And stuck somewhere in the middle are those of us who are less interested in how we characterize the enemy we face, and more interested in not making a mess of whatever action we choose to take.

There is an almost tragically wide gulf between being right about the odious nature of our enemy and the threat they represent, and actual actions and policies that help reduce the threat. And I think many of us have unfortunately reached the point where arguing over who's right about how evil or dangerous al Qaeda is, really is so much ado about deck chairs. Until we demonstrate that we can act competently (and both parties have been idiot savants on this subject), our nation-wide mental context vis-a-vis the war on terror feels less and less relevant.

Making a mess is okay, as long as you learn from it and follow it up with more effective action. The important thing is to learn how to knock the jihadi down and keep him down. Stop debating the fine points--that's idiotic. Get straight in your mind what's at stake. If you're not bright enough to understand the stakes, then just get the f*** out of the way.

It's my understanding that Al Qaeda refers to it as the "Long War". Can we afford to view it otherwise? I think not.

Wish my old blog host hadn't closed shop and taken the redeye to wherever, but I've been calling this a decade-long struggle (at least) from the get-go.

This problem will cross administrations. I wish everyone would keep that in mind.

I'll watch this movie tomorrow!

This problem will cross administrations.

The problem is, "this problem" isn't very well-defined at all. Thus, any response beyond the three minutes' hate against The Jihadis!™ is problematic.

Is "this problem" every radical Islamic state in the Middle East? Was "this problem" the more-or-less secular Iraqi regime -- which, remember, had nothing to do with 9/11?

Is "this problem" a direct threat posed by the nation-state of Iran? If so, do we deal with it by making war on Iran? What are the potential costs of such a course? There's lots of talk on this site about "the enemy," but you all seem very ecumenical about defining him.

Remember, as you agitate for a very Long War indeed: there are limits to American power. We are up against them right now. We can not afford another trillion-dollar adventure in the Middle East, and if you doubt me check our national debt levels.

Any critics are welcome to post thier solutions. But, after wasting my breath for years, its now my policy only to take people seriously if they have a plan.

But, after wasting my breath for years, its now my policy only to take people seriously if they have a plan.

Here's my plan:

Don't invade Iraq.

What's that you say? The leadership of my nation invaded anyway, and did it about as incompetently as possible? Well.

Then, I'd suggest that we, as a people, don't follow that same leadership team into another -- startlingly similar -- misbegotten military adventure.

Stickler, you were doing sort of OK when you pointed out the danger of tunnel vision. I agree on the matter of "this problem" being fuzzy.

Then, very next post of yours on this thread, you appar to put on your own beer goggles about "it" being (I'll take a wild guess here) Iran.

No argument that some people are spinning it that way. Well and good. Assume we've noticed that.

Got anything substantive to say about the nontopical, even nonpartisan -- that is to say, "long" -- parts of the general issue?

Bring it. Please.

PS: "about as incompetently as possible" implies that you have a really poor capacity to imagine what severe incompetence really looks like. It's a common lack of perspective; lots of people on both sides of the aisle have it. It can be hard to engage in constructive discussion with such people.

Some people even find it as impossible as possible. :)

Please step away from the inflated rhetoric.

... its now my policy only to take people seriously if they have a plan.

Here's my plan:

Skip the next election, and lease the White House to the Democratic Party for four years.

(The lease will stipulate that they are not allowed to appoint any judges, approve any promotions to general, or play with the nuclear football.)

Their sole metaphysical objective having been achieved, history will come to an end for Democrats (cf. Hegel, Fukuyama) and the universe outside of the District of Columbia will effectively cease to exist for them, leaving the rest of us to deal with it as best we can. We can start by digging bunkers, organizing neighborhood watches, and training for partisan warfare.

While ever there are governments and groups who teach their children to hate then there will be no change.

It will take at least two generations of better education before change will be possible.

We are in this for the long term. get used to it.

The issue for the US is how to make the voters and their children understand the problem without the messenger being impeached or just voted out of office.

How do you inculcate into the population the fact that people want to wipe out America and it will take a long time to fix the problem. The school system will not do it.

My worry for the short term is the Dems taking power and walking away from everything as they have done so many times before.

"Don't invade Iraq"

And you guys wonder why no one will take you seriously on National Security, at least...not enough to actually elect you.

So, once again a liberal here demonstrates that there is no plan from the Democratic Party...other than sideline anklebiting.

Get back to us when you have an actual plan; one that doesn't involve a time machine. I won't wait up.

stickler says "..don't follow that same leadership team into another ... military adventure."

However, at least for some, it seems difficult to determine whether the main problem is with the adventure/operation, or with the leadership.

Most likely the Iranian issue will reach terminal crisis early in the next administration. Absent regime change, I wonder how much patterns of support and opposition might vary if the President ordering military action is named Hillary Rodham Clinton rather than (say) John McCain.

For that matter, if the UK has a Conservative government by the crisis point, it might be interesting and instructive to observe how many British Conservative politicians and commentators judiciously determine that this military action is necessary and prudent.
Of course, any suspicion that their views might shift because they no longer had an overwhelming political requirement to BASH BLAIR! would be completely unjustified. Or at any rate unprovable.

On both sides of the Atlantic, and on both sides of politics, it's as well to reflect that some thing are really are too important for partisan politics to be the paramount concern. That it may be wise to differentiate between opponents and enemies.

I'm a (Burkean) conservative who wouldn't vote for Hillary Clinton for dog catcher. But I'll make a pledge right now. If Hillary bombs or invades Iran early in her administration, I'll vote for her for re-election.

Stickler, your plan not to invade Iraq is a good one. Fire up your TARDIS and go have a talk with Governor Bush, explain how incompetent he will be as President, and watch him vow not to run. (In the next scene evil Karl Rove learns of Bush's decision not to run, attempts to kill your lovely sidekick, Bush jumps to her rescue taking the bullet instead, and with his waning strength brains Rove with a Texas Rangers baseball bat.)

Getting serious, how about these specific questions: Assume we did invade Iraq in 2003. I take it you want an exit strategy. What would that exit strategy be? And why would that strategy make the world a safer place in the short, medium, and long run?

About terrorism: How do we attack a set of like-minded, well-funded, geographically dispersed, digitally connected actors/organizations that are hell-bent on the destruction of western civilization? These actors can be assumed to not follow standards of conduct which we expect of ourselves. Any weapon or tactic at their disposal can be expected to be used.

About Iran: What form of leverage will you use to deter their nuclear ambitions? Assume the regime there for the last 30 or so years has made hatred of America something of a fetish, and that there is little sign of any potential to change.

These are serious questions. I have not problem at all with an argument that starts with the statement that the Bush administration is incompetent. However, arguments that end there do nothing to make me think you and yours could do any better.

I am a general supporter of the war against Al Qaeda, sadly that war has not been prosecuted as I would like to have seen it.

I supported Iraq based on what I knew of the region, its consistant snubbing of the 91 cease fire, the possiblity of WMD's and Saddams willingness to support terrorists, and the need to give one of the more vile regimes in the ME a bloody nose so as to prove that we were not the Paper Tiger that the ME generally percieved us as.

I do not support nation building combined with muddled post-war reconstruction plans that seem to change daily.

There is a true disconnect between this administration, congress and the American public. The Administration has done a horrible job at selling the public on its war plan, on explaining why the need is there. You can't just say "stay the course" and expect people to keep buying it year after year when the progress ins't being realized. And even when progress is taking place, the Administration fails to highlight it, fails to get the message to the people, and fails to capitalize on it. Now I know a good portion of that is a direct effect of a Press/Media that is violently opposed to the Administration and the war, and doing their best to play down positive outcomes. But the Administration could do a far better job of getting the message out. Sadly all I see anymore is a bunker mentality.

It probably doesn't help that this administration has decided to crap all over its base with some of the most insane policies as of late. This meddling in the price of gas, the absurd amnesty programs are just two major slaps in the face to the conservative base. The rampant spending by Congress and the Presidents inability to comprehend the VETO adds insult to injury.

