam era. Also, as other have already stated, the Bush administration used the media very well in getting core deceptive messages accross, as did the Blair government. Both used word repetition and misdirection to convince a significant portion of their citizenry that Iraq was connected to terrorism and 9/11, had readily available WMDs they were willing to use against the US/UK civilian populations and were an active threat to do so. And two of the biggest cable news systems in the US, CNN and Fox seemed to be so "on message" with the administration you'd think they were getting teleprompter feeds directly from the west wing. The quote a responder put here was "No nation other than the US contributed significantly to Afghanistan, and no nation today has done much." I'm sorry, on the Afganistan issue a lot of people put in a lot, militarily and economically. Granted the "no nation today has done as much" is probably fair, but when the US is the biggest developed economy on earth and the most affected by 9/11, being the key player in Afghanistan was a no-brainer. I'm a Canadian, and for me like many of our citizenry we were appalled and outraged by 9/11 and quite pleased our government sent what little is left our our military (after massive budget cuts and deployments all over the earth peacekeeping) over to help attack, police and rebuild Afghanistan. Canadians, especially our sniper teams, were very highly regarded in their work in combat. And Canadians are still there, most recently moving back into the more hostile Taliban-controlled territories of Afghanistan again. Canadians died in combat, not to mention by an overstimulated and triggerhappy USAF pilot who bombed thier night training area... Which I guess bring me to where many Canadians (and our Prime Minister) ran into problems with the Iraq war. 1. The war in Afghanistan wasn't over. Sure it was ANNOUNCED as over (sound familiar anyone?) but the country wasn't even starting to be rebuilt and was not under any control in many many places (surviving Taliban and Al Quada elements having simple gone to ground to wait it out). Even now most money pledged by nations including the US to rebuild Afghanistan hasn't been paid out. Instead we bombed them back into the stone age (not for the first time) then camped out in the the capital doing very little of lasting value in the rest of the country. 2. We saw how little of what was supposed to happen in Afghanistan was delivered, and had our doubts about what was promised for Iraq. There is still a good part of Afghanistan owned by the Taliban, although a tad less formally than when they were considered the government. Promised reconstruction dollars were often not actually spent, and may never be now that Iraq is eating so much money. Afghanistan has gone back to being the Opium/Herion capital of the world, overturning about the only good thing those lunatics in the Taliban ever did for that country. 3. Our government wasn't prepared to lie to or deceive us about Iraq. So during the debate about joining GW II, when people asked about current threat MWDs or links to 9-11 (which we all heard about on US TV), our leaders answered with what we now know is the truth "well, actually we don't have current information about WMDs and most experts believe chem/bio weapons are either hidden so deeply they can't be deployed quickly, or are decommissioned. There's no evidence of a functional nuclear program in Iraq since the Israelies bombed Iraq decades ago. And the proof coming out of Washington is that 9/11 was more likely sponsored and carried out by citizens of allied Arab countries rather than rogue states like Iraq". Faced with the truth and nobody trying to sell us either way, many of the exact same people that wanted our troops on the next plane to Afghanistan after 9/11, and to stay until the work was gone, were having REAL big doubts about GW II. 4. This is probably the telling one, although it's Canadian only. Even when we stood up shoulder to shoulder with the US after 9/11, Bush forget to even mention us when giving international credit (yay Poland, I'm sure they put up thousands of US citizens in their own homes when flights were grounded, or sent hundreds of trained fire, rescue, trauma and civil affairs professionals to NTW within hours of the attacks) . Plus the Bush administration continued with some VERY nasty trade policies contrary to NAFTA that put many of our citizens out of work, and threatened the collapse of the economy of one of our larger provinces. All while they were building a "coalition of the willing" with foreign countries who needed in many cases to be bribed or co-erced to join. And while US politicians continued to imply to the American people (and again, remember we get US television so we saw this first hand) that Canada was feeding terrorists into the US, despite the clear evidence that not a single 9/11 terrorist entered through Canada, that most of the 9/11 terrorists had legitimate papers from the US government to be there and despite the fact that the only person we know of who has actually tried to launch an attack on the US from Canda (the millenium bomber) in the 21st century up until then was stopped at the border and failed utterly in his mission. This crazy partizan rambling I've been seeing in blogs and US news sites is scary. The left wing there are clearly nuts, but so is the right wing. Nobody is interested at all in the objective truth except to parcel it out in little pieces when a cherry-picked bit fits their larger agenda. But of course, I'm a citizen of "Soviet Canuckistan" (thanks Pat B. for that by the way) so everyone will ignore what I'm posting anyways, aside from a few libs who will moon about our health care system and a few righties torqued about our (admittedly) lax cannabis laws. Well, for anyone who is interested, the difference between the Afghan war and GW II is a textbook example of "how to alienate your friends and scare off potential allies". It is frankly tragic that the Bush administration threw the big stupid mess in Iraq at a time when the whole world needed to be getting on side with a REAL war on terror, starting which countries we know to be huge problems and have WMD programs (Iran and N Korea anyone). Not to mention rebuilding the countries we blast to shit and occupy them long enough to shape their destiny a bit, so that they can turn out to be longer term peace partners like Germany and Japan rather than returning within a few years to their previous state (as Afghanistan threatens to do). BW So here's the kicker. Instead of getting some credit
#18 from AMac at 7:17 pm on Aug 19, 2005
