Right now it seems as though the insurgents have more or less failed at any plans to disrupt the Iraqi elections. In contrast to the January elections, there doesn't appear to have been much of an effort this time around (again, going by comparison to what happened in January).
There are a couple of possibilities here as to why Zarqawi and al-Qaeda in Iraq haven't made more of a concerted effort to disrupt the voting, but I would guess that the actual result is a convergence of several factors. I've noted before that Zarqawi actually runs more of a coalition than a traditional guerrilla or terrorist organization and according to Cordesman and the head of CENTCOM intelligence, most of its members are Iraqi Sunnis. If the a big enough number of the Sunni insurgent groups are indeed planning to vote in order to try and gain some influence over the government (and this would be true whether they're looking for a way out or if they still plan on bringing it down further down the line), then that puts the onus on Zarqawi not to attack since he runs the risk of hitting his actual or potential allies.
Additionally, al-Zawahiri's warnings about paying heed to popular opinion following the capture of Amir Khalif in Ramadi at the hands of a presumably Sunni mob. While Khalif's position inside al-Qaeda in Iraq was only that of the #3 guy in Mosul, events like this have to make al-Zawahiri's chastening and the need to pay heed to public opinion echoing all that much louder. So when you combine those three factors: that many Iraqi insurgent groups and their supporters are actively participating in this election, the chastening from al-Zawahiri, and the potential for a further loss of popular support (or even popular fear, as the mob that attacked Khalif apparently wasn't afraid of retaliation from al-Qaeda in Iraq).
One of the points that Cordesman has noted in his magnum opus on the Iraqi insurgency is that while it goes through cycles of relatively high and low activity, there doesn't seem to be any way to establish its ebb and flow in any measureably way - for instance, there was a noticeable drop in activity during Hurricane Katrina for no reason on the ground that I can determine. As long as Zarqawi is still out there, though, I think it's naive to think that he isn't going to make a renewed effort to destroy whatever government comes to power following the election, which is why as Cordesman and others have noted that the neutralization of his network must serve as an integral part of any strategy for stabilizing Iraq.
Well the point is, insurgencies only work if they grow. Zarqawi's ability to strike is stagnant at best. He cant find a way to hurt us or the Iraqis on a day when the targets couldnt be richer, but the security couldnt be tighter. He can only strike when the element of surprise is on his side. Before he couldnt stop elections in Basra and parts of Baghdad. Now he cant stop them in Ramadi and Fallujah. That is progress.
By failing to stop the election, I think it is the beginning of the end. When the Sunnis turned in the latest big get, the signal was sent. The insurgency, it's over -- may take a while before all get the message, but it's over.
The question now is what al-Qaeda will do. By now they know Iraq is lost, they signaled as much when they berated Zarqawri for attacking civilians, the only option left, so you knew the end was coming.
So will al-Qaeda attack western targets? Can they? Or has the effect of the Iraq election taken the steam out of the whole Jihad movement? Time will tell, but I think this election and the following weeks will be the tipping point of all time.
How about because even the fobbettes rack and stack Zarqawi's bozos like they come in six-packs? Anything they do today is going to involve a stand-up fight, which means they're going to get royally pasted, and they know it.
Sometimes the simple answers really are the right ones....
"there was a noticeable drop in activity during Hurricane Katrina for no reason on the ground that I can determine."
The reason there was a noticeable drop in attacks from Zarqawi's group might have something to do with the fact the US/Iraqi Army were conducting major operations against them in Western Anbar region from the Syrian border, along the Euphrates river valley. Several towns where the terrorists had previously operated freely, such as Qaim, Husabah, & Karabila were then brought under US/Iraqi control. Hundred of terrorists were captured or killed and dozens of weapons caches captured. You can read all about it here: http://billroggio.com/archives/2005/08/
It hard to launch attacks when you are being pressed on all sides by thousands of soldiers & marines and guided munitions. This is the "reason on the ground" you somehow missed.
Think Zarquawi didn't attack because he lacks the capacity. Much of the work of the insurgency seems to be done by freelancers, Iraqi suuni doing attacks for money. But the mercinaries didn't go to work today, they were voting.
Zarquawi had the choice of using up what meger personal resources he has by getting his core group killed in a small number of futile attacks, or wait until the roads open. The real question about violence going is forward will be how many mercinaries go back to their old job in the days ahead, or if their blue fingers make them want to find a new one.