I lost friends on 9/11. My wifes mothers neighbor was killed in the Pentagon when the flight flew basicaly into his office. I am not a member of the public that has forgotten 9/11, but I'm frustrated that our policies seem to have been so misguided in many respects when it comes to thwarting further attacks. One need only look at the pathetic beuarcracy that the DHS has become to get the feeling that this could happen again.

Yes, Bush bungled the first few years of the Long War. But I have no doubt that so would have Al Gore or John Kerry, albeit maybe in different ways. The truth is that the U.S. has never faced an enemy quite like this one, who operates at least as much in the realms of memetic warfare, mob intimidation of civilian authority and the private sector, and leveraging demographic trends than in actual terrorism and armed combat. So, it's quite possible that we'll be saddled with at least one, if not two or three, more Presidents after Bush who'll continue to muddle through the war before we finally get one who can fully grasp everything it will take to win it.

"Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult." - Karl Von Clausewitz

Whats the story with hotmail addys getting kicked out of the email field? Not good.

Get back to us when you have an actual plan; one that doesn't involve a time machine. I won't wait up.

Typical. You drive the two of us off a cliff, then bitch because I didn't bring along a parachute.

And as usual, Glen Wishard's "plan" is about as useful as his past 60 claims of victory. Though I have absolutely no doubt he'd love to see us skip the next few elections.

This site consists of a crew of self appointed "experts" who have consistantly gotten it wrong on foreign policy and mocked those who turned out to be right. Heck, even bringing in Wretchard couldn't seriously affect the pitiful gravitas rating on this group.

And so, having shredded what credibility they may have once had, they are left with only ranting about how bad it "could have been".

But since you're desperate for a "plan" that you can then deconstruct and deride, here ya go.

The next time we get advances through back door channels from Iran, listen. Seal off the office of the Vice President so that there's no chance the morons there could possibly leak into these conversations. Beg Powell, even though he's pretty sad, he's the best you've got, to take part in those conversations and find out what possible diplomatic options we have. (I know, I know, you read it as capitulation.. )

Unilaterally rescind the recent agreements regarding nuclear weapons/ power with India and tell them it's time to sign off on the NPT. Otherwise the world will rightly claim that we have not a double, but dozens of standards when it comes to nuclear proliferation. In other words, try to gain back a bit of the credibility we've tossed out the window over the past 5 years.

Finally, apply strong pressure for democracy throughout the mid east region. Not just in those areas we're considering invading.

None of this will happen of course and we'll waste precious time in addressing these issues in a reasonable manner making the job that much harder for whoever takes over from this miserable crowd.

At that point, you'll complain about a lack of progress and of course, scream like children about the inevitable tax hikes that will be required to clean up this mess.

We've seen it all before. And I doubt it will be any different this go around.

"The next time we get advances through back door channels from Iran, listen."

I'm sorry, I don't get it. Could you possibly explain what this means.

Thank You

I understand that point Joshua, but I just don't see our leaders adapting to the enemy, and countering them effectivly. We continue to let Al Qaeda win the PR war and shape the discussion. As long as Bin Laden is running around making videos, his very existance will be synonymous with US failure, same with Zarqawi. I understand tracking down an individual within these areas is difficult, but 5 years later and still we appear no closer to snagging the guy?

Are we incapable or unwilling to put the kind of pressure on Pakistan that is required to nail this guy?

Gabriel: I wasn't going to respond to anyone that offered a substanceless post, but I'll make an exception for you because your tone is radically different than the average critic and because your closeness to 9/11 gives you greater authority to give voice your emotions and frustrations.

I've long said that Bush was a mediocre President in time that called for greatness. Simply put, he's in over his head. The liberal moonbats claim that Bush is stupid. That is not the problem. This is typical liberal confusion of charisma with intelligence. On a stage, I would look like a great idiot too. Bush's biggest problem is that he has no charisma. The country needs a statesman who can through the force of his rhetoric unite the country behind a common cause. Bush is not such a man. At best, Bush is the sort of guy you want by your bedside when you are sick to say a prayer with you and offer a few words of comfort and a hand to hold. He's not the orator we are looking for who can give the public a common vision.

Moreover, Bush is as you noted not really a conservative. As I have said many times before Bush is a liberal who happens to be a born again Christian. The Bush family comes from the liberal wing of the party. Bush was educated in a liberal university. The policies that Bush have implemented are centrist to leftwing 'compassionate conservative' with a strong dash of newly acquired Wilsonianism. So yes, there has been a very strong disconnect throughout his Presidency with his base. I've held my nose both times I voted for him. I loath voting for a liberal - even a Christian one - and frankly good for him to be a 'reformed drunk', praise the Lord, but I'd like to think we could do better for a President.

However, let's be fair to this President.

On his watch since 9/11:

1) Al Queda has not been able to mount an attack on US soil over the course of 5 years, and indeed has made no successful operations against US interests outside of war zones of our chosing. Compare that rate of success to the success we had stopping Al Queda attacks prior to 9/11.
2) The President's boldness has lead to Libya giving up its WMD program, which proved to be at a state more advanced than anyone would have believed.
3) The President's boldness has lead to Sudan ending its then 16 year long war in the eastern Sudan.
4) The President's boldness has forced Syria to withdraw from Lebanon.
5) The US has been involved in the a large number of peaceful revolutions in the caucus regions, resulting in the spread of democracy and greater US access to this critical region in the WoT.
6) The US has overthrown the Taliban regime in spectacular fashion, demoralizing Al Queda and many of its followers and driving its surviving leadership from Afghanistan, liberating a large number of people from the Taliban's tyrannical grip and has lost less than 300 troops in more than 4 years of peace keeping missions.
7) Under Bush, the nuclear trading ring of AQ Khan has been reigned in and Pakistan has been turned from one of the main exporters of Islamist hate to, at least for now, a valuable ally in the WoT.
8) Under Bush, North Korea's nuclear blackmail has been ended. We are no longer paying for the development of thier missile and nuclear technology simply to keep them quiet and beneath the political radar of the American public, and we are no longer artificially propping up the regime.
9) Under Bush, Operation Southern and Northern Watch were brought to close, after failing to significantly stop Saddam Hussein from avoiding UN sanctions at the cost of the lives of dozens of Americans. In a dramatic military action, our Kurdish allies were liberated, the oppressed people of Southern Iraq freed from thier slavemasters, the marshlands restored, and a tyrantical and dangerous man was removed from power. And we finally got some good answers on the state of Iraq's WMD program, and fortunately we found none.
10) Bush's pressure on the ME to adopt democratic reforms has forced at least token increases in liberties in Egypt, Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, and several other countries who now feel that they should at least try to appear to be moving toward democracy.

And so far, nearly 5 years into this long war, the US has lost fewer people than it lost on the first day of it - or at least the first day of it.

So, no things have not been planned or executed to perfection. But things aren't exactly going badly either.

One of the reasons that I'm not as critical of the US war plan as some is beginning on 9/12 I set down with some friends and did my own brainstorming about what to do. Going into Afghanistan was obvious, but it was equally obvious that that alone wouldn't do it. Basically two plans evolved - 'containment first' and 'strategic center first'. I advocated 'containment first', which would have meant hitting places like the Sudan ahead of Iraq. The President's staff appears to have adopted 'strategic center first'.

I'm a humble enough person to recognize that things could have gone even more disasterously with a containment first plan. For example, some of the big problems of going into the Sudan were:

a) It would have almost certainly meant breaking the country up. This would have been seen as a 'reconquista' by the Islamic world, and would have greatly contributed to the perception that we were making a war on Islam generally.
b) It would have almost certainly moved China closer to the Islamist camp, as it would have been percieved by China as an attempt to cut off its access to African oil.
c) Security operations in the Northern Sudan would almost certainly been fraught with all the difficulties we've had in Iraq.
d) Security operations in Southern Sudan, would be complicated by all the following: the country is EIGHT times the size of Iraq, their are 50% more people in the Sudan than Iraq, the government of Iraq is controlled by the plurality ethnic group not the minority (black Sudanese must properly be divided into a large number of ethnic groups speaking a rather large number of languages).
e) Going after the Sudan would have put no particular pressure on Arab governments, as the Sudan does not occupy the same symbolic ground that the Iraqi Baath party does.
f) The Sudan is a miserably poor, ethnically, and ideologically diverse tribal nation. While this certainly suggests a humanitarian motive for going into the Sudan, the near term future of the Sudan as a properous democratic state is even more remote than Iraq (for example compare with Kurdistan), or at the least Iraq seemed at the time a more plausible candidate. Whether this proved true upon closer inspection is a matter of debate.