Tracy #13: Thanks for those thoughts. As a proportion of the US population, the number of soldiers serving in Iraq is small, about 0.05% by my calculation (150K divided by 300M). However, the number of folks with loved ones who have gone, are there, or may soon go is much higher (say 20*1M/300M, or 7%). Thus, it's not surprising that there are number of people, including bloggers, in situations that are somewhat similar to yours. JC #16: "The Enemy Gets A Vote." I'm not sure it's possible to answer your call for concrete and measurable deliverables, that are definite criteria for success or failure. Although it's a demand that's well worth making--the opposite of executing a plan that stems from a clear and realistic vision is likely to be "quagmire" or something equally bad. "Electrical generating capacity up to X MWh/day within 12 months" is a call for jihadis to blow up transmission lines, murder electrical engineers, etc. Which they have done, for these reasons. "X police brigades fully staffed" is a call for the enemy to focus car bombs at recruiting stations. "Polls reflecting a growing sense of physical security on the part of Baghdadis" is a call for car bombs in markets and at sewage plant opening ceremonies. The "definite metrics" line of reasoning leads to the proposition "don't engage in a fight with an enemy that is wholly ruthless and inhumane, that has a nazi-like concept of morality, and that has access to explosives and weapons." That might be (might have been) the "right" posture to take with respect to Iraq. It would be refreshing to see it discussed plainly, rather than elided. And the broader strategic implications of this stance are certainly not lost on the acolytes of Qutb and similar militant Islamists. While they shouldn't come as a surprise to Westerners, either, I have the feeling that few among the anti-war movement have thought much about them.
#19 from Steve at 7:25 pm on Aug 19, 2005
I would like to point out that there are those of us who are actually pro-war, but who think that Rumsfeld should resign.... I feel that the war was the right thing to do. First, what intelligence we had indicated that Saddam did have WMDs and the desire and means to produce more. Second, his regime richly deserved destruction just from the human rights and anti-corruption point of view. Third, his "rejectionist" viewpoint was encouraging terrorism in the Middle East, both overtly and as an Islamic reaction to secular authoritarianism, which is what the Baathists were all about. Fourth, his defiance and corruption of UN resolutions was undermining what little international order there is in the world. That being said, Rumsfeld needs to go. Not because of tactical events on the ground. For instance, there have been several instances over the last couple years of marine squads essentially being overrun and wiped out. That's not Rumsfeld's fault, that has to do with marine doctrine and equipment. I don't blame Secretary Rumsfeld for the various flaps over the lack of armored humvees or body armor. No organization has everything that it needs at every point in time. There is always a loose end somewhere. The fact is that the U.S. military is the best-equipped military in the world. That doesn't make it perfectly equipped however. I don't blame Secretary Rumsfeld for demobilizing the Iraqi Army, which lead to some members of that army joining the insurgency because they didn't have much else to do. Demobilizing the army was a normal "de-Baathificaion" procedure, that as it turned out perhaps wasn't the way to go. However, considering past reconstruction efforts (Post-war Japan and Germany for instance) this kind of demobilization was standard procedure. What I do hold against Rumsfeld is: 1. Scrapping the State Department post-conflict reconstruction plan, and replacing it with next to nothing. I don't know why the State Department plan was tossed, but if you toss an existing plan, you have to replace it with something concrete. Rumsfeld failed to do this. 2. Silencing, or failing to discourage the silencing military leaders like General Shinseki who pointed out the numbers of forces that would be required for the mission at hand. 3. Failing to learn the lessons of other authoritarian regimes in recent year. For example, pretty much all the collapses of the old Warsaw Pact governments were occasioned by an increase in overt crime, and a significant decrease in the effectiveness of security forces, as the old politicized leadership lost motivation, went into hiding or were forced out, and as existing authoritarian security doctrines had to be scrapped in the new environment. The DoD made no plans for these contingencies in Iraq. 4. Failing to secure weapons dumps. This lead to a profusion of weapons early on in the insurgency. Again, given the irregular nature of the resistance that was found on the way to Baghdad, it should have been obvious that there were large numbers of irregulars in circulation that would probably try to loot these weapon dumps to sustain their resistance. I was personally pretty shocked when I found out that these sites were not being secured. If for no other reason, than to prevent Iraq's various aggrieved ethnic factions from arming themselves prior to campaigns of revenge on their previous persecutors. 5. Drift in the immediate post-war political system. From replacing the original transition organization with the CPA after about 1-2 months, to dithering about whether and when to hand sovereignity back to the the Iraqis, the first 6-9 months after the original invasion was badly disorganized. 6. Lack of discipline on human rights issues. I don't think that Secretary Rumsfeld had anything directly to do with Abu Ghraib. However, there are plenty of indications that on many levels the DoD did set up an atmosphere of being "above the law" on many of the human rights issues involved in the War on Terror. I think that this general atmosphere did contribute to what happened among the MPs and intelligence officers at places like Abu Ghraib. 7. Failing to demand better intelligence on prewar Iraq. Either Rumsfeld and the rest of the DoD leadership failed to adequately demand quality intelligence, or they consciously or unconsciously distorted what intelligence they did have in order to mesh with an existing desire to invade Iraq. I personally think that the invasion was the right thing to do, but that the intelligence failure has badly dented U.S. credibility on security issues. Part of the responsiblity for that lies with the intelligence customers like Secretary Rumsfeld, who should have questioned and demanded more. For instance, the CIA has said that they had NO intelligence sources inside Iraq prior to the war. Considering the importance of Iraq in the previous 12 years before the invasion, this is pretty much unforgivable. And it is also unforgivable to present what was essentially second-hand information as being reliable intelligence providing a basis to go to war.
