Tony writes in with a tip from the Peoples' Republic of Boulder, CO. This guy is a hero:
"I ran back to the lead vehicle and told the major what was up. He agreed with me that we didn't have time to try and get them to retrieve their own. He asked me what I wanted to do. I said I want to get them sir. So the plan was to take the lead vehicle with the .50 cal and cross the street while shooting down the street and get to the wounded. I suggested that we shoot out the street lights before we cross. He agreed and we shot them all out. We mounted up, closed the doors and the Major told everyone else the plan. As the driver punched the humvee I gave the .50 cal gunner a "good game" slap. The Major told the gunner to open up, and he did. Damn that thing was loud. We crossed the street ok. I could see a soldier sitting with his back to a pick up truck. His rifle was on the ground, and his chin was tucked in his chest. The driver was told to pull up as close as he could to the wounded soldier. He did, and I grabbed my aid bag, put my rifle down, removed my M-9 from its holster, chambered a round, and returned it to its holster. I looked across at the major who was sitting in the rear seat behind the Commanders seat. I said well sir here goes. I got out, and maintained a low profile as I ran to the wounded Iraqi. I got to him and took a knee. There was alot of blood. He was shot in both legs. I reached into my vest and grabbed a ratchet strap and ratcheted his right leg. He looked up at me which was a good sign so far at least he was conscious. As I was reaching for the second ratchet which was in my bag, rounds started impacting the pickup on the opposite side. [more...]"
Good news:
- The personal heroism of the 101st Airborne combat medic writing this.
- The ratchet straps that saved the Iraqi's life, and probably a few others before all is said and done, were donated and sent to Iraq by fellow Hannity Forum members.
Bad news:
- Why he had to be doing this in the first place.
It's not the story everywhere in Iraq, by any means. But it is the story sometimes, as it would be in most non-western (and some Western) militaries throughout the world. When you hear military analysts talking about how quality of leadership is especially important at the NCO and to some extent the junior officer levels, think of this story. This is what they're talking about.








Two wounded Iraqi's. What happened to the other one?
American combat morale is based on professionalism and attention to individual tasks (that's not a textbook definition, BTW). It isn't "let's go die for our country" or "let's go kill some people", it's "let's do our jobs and everybody's going to be okay."
Other military cultures have very different ways of sustaining morale, like the Vietnamese. They drench soldiers in propaganda about killing the evil enemy, and about how glorious it is to sacrifice yourself for the cause. In combat their soldiers often go into a kind of frenzy in which they temporarily suspend belief in their own existence, sort of like somebody playing Russian roulette. Invariably, they have very high casualties.
Someone from that culture is lost when called upon to fight like a Westerner: staying cool and performing methodical tasks, following a plan which might be changed in the middle of a battle. They look like cowards and incompetents in that environment. A lot of US soldiers in Vietnam looked down on the ARVN that way.
That banzai approach is part of the Soviet military doctrine that the old Iraqi army was trained in. In that army, you didn't expect a medic to come running if you got hit. If you got hit you were just one of the martyrs. We would have a huge mess if the old Iraqi army had been retained, as it was never good for anything except getting lots of people killed.
Many ARVN and Montagnards in Vietnam learned well from advisors and became good soldiers in the Western model, though that of course took a lot of time. It would be interesting to hear somebody who had first-hand experience in both situations compare the capabilities and potentials of the Vietnamese and Iraqis at this point.
But it is very early days yet, and the question is whether we're going to give up on the Iraqis before they've had a chance to learn.
Glen made excellent points, and I agree completely. I never believed that the process of democratization and westernization would be easy. I think, given enough time and training, the Iraqis can become model soldiers in the western tradition. But it will take many years... you can't overcome decades of ingrained military/societal paradigms for a whole nation over the course of a couple years.
It is possible that much of the older generation of Iraqis may not ever be able to learn, but I have no doubt that the younger generation, as they grow up around American soldiers and influence, will come to learn and value the "western" way as their primary way.
Did the Iraqi soldiers have the same quality flack jackets as US soldiers? Did they have the vehical mounted machine guns? Would wounded be taken to hospitals in the green zone? Could they call in special forces for one wounded soldier?
Trading a brave knight for a smart pawn is not the way to win a chess game.
American military forces have proven themselves time & again over generations of conflict throughout the world. Whether it's hopped-up Commies or bummed-out Imperial die-hards that wish to throw themselves upon the shield wall of cool-headed professional citizen/soldiers, what it comes down to in the end is the sense of confidence in training and knowledge that "his back is got" that pulls a combat armsmen away from his natural inclination toward self-preservation & toward the buddy in need. Iraqis are not there yet, going by this particular example. I know there are fighters in the ISF, but until it becomes an ingrained corporate mentality, we'll just continue to read more about individual acts of heroism rather than confident units like Julius Caesar's X Legion, fully prepared to hack their way toward their canny commander, who had grabbed sword & shield and personally rushed to the front line against the surge of Belgic infantry which almost overwhelmed the Romans at the onset of their Gallic campaigns...It's gonna be a long, hard slog to come in Mesopotamia, though i believe I believe the hardest part is already behind US