Ah yes, tritium can be used to boost fission nukes. Still, I think that Iran would first acquire a working pure fission weapon, and then eventually study improvements. That's what all the nuclear powers did before.

Wikipedia is not exactly what I regard as a highly reliable source for complex enginering matters - but it seems that the plutonium production use of CANDU reactors is a side-effect of a feature with economical and practical benefits, rather than a result of Canadian malice.

I was intentionally misrepresenting nothing. I guess I was simply confused by your "nuanced" posts, titles, and the differences between Trent, Tom, and Ledeen. And my impression of a tendency to post things that have dates in them, and not to take issue with said dates, but then to disavow said dates.

All I wanted was a clarification of what you believe now. If I was incorrect about what you stated earlier all you needed to do was clarify that. Its interesting that such simple questions make you want to ban me.

So, to clarify. You are saying that (pace Tom) that Iran may not have a bomb now, but will have one by March 20th? And that they WILL test by 6 months after your Feb 15th post - IE by August 15th? Or are you saying that they MAY test by August 15th?

You are arguing for war. A war, which, like all wars, will be full of risks. I think the burden is on YOU to be clear about the facts.

"Does the words nuclear retaliation mean anything to you?"

Do the words "national suicide" mean anything?

1.Im not sold that Iran has a working nuclear weapon or is within a few months of one. Apologies, but i find your argument stretched in that regard, it seems to rely on a great deal of circumstantial evidence that Iran could have a weapon. To insist it therefore does doesnt seem logical to me.

2.Whether it is pragmatically wise to assume the worst and act as if Iran does is another argument. I would say absolutely not. Iran might as well not bother to spend resources on a nuclear arsenal if we are going to hand them that courtesy for free. A nuclear threat is not useful until it is credible.

3.A single bomb or even a small handful is not a deterrant arsenal. If we attacked Irans nuclear infastructure one of the following would happen:
-Iran doesnt have a bomb and the conventional/4th generation conflict proceeds however it proceeds
-Iran does have a bomb but realizes using it will provoke a massive nuclear retaliation resulting in the destruction of part of one enemy city and the complete annihilation of Iran.
-Iran does have a bomb and uses it, resulting in the destruction of part of one enemy city and the complete annihilation of Iran.

Assuming the Mullahs are indeed suicidal and option 3 comes to pass, there is an argument to be made that that conclusion was inevitable, and it is better to get it out of the way while the Iranian arsenal is limited now rather than extensive later. If we are going by the assumption that our enemy is not a rational enough actor to value self preservation on a nationwide scale, we should probably remove them from the board immediately. Waiting for some favorable turn of events is equally if not more dangerous with those assumptions.

Iran apparently did buy a working nuclear weapon from one of the former Soviet Union republics in the early 1990's, but it quickly became non-functional due to the nature of Soviet fissionables. So Iran has had the opportunity to study a working weapon. How much it learned from that is conjectural.

And Iran could have built a Chinese-designed weapon, without the fissionable trigger, from the Chinese plans it acquired from Pakistan's Khan network.

Weapons-grade fissionables for the trigger have always been the major obstacle to production of nuclear weapons.

What testing of weapons does, at least initially in any nuclear weapons program, is help match the sheer engineering expertise of the builders with the particular variety of weapons-grade fissionables used, particularly in regards to the "shelf-life" of the fissionable trigger. The latter was the Soviets' major problem - the marginal cost to them, in terms of nuclear and physical engineering expertise, was so high in getting out the last bit of the minute radioactive impurities in the fissionable triggers that it was actually cheaper for them to accept lower shelf lives and have to constantly recycle warheads through recooking and remanufacturing.

Nuclear weapons are not particularly useful if their triggers so decay in a year that they cease being capable of sustaining the really dramatic chain reaction required for a detonation, and merely produce a messy radioactive fizzile.

So that's the first thing testing does - determine how much of a given warhead design's theoretical explosive yield is actually produced. This helps the builders determine how long a shelf-life that design has given the particular type of weapons-grade fissionables used in it.

The next thing testing does is help determine how to reduce the size and mass of the weapons so it can be fitted into a casing as a missile warhead, and how to shock-mount the puppy so it will work reliably given the vibration and shock/gravitional stress of launch and re-entry.

Tritium is involved in all of this.

Mark,

Consider that Iran's mullahs want nuclear weapons for many reasons, of which use as a means of intimidating all their neighbors is not least. I have said that the Saud regime is easily intimidated, and eager to pay off those who frighten them.

"Consider that Iran's mullahs want nuclear weapons for many reasons, of which use as a means of intimidating all their neighbors is not least. I have said that the Saud regime is easily intimidated, and eager to pay off those who frighten them."

Agreed. And that is a rational thought process inconsistant with the act of suicide that nuking someone in retaliation for airstrikes implies. My point is either the Mullahs are rational and will not commit suicide in revenge for airstrikes, or they are not rational in which case they are at risk to nuke someone anyway and should be dealt with sooner rather than later.

This is and always has been a part of the nuclear game- brinkmanship. If the Mullahs are willing to commit suicide (one sided in this case since they would be unable to fatally wound any of their enemies with their current theoretical arsenal) in retaliation for strikes against their program- what else will they be willing to play chicken with once they have a true arsenal?

If the Mullahs get, say 50 Hiroshima sized weapons and threatened to use them unless the United States vacated Iraq- and we believed them crazy enough to carry through on the threat, what would our options be compared to now?

My point is that if we believe this regime is indeed willing to start a nuclear war that will surely destroy them utterly in order to gain or maintain a nuclear arsenal- would we not then have to take any threat they made with their nukes equally seriously? And if so at some point they will surely make a threat counter to our vital national interest and incur a nuclear war. A war in the future will be more horrific and bad for the US and global interests than a war now.