#20 from Santiago at 8:00 pm on Aug 19, 2005
Anyone insane enough to compare Kosovo and Iraq probably needs a nice padded cell to spend the duration of the war. Pipe in some nice cartoons and soothing lullabies. There now, isn't that better? " The embed process especially was deemed a huge success by the Pentagon and led to reporting MUCH more sympathetic than the Vietnam era." True. When the media is actually on the scene we tend to get balanced reports. Unfortunately since the shooting war ended the MSM has confined itself to the Green Zone (hotel lobbies mostly) and gets its news from military and Iraqi press releases. They could do that from here. The best reporting continues to come from imbeds like Michael Yon. "Both used word repetition and misdirection to convince a significant portion of their citizenry that Iraq was connected to terrorism and 9/11, had readily available WMDs they were willing to use against the US/UK civilian populations and were an active threat to do so." Translation: Our people are stupid and easy to fool. Not going to argue, simply disagree completely. Try selling that message next election, "you were too stupid and should have let us do the thinking for you". And why was the NYT editorial page and the Clinton administration 5 years previously on the same page btw? Man Rove is good. "And two of the biggest cable news systems in the US, CNN and Fox seemed to be so "on message" with the administration you'd think they were getting teleprompter feeds directly from the west wing." CNN? And what about NBC, ABC, CBS, PBS, NPR, BBC, NYT, LAT, Wa-post, etc, etc, etc? "Canadians, especially our sniper teams, were very highly regarded in their work in combat. And Canadians are still there, most recently moving back into the more hostile Taliban-controlled territories of Afghanistan again." Very true. "Canadians died in combat, not to mention by an overstimulated and triggerhappy USAF pilot who bombed thier night training area..." Thats a cheap shot. I expect Canadians have had blue on blue problems at some time in their well deservedly highly-regarded marshall history. "1. The war in Afghanistan wasn't over. " Of course. How were 150,000 extra troops going to help is the question? Or would they actually hurt the effort (the answer is yes, as the Russians could tell you)? "Instead we bombed them back into the stone age (not for the first time) then camped out in the the capital doing very little of lasting value in the rest of the country." That is pointedly absurd, ignorant, and smacks of reliance on the MSM for information. Read Good News from Afghanistan on this very site some time. The allies have done tremendous things in Afghanistan. Just remember how low they started from. Does Democracy mean anything to you?! "2. We saw how little of what was supposed to happen in Afghanistan was delivered, and had our doubts about what was promised for Iraq. There is still a good part of Afghanistan owned by the Taliban, although a tad less formally than when they were considered the government." Untrue. Link? If 'own' means they can hide in a cave and blow up a school once a year you may have a point however. "3. Our government wasn't prepared to lie to or deceive us about Iraq." Now you are arguing with yourself. "4. This is probably the telling one, although it's Canadian only. Even when we stood up shoulder to shoulder with the US after 9/11, Bush forget to even mention us when giving international credit" Sorry you got your feelings hurt. I suppose the 25 millions Iraqis should suffer for it. Hey we brought back hockey though. Truce? "Well, for anyone who is interested, the difference between the Afghan war and GW II is a textbook example of "how to alienate your friends and scare off potential allies". I thought how we handled Afghanistan was a disaster and alienated our allies? Make up your mind.