Well said Seth. Many will, without a doubt. The only solution to that comes with more and more Iraqi boots on the ground. That part of the violence will end when enough IA and IP troops are around gathering local intelligence to make that profession too dangerous. For that matter, we have to recognize that AQ funding is not limitless. There will be a tipping point reached there as well, when it becomes clear that pouring the majority of their resources into Iraq is achieving nothing. Another good reason to put the pressure on Syria via Lebannon, and try to make progress with the Palestinians (if possible). Those fronts are critical to AQ as well and every dollar or thug that goes to those places instead of Iraq brings us and Iraq closer to victory. Now is the time to push against Syria and Iran (not necessarilly militarilly).
This might be another factor:
Iraq the Model
"The insurgency, it's over -- may take a while before all get the message, but it's over."
IMO, its been over as a military insurgency since second Fallujah. Since that time, they've been unable to hold ground and unable to mount military operations. Moreover, since that time they've lost the belief that they can hold ground or mount military operations. They know on one level that they've lost, but they still believe in the myth of the suicide bomber. Since second Fallujah, they've been increasingly reliant on sporadic acts of terror, which murder people - Iraqi and Coalition - and which make the nightly news but which have no real military value. You can't win an insurgency with acts of terror alone.
Moreover, even with just a terror campaign they are getting hammered. This provoked a great deal of desperation on the part of Al Queda during the first half of the year, which caused them to turn from primarily targetting the coalition to primarily targetting Iraqi's. But that is lethal to an insurgency. Without the support of the local populace, you can't have an insurgency. Since June they've been trying to at least partially reverse that mistake, but I think its too late.
Of course, it would be nice if the enemy would recognize when he's beaten and surrender so as to end the pointless loss of life, but it never works that way. Al Queda and various die hard Sunni factions (particularly the ones who find that they do poorly in elections) that can't deal with not being beneficaries of Iraq's oil wealth at the expense of the Shi'a will keep on fighting for probably at least another two years.
But yeah, they're done. Time is on our side. The longer the democratic process continues, the more legitimacy it will obtain. The longer we are there, the more competant and Westernized the IDF will become. The longer we are there the more the disparity between the Kurd and Shi'as thriving recoveries and the Sunni regions violence torn sabotage afflicted economy will be obvious. The longer we are thier the more basic freedoms the Iraqi's will become acustomed to. The longer we are there, the more we will be able to shape the education of Iraq's children.
The insurgents can't win now. Their 'board position' has gotten too bad. I sure wouldn't want to play it from here. There are no winning lines of play left, just ways to drag out the affair and make it bloodier. Unfortunately, losing real soldiers isn't an academic exercise like losing mere game peices.
"there was a noticeable drop in activity during Hurricane Katrina for no reason on the ground that I can determine."
Perhaps another reason (pretty unlikely, I suppose) is that most American media was focused on Katrina at the time. It would've been in the best interest to Zarqawi and the insurgents to wait for a larger strike until the media was more focused on them again.
Just a thought... Trying to think outside of the box here.
Another explanation for Zarqawi's inability to produce the promised disruption in the elections (other than lack of ability due to lack of personnel) is that his personnel aren't in the cities anymore. The roads have been closed and they can't get into the cities to disrupt.
The Coalition has been on the horns of a dilemma for a while on this issue. When the roads are closed, violence goes down. But economy activity goes down, too.
Mark Buehner:
There was voting in Fallujah in January, I saw (and I believe noted either here or at Rantburg) the Reuters story at the time. The problem was that there wasn't much of it due to a combination of spite and fear on the part of the Sunnis, a problem that seems to have been rectified this time around. As for al-Qaeda funding, right now it's divided up into supporting Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir (or rather rebuilding the jihadi groups active there post-earthquake), Algeria, the southern Philippines, and possibly Thailand in that order. Those are the main fronts right now and we know that the Taliban funding has been cut in half in order to support Zarqawi. Be interesting to see if Zarqawi is currently suffering a drop in cash due to all the Gulf money that's been flowing to the LeT since the earthquake.
bill:
The insurgency can't win now and won't be able to win for as long as the US continues to provide security for much of the country. I'm more concerned about whether or not the new Iraqi forces will be able to follow suit after the apparently impending 2006 draw-down.