I'm still somewhat regretful that we didn't try the Sudan first, but I'm not about to suggest that things necessarily would have gone better. Honestly, given the total lack of experience that the US has with the tools of empire, its no surprise at all that nation building programs have not gone so well. Heck, our own 'reconstruction' on our own nation was a more miserable failure than what is going on in Iraq under any standard.

"Are we incapable or unwilling to put the kind of pressure on Pakistan that is required to nail this guy?"

Pakistan has probably nailed more Al Qaeda members and leaders than the US has, I think its unfair to assume they arent carrying their share of the load. We saw what happened a year or so ago when the Pakistani army tried to go into the tribal areas- basically war broke out and the army didnt fare all that well.

I think its worth entertaining the notion that OBL simply has an outstanding place to hide. It would be a horrible idea for the US to send the multi-divisions it would take to root out the area (which still stands a high probability of failure), how then do we ask the Pakistanis to do what we arent willing to? It would require a far larger force for them to do it, and that could well destabalize the regime. Losing Pakistan to the zealots would be a far deadlier blow to us than OBL putting out the occasional video tape from his cave at the end of the world.

Davebo, thanks for providing real opinions in addtion to the insults. I'm still not seeing much in the way of concrete suggestions, except that we should punish the world's most populous democracy (with whom our relations have improved quite a bit recently) in order to shame a country where the government starts each meeting by chanting "Death to America".

(FWIW, I agree that we should just ditch the NNPT. Its an embarrasment on so many levels.)

I'm not suggesting we punish Idia. Just hold them to the same rules as everyone else.

The deal we struck with India was one of desperation and it reflects that. Bush was determined to leave with a signed deal even if it meant capitulating on every level which he did.

And if you think I suggested we scrap the NPT, you're not reading what I wrote. Sadly you don't even seem willing to attempt to deconstruct my suggestions but rather just pick one, misrepresent it, and then ignore everything else.

Jeffrey, it means engagind in direct dialogue with Iran when they offer it. Sadly it's probably too late for that now but I still hold out hope. Had we been willing to when they offered in 2003 we'd could possibly be in a much better situation regarding Iran today. Of course it's possible that it would have done no good. But you've got to try.

Unfortunately at the time we were far too busy beating our chests and leading ourselves into a disaster to bother at the time.

Davebo:
Back-channel negotiations with Iran might be sensible. At any rate, unless/until the time-urgency is so great that an Iranian talk-for-time ploy is too perilous. Avoiding meddling from alternate internal power-centres is also sensible.

Pressure for democracy throughout the M.E. Yes...but:
This could risk driving Arabia &/or Egypt (those are the states you mean, I assume) into enmity either from dislike of that pressure OR from regime collapse and potential of replacement by elected (one man, one vote, once) Muslim Brotherhood or similar.
Democracy promotion has to be part of the long-term strategy. Whether it's sensible to push this too hard (as opposed to encouraging incremental reform) short-term is debateable. It may be better to take it in stages: maximise time in Iraq, get back to pressurising Syria, wait as long as possible on Iran, then address Egypt, Saudi, Pakistan.

However: "Unilaterally rescind the recent agreements ... with India..."
This is not a good idea. Do you seriously want to add India to the list of states with ill-will toward the USA? India would not forgive this for a generation or more.
Arguably Russia, China etc. have been obstructive out of misperception of regional interest, conditioned reflex from the Cold War era, a desire to prove independence by sticking a finger in the American eye, and to impede US dominance almost by instinct.
Your proposal, however, would give India a massive, substantial, permanent grievance that could not be removed without another volte face.
It would create an enemy,and add to the dangerous reputation of the US for diplomatic unrelability.
It would also require a similar demarche re. Pakistani nukes, and now is NOT the time for that either.
Frankly, this verges on the crazy.

"... the world will rightly claim that we have not a double, but dozens of standards..."
Of course there are differing standards. It is both perilous and insulting in international relations treat both friends and enemies the same.

John,

I'm guessing you aren't familiar with the agreement itself no?

As to angering India, we've created a lot of the current problems in an attempt not to anger supposed allies. Does the name Khan ring a bell?

India will get over it. Frankly they were jaw dropped amazed we agreed to it in the first place.

Davebo,

I'm having a bit of trouble piecing it all together. What's your preferred approach for dealing with Iran, and what would you do vis-a-vis India?

There are plenty of us who think this enemy is a very serious threat, requiring serious action, and who believe that the Bush administration is doing exactly the wrong things. They are doing precisely what Osama bin Laden wanted to accomplish with his terrorist acts.

OBL's goal was to foment global war between Islam and the West. This would polarize the youth of Islam, away from Western values and towards his brand of fundamentalist Islam. We are playing his game plan, precisely. Iraq was a big step forward for his plan, and Iran would be another. He doesn't care how many Muslims get killed in the process. Even if some of those killed are terrorists from his group, the hatred we inspire will cause dozens more to arise to replace each one fallen.

You want a plan?

Two years ago, I wrote an essay, How to Defeat Terrorism. As I have followed events since then, I am even more convinced that this plan will work, and nothing else will. (By the way, contrary to the intro they provided to my essay, I am not a "terrorism expert". Just someone who thinks hard about these things.)

It's hard, dangerous work. It requires courage, and we will take casualties. It is not appeasement. It is not hoping everyone will just be nice. But it does require realizing that we are not the ones who will win this war. We can provide the support that allows Muslims to win this war. These are the only weapons that will be effective.

Some of what's happening on the ground in Iraq is exactly in line with my suggestions, no thanks to the Pentagon leadership and their failure to plan for the post-invasion steps that would actually defeat the terrorists. My problem with the Bush administration is that the relevant factors seem to be simply invisible to them.

What success we have had in Iraq has been largely due to the good sense of our individual troops and local commanders there. Many of those success stories have been documented here, for good reason. The failure at the top is to recognize that those are the powerful weapons that will win. If the leaders fail to build or deploy the right weapons, and don't know what it would mean to aim them effectively, then is it a surprise that the war goes poorly, even with many people on the ground doing their pretty good best.

We are watching the unfolding of a tragedy. Our leaders strike at shadows, and fail to act in ways that would defeat our enemies.

Davebo means dialogue (appeasement) with Iran, and the breaking of our treaty with India (South Viet Nam anyone?), a tremendous and valuable ally.

In other words he's a picture perfect Democrat who is absolutely wrong about everything.

Always remember that the American left associates America's defeat in Viet Nam with their ascension to power and they can't wait to defeat America again in a Republican led war. Hey it worked once before. Maybe a decade or two with lot's of sex and coke will follow again too!

Paul,

If you truly believe that dialogue equals appeasement then what are we waiting for? What decision is left to be made other than nuke or conventional?

As to "breaking our treaty" with India, we have no treaty with India. Unless you've got some information on congress ratifying a treaty with India of late. Now regarding the idea of breaking our recent agreement with India, it was a bad agreement and settled on purely out of political concerns instead of foreign policy concerns. That's a good enough reason for me.

Perhaps the biggest problem you have with my post is that you are ignorant of the underlying facts it's based on. I can't be sure of course, but that certainly seems to be the case.

Benjamin Kuipers: Before I set about trying to rhetorically evicerate your plan, let me say something.

WOOHOO!! ACTUAL SUBSTANCE!!! HOORAY!!!

You made my day. I think your plan is dog droppings, but at least you are thinking seriously about this and you do have some insights once you worm them away from your thesis. Sadly, I think you completely miss that the US's current plan basically involves the same insights.