#22 from JC at 8:56 pm on Aug 19, 2005
Huh - I might as well give this up, actually, with the wingnuttery one has to deal with - "The Enemy Gets A Vote." - good mind-reading skills I suppose - yes AMac, THAT's what I was attempting to say. How'd you guess? "Comparing Kosovo to Iraq" - you might do better to think about WHAT was being compared, yes? And do you object to the fact that no american lives were lost in combat in Kosovo? Do you think I need a "padded cell" for pointing out that Clinton seemed to care more for american military lives than Bush does. But personally, I think it is contemptible how Rumsfeld treated generals serving their country for 30 years "Rumsfeld’s personal contempt for many of the senior generals and admirals who were promoted to top jobs during the Clinton Administration is widely known. He was especially critical of the Army, with its insistence on maintaining costly mechanized divisions. In his off-the-cuff memoranda, or “snowflakes,” as they’re called in the Pentagon, he chafed about generals having “the slows”—a reference to Lincoln’s characterization of General George McClellan. “In those conditions—an atmosphere of derision and challenge—the senior officers do not offer their best advice,” a high-ranking general who served for more than a year under Rumsfeld said. One witness to a meeting recalled Rumsfeld confronting General Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, in front of many junior officers. “He was looking at the Chief and waving his hand,” the witness said, “saying, ‘Are you getting this yet? Are you getting this yet?’ ” Rumsfeld gets a bum rap. His ideas were revolutionary and correct in the main. They worked best when melded with dynamic but experienced leaders like Tommy Franks. Franks 'got it', he believed that speed was more deadly than fire power, and he proved himself correct twice. Rumselds 'babies' are just starting to come online, like the Stryker which was much derided but highly successful. Admittedly he has had to learn the value of boots on the ground, but just as obviously many of the Cold War generals needed to learn the value getting inside the enemies decision cycle as opposed to bringing overwhelming firepower as the answer to every question. We may recall a number of Ex-Generals who shall remain nameless bewailing the imminent disaster of Franks charge across Southern Iraq. Was Rumsfeld wrong for pushing perfumed princes like that out?
#24 from AMac at 9:29 pm on Aug 19, 2005
JC #22:
Sorry, I guess I wasn't clear. Not trying to impugn you or to mind-read, rather to point out that we (the US military/post-Saddam Iraq/The West; take your pick) are facing intelligent and resourceful Islamist adversaries. Unlike volcanoes, they consciously make plans and implement them in order to thwart our objectives. The phrase is supposedly used in the US Army to illustrate that point. It seems evident to me that al Qaeda in Iraq is already visualizing what we see as "metrics of success" and allocating resources (e.g. car bombs) to lower them. The battlefield value of scores of maimed and dead Baghdad children is low--until one broadens "battlefield" to include American TV sets because one is banking on creating a sense of futility that will fuel the "bring the troops home" movement. So--no efforts at repelling you with wingnuttery. Perhaps my comment #18 makes more sense with this added context. Also, consider that there are voices across the political spectrum that find fault with Bush et al.; it's as much a question of the context of their errors as anything else.
#25 from Chris at 9:43 pm on Aug 19, 2005
Like JC said, too many good posts to deal with fully. That said: AL (#4): The problem with supporting the current "high level" strategy is that the math just doesn't add up - Greg Djerejian seems convinced that the Iraqis aren't anywhere near ready to "stand up", but I haven't heard anybody convincingly argue that we will be able to maintain troop strength more than a year out from now... which is, it seems to me, at least as long as it'd take to get the Iraqi security forces up to speed. And again, the guys who have repeatedly "stumbled" (Rumsfeld in particular) haven't been booted out, nor is there much sign that there will be. I know you've said you don't want to wade in and talk about the hard details on Iraq, but I think if you want us to keep hoping, you, personally, have to give us some concrete reasons to hope. Jeff (#5): I'm honestly not sure what to say here: you've put together a hermetic bubble of logic where it seems like proposing anything but staying the course, no matter what, is tantamount to wanting the US to lose. This is not high school football; the team that "wants it more" will not necessarily win. Again, trend lines are important. Your historic examples have some merit, but they're a bit smudged: Gettysburg happened 2.5 years after Sumter, and the Union had some bright spots prior to that. And both sides were more or less in a stalemate through much of WWI, but the manpower trends favored the Allies, and the Germans knew it - that's why they launched their spring offensive in the first place. And those were wars fought against real armies, where there was always the hope and possibility that a decisive battle could be won and things would suddenly change. In comparison, we're fighting against bees in Iraq, against fog, and we are being worn down, with little hope for relief that I can see. If you want to make an argument, argue concrete strategies as to how we can get out, or demonstrate how the Iraqi training process is going far better than is generally thought. Otherwise, railing against "vile arguments" may make you feel morally superior to the other side, but it won't help anybody win this war. Mark (#6): Your points are well taken, but I still stand by the gist of my remarks, for many of the same reasons I gave Jeff above. Relative to the overall US mobilization in the Civil War and WW2, those casualties aren't that bad. Furthermore, the US had the momentum at all those points, which is not the case now. Nor can we hope for a single decisive battle to turn things around. I'm not running in terror because of a few casualties - if I honestly thought 10,000 US deaths would guarantee a democratic, unified Iraq, I'd say it was a worthy trade. But at the moment, I'm afraid we could lose 10k Americans in Iraq and it still wouldn't bring us any closer to beating the insurgency. That's what I'd like to see addressed here. Steve (#14): I think you're fudging the lines more than a little with the list you present. Even from hawks, I've seen far more complaints about our handling of Sadr than praise - it's definitely stretching it to say we handled that "subtly and effectively." What's going on with the Iraqi Constitution right now is a much bigger deal than "stopping to discuss policy matters", the training of Iraqi forces is moving forward far too slowly, and in reality, the construction projects you discuss seem to be at a standstill, especially in regards to oil and electricity production. Furthermore, it's not at all true that "we couldn't accomplish ANY of them if the enemy was truly quicker and more adaptable than we are." The US has the world's finest army and billions of dollars - we'd have to be completely braindead not to have something to point out as progress. The question is, as always, does the progress we've made indicate that we've wisely and correctly used our resources? The jury's still out on that one. And BW (#17), I agree with you almost completely - for my money, the biggest warning sign in the world that the hawks were ODing on hubris was when Steven Den Beste declared Canada a "Level One enemy". When I think of how things might have turned out if we hadn't been so eager to swallow the "with us or against us" crap...