Kenneth:
We'd been launching major operations up around Anbar and the Syrian border area since at least May 2005 in an effort to stem the tide of foreign fighters. Bill's a good friend of mine and we discussed the situation quite regularly over the phone. However, I'm not talking about the destruction of Zarqawi's bases having a positive effect - I think we can all agree that that was the case. Rather, I'm referring to the fact that there was a specific lull that occurred during Hurricane Katrina followed by a steady upbeat afterwards that occurred for no reason that either myself or Bill were able to determine at the time.
Seth:
Yeah, a lot of Zarqawi's cannon fodder seem to be mercs, but those are mainly the gunmen, the mortar crews, and the guys planting IEDs, not the ones going for the mass casualty operations like the suicide bombings. One possibility is that we've finally gotten around to completely sealing the Syrian border, effectively cutting Zarqawi off from his source of suicide bombers. That would be an extremely good development, if true.
PD Shaw:
Good point and thanks for the link.
celebrim:
Al-Qaeda doesn't fight a traditional guerrilla war because they know they'll get clobbered by the US, that's why they rely on suicide bombers and assymetrical warfare. Keep in mind that their agenda is such that Zarqawi more interested in killing Americans and as many Iraqis than they are in driving us out of Iraq. That's one of the things that al-Zawahiri criticized him about in the recent letter.
Steven Dave Schuler:
Interesting points, I'll give both of them some thought.
"Al-Qaeda doesn't fight a traditional guerrilla war because they know they'll get clobbered by the US, that's why they rely on suicide bombers and assymetrical warfare."
I don't think I completely agree. From March 2004 to November 2004, the IAF conducted what seems describable to me as a traditional guerrilla campaign with attempts to take and hold territory and field company size and larger units of irregular infantry.
The initial operations around First Fallujah must have given the insurgents a degree of confidence. From thier perspective, things had gone swimmingly. The US was caught somewhat with its pants down in mid-rotation, forcing the US to cancel its then planned troop reductions (if you look back at February 2004 one definately gets the impression that the war was winding down to a conclusion). The US was forced to fight a multi-front war in populated areas, allowing Al Queda to achieve some needed propaganda victories by rolling out real and faked civilian casualties. And by all appearances, the US was unable to prosecute the battle to its conclusion on any large front. In Fallujah, the IAF made the assumption - perhaps warranted - that they had won the battle. In any event, they certainly retained control of the town and began spreading thier influence throughout Anbar. With the IAF having a relatively secure base of operations, US casualty levels made a huge jump.
Whether they believed it or not Al Queda in Iraq continued to spread the meme that against determined 'Muhajideen' fighters, the US military would be unable to stand and fight and would ultimately be shamed and routed. This has been central to the Al Queda mythology ever since Somalia. Whether Al Queda believed it or not, its apparent success at First Fallujah gave Al Queda in Iraq alot of prestige and virtual control over the insurgency in Iraq. The result was something like a real guerilla war. Certainly First and Second Fallujah, Ramadi and other 'big city' battles do not resemble anti-terrorist policework, but are rather 'major military operations' with classical military objectives.
Second Fallujah and the Anbar campaign that has followed that has effectively ended that at this point. Al Queda's current goal may be to simply kill as many Americans as possible, and maybe they do still think that America's morale will suddenly snap and we'll rout and go away, and maybe Al Queda's leadership was always incompotent enough to never be able to articulate a strategy more complex than that, but I do not think that one can consider the current 'command detonated mine' and suicide bomber campaign to be Al Queda's first choice. This is not how they expected things to be going at this point. They had expected the US to find itself in the midst of a half-dozen Grozny's. They had expected 'the faithful' to rise up in mass. They had not expected the provisional government to achieve this measure of legitimacy. This current tragic 'IED' campaign is what they've fallen back on when 'plan A' failed - regardless of how they may currently rationalize this being the plan all along.
If the IAF had been able to successfully morph into a popular insurgency, then they'd have some hope of winning. As it is, they are stuck in a low intensity quagmire that is sucking up thier money and personnel and achieving no measurable results beyond slowing down (but not stopping) US ambitions in the region. The US is clearly taking control of the field, both in classical terms of controlling space, and in a more holostic sense of controlling the mental space.
