So says Associated Press, which says that they're throwing in the towel as far as their nuclear weapons program is concerned. If true, this is a major triumph for US diplomacy and a definite positive step.
Still, let's be sure that we trust but verify on the dismantling after what happened the last time ...
Prediction: If this in fact pans out, people who have previously argued that the North Korean diplomacy was a complete failure will now start arguing that this would have happened anyway regardless of what the US did.
UPDATE: I've gotten some mail to the effect that it's going to take a lot more than reassuring words as far as Kim Jong Il's pledges are concerned. This is why I thought I stressed verification - as part of any agreement. Joe's Dartblog also provides some helpful commentary on the situation.








Obviously, John Kerry will now realize he was wrong when he said we should abandon the six-party talks.
It's an all-you-can-eat special at the Crow Buffet.
Unless he claims that his policy (do the opposite of whatever Bush was doing, then run to the Security Council and ask what to do next) would have made North Korea disarm even faster. Nah, he wouldn't try to sneak out of it like that.
There is no agreement, pledge or vow that North Korea will do away with its nuclear arms programs. A careful reading of the joint statement reveals the parties only agreed to three things:
First, the six parties agreed to the six items in the joint statement. The statement is nothing more than a list of observations, two which concern agreements;
Second, In section 4 of the joint statement, the six parties "agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in northeast Asia;"
Third, in section 5 of the joint statement the six parties "agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the aforementioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of 'commitment for commitment, action for action;'" and
Fourth, in section 6 of the joint statement, the six parties "agreed to hold the fifth round of the six party talks in Beijing in early November 2005 at a date to be determined through consultations."
Everything else in joint statement has been agreed to or stated previously.
If you believe that, I've got a bridge to sell you. As one of those people you mention who thinks this diplomacy has been a complete failure, I'll go on record as saying that this is just Kim jerking everyone around again. The only way I could see hm throwing in the towel would be if China had decided to start leaning on him hard behind closed doors, and I strongly doubt that that's the case. But we'll see.
I'd caution MAJOR skepticism about DPRK's intention to live up to any pledges of any kind.
This is going to be sorta like the deals in the 90s except we're not giving quite the whole farm this time. Which is progress.
This is all premature speculation in terms of what the agreement actually means and what North Korea will do.
But if the deal as described materializes, the critics will say that Bush's poor diplomacy delayed the deal for three or four years. And, if the deal looks like 1994, I'd have to say I think they're right. If the deal doesn't look like 1994 Plus (Kim hands over the Plutonium), I think they might be right.
We (by which I mean The Civilized World and the Western News Media) don't want to imagine that the government of North Korea is what it is. John Lennon's "Imagine" is so much nicer.
In 2000, Steven Bradner wrote North Korea's Strategy for the CINC of UN Command Korea. He claimed that the "Kim Family Regime" is akin to an organized crime family that has the good fortune to run a country. Their strategic objective--their reason for being--is the reunification of the Peninsula under their control.
Why would the KFR make a genuine, major concession? What about the regime has changed? What's in it for them?
Let's not confuse "It's a sunny day!" with "A known liar says it's a sunny day."
Well, I'd say that the US had to concede some of its position in order to get this deal. But if it holds up, I certainly won't complain.
Well, we'll know soon enough when the inspectors get in there whether Kim is planning to follow the Lybia example or if this is just the Clinton arraigement all over again. Something tells me NK really is resolved, but we'll see.
I can only believe that the DPRK has secured enough of what they need for their nuclear arsenal that now they can give up production while retaining a credible threat.
The regime there means no good will. They're simply on to the next square on the chess board.
Still, perhaps this is an improvement. Call me guardedly pessimistic.
And I'm Marie of Bulgaria.
The Norks promised the same thing in 1994, but kept on with their nuclear weapons program - they just changed their choice of fissionables (from plutonium to U-235 or vice versa). Absent no-notice on-site inspections, their word is useless. They'll just keep on with their nuke program and lie about it. They did before.
This is just propaganda.
The only way to keep North Korea from developing nuclear weapons is to terminate North Korea. They don't need any help in that, and will collapse no matter how much aid the Chinese offer unless the aid comes with several hundred thousand Chinese fraternal humanitarian aid volunteers to make certain most of it is used as aid rather than being sold in the black market in China. I.e., only Chinese occupation can keep the Norks nominally going.
But the Norks can do a lot of damage selling nukes for cash before they collapse.
I repeat, this is just a sham.
Never happen.
Its a sham. NK has no incentive to play ball at this point. Once they have their nuclear assembly line humming and their arsenal ready (if they dont already) they will inherit all the carrots automatically and fear no sticks.
Why? Hard to say when dealing with a lunatic meglomaniac, but the most rational explanation would be that NK is giving the US the chance to 'save face' by letting it rejoin the respectable nations and pretend the dilemna is solved. KJI is giving Bush the chance to wash his hands of the issue and accept the de facto arsenal while the appeasers and diplomats nod sagely and praise the 'breakthrough'. That is what Kim Jong Il would seek to do in Bush's position.
"North Korea has promised to drop all nuclear programs as soon as possible"
I should think the memo could be ready for disemination by late this afternoon.
I suspect it may make months or years.
Since everybody is in such a cynical funk, I volunteer to draw fire:
If Jong-Il agreed to this because he's getting nervous about his sovereignty, this would be the second major peace dividend of the Iraq War - the first being the Syrian skedaddle in Lebanon. Long live Robust Unilateralism!
Kim Jong Il just wants a chance to drop Hans Blix through the trap door into his shark tank. "Prease move a rittle bit to the reft, Mr. Brix. . ."