First, the good part. You correctly realize that the strategic center of the war is the population that the terrorists depend on for support. Good for you. But you don't develop what I see as a workable plan based on that, and you neglect some really important observations.

a) The 9/11 operation was carried out in a country which has a rather strong 'blue line' and respect for law and order. Terrorism - just like crime - can exist and be successful pretty much without regard to support from the local population. No community really wants muggers operating in its neighborhood, regardless of what they think of the police, and yet muggings continue to happen. Given the scale of damage caused by international terrorism, to say nothing of the potential scale, you can't fight terrorism with the tools you use to fight crime.
b) Your analysis of the Hamas/Isreali situation is interesting, but fatally flawed in one respect. If you plot a graph of the number of terrorist attacks on Israeli soil a graph of the number of attacks the Israeli's make on palestinian targets you'll see that as Israel retaliates the number of attacks they experience decrease. The more restrained they are in thier responce, the more attacks that they suffer. You talk about trust in the thin blue line, but you miss a very important point. From the perspective of an Israeli citizen, it doesn't matter how much support Hamas enjoys in Palestine. What matters is that bombs don't blow up in cafes. That trust in the government is shaken every time a bomb blows up and the government doesn't do anything about it. Using your analogies, it would be like if you say a criminal shoot your neighbor and you called the police and they said, "Well, we are refraining from retaliating against the shooter because we don't want to increase his support in his community." Trust is broken by police brutality, or percieved police brutality. But it is also broken by percieved police apathy and inaction.
c) Hamas's authority is increased in its community when colateral damage from Israeli retaliation suffering on the percieved innocents. But that is far from the only source of Hamas's authority, and in my opinion it is not the most important one. Hamas and the PLO's most import source of authority in the palestinian community is the perception that they can achieve victory. Hamas wins when Israel retaliates, but it gets an even larger victory when Israel doesn't. The calculus works the same for both sides, when you would have it work one way for one side and one way for another. Let's say Hamas blows up a bus. Israel retaliates. So Hamas blows up another bus. Israel retaliates. So Hamas blows up another bus. So Israel retaliates. Then for whatever reason Hamas doesn't blow up a bus. Isn't it obvious that to an Israeli, the outcome 'Hamas doesn't blow up a bus' reflects far better on the Israeli government than the outcome 'Hamas blows up another bus.' This is because the outcome, 'Hamas doesn't blow up a bus', is percieved as a victory. The fewer buses that blow up, the more esteem that the government will be held in. The calculus works the same way for Hamas. If in that long chain it is Israel refrains from retaliating, Hamas can declare victory and is perceived by the Palestinian people as being closer to 'winning'.
Yes, the immediate impact of retaliation is to solidy hatred against the attacker. But the long term impact of retaliation is not. Consider how you would feel if every time the US dropped some bombs somewhere, a building blew up in America. The first few times this happened, you'd just get angrier and demand more bombs be dropped. But as more buildings blew up, sooner or latter you're anger would turn from the guys blowing up the buildings to the incompotent government that was failing to prevent buildings from blowing up. Sooner or latter the realization of defeat would set in, and the consequences of deprivation would leave you long for an end of the conflict. This is precisely how Israel has successfully ended palestianian wars against it, and IMO had the world not meddled in conflict and artificially propped up the terrorists and granted to them a perception of victory amongst the Palestinians that there would be peace there today.
d) Crime is internal to a community. Terrorism - at least the sort of terrorism we are waging war on - is not. It's reasonable to suspect that you're esteem for criminals will decrease when you see thier actions occuring to you and your neighbors. It's not reasonable to suggest that when the criminal does something entirely outside of your perception that you'll necessarily loath him for it. Has it not occurred to you that part of the strategy of the WoT is to force the terrorist to fight in 'his own neighborhood' so that that the terrorist's supporters will see precisely what sort of people they actually are.
When you say, "The biggest danger to the terrorist is the trust that the people have in the authorities.", you are locked into the problem of still seeing terrorism as something happening internally to the community. If the terrorists are the authorities, the trust that the people have in the authorities may well be based on thier ability to successfully conduct acts of terror.

Now having considered the philosophical basis of your plan, lets move on to the steps you actually advocate.

1) "avoid getting killed by them"

This is like saying, "Score more points than the opposition" is a good sports plan. Duh! How do we go about doing this?

2) "make it clear that overwhelming power is available, but avoid using it"

How will we make it clear that overwhelming power is available if we don't demonstrate it? For that matter, is overwhelming power available? We are not invincible. Moreover, Osama Bin Ladin's claim was that America appeared strong, but was in fact weak because it lacked the will to use its strength. Is thier any real difference in being weak and being unable or unwilling to use your strength? The majority of Al Queda's recruitment success and operational success occurred during a period in which the US had overwhelming power but refrained from using it, and each time the US refrained from using it Osama Bin Ladin increased his authority because it appeared to validate his claim of US weakness.

3) "gain the trust of the general population"

Which general population? The US general population? The islamist general population? Third party general populations? You are aware are you not that actions which might increase the trust of the US general population, might decrease the trust of the Islamist population and vica versa.

4) "refute the terrorists lies"

Since one of Osama Bin Ladin's major claims was that the US was a coward who would flee and crumble when attacked, how would you reconcile refuting this specific claim with #1. For that matter, how would you go about refuting any of Osama Bin Ladin's specific claims - and in particular those which are religious in nature.

5) "create, publicize, enforce, and obey a simple "Bill of Rights""

We've got one. It's never seemed to much impress the terrorists. For that matter, Iraq has got one. Supposing we created one for say Syria, how would we go about imposing this Bill of Rights on Syria without removing the current regime? How do you address the fact that Constitutional Law itself is seen by many Islamists as an attack on the Koran?

6) "Demonstrate even handedness in local disputes"

I would argue that we do this already, at least as best as we are able. You are aware of course that when you demonstrate even handedness, you tend to offend at least one party. When you are judging a dispute, its very hard to get both sides to accept your judgement. This is particularly true in tribal cultures where 'justice' typically is seen as 'favoring me over him'. For example, are you aware that much anti-American sentiment in Greece is do to the fact that we intervened to stop Serbian atrocities when Serbia was seen as an ally? And in any event, how do we do this unless we intervene in local disputes which brings us back to point #1.

7) "Demonstrate justice, even when treated unjustly"

See #6.

8) "Avoid massive retaliation even when taking casualties"

Show me any signs that we've ever preferred in this war to engage in massive retaliation over risking taking casualties. Do you have any idea at all what 'massive retaliation' would look like? Why the heck do you think we are bothering with infantry wars anyway?

9) "Visibly work for economic justice of the oppressed"

See #6

10) "The people will turn the terrorists in for trial and prosecution"

It was a good think I wasn't drinking any milk when I read this sentence.

Let me see:

Step A: Do nothing.
Step B: Without interfering with the terrorists, reward the population for thier support of the terrorists.
Step C: Publically claim moral superiority.
Step D: The population turns in terrorists for thier acts of terror against a foreign population.

Riiiiiiighhhhttttt.

Some other sentenses which caught my eye:

"The whole point of terrorism is to provoke massive retaliation"

The whole point? The whole point? No, the point of terrorism is to demonstrate your strength and viciousness. This is like saying that the whole point of bullying someone is to get them to fight back.

"Even so, to win against terrorism, they must be treated like ordinary criminals"

That worked so well for us back in the '90's.

You go on to site two examples of domestic terrorism. Did it never once occur to you that international terrorism was distinctly different than domestic terrorism in at least one important way?

Davebo, I'm sorry I implied that you were in favor of scrapping the NNPT. (Never post in haste. Never post in haste....)

Otherwise the world will rightly claim that we have not a double, but dozens of standards when it comes to nuclear proliferation.

That's a valid point. My counter-argument is that the NNPT is such a useless instrument that paying any lip service to it is counter-productive, and in exactly the way you describe.

India is not Iran. I can't see a logical reason to treat them the same. In my opinion we should have as many standards as their are nuclear aspirants. That strikes me as a more nuanced approach to a growing problem.