Dan, Yea. I fully expect in a few days or weeks a shockingly huge 'we're still here' attack in the middle of a big crowd of civilians, in a place previously thought peaceful. I was just responding to the question of why he didn't try to stop the election. Zarquawi isn't a fool, he's got limited resources so hasn't wasted them by matching his weakness vs. the Iraqi & coalition army's strength. He'll bide his time and go his hard vs. our soft, like always. If he, however, he is running out of jihadis willing to die to stop Muslems being free, that might actually be that. It could further change the calculus and cause AQ to 'cut and run', try taking the fight to France's disgruntled firebombers or someplace. That happens it might even make people take a second look at Cheney's 'they're on their last legs' comment that was so ridiculed just a couple months ago.
The insurgency is primarily over because the insurgents have lost the Iraqi people's support. That is the definition of insurgency. Blowing up the countryside is not the way to bring others to your side. Once the Iraqis became the targets, the end had arrived.
It's very possible that this defeat in Iraq will take al-qaeda with it, as more people around the ME see there is a better life, you just need freedom.
This is the point that gets lost when the MSM scores the conflict by car bombs per day.
Thank our commanders and the US leadership for the victory -- the iron fist and velvet glove are very hard to master.
celebrim:
Agreed that the biggest insurgent gains were made from March to November 2004 (though I tend to regard April as more of the turning point since from that point on we more or less left Fallujah in the hands of the Fallujah Brigade, which was coopted or liquidated in reasonably short order) and that we've more or less been cleaning up since. Routing them out of Fallujah, Samarra, Ramadi, and so on had no appreciable impact on the mass casualty terrorist attacks since the bombers were being used up by the bad guys almost as soon as they entered the country, which probably contributed to the decision in late spring to mount a campaign to shut down the rat lines in an effort to end the supply of foreign fighters and suicide bombers. If we've succeeded or even minimized that, it's a positive development.
Disagreed on al-Qaeda not having a more sophisticated view of Iraq than the one you laid out - Iraq al-Jihad, which was published circa August 2003, is pretty sophisticated as far as it sketches out the situation. I think that the IED campaign was started independently by the Baathists after the invasion and then only later coopted by al-Qaeda when al-Douri threw in with them. I think that the Grozny scenario you lay out is at least somewhat accurate, though Iraq al-Jihad advises the Bad Guys that the tactics favored by veterans of Chechnya or Kashmir don't work in Iraq.
As far as the scenario you sketched out goes, I'd more or less agree if we take the time to defeat them, which is one of the reasons why I'm somewhat concerned by all of the tentative timetables to pull out of the country around sometime in 2006 since we don't know if Zarqawi will be defeated by then.
Seth:
I don't consider it a positive development if Zarqawi and Co. packs up and moves to France. Our goal, as I'm sure you recognize, is not to run Zarqawi out of town, it's to eliminate him and his followers so that they aren't a threat to anyone else.
bill:
For al-Qaeda, it was never about enlisting the support of the Iraqi people. They are only incidental in al-Qaeda's war against the US, which is one of the reasons why Zarqawi has so little regard for them.
Sorry everybody, I'm a pessimist.
Didn't violence go down during last year's elections too? And wasn't it hailed as the last gasp of the insurgency? And didn't violence being to peak again afterwards?
It's easy to have no insurgency if you cut out all the roads. Next week will be difficult again.
But the election numbers do seem to be a promising sign.
"Sorry everybody, I'm a pessimist."
I'm not only a pessimist, I'm a cynic.
"Next week will be difficult again."
Or if not, then next month, or the month after. Actually, if past trends are an indication, you are better off betting on an insurgent offensive sometime in the spring.
But its hard to not like a simultaneous trend downward in US (check out the moving average of wounded graph, http://icasualties.org/oif_a/CasualtyTrends.htm), Iraqi Defense force, and civilian casualties (http://icasualties.org/oif/IraqiDeaths.aspx) coupled with visible progress toward US goals in the region.
At this rate, things will get under control in 15 months or so barring another April 2004 scale offensive, another jump in insurgent tactical capabilities like the May 2005 jump in the lethality of IED's, an air transport crash, the start of a full scale civil war, the outbreak of human transmissable avian flu, a surprise invasion by Iran, the detonation of nuclear weapons in the theater, China deciding to try for Taiwan, Syria deciding to gamble its hand, a large scale attack on US soul, or any number of horrible other things that can go wrong.