If my logic is correct, we must strike. Either the Mullahs will back down or they will commit suicide. If they commit suicide they will have proven themselves suicidal and hence not to be trusted with a larger nuclear arsenal. Is there a flaw in my argument?

"If the Mullahs are willing to commit suicide (one sided in this case since they would be unable to fatally wound any of their enemies with their current theoretical arsenal) in retaliation for strikes against their program- what else will they be willing to play chicken with once they have a true arsenal?"

How many bombs are needed to destroy Tel Aviv and Haifa? 2? 4? I would suggest that destroying 2/3 of the population of Israel might count as fatally wounding any of their enemies.

Mark,

I doubt Iran's leadership is irrational by its own terms. It might be irrational by our terms. Such cultural differences are often how how wars start unintentionally. Here's an example:

When Egypt's President Nasser told the UN peace-keepers in the Sinai peninsula to leave in 1967, he did not expect that they would acually obey. He thought they would protest and that he would then accept their protests - his demand was made solely for domestic political effect. But the UN peacekeepers did what he overtly demanded, and that miscalculation is how the Six-Day War started - once they left it was certain that war would come.

This is one of the reasons why intelligence analysts prefer to make predictions based on capabilities rather than intentions.

I doubt Iran's mullah regime will use its small supply of nuclear weapons against the U.S. save in response to an American invasion. I expect they will threaten to use them. They might use them against Israel when they think they can do fatal damage to the Israeli state, but I doubt they will have the means of doing so before they are overthrown by their own people.

But we would certainly be taking an awfully big chance on doing nothing. Given that, plus the certainty of mass nuclear proliferation if we do nothing, and I don't think we have any real choice here.

"How many bombs are needed to destroy Tel Aviv and Haifa? 2? 4? I would suggest that destroying 2/3 of the population of Israel might count as fatally wounding any of their enemies. "

Which is a moot point if they only have 1 bomb. Even if they have more they would have to find a way to detonate them at some height for maximum effect, and their missile technology is almost certainly not fine-tuned to carry and detonate the devices yet. Any airborn attack would need to penetrate Israels aerial defenses including advanced anti-missile technology. Sneaking a weapon in via boat or truck is possible but risks discovery and loss of the weapon.

The point is in 2 years Iran almost certainly will be able to destroy Israel utterly if they are willing to take the same in return. Right now it is much more doubtful- as the Israelis themselves seem to have concluded if their rhetoric is any judge. Again- it comes down to whether the Mullahs are willing to exchange queens. If they are, better to do it now then later. If they arent it's immaterial.

Tom, I agree with your analysis completely. Personally i believe the Mullahs want to live and want their people to live. That being the case it is 'safe' to raid Iran and destroy as much of their nuclear infastructure as possible- there wont be a nuclear retaliation if they have nukes. The conventional retaliation becomes the issue.

My argument is for those who suggest the Mullahs are willing to initiate a nuclear war they cannot 'win'. Its one thing to run the Wargames scenario knowing both sides will be destroyed- quite another when only your side is annihilated while the enemy is only hit once (if that). If we allow that scenario to frighten us we are already dancing to their tune and have a clear picture of what life in the region will be like when Iran has a legitimate nuclear threat. 30-50 nukes and the missiles to launch them on could destroy Israel, irradiate the regions oil fields, and kill several tens of thousands of American troops. That is a legitimate deterrant to US action. We mustnt allow Iran to get that far, rational or irrational. Strike them now while it doesnt matter.

Sebastian,

Web sites indicate that fission weapons with explosive yields of 20-80 kilotons produce a 5 pound per square inch overpressure over an area of about 2-3 kilometers radius, and produce eventual total burn-out of structures, absent rain or snow, over an area of about 3-4 kilometers in radius.

I'm at the office and my copy of The Effects of Nuclear Weapons 7th Ed. is at home.

As a general rule, the zone of 5 psi overpressure is the zone of effective total destruction, and the zone of eventual burnout is the same as the 2 psi overpressure zone. You can pretty much write off the 5psi zone regardless. How much of the 2 psi zone burns depends very much on the weather.

Equivalent Megatons (EMT)

In evaluating the destructive power of a weapons system it is usual to use the concept of equivalent megatons (EMT). Equivalent megatonnage is defined as the actual megatonnage raised to the two-thirds power.

Sebastian,

OK, here goes with the nuclear weapons effects calculator in The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3rd edition, published in 1977. All figures based on the optimum burst height to produce the maximum overpressure over as wide an area as possible.

The 2 psi range (radius) varies from 4 km for a 30kt detonation to 5.8 km for an 80 kt detonation.

The 5 psi range varies from 2.2 km for a 30kt detonation to 3.2km for an 80 kt detonation.

For a one megaton detonation the 2 psi range is 13.2 km and the 5 psi range is 7 km.

As you can see, the blast effects per unit of yield drop drastically due to the inverse square law.

Dunnigan agrees with Tom Holsinger's take on Iranian motivations, but not on the Iranian's nuclear capability. This is his latest from Strategypage.com:

Buzz Versus Bluster

March 9, 2006: Iran's neighbors are nervous about Iran's nuclear weapons program, but they believe that the radicals currently in charge will soon be out of power. There is constant traffic between Iran and the other Gulf States, and Arabs are big believers in what the buzz on the street is. The buzz in Iran is that the Islamic radicals running the country are unpopular with the majority of Iranians. These Islamic radicals know they are not liked, and are running with the nuclear weapons program (which they insist does not exist) because this is popular with most Iranians. The Islamic radicals believe that once they carry out a successful nuclear weapons test, their popularity in Iran will go through the roof, and the rest of the world will be more reluctant to stand up to Iranian demands. But such a test may be years away, because of the apparently slow progress in developing some key technologies needed for the weapons.