As to dialogue with Iran, what part of "Death to America" aren't you getting? Or to be less of a smartass in my questioning, what can we offer to Iran in exchange for them giving up their nuclear ambitions?

I'm serious. When people start talking about dialogue between countries, the question that immediately comes to mind is "what are we going to talk about"?

"Die Yankee Dog!"

"Okay, we feel your pain. Help us to help you."

"Give us nuclear technology!"

"Gee, I don't know, Mahmoud. We're pretty much opposed to nuclear proliferation. What would you do with it?"

"We would use it for strictly peaceful purposes. Unless we were threatened. Then a fire would burn over the lands of the infidel."

"Okay, we were fine with that right up to the third sentence."

"You are threatening me! Die Yankee Dog!"

In negotiations, as a rule, there are carrots and sticks. Frankly, I can't think of a carrot to offer the Iranian government right now. And the trouble is, in all the dialogueing Britain, France, and Germany have done with Iran, the only carrot that anyone mentions Iran wanting has been one that glows in the dark. If you could point me to something else that's been mentioned, I always like more info.

Regards,
Mark Poling

Mark,

The NPT is far from perfect, but to claim it's useless is disengenuous if you ask me. There are IMO, far fewer countries with nuclear weapons than there would be had it never been enacted.

Now you may say "who cares whether or not Finland has nuclear weapons?" but I think it is positive that they don't and that they were still able to develop nuclear power generation.

As to dialogue with Iran, well we won't know until it's attempted. They certainly wouldn't be the first country to bluster loudly for the benefit of their populace while reaching agreements quietly in the background including agreements that may reach a positive goal while providing a bit of cover for them with the folks back home.

It's a heck of alot better than all the other options we have if you ask me and to take more drastic steps without even trying dialogue would be grossly irresponsible.

But again, it would most likely have been more fruitful 3 years ago when the opportunity arose. But at that time our leadership had "other priorities".

India is NOT signatory to the NNPT. Neither is Israel. Iran is. The Norks were, until they repudiated it.

Did I miss something? When did Davebo gain access to all back-channel diplomatic occurrences, that he's able to say the US has rejected them all? Or does "back channel" no longer mean "top secret, or at least secret enough that random bloggers don't know about". How do you know that the current situation with Iran isn't the result of some such secret negotiation taking place and failing back in 2003? How could you tell the difference between a situation where no negotiations were made, and one where negotiations took place and failed?

Heck, the EU has been in talks with Iran for years, with no positive outcome. In theory, the EU would be even more "receptive" to such diplomatic maneuverings than the US, yet EU/Iran relations have gone south and nuke talks have failed. Why aren't you going after the EU for bungling theoretical "back-channel advances" instead?

You have to understand, to someone intent on not doing anything negotiations are an end in themselves.

I'm courious about The Unbeliever's questions as well, but I'd like to know what the basis for this assessment is:

"There are IMO, far fewer countries with nuclear weapons than there would be had it never been enacted."

Ok. Which ones?

As far as I'm concerned, the logic of nuclear proliferation is as follows:

a) Nuclear weapons are expensive items to produce and have little in the way of direct benefit. Most countries that become involved in thier production quickly realize that the cost doesn't nearly equal the gain.
b) Once you obtain nuclear weapons, its generally not in your interest that your neighbors do so. The NPT is an artifact of those powers that had nuclear weapons, not those that did not.
c) If your ally has nuclear weapons and you have a reasonable belief that you can sit happily under thier umbrella, there is a strong incentive not to bother with nuclear weapons in order to save costs and avoid being directly targeted.
d) If you have an adversary, you have a strong incentive to obtain nuclear weapons whether or not they have nuclear weapons. If they have nuclear weapons, obtaining nuclear weapons maintains parity. If they don't have nuclear weapons, obtaining nuclear weapons represents a strong deterence. Either way, a treaty isn't worth the paper its printed on so long as the conflict continues.

Brazil and South Africa abandoned thier nuclear programs, not because of the NPT but because lacking a clear adversary the fall under the logic of point #1. All the NPT represents is a formalization and proclamation of point #2, and its the activities of the nuclear powers in detering the spread of nuclear weapons which are really important - and these would go on regardless of the NPT and regardless of whether the emerging nuclear power was a signatory to the treaty. The NPT consistantly fails whenever the logic of point #4 comes into play, so its overall effect appears to me to be absolutely nothing.

Davebo:
"As to dialogue with Iran, well we won't know until it's attempted. They certainly wouldn't be the first country to bluster loudly for the benefit of their populace while reaching agreements quietly in the background..."

Perhaps.
However, what reason is there to suppose that direct US/Iran talks are more likely to produce Iranian concessions than the negotiations Britain, France and Germany have been pursuing?

It is perfectly apparent that, absent Iranian nukes or regional military adventures, the US was not and is not going to attack Iran.

Even Iranian military activities in Lebanon, sponsorship of terror operations against Israel, overseas assasination operations etc. have been in effect overlooked.
The US may not establish direct trade and diplomatic links with Tehran unless Iran cleans up its act in these areas, but Washington is not going to make them cassus belli either.
And it is plain enough that the US will accept Iran having trade and diplomatic arrangements with China, Russia and Europe. The US acceptance of the EU3 diplomacy makes this obvious. As does the muted reaction to Russian SAM sales.
What more could Iran possibly, realistically, want?
Acceptance of its position as hegemon of the Gulf? A gurantee that involvement in more direct military operations against Israel will not provoke a response? Not going to happen.
In any case, no administration could effectively bind its successors in these regards. If Iran wishes to pursue a course of regional bellicosity, nuclear weapons are essential. If not, they are useless.

This emerging criris is entirely of the Iranian regimes making.
The EU3 have been attempting to persuade Iran not walk down this road; that it has no good ending for them or us. And just how worrying the adamant refusal of Iran to turn aside has been to its interlocutors may be judged by President Chirac's recent pointed remarks on French nuclear options. These sort of words, directly by the head of state of a nuclear Power, are almost unprecedented.

and these would go on regardless of the NPT and regardless of whether the emerging nuclear power was a signatory to the treaty.

However, outside of the framework you have described, India, for example, cannot be held to be in violation of the so-called "international law" since it never signed on.

Countries that did sign agreed to accept assistance toward developing civilian nuclear technology with their promise not to pursue military uses. Iran appears to be in violation.

Assuming that the framework of proliferation that Celebrim describes is accurate, then the NNPT has actually been a counter productive, since it ENCOURAGES civilian proliferation, which helped spread the industrial basis for later militarization.

The idea that the Bush administration is not doing any diplomacy is among the more pernicious and dishonest myths. I've been astonished at the immense amount of good diplomacy world wide that the Bush admin is accomplishing which is being intentionally and malicious ignored and misrepresented. India is a recent example. Of course, the Bush admin is involved in the EU/Iran discussions - the claim to the contrary is just ludicrous.

Bush has made strong allies of both India and Pakistan a paradox in itself.
-Bush has won over Libya from a major terrorist sponsor with a secretly robust nuclear program into a non-nuclear state that at least pays lip service to regional peace.
-Bush has made Yemen, another classic terrorist state, a regional ally against terror.
Bush has made strong inroads into central America including military bases on the soil of the former Soviet Union a strong warning against any Russian resurgence in the region.
-Bush's Iraq decisions spurred a democratic revolution in Lebanon that is squeezing Hezbollah and has put Syria in a diplomatic corner.
-Bush has held the spot light on the Europeans diplomatically, shaming them into keeping Irans feet to the fire.
-Bush has led an effort to starve any Hamas ruled Palestinian state of resources. Any cash flowing from Arab states to make up for it isnt going to fanatic madrassas or other international terrorist organizations. Hamas must choose between bombs and keeping the lights on.

Bush gets credit for none of these accomplishments.

Stickler --

the problem is Islam and Muslims. America is the engine of modernity and modernity will erase Islam as it did traditional Christianity in Europe. As long as we exist Muslims around the globe will try to destroy us to save their way of life.

The solution is to make them so afraid that they dare not try it. By sadly, killing a lot of them, and breaking even more "stuff."