#26 from BW at 9:47 pm on Aug 19, 2005
“" The embed process especially was deemed a huge success by the Pentagon and led to reporting MUCH more sympathetic than the Vietnam era." “"2. We saw how little of what was supposed to happen in Afghanistan was delivered, and had our doubts about what was promised for Iraq. There is still a good part of Afghanistan owned by the Taliban, although a tad less formally than when they were considered the government." “"3. Our government wasn't prepared to lie to or deceive us about Iraq." “"4. This is probably the telling one, although it's Canadian only. Even when we stood up shoulder to shoulder with the US after 9/11, Bush forget to even mention us when giving international credit" Anyways, the only thing I felt strongly about in my initial post was the commenter (not the original poster) that said no nation but the US contributed significantly in relation to Afghanistan. After that I just decided to blow some of my work time (boss won’t be pleased I’m sure) to share, if anyone cares, why some of the very same countries who backed the US in Afghanistan didn’t (and may never, who knows) back GWII/OIF. I probably went overboard in that area and got into aspects of the partisan debate there in the US that I’m best not to comment on. I’ve got no vote there and that’s not likely to change soon. My apologies for stepping on toes in that regard, I had intended more to just give an idea about what really happened here that led to us not joining, rather than some of the sensational/ignorant things we’ve heard quoted about us and our choice from US pols and commentators. Anyone who wants to know more about the wonderful story of the Icelandic volcano battle, read John McPhee's book "The Control of Nature." Speaking of wingnuttery: Clinton seemed to care more for american military lives than Bush does. That's just partisan crap and you know it. I will resist the temptation to reply in kind about what I think Clinton's real motives were. Considering you've made some very good and important points here, you really didn't need that. I do wish you'd flesh out the Kosovo comparison, some, and include Bosnia as well. These were rather different wars with different objectives against a different foe, no? We could do it with an air war because our goal was to drive the enemy out of a specific territory and back to his home, not to take over his home and put him on trial. Slobo was deposed by his own people, remember, not us. Was that a practical alternative for dealing with Saddam?
#29 from BW at 9:59 pm on Aug 19, 2005
""And BW (#17), I agree with you almost completely - for my money, the biggest warning sign in the world that the hawks were ODing on hubris was when Steven Den Beste declared Canada a "Level One enemy". When I think of how things might have turned out if we hadn't been so eager to swallow the "with us or against us" crap..."" yeah, thanks for that. I didn't have a good link to point it out, but it was weird to go from ally (if not always acknowledged) to a perceived enemy. Your ambassador at that time was also a pretty high-handed guy and made it pretty clear we were expected to toe the line on that or we'd suffer. That put a lot of people's back's up. Personally I'm glad he's gone. The new guy doesn't know a heck of a lot about us given he's not from a border state, but at least he doesn't look at Canada as an unruly colony who needs to be kept in line. Anyway, it was totally weird when we actually had the majority of our available combat arms troops already deployed in Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia in roles supporting rebuilding, peacekeeping and peace support operations after past US/NATO campaigns, and then being told we were either not good friends, or in fact enemeies because we wouldn't back the new war. I'm just glad I'm not French :P BW
#30 from BW at 10:01 pm on Aug 19, 2005
Er, and sorry for that big post up above. It looked FINE in word, but didn't cut and paste well. /me makes a mental note to save as .txt before cutting and pasting next time BW "a. The hyped objective was that Hussein was a threat to the United States and we needed to deal with the "weapons of mass destruction". This turned out to be true if you believe both Iraq Survey group reports and the 9-11 Commission. All stated that Hussein was doing his best to reconstitute his weapons programs, that sanctions were falling apart, and therefore Hussein would be able to do so. And after Saddam cam Uday and Qusay. b. The goals were clear - except for that "weapons of mass destruction". But again, the goals were unrealistic - Bush I's reasons to not continue into Baghdad - why did that turn into Wolfowitz's "a few Bush I stopped because the UN told him to. "billion" cost? Why did Rumsfeld say "I can't imagine that the costs after the invasion would cost more than the invasion" (something like this...) Why, when there was the clear example of the ratio" You are taking one statement out of many by all admin officials. ofpeacekeeping troops necessary to actually keep the peace - as mentioned by Shinseki - why was this belittled? Shinseki isn't the only general there. franks was in charge of the effort and he said we had enough troops. Why listen to a retired general instead of the ones actually in ncharge of the war? c. No UN resolution Because Russia and China and France sold saddam 90% of his weapons and had lucrative backroom oil deals with him. d. Coalition of US, Britian, and Italy. Nothing like previous coalitions. Coalition of 60 countries. Including Japan, Poland, Australia, Spain. To name a few. e. Compared to contributions of troops from other nations, pretty weak. So what? Not to mention, the administration cynically using the War and preparations for the war to divide americans." Anyone who can say this seriously has just rendered the rest of his argument not credible.
