Michael Reynolds follows convention in dividing the current American foreign policy attitudes, very roughly, into four groups: liberals, neo-cons, paleo-cons and realists. It's useful to have such categories, and probably most people who are discussing this topic will understand intuitively the rough values of each class he invokes. These terms, rather than others (such as Walter Russell Mead's Jeffersonians, Hamiltonians, Wilsonians, and Jacksonians) probably are the ones most people carry in their heads, at least those who think about it at all.
The taxonomy isn’t the point of Michael's post, by the way. The point is the need to be smarter as a people when thinking about the world and somehow to bring all these views to the table to develop a coherent foreign policy that the nation can unite behind. But reading it was what got me thinking about this again.
It also got me thinking about the language trap. Dividing America into four parts, however useful for argument, ultimately obscures the truth. It's useful sometimes to remove that template and apply another one, to see what new relationships emerge when you look at things differently.
One taxonomy that seems to me to have some relevance is in the book "Semi-Detached Idealists: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1854-1945," by Martin Ceadel. In describing the peace movement in a different time and place, Ceadel uses a vocabulary that can be applied to the current situation -- excluding outright traitors, profiteers, or people whose primary motivation in this is something other than the question of justice and war.
As always, British clothes fit poorly on an American frame, but in the interest of learning something a "compare and contrast" exercise doesn't hurt.
Ceadel describes two types of peace advocates, and three brands of people opposed to them.
In the extreme wing are the militarists, who "glorify conquest on the grounds that it advances civilization."
What Ceadel calls (and, being British, spells) the defencists "hold that the incidence of war is minimized when all countries reject aggression and maintain national defences strong enough to deter others from attempting it." This is the si vis pacem, para bellum view, which probably has been the popular view among politicians and citizens in Britain and the U.S. over the long run for the past 200 years.
Between these two are the crusaders, who "believe that the first use of military force is sometimes necessary to achieve justice and thereby create the conditions for lasting peace." It's pretty clear which of these three classifications accurately describes the "neo-cons," and the other architects and supporters of the current U.S. effort in Iraq.
Crusading is an awkward word for this idea, though, because it conjures up specific images of the Christian Crusades of the Middle Ages. Those mass movements can be understood on several levels, many of which have nothing to do with the modern concept being described. Worse, "crusader" has particular unpleasant associations for non-Christians.
Yet it is felt as the right word by Ceadel and other specialists on this topic, and it probably was felt as such by President Bush when he used it as America began to change its foreign policies after 9/11. He was mocked for that, but in fact it is just the word many academic political scientists use among themselves. Bush and Bin Laden both at different times have called America's work in Iraq a "crusade." However darkly and differently, both are right.
Crusading is nothing new; it was expounded in the 1790s both by the radical Tom Paine (who wanted Revolutionary France to conquer Britain and reform it) and the conservative Edmund Burke (who wanted Britain to conquer Revolutionary France and eradicate its bloody and dangerous regime). Throughout the 19th century, it took the lead from time to time in the British popular mind, usually expressed as a yearning to aid revolutionaries and freedom fighters against repressive empires. Lord Byron was crusading when he went to help the Greeks in their fight for freedom. The crusading spirit ran high again when the Hungarians (1840s) and the Italians (1850s) rose against the Austrians, and the Bulgarians (1870s) rebelled against the Turks.
Ceadel's topic is Britain, but he looks beyond it for comparisons. In his opening chapter, he outlines a rough prediction model to discover what is likely to be the dominant view of war and peace in a nation, based on its relative security and on the liberality of its institutions. Germany, with high insecurity, feudal structure, and historically illiberal religions, tended toward militarism. America is at the opposite pole, Ceadel writes, and crusading is one of its natural states.The United States, however, was too secure and too liberal for the goal of the peace movement: its geo-strategic security was so great as to allow it to ignore the balance of power; and its model liberal constitution and puritan tradition, unchecked by a feudal elite, also contributed to a self-righteous approach to the international system which oscillated between the desire to take charge of it and the desire to wash its hands of it. American peace sentiment thus leaked away into crusading in moments of confidence and into isolationism in moments of disappointment. [p.22]What unites the militarists, crusaders, and defencists, and opposes them to the peace movement, is that they do not believe the ultimate goal of abolishing war is a practical one. In the case of the militarists, neither do they think it desirable.
The peace movement adherents also come in more than one flavor, and their agendas sometimes clash:
There is a group, at times a majority, that "argues that the abolition of war will be achieved only by improving the structure either of the international system or of its constituent states and that until this has been achieved defensive military force may be needed to protect these reforms." To label them, Ceadel turns to A.J.P. Taylor's awkward term pacificist. It's only one short syllable removed from "pacifist," and the eye is at risk of reading the longer word as the shorter one, a problem Ceadel acknowledges by always printing pacificist in italics.