Trying to be "loved" is ridiculous. America also has the premier Navy and Air Force and the ability to triple each in size without seriously impacting the economy (though pork would have to go).

Madison faced this with the Barbary Pirates. And found the solution in the US Navy.

I find Davebo's comments laughable re: Iran. Iran wants nukes ... to nuke us and Israel. The only "negotiations" that work are bombing the place to the level of 1945 Germany. The NPT is a joke, just like the UN. Which elected IRAN to the UN Disarmament Committee. Words on paper are meaningless. Real consequences like dying during a bombing change behavior.

Look at Pakistan. It's a set of competing tribes and leaders. The only thing motivating them is fear of a Predator dropping a missile on them.

Celebrim [#34],

Thank you for your appreciation of substance in these discussions. We're on the same page on that point. You might consider cutting back on the use of terms like "dog droppings" in your reply if you want to be treated seriously in return.

You did write a long, thoughtful reply, so I will start working on a response. Since real life is likely to intervene, it could well be tomorrow before I am able to post it. Please check back.

The most sensible comment on this thread?

#1

"There is an almost tragically wide gulf between being right about the odious nature of our enemy and the threat they represent, and actual actions and policies that help reduce the threat."

Very well put.

Celebrim [#34],

Again, thanks for a substantive response to my substantive suggestion [#31]. Let me start with where we agree.

(1) We agree that the strategic center of the war is the population that the terrorists depend on for support.

(2) We agree that some of what US troops are doing in Iraq is directly aimed at furthering the goals I describe.

The first point means that our strategy for winning is to get the population the terrorists depend on to turn on them, to deny them refuge, and indeed to work with the US to defeat them. If you go back and look at items of good news from Iraq, appearing in Winds of Change regularly, you will see that a significant number of them involve the ordinary civilians in various cities and towns in Iraq (i) providing useful intelligence to US troops, (ii) denying refuge to various insurgent or terrorist groups attempting to use or pass through their territory, (iii) providing refuge to wounded US soldiers trying to escape from insurgent or terrorist groups, and so on.

Mao said that the guerrilla fighter "swims like a fish through the sea of the population". But if that sea turns on him, he's sushi before he knows it.

So, there is some amount of good news from Iraq, and that good news matches the pattern I describe. When that good news happens, is it happening because the ordinary Iraqi people are threatened by our troops? Of course not. It happens when our troops have demonstrated firmness, justice, and fair-mindedness. When events like Abu Ghraib take place, that digs us farther into a hole, and it takes more good work to climb back out. (And the issue here is not news and publicity; it's whether the event takes place at all. They know.)

My criticism of Bush administration policy is that no planning and preparation went into making sure that this kind of thing happened. Rumsfeld, et al, were convinced, correctly, that a blitzkrieg approach would topple Saddam's regime. It worked in Afghanistan to everyone's surprise, and it would work in Iraq, too, though success was much less surprising in that case. However, both in Afghanistan and much more in Iraq, the thin blitzkrieg forces that toppled the government were not the right forces, and certainly not numerous enough, to impose law and order on the resulting situation.

The Powell doctrine had always been to go in with overwhelming force: enough to impose day-by-day, neighborhood-by-neighborhood law and order. Make it clear that challenging US forces would be utterly futile. Have US troops on every other street corner for the first few weeks, capable of calling in immediate reinforcements to quell any disturbance. That makes the disturbances not happen in the first place. This makes our troops into policemen guaranteeing law and order for the ordinary people. (This is what it means to have overwhelming force, but not have to use it.) After the first few weeks, mix in increasing numbers of Iraqi policemen, with plenty of US troops around for support, and to keep them honest.

We're doing this now, having started years too late, giving terrorists, insurgent, local warlords, and various other kinds of bandits the opportunity to build up groups of supporters who owe allegiance, safety, and prosperity to their local leader rather than to the central government. Rumsfeld's major act of professional malpractice was failing to anticipate and plan for this problem. As far as I can tell, he thought Baghdad would be Paris in 1944, and had no plan for alternatives. In fact, he gutted Shinseki for standing up to him and suggesting otherwise.

So far, I am elaborating on our points of agreement (1) and (2) above, with a clarification of how we may (or may not!) disagree on the history surrounding (2).

Let me move on to our points of disagreement.

It is explicitly obvious that the community in question is "the community that the terrorists depend on for support." Although 9/11 happened in New York, that is not the community that will defeat the terrorists. Those communities are in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. For the current discussion, it's Iraq, because that is where we are playing a conspicuous role in the day-to-day life of the everyday people.

So, your point (a) is not relevant. We need to attempt to protect ourselves from further attack, but we need to implement this plan in the areas that breed terrorists. And avoid creating more breeding grounds.

Your point (b) is interesting, though I'd want to see the data, and you didn't provide a URL. It's my impression that the Israeli retaliation that was effective has been targeted, tit-for-tat assassination of specific terrorist leaders in response to specific attacks. I would conjecture that the more collateral damage took place in a retaliatory attack, the less effective it was in preventing further terrorist actions. But it would take a careful analysis of the data to test that, and I don't have the data (or time) to do it. (I believe this also addresses your point ©.) Measured response, tit-for-tat, focused on responsible parties, is effective. Collective punishment like bulldozing the houses of the parents of suicide bombers, is much less so.

Re your point (d). Terrorists live in one community, which gives them support and refuge, and attack a different one. To defeat them, the community they live in must turn on them. When the terrorists are the authorities, then we have the much more familiar problem of conflict between states. Hamas has not yet confronted the fact that they have responsibilities to their people, and they are a billion dollars short of being able to fulfill them. It's pretty safe to assume that their people will let them know in short order. The situation there is very dynamic, and Hamas has very few cards to play, now that they have political power. (It's an interesting paradox, isn't it?)

Now let me move on to responding to your criticisms of my steps.

(1) "avoid getting killed by them". I really didn't think I had to spell out how to do this. My major point is that it is a priority, but not an absolute one. There are going to be casualties on our side, even following my plan.

(2) Overwhelming power is just the Powell doctrine. See my discussion above.

(3) Which population? Obviously, it's the general population on which the terrorists depend for support. As discussed above.

(4-9) If we had been functioning as an honest police force in Iraq, maintaining peace even among Iraqi enemies since the fall of Saddam, we would have refuted most of OBL's claims. We would have demonstrated resolve in the face of threats, strength and honor in the face of our enemies, no cowardice at all. Torture is the act of a coward. Incidentally, I was talking about Iraq, once we had occupied it, not imposing our bill of rights on Syria. The point was to make Syrian citizens admire our bill of rights. But by failing to handle Iraq correctly, we lost a huge amount of ground. Perhaps we can make it up; perhaps not.

(10) I've already addressed this. This is actually happening, and is often cited as evidence of success in Iraq. Better not laugh.

Your summary of my proposal (A,B,C,D) is incorrect, as I hope the above has made clear.

I may have overstated my point by saying "the whole point of terrorism is to provoke massive retaliation." Clearly, demonstrating vulnerability is important to them, too. But it's still symbolic. Even the damage done by 9/11 is a pinprick compared with the might and wealth of the US.

Re your final point: The sarcastic way you stated it makes your statement too ambiguous to be meaningful, so I can't respond.

Celebrim, nice posts. Good logic.

What is the consensus on the fact that Iran is no longer waiting to begin dealing in bad faith with their nuclear technology regarding the transfer of technology to Sudan?

What actions would have to happen if Iran goes nuclear and the Sudan follows shortly thereafter?

In terms of identifying The Problem, I will sum it up as I see it like so: there are rabidly expansionistic, anti democratic factions that are hideously well funded and incapable of building or maintaining a truly modern society, but have been held apart from the natural consequences of holding these belief systems by their stranglehold on oil, and the leverage that comes from it.

Iranian and Arabic Islamists, a number of whom are in political power, want to put forward a notion of Islam like the old term Christendom. This includes the elimination of any meaningful cultural mechanism that isn't in Arabian Islam. In even worse cases, there is a desire to promulgate an image of Islam that is so linked with the Arabic image that it is almost identical to the old definition of "white," as in the colonialist dictum of "white is right." Certain Muslim scholars consider the term Muslim to simply be a stand in for Arabic, which bodes ill for nonexpansionist, non Arabic Islamic cultures in other parts of the world.