#32 from Chris at 10:21 pm on Aug 19, 2005
On the contrary, anyone who disagrees with BW's statement has completely forgotten every bit of partisan wrangling over the Patriot Act, the Department of Homeland security, the 9/11 commission, etc. "Not a ton since Korea, but then to be honest we depend on your lads for our air cover and usually don’t deploy arty overseas, so it hasn’t been a huge issue. I pressed the button relating to that hit to make a point because many Canadians (even the conservatives most likely to back Bush) felt this incident was handled poorly, especially initially. There certainly wasn’t enough answers as to why the pilot disobeyed an order not to engage, but personally I don’t so much blame him as wonder if his command had been demanding too many flight hours out of him in one of the highest pressure, split second jobs on earth. You may however trust me when I say that the incidenent, and how it was handled, was NOT good for the overall Canadian attitude towards our alliance in the war on terror." You seem like a respectable guy, but with all due respect, much of your country needs to get over itself. If a large portion of it hadn't already been jumping at the bit to blame us stupid American hicks, it wouldn't be nearly so much a problem. You made a serious effort in Afghanistan. OK, the only reason it was a serious effort is because your country spends the second lowest amount on defense in all of NATO, ahead of Luxembourg. Why? Because you are North of us, period. Forgive me for not jumping at the rails when your emaciated military struggles even to maintain this commitment, even as your citizens use one blue-on-blue incident to heap your traditional abuse on us. “"1. The war in Afghanistan wasn't over. " Trying to fully occupty Afghanistan was a losing and unnecessary proposition. The Russians lost because they were arrogant and over-ambitious. We wiped out the current leadership, replaced them with complacent politicians, and bought off the tribes. The alternative is exactly as Rockford describes, flooding the countryside with troops that alienate xenophobic Afghans and suck our Army dry for years. The military did exactly what they should have and kept our presence low. The rest of it I'll let Rockford respond to.
#34 from davebo at 10:29 pm on Aug 19, 2005
Yehudit. So Franks was in charge and Shinseki was retired? I think you need to revisit your timeline there feller.
#35 from Tom Holsinger at 10:44 pm on Aug 19, 2005
Piling assumption on assumption in a situation unfamiliar to those making all these assumptions can lead to lots of strange conclusions. One of the assumptions is that events in Iraq are not related to the war on terror. This results in "Garbage In - Garbage Out" reasoning. History is a process, not an event. Of course the outcome isn't known save in rare situations, which this isn't one of. But it is possible to know who will win if there are staggering disparities in raw power, and here that is the case. The United States has the raw power to reduce all the rest of the world to subsidence level economies and population levels even if they all gang up on us by surprise. That goes in spades for (a) the countries with majority Muslim populations and (b) Arab countries. Furthermore (a) and (b) lack the capability of inflicting significant damage on us even if they know we're about to kill most of them. Those who were aware of the raw power of the U.S. economy on December 8, 1941, well understood that the outcome of World War Two was no longer in the slightest doubt. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was one of those. We are dealing with a greater disparity in raw power now - one greater by several orders of magnitude. We also know that our enemies won't stop attacking us no matter what else happens save their death without descendants willing to carry on the fight. And they are limited to Islamic nutballs in terms of possible descendents. Furthermore those Islamic nutball descendents won't come into being once Arab oil funding, almost entirely from the Saud clan, ceases. The consensus of opinion is that the Saud clan has no more than another five years of power left, at which point their continued oil income will cease. The events causing that will give us and the unhappy world many more problems, but continued Saud funding of Al Qaeda type groups and their "madrassa" type recruiting programs won't be among those. So we really have only two plausible outcomes here. 1) We hang on until the Saud clan's departure from history (and hopefully this life) reduces terrorist recruiting and development by at least 90% (an order of magnitude for the math-impaired). At that point we'll have problems which will make those in Iraq now a fond memory, but they'll be different problems for the doomies to cry doom & gloom about. Their world is always falling, and whatever is going on at the moment that they don't like is always America's fault somehow. 2) We are hit with a major WMD attack at home before the Saud clan joins the Nazis, Japanese militarists and Soviet Communists in deserved extinction. Then we'll win the war on terror the old-fashioned way - with mass slaughter, genocide and a nuclear winter which will somehow offset global warming. So the doomies will suffer extreme cognitive dissonance causing their heads to explode. Get a grip. Look on the bright side of life. And show some imagination. There's always a new way to find disaster looming, and it can be a worse one if you try hard enough. You can do better than that, A.L. "We hang on until the Saud clan's departure from history (and hopefully this life) reduces terrorist recruiting and development by at least 90% (an order of magnitude for the math-impaired)." Come now. While the Saudis and the Sauds certainly are part of the problem, this obsession with making them into the Barzini of the conflict is ill conceived. We could turn over the Sauds and run them out of the Middle East, freeze there bank accounts and do you seriously think terrorist acts would decrease significantly? 90%? Please. The Sauds are playing both ends, no question. They do wipe up a few AQ boys every couple of months, and thats a few less for us to deal with. Considering the alternative is almost certainly a full blown Taliban style government I find it hard to buy this argument. Yes we can pressure the Saudis more. No they are not the catalyst for anything like 90$ of terrorism.