Whatever you call it, this group, while more practical than absolute pacifists, easily can get tangled in contradictions. Reading about it, I thought of the Quaker pacifists in the North who urged Lincoln to wade through gore to crush the Southern rebellion. Ceadel points to the way out of this ethical briar patch:Only when pacificists have managed to link their support for war to the promotion of an evidently eirenic reform, such as the creation of a league of nations, have they been able to make their predicament as pro-war members of the peace movement seem less paradoxical.Finally, the outright pacifist "believes that war can immediately and unconditionally be repudiated." This view has been, at all times, that of "a small but dedicated minority."
***
For centuries, in the Western Christian mind, war was an evil but unavoidable fact of life in a sinful, fallen world. Peace movements in Britain began to take shape only gradually, after the 1730s. They were children of the British Enlightenment, with its remarkable marriage of evangelical Christian values and rational humanist ones.
The flowering of this in the radical idea that war could -- and should -- be banished entirely from human experience began to express itself politically in the 1790s, Ceadel writes, when Britain fought France.
Interestingly, then, the first real pacifist movement arose in Britain exactly at the moment Britain went to war against Robespierre's totalitarian tyranny, one of the most vicious in modern history, which slaughtered its citizens and menaced its neighbors and gave the world's languages the fresh-minted word terrorism."
"What Ceadel calls (and, being British, spells) the defencists "hold that the incidence of war is minimized when all countries reject aggression and maintain national defences strong enough to deter others from attempting it.'"
We all saw how well this worked on 9/11.
"Between these two are the crusaders, who "believe that the first use of military force is sometimes necessary to achieve justice and thereby create the conditions for lasting peace." It's pretty clear which of these three classifications accurately describes the "neo-cons," and the other architects and supporters of the current U.S. effort in Iraq."
This kind of stereotyping ignores the facts that Iraq tried to kill president Bush the elder, failed to live up to the commitments it made to end hostilities at the end of gulf war I, supported international terrorists (the palestinians) who killed Americans (American citizens visiting in Israel) etc etc.
Those who prepetuate this type of misinformation make it much harder for our government to win the war at home, which leads to dead americans at home and overseas.
As you note, Callimachus, comparing political points-of-view in different countries is chancy at best and particularly so because the historical circumstances under which points-of-view which have superficial similarities may differ markedly.
For example, our militarists haven't had much political influence here for many years. And even our most militarist e.g. Theodore Roosevelt are really more properly considered as Wilsonians and derive their thoughts from a missionary tradition. Our Jacksonians, although vilified as militarist particularly by foreigners, simply aren't despite some superficial resemblances.
Interesting piece.
I wonder if another example of pacificist might be in those WWI soldiers that refused military orders without their consent, typically through soldiers' committees or soviets. They were not non-violent since they could be persuaded to fight, but they appear to have desired that the war be rational (in a fairly Marxist view of things).
In France, being partly occupied, the rationale of a defensive posture was apparent, but the soldiers' committees were reluctant to participate in offenses for fear that command was again leading them into battles of attrition in which no strategic advantage would be gained. This reluctance seemed to change in 1918 with the arrival of the Americans, which not only made victory foreseeable it brought Wilsonian (crusading) war aims which were more palatable to the French soldier.
In Russia, where the troops were essentially defending non-Russian portions of the empire (and thus at odds with the principle of self-determination), the soldiers eventually walked off and in the process failed to even defend Russia against German invasion.
All and all, these groups seem to exhibit a conditional form of pacifism that is not linked to the desire for non-violence, but that the violence comport with personal idealogical preference.
"All and all, these groups seem to exhibit a conditional form of pacifism that is not linked to the desire for non-violence, but that the violence comport with personal idealogical preference."
Or self-preservation. The number of times the two mysteriously are made to intersect is impressive if this type of this is allowed to go on. Practices like this are suicidal for an army, as the Russian example depicts.
"Or self-preservation. The number of times the two mysteriously are made to intersect is impressive if this type of this is allowed to go on. Practices like this are suicidal for an army, as the Russian example depicts."
Yes. I have a certain ammount of respect for pacifism, but pacifism will get you killed quicker than than militism will.
Much of the training that militaries give to thier troops to encourage them to be 'brave' is not merely so that the troops will be willing to die to preserve country and cause, but because on the field of battle a soldiers animal level self-preservation instincts actually work against him. Generally speaking, being 'brave' is not only the best way to preserve the cause, but barring spectacularly inept leadership (which in thier defence the Russians soldiers probably had), the best way to preserve the soldier's own life.