Nuclear weapons would be prestige items that would allow for one sided, one way expansion in a number of areas. If the Sudan (which tried to kill Hosni Mubarak in an assassination attempt while he was visiting Ethiopia in the 90's, and has recently tried to topple Chad) gets nuclear weapons from Iran, and promises to use nuclear weapons only if invaded, they would effectively set themselves up as a permanent safe-house for any proxy that wants to opperate with impunity against any neighboring government.

Is my identifcation of the problem accurate? Is there anything that should be covered, refined or refuted?

Imagine telling a cancer researcher that, despite their recent impressive progress, bird flu is "The Problem", so their work is irrelevant because it doesn't address The Problem.

Sounds silly, doesn't it? Surprising as it may seem, international affairs is pretty complicated, too, and more than one problem is out there.

At 9/11, we faced an unfamiliar kind of problem, receiving a substantial attack from a non-state actor. Not being a state, al Qaeda couldn't be pinned down and held responsible in the same way that a state can. They received comfort and refuge from the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the international community was pretty well lined up behind clobbering the Taliban for their role.

Way back then, the USA had near-unanimous support from the international community, and those parts that didn't support us knew to keep pretty quiet about it. But, although we knew how to topple a state using a blitzkrieg attack, we didn't know how to follow through. We let OBL slip out of Tora Bora. We literally forgot to include development funds for Afghanistan in the budget after defeating the Taliban (look it up!). The fact that the major strategic weapon against non-state terrorists is to turn the supportive population against them was (and is) completely invisible to our civilian military leaders.

As a result, the problem has metastasized. The non-state actor al Qaeda has distributed so widely that rooting them out has become (evidently) beyond our capabilities. They, and the fundamentalist Islamic forces behind them, have taken root in a number of state-level actors. And now we have another problem (not "The Problem"), in addition to the previous one.

So, sure, Blair has stated "A Problem". And it's an important one to think about. But it's not the only one. If you use this problem as an excuse not to think about the others, you will repeat the disasters of the recent past, where the focus was on toppling the current regime in power, ignoring until too late the deeper problem of getting the support of the population.

Actually, the bit about unanimous support is a myth - and subsequent elements of Mr. Kuipers' comment (#50) also descend past useful or accurate discussion and into self-flagellation.

Within days of 9/11, many of the outlines of the present situation were already clear - from the Euros and academics who smiled and said that America deserved it, to the leaders of today's "war on the war" movement who were already gathering and planning marches to give the Taliban cover, to the nations quick with sympathy but slow on actual commitment of anything meaningful. Transatlantic Intelligencer ably dissects one aspect of this myth/lie in the Legend of the Squandered Sympathy

"In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, countless private individuals in western Europe undoubtedly felt sympathy with the victims and many saw fit to express it in small symbolic acts, such as the laying of flowers before the American embassy in Paris. Given the horror of the attacks, such reactions were, so to say, only human. What was more unusual and hence noteworthy, however, was that at the same time the attacks seemed to elicit from the very start a sort of paroxysm of – as an Austrian friend of mine aptly put it – anti-American “ventilating”. In the major media, moreover, the expressions of hatred and contempt for America quickly came to eclipse those of sympathy. An especially conspicuous case in point is provided by the influential French daily Le Monde.

This is ironic, since the legend of the squandered sympathy draws much of its inspiration and seeming plausibility from the headline of the front-page editorial that ran in Le Monde the day after the attacks: “We Are All Americans”.

There are other statements here that are exaggerations approaching dishonesty.

Complaints that al-Qaeda has metastisized, for instance, because they are broken up into more independent cells. Um, duuuh - when you take out large portions of the command and control infrastructure for an international terrorist movement with a presence in many countries, thus hurting their ability to conduct large-scale attacks, smaller Islamist groups that act independently and are harder to target is exactly what you should expect to see. The fact that Islamic Jihadism is harder to target when it is not as cohesive an entity means what - that we should leave al-Qaeda intact?

"They, and the fundamentalist Islamic forces behind them, have taken root in a number of state-level actors."

Because, you know, Muslim states offering aid, comfort, and direct support to Islamic terrorists is something we had never seen before 2003.

Give me a break. The transparent silliness behind that whole line of argument is jaw-dropping.

Then there's this, which shades past silly and toward dishonesty:

"We literally forgot to include development funds for Afghanistan in the budget after defeating the Taliban (look it up!)."

One wonders if Mr. Kuipers recalls the immediate and large-scale humanitarian efforts made by America both during and immediately after the war - efforts made necessary by the fact that if Taliban rule had continued, Afghanistan was headed for starvation. One wonders, also, if Mr. Kuipers is familiar with the concept of non-budget supplemental appropriations, which have been used to finance both war and reconstruction in the current conflict.

I would further invite Mr. Kuipers to compare reconstruction aid given by the USA and by EU countries in Afghanistan over the past few years.

"The fact that the major strategic weapon against non-state terrorists is to turn the supportive population against them was (and is) completely invisible to our civilian military leaders."

It's hard to see exactly how someone could say this with a straight face, given that this is in fact an animating feature behind the Bush Doctrine. The book Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground also falls into the "recommended reading to cure ignorance" list.

Having disposed of that little piece of unjustified smugness, the question of exactly how to accomplish this is worthy of debate. Massive devastation and loss of life in Germany and Japan succeeded in a similar task within recent memory, and looking back into history the Mongols were quite effective in the Middle East itself (including the utter destruction of the Assassins, heretofore considered impossible).

I'll note that historically, this has been the usual model for turning enemy populations against specific ideologies or rulerships.

A different tack might point to the role of hate-indoctrination madrassas, note that they are and remain the wellsprings for murderous religious jihad, and observe that material aid is limited in its ability to offset a religious belief in murderous supremacism that has been part of mainstream Islam for centuries. How to gain sufficient support from populations, while the hate factories continue churn out proto-terrorists who will also murder fellow Muslims expressing that support? One option would be to help finance educational alternatives to the madrassas, possibly with a focus on education for girls (Biden, among others, has proposed this). Another would be to start killing the leaders of madrassas that spew hate and supremacism. Of course, one could do both.

Or one could note precedents like the "Palestinian Authority," which remains (as it has since the early 1990s) the major source of hate propaganda and recruitment to death-cult Islam. In such cases, looking to "the support of the population" cannot be meaningful so long as the current regime remains in power.

Short of adopting the Mongol solution, what to do about all this is not exactly clear, beyond the obvious necessity of removing certain regimes. Various approaches are being tried, in different situations around the globe, and our approach will continue to learn and adapt as the war continues.

With respect to the Muslim ummah's base of support for murderous supremacism and hate, some signs thus far have been encouraging, other signs have been discouraging. And lurking behind it all is the unresolved question of whether Islam itself is the problem, or whether it is possible for that religion to peacefully and equitably co-exist with others.

Not an easy set of questions, and not clear set of answers. What is clear, however, is that we'll have to show a bit more depth than Mr. Kuipers does if we hope to find those answers.

Thanks for the good job on the myth of "universal" support that was somehow "squandered", Joe. I've long tired of that false meme from the trolls.

Joe,

I'd be happy to have a substantive discussion with you, but it's hard to pick out your substantive points from amidst the gratuitous insults, and what sounds like recorded lectures aimed at someone else.

First, I am not "into self-flagellation". I am into criticizing the leaders of our country who, in the face of a threat we all understand as serious, persist in taking many actions that are seriously counter to the best interests of our country. There's a real threat. We need to address it. I believe they are doing it wrong, and that they are damaging our country. It's my patriotic duty to bring this to their attention if I can.

I followed your link on "the legend of squandered sympathy". The columnist seems to think that genuine sympathy would require all other countries to abandon their policy differences with the USA in deference to our suffering. The fact that other countries, and opinion-writers in other countries, persisted in their policy differences indicated that their sympathy must have been false. This is, to be mild and polite, unrealistic.