#37 from JC at 11:35 pm on Aug 19, 2005
Yehudit, Not only do you have problems keeping your timeline straight, but right off the bat, you engage in, honestly or not, a falsehood. "This turned out to be true if you believe both Iraq Survey group reports and the 9-11 Commission. All stated that Hussein was doing his best to reconstitute his weapons programs, that sanctions were falling apart, and therefore Hussein would be able to do so. And after Saddam cam Uday and Qusay" I would do yourself a favor, and read ALL the links from this post .
#38 from JC at 11:45 pm on Aug 19, 2005
Rob Lyman, That one statement does go too far, and I apologize. However, I do believe that Clinton doesn't get enough credit for Kosovo and Bosnia, and doesn't get enough credit for the team he put in place for that action. I'll say again - not one american military death to armed conflict in Kosovo. If anyone wants to debate Kosovo, you START by acknowledging this, and acknowledging we met our objectives, AND kept the respect and good will of our allies (for the most part) in that situation. We can START from there. Otherwise, I'm not debating Kosovo. AMac - okay, thanks for clarifying. To the point of "no metrics" - since this is really the point of A.L.'s post. There's a valid point there, but "no metric, no metrics" (and we've had this discussion before) is again - lack of accountability, "hope is not a plan", "stay the course", but no way to judge if the course is successful or not - thinking.
#39 from Jim Rockford at 11:45 pm on Aug 19, 2005
JC -- Rummy's contempt for the go-along-get-along Clinton generals is well deserved. They went along with the Clinton ideological agenda of the "end of history" and focused on soft-imagery "nation building" instead of war-fighting. Thus the caving on Force Protection in Somalia for political reasons driven by Dick Morris polling, the disgraceful intimidation of the US Navy by Haitian mobs in Port Au Prince, and the catering to Clinton's desire to have bloodless wars. Utopian nonsense, letting the perfect be the enemy of the good. More importantly, the Clinton era generals did not advance military theory, practice, and prepared endlessly for avoiding Vietnam, instead of the enemies we were likely to face: tribal gangs in failed states and the Chinese challenge in the Pacific conventionally. During the Clinton years, the Military as long as it went along with Clinton's social engineering agenda, was left unsupervised. Of course Rummy made people unhappy and angry. Particularly since he cut gigantic and useless procurement programs (that sometimes thousands of military and post-military careers depend on), such as Crusader (designed to fight the Soviets in Europe) and tried to kill Osprey (designed for another European D-Day). Rummy has also tried to close bases that are not needed. Always a political storm. Rummy's RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) marries networked technology (such as the Landwarrior program) completely and redundantly, designed to reduce friendly fire incidents and multiply lethality by concentrating firepower where needed with precision. Essentially every rifleman the equivalent of a mortar brigade, with precision lethality and C and C plus cross-functional links everywhere (which has been the traditional American Army strength since WWII when a sarge with a radio could call in arty). BW -- you missed my point. Not only was there considerable resistance politically within NATO to Afghanistan, the organization and Canada itself could provide no materially significant assistance. Yes Canadian soldiers are brave and well trained and have fought superbly. However they are so few and so totally dependent on the US that they have no significant military impact in Afghanistan. Canada contributes territory and radar stations to NORAD. That's about it military wise. Let's not forget, Canadian politicians aped Chirac in actively opposing US efforts in Iraq, which is not good for harmonious relations (particularly when the US pays the Canadian defense bill). The Canadian Navy effectively does not exist, and Canada depends on the US Navy. As for Iraq, post 1996 defection of Saddam's son-in-laws, it was revealed that Saddam did INDEED have substantial nuclear elements, including Uranium refining equipment, carefully hidden. These were destroyed but it was thought that there were others, given how wrong (and how shocked Inspectors were in 1991-2 to find his various WMD efforts far more advanced than thought) the Western Intelligence agencies had been before (consistently pre-Gulf War 1, 91-92, and again the shocking 1996 revelations) awful in UNDERESTIMATING Saddam's WMD efforts (which also btw included forbidden missile tech). In 1998 Saddam threw out the inspectors saying he was done. You might recall Bill Clinton's response, he authorized Desert Fox 1998-99 which led to repeated air strikes against Saddam, and the formal 1998 Iraqi Regime Change Law (Act of Congress) setting forth regime change as US policy based on the belief that Saddam possessed WMD capacity and intent. This was shared during the run-up to the Iraq War by Putin, Schroeder, and Chirac publicly, they simply disagreed on the response. OBL cited above saw negotiation and lack of resolve in use of force as proof the West was/is weak and corrupt and easily cowed by mass terror. The fundamental conflict