China has other objectives, doesn't want an obviously nuclear NK stirring up Japan to re-arm. Notice this came on the heels of the re-election of Kozumi?
Japan could go nuclear very quickly, unlike NK it's industrial base is superb and would likely get assistance from the US. I'm sure THAT card got played as well "You let the NKs stay nuclear, we'll help the Japanese."
There's also I'm sure some private language conveyed to Beijing about where the return address would be for any nuclear attack on a US city by bin Laden. THAT uncertainty is to everyone's advantage to take off the table.
hmmmm...Dr. K just said (on brit hume) that this is China's hand. China wants a pan-asiatic alliance and the dragon is just showing everyone who is the real playah in the orient. If this works, it will be because of China's involvement. I'm inclined to agree. There is no altruism in nature.
They want a nuclear reactor in exchange. Looks like Bush will end up doing exactly what Clinton did (actually hopefully he will). A light-water reactor or two would be more than worth the money.
...waiting for Glenn to condemn Bush as soon as he signs the OK :)
SAO we have a seat at my weekly pokr game with your name on it.
So, what's your grand theory, Mark?
I know it doesn't jive with the usual quasi-conspirational stuff said here regarding Korea, but keep in mind that last time Clinton and Carter essentially bluffed; we sent no cash for any reactor and in return got roughly six years of deterrance.
What we need is an agreement that forks over a necessary amount of cash (over time, for light-water reactors or whatever) in exchange for the dismantlement of their current centrifuges. That will put N Korea back into the 5-8 year range for them to be able to produce another dozen nukes. In 5-8 years we can hope that the geopolitical situation in Japan, China, and E Asia change enough to make any move towards acquiring more nukes (which can only be done in secret for so long) less than attractive.
Dan Darling:
. . . they're throwing in the towel . . . let's be sure that we trust but verify . . .
Premature. There is no deal yet. There is a set of principles around which a deal may or may not be consummated.
Text here.
Observations:
In short, this may be a diplomatic breakthrough, but it's a long way short of an operative agreement.
Two theories:
A few early data points:
Looks like John Bragg got that one right.
It would be best if the talks do stall, and it would be in our best interests for that to be the case. I have heard that the harvests in NK this year will be below normal, and even in the best of times they can barely keep their population fed. Is it just a coincidence that they are being "reasonable" now? I doubt it. As soon as circumstances improve they will go back to their old belligerent ways.
The best thing to do is to withhold all aid and just let the country implode. We should do as they have done in the past. If they make concessions, we should ask for more, and just keep dragging the negotiations out, while making it clear that there will be no aid or economic concessions at all until a final agreement can be worked out, which we should make sure never happens.
My theory is that concessions were offered so as to isolate Iran at the IAEA today. It's divide and conquer, with Iran being regarded as the more immediate problem.
Robert McDougall:
The initial post was made off the AP report early Monday morning, which made it look as though a more formalized agreement was in the works, which was one of the reasons for my initial optimism. The AP story was later altered when it became clearer as far as what had actually happened.
On the diplomacy aspect, lemme get this straight: if the deal succeeds, it's appeasement and it was it was delayed for the last 3-4 years?
That's certainly one way to look at the potential de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula ...
One other point that's not entirely clear to me is how the recent shift in the North Koreans' attitudes (if it is indeed that) is solely influenced by the US. Some heavy Chinese leaning brought about as a result of the reelection of Prime Minister Koizumi and the very real prospect of a nuclear Japan in response to the North Korean threat strikes me as being an equally plausible explanation for recent events.
Excellent points raised by Robert McDougall (#22, #23).
Each of the six Parties to these talks has their own agenda. In many important respects, they aren't compatible with one another. South Korea's various priorities are notable for not even being in line with each other--they'd like to see eventual reunification on SK terms without having their economy dragged down, in the meantime achieving domestic consensus, responding to the suffering of the North's people, without upsetting the North's regime or annoying China...
A good description I read (somewhere) on the Agreed Framework is that it was achieved because the KFR and the US each supposed they were getting a deal by pulling a fast one:
The US and the KFR each got something out of the Agreed Framework, but details didn't work out the way either expected.
One example Austin Bay discusses is the meaning of SK agreeing to supply electricity to NK. NK agrees because they want the free power. SK anticipates having
The often-incompatible agendas of the parties and the absence of any basis for trust mean that agreements like this are going to be difficult to negotiate and even harder to implement.
I wish the State Dept. the best of luck in their efforts.
"keep in mind that last time Clinton and Carter essentially bluffed; we sent no cash for any reactor and in return got roughly six years of deterrance."
We got roughly 6 years of the NKs working on a parrallel uranium bomb program, which has now blossomed into a fledgling nuclear arsenal.
"What we need is an agreement that forks over a necessary amount of cash (over time, for light-water reactors or whatever) in exchange for the dismantlement of their current centrifuges."
What we need is far different than what we are going to get and shouldnt be confused. You are making the classic diplomats mistake, assuming their is some combinated of ways to stack the carrots that will turn the light bulb on over KJIs head and he will do what we want him to.
I repeat, there is nothing we can offer NK more valuable to them than a nuclear arsenal. We need to stop pretending otherwise, it's dangerous.
I like Mitchell Porter's Iran theory. That would be smart.
Dan Darling:
On the diplomacy aspect, lemme get this straight: if the deal succeeds, it's appeasement and it was it was delayed for the last 3-4 years?
You would need to talk to Matt about that. As I read his note, he's somewhere between embracing the term "appeasement" himself, and using it to goad the hawks with their own rhetoric. More substantively, it seems he'd agree that, appeasement or not, a deal involving concessions to North Korea is the least bad alternative on offer.
Hmmmmmm....
Looks like they're (the NORKS) already beginning to shuffle.
Why am I not shocked?