Responding to my point about al Qaeda metastasizing, you imply that they had a substantial command and control structure to begin with. A decentralized structure, with relatively little communication with action groups, seems to have been one of their strengths from the beginning. In any case, although at one point they were a relatively small organization, mostly in Afghanistan, they are now much larger and more widely spread around, partly due to our failure to kill or capture them in Afghanistan, and partly due to our creating a recruiting magnet it Iraq. (Following the example of the Soviets who created the recruiting magnet in Afghanistan in the first place.)

Perhaps you call this "self-flagellation". I call it an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of our strategy, in hopes of improving it. If you want to add or correct factors in this evaluation, feel free.

The fact that, after being reminded of their failure to include Afghanistan in the budget, the administration included the needed funds in a supplemental appropriation, doesn't excuse their lack of focus on what is actually needed.

A central point of my argument is that the administration is failing to use the strategic weapon that would be most effective against terrorist movements: the support of the local population. You say that this is a central feature of the Bush doctrine, and then you cite Kaplan's Imperial Grunts on your side.

The Bush doctrine says "we will make no distinction between the terrorists and those who harbor them". This is fine when applied to state actors, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, but when applied to the ordinary people, leads to attacking and alienating them when we need to be turning them against the terrorists.

Following the link you provided for Kaplan's book, in the second Amazon review (5-star, signed), you find the following paragraph:

"Most important in this book is Kaplan's documentation of the fact that transformation of the U.S. military is NOT taking place--Washington is still enamored of multiple layers of rank heavy bureaucracy, the insertion of very large cumbersome task forces in to every clime and place; an over-emphasis on technology; and a lack of appreciation for the urgency of providing security, food, water, and electricity IMMEDIATELY so as to start the cycle of counter-insurgency information collection from volunteers. The author is brutal in his indictment of the bureaucracy for failing to provide the linguistic skills, four years after 9/11, that are far more important to transformation than any weapons system. He is also brutal on the delays in approving operations in the field that are associated with layered bureaucracies that come with joint task forces, and completely detrimental to fast moving tactical success at the A Team level."

This is precisely the point I made in several posts: in many cases the troops on the ground are doing exactly the right thing. In many cases of positive progress in Iraq, as described in WoC, this is exactly why: they are enlisting the support of the Iraqi people. But the civilian leadership (I mean Rumsfeld, of course, but the buck ought to stop at Bush) obviously failed to plan adequately for these needs, and let many precious months go by after the fall of Baghdad. If you'd be willing to read something new, try The Ugly American.

I have trouble understanding the next half-dozen paragraphs. Are you actually advocating "massive devastation and loss of life" (presumably in Iraq, Iran, and elsewhere) as the solution to our problem with al Qaeda and the Islamofascists? Are you actually advocating "killing the leaders of madrassas that spew hate and supremacism"? Or are you describing these thoroughly anti-American "final solutions" as a reductio ad absurdam, and if so, to what? (Killing military leaders is one thing; killing people for "spewing", no matter what, makes our reverence for Freedom of Speech a little suspect.)

Towards the end of your remarks, I do find a bit of common ground, possibly taken out of context:

"... what to do about all this is not exactly clear ..."

"Not an easy set of questions, and not clear set of answers."

I certainly don't think I have all the answers, and I spend time at WoC partly looking for constructive comments (including criticism) from points of view different from my own. Occasionally I find them. Often not.

I would think that we could agree on:

We are facing some serious problems and threats.

Some of our attempts to deal with them are not going well.

Some things are going well.

Many writers on WoC, including you, seem highly motivated by the fact that people aren't paying enough attention to the third point. Many people like me are motivated by the fact that the people with decision-making power are ignoring the second point, and failing to anticipate and learn from our mistakes.

Maybe, just maybe, if we could focus on all three points at once, and stop name-calling, and avoid being defensive, we could figure out how to make things work out better. Worth a try?

“Mao said that the guerrilla fighter "swims like a fish through the sea of the population".

There is a quantitative difference between a terrorism campaign and a guerrilla insurgency. On a scale of intensity, a terrorist campaign should generally be regarded as lower intensity conflict than a guerrilla war. What this means is that though the terrorist is dependent in a small degree on the support of the community, by no means is he as dependent as a guerrilla fighter. A terrorist at some level is little more than an exalted serial killer, and the minimum he requires to do his work is anonymity and a free press - not necessarily material support or widespread sympathy for his cause.

The US anti-terror strategy cannot be based on the false canard of getting enemy populations to love us. Winning hearts and minds is an important element of a successful anti-terrorism operation, but it’s not a sufficient or even necessary one. It’s great when it happens and we should strive to act honorably for its own sake whether it wins us any friends or not, but the fact of the matter is that there is no way we can be friends with everyone. In most cases, the transformation that we really want to see is to turn international terrorism problems into domestic terrorism problems, and to cause terrorist supporting populations to – if not love us – then at least see exporting terrorists to the US (or anywhere else for that matter) as something which does not solve their problems.

“When events like Abu Ghraib take place, that digs us farther into a hole, and it takes more good work to climb back out. (And the issue here is not news and publicity; it's whether the event takes place at all. They know.)”

I agree, though I think that it is worth noting that the coverage greatly exacerbates the problem. In my opinion Abu Ghraib is a non-story. From the media coverage one might imagine that there had been some sort of ongoing program and military cover-up which had been uncovered by investigative journalism. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the Abu Ghraib situation was rather quickly the subject of an internal military investigation. The military announced it was investigating wrong doing in Abu Ghraib months before someone leaked the pictures to the press (for whatever purposes they may have had for doing this) and the story suddenly became front page. It was sensationalist and exploitive coverage, and it had a certain note of revenge to it by partisan elements of the press. Ultimately none of this appears to have any real impact on military decision making, as the military was already trying to deal with the problem months before the place became a household word. And while the local population knows when it is being mistreated even when the scandal doesn’t ever rate headlines, the publicity does serve to motivate non-Iraqi populations far more than the event itself ever would.

“My criticism of Bush administration policy is that no planning and preparation went into making sure that this kind of thing happened.”

That’s a mischaracterization of the nature of the mistakes made in Iraq, and simply isn’t true. To understand what happened in Iraq, you have to go back to Afghanistan and see what happened there. In Afghanistan, the US adopted a three element approach – political, military, and humanitarian. First, it would use its contacts in the CIA to make contact with popular dissidents within Afghanistan who would be capable of providing leadership after the fall of the Taliban regime. These dissidents would then be joined by special force’s advisors and using a combination of local resistance groups to provide military mass and US airpower would obtain a decisive military victory over enemy forces. Because of the small number of US troops, the overall US ‘footprint’ on the population would be small, and there would be no sense of conquest, occupation, or daily friction with the population. After the military victory, the US would move rapidly to provide humanitarian assistance and win the hearts and minds of the population.
In Afghanistan this basic plan worked with a stunning degree of success, and while I’m not personally convinced that Afghanistan isn’t going to blow up into a major war in a few years if it does so it won’t be because of any basic flaw in the plan.

The administration attempted to modify the basic Afghanistan approach to the war in Iraq. However, the Afghanistan approach proved a false model for a war in Iraq for several key reasons, some of which were outside of administration control.

“Rumsfeld, et al, were convinced, correctly, that a blitzkrieg approach would topple Saddam's regime. It worked in Afghanistan to everyone's surprise, and it would work in Iraq, too, though success was much less surprising in that case. However, both in Afghanistan and much more in Iraq, the thin blitzkrieg forces that toppled the government were not the right forces, and certainly not numerous enough, to impose law and order on the resulting situation.”

Nobody thought going into either Iraq or Afghanistan that US forces would impose law and order. In both cases, it was friendly factions within the invaded nation that were supposed to step in and provide the leadership necessary to transition into a new government with minimal chaos. In fact, part of what was motivating the blitzkrieg approach was an attempt to prevent lawlessness from having a lot of time to set in. I agree that the US needs more MP forces and needs to have contingencies for the total collapse of law and order as seen in the first few days after the fall of Bagdad, but I also think that it