If you look at the history of pre-modern wars, you don't find alot of hard fought slugfights. You find battles generally of one of two types, either few casualties on either side, or else totally one-sided massacres in which one side annihilates the other to the man while taking virtually no casualties themselves. If you take your average war game resolution system, you'll find it almost impossible to duplicate these results. The reason is that most war game resolution systems greatly underestimate the importance of morale (usually this is intentional on the part of the designer, because systems governing morale are either extremely complex or make for bad gameplay or both). In pre-modern wars, almost all the casualties of most battles occurred in the 'rout' faze of the battle, after the formation had broken and was now open to attack. Reading both the Bible and Homer's Illiad can be particularly illustrative here. Most of the deaths occur when someone is fleeing, or after someone has begun to fled. Some guy turns around, throws down his shield, and starts running - and only then is he cut down and dies.
I don't know how many of your are familiar with them, but the Close Combat series of games handles this particularly well. So many of the deaths occur do to improper attempts at self-preservation on the part of your troops. Infantry troops will come under fire, and in an effort to keep from getting shot they'll do everything wrong. They'll come under artillery fire and freeze. Under orders to assualt, they'll get halfway across and then go to ground in poor cover. Sitting in a fairly safe place, but taking suppressive fire, they'll suddenly wander into a kill zone trying to find better cover. They'll get 2/3rds or 3/4s across a street, and then decide to turn around and fall back rather than go forward. Under suppression by a machine gun or mortar, they'll rout and start running across open terrain. (If you are still unconvinced, fiddle with the game's data files until all your troops are maximally brave and see how much better your infantry gets at staying alive.)
I have no respect for pacifism that contains an element of self-preservation. I can under some conditions respect the pacifists that adopt the belief fully knowing that it means giving thier life way without a fight but any other sort is cowardice and foolishness.
Good points, Celebrim. I don't play the games, but it sounds very much like the reality of Civil War soldiers as they described it in the letters I read that they wrote after the Seven Days battles and Antietam.
I was raised by and among Pennsylvania Quakers. I have a great respect for true pacifism; I think it's wrong, personally, but I respect it. It's a self-discipline comparable in some ways to that of being a warrior. But like the warrior's calling, when it deviates just a little from the discipline, it becomes something execrable. In the one case, criminal, in the other, cowardly.
>>I have no respect for pacifism that contains an element of self-preservation.
For sure, battlefield cowardice is usually just stupid (gets one killed faster).
That said, how would you judge Wehrmacht/Red Army/Iraqi soldiers who deserted their (manifestly unjust) cause in order to save their own skins? Here cowardice, self-preservation, and justice would seem to line up. Doesn't the USG have extensive psy-ops programs designed to promote such "virtuous cowardice" in its enemies?
You fight a battle for the express purpose of breaking an enemy so the real killing can begin. There's an anecdote about Stonewall Jackson. Apparantly during one of his battles he was close to the lines (as usual) observing a repulse of union infantry. The union formation was savaged and retreating in disarray but the standard bearer was maintaining his composure, holding up the flag and retreating one step at a time. The Reb troops, out of respect, werent shooting at him and Jackson asked why. Some unnamed soldier replied that they shouldnt shoot a foe so brave. Jackson ordered the man shot down, saying, "Shoot the brave ones especially. Then the rest will run away".
TJ, Nazi soldiers and Russians who deserted were summarily shot if captured or noticed. Whatever you call it, desertion was NOT self-preservation but a different form of risk. In the Russian case, the NKVD SMERSH units often made sure of that immediately. Which they kind of have to do, if you're a platoon of political prisoners ordered across a minefield.
In Desert Storm abd OIF, the US did indeed encourage desertion among its enemies. With some success in both cases.
Mark is right about the element of self-preservation in the ranks of the WWI soldiers that collectively organized.
I was try to get my head around the idea of a pragmatic pacifist. At a basic level, Christian just war doctrine holds that war can be necessary for peace and justice. The trick is in figuring out when the costs of war outweigh the benefits or vice versa. I don't think this view is limited to Christians, but it is a good example of where an ideology of peace recognizes the circumstantial need for violence.
Ultimately, I would say the crusader group and the conditional pacifists are one-in-the-same. They both operate with a similar moral compass; its just one is ultimately unconvinced that the war will bring about the desired outcome. For example, Rev. Sensing has argued that Iraq qualifies as a just war while co-confessionalists have argued the opposite using a similar framework, but different conclusions over future events. Returning to WWI, you can compare the Russian socialists call for a peace conference at Stockholm and Wilson's war speeches and realize that both were essentially advocating democracy and self-determination, but one believes that the path is through war and the other through negotiated peace.
True pacifists refuse to take responsibility for the choice, something which I personally consider immoral. Militarist refuse to take into consider the morality of their actions and are likewise immoral. I am unconvinced that defencists exist -- they are more likely one of the above categories.