in finding a solution is between utopians and pragmatists. Pragmatists believe that a decent/good solution even if flawed is better than wanting a perfect solution or none at all. Afghanistan was tribal and primitive before the Taliban, and they remain so today. However, they have the space and time required to make progress, which under Mullah Omar's rule they did not. Net? Positive for pragmatists, utopian rejectionists point out the many problems there and insist on a total withdrawal NOW. In Iraq, under Saddam the nation was a collection of a primitive set of tribes. Under the air cover in the extreme North, the Kurds have developed a society that more closely resembles say, the 18th Century instead of the sixth. The rest of Iraq particularly the very tribal Sunni center has not been so lucky. That society will not change over night. However, absent Saddam Iraqis have at least the opportunity to change for the better (sadly most of those who would have moved progress forward were slaughtered when Bush 1 stood by in 1991). Electricity for example had no new investment since the late sixties, and power was reserved for Baghdad alone leaving the rest of the nation to rot. New generation capacity has been brought online despite repeated sabotage, and electricity distributed fairly to other places. The same holds true for sewage, school construction, telecom, and other measurable things that make life better. Iraq will not resemble Sweden for a long long time if ever. However, things are better now even with the violence, much of non-political and simply criminal.
#40 from Tom Holsinger at 11:57 pm on Aug 19, 2005
Mark, I didn't say that the 90% reduction would happen overnight. It would go down gradually. But after about ten years, IMO yes. And we'll find out unless we're nuked first.
#41 from Steve in Houston at 12:00 am on Aug 20, 2005
Chris: Even from hawks, I've seen far more complaints about our handling of Sadr than praise - it's definitely stretching it to say we handled that "subtly and effectively." I suppose I'm coming at it from a results standpoint. To this point, al Sadr has been effectively neutralized - at least to the point that he's not roaming around southern Iraq fomenting open rebellion. Of course, he may simply be biding his time until he can make another power play, with Iran's blessing and support. But we decimated his followers militarily; we helped keep the apparently more quietist Sistani alive and in high esteem; and we did it without leveling Najaf or Nasiriyah or the other holy sites in the south. We certainly showed more deference to various mosques and burial grounds than the Sadrists did themselves. And we did it without turning Sadr into a martyr. A side benefit is that Sadr City is one of the more stable areas around Baghdad these days. At the very least, it's one less front we have to deal with as we attempt to bring the Sunnis in and reduce the more intractable elements. I'm not sure what the complaints you're referring to are - maybe that we didn't deal more ruthlessly with him and his adherents? I can see a case for that. Maybe it just comes down to how one defines success. I found the way we handled the Shia rebellion to be effective and without having to live down to our widespread reputation as a bunch of blundering, uncultured boobs. In fact, I see it as an example of the exact sort of adapting that you suggest we aren't doing. I'm also not convinced that the construction projects have come to a standstill, nor that oil production has stagnated. I've seen conflicting reports. It's difficult to get real reports on how the infrastructure is doing, since they are inherently incremental, dull and unlikely to be covered if they occur outside Baghdad (or, for that matter, within it). Certainly electricity production is lagging in the capital; is the same true in the rest of the country? The wrangling over the constitution appears to me to be the usual horse trading and brinksmanship you see in politics. Over here, it might be referred to as healthy debate (or rabid partisanship). Over there, I dunno. Maybe it is borderline catastrophic. As you say, though, time will tell. My optimism is perhaps misplaced.
#42 from JC at 12:05 am on Aug 20, 2005
Jim, Correct me if I'm mistaken, but you think it's okay for Rumsfeld to humilate generals in front of those of lesser rank? Does your blinders-Republicanism go that far?? Another bit of your blinders-Republicanism - most of what Rumsfeld was arguing was pretty much straight out of what Gary Hart was advocating in the early 90's. (And then of course in the late 90's was the Hart-Rudman report). It might be good to get that timeline right. Here is a taste of Rumsfeld wisdom, courtesy of Larry Diamond. "ne story that really got me was the tale of former ambassador to Yemen Barbara Bodine suggesting to Rumsfeld in March of 2003 that it would behoove the Bush administration to develop a plan to pay Iraqi civil servants. Rumsfeld replied that American taxpayers would never go for it and that he was not concerned if they were paid for several weeks or even months; if they rioted in the streets in protest, he said, the US could use such an eventuality as leverage to get the Europeans to pick up the tab." Yes, he is quite the visionary, isn't he? In fact, our handling, with the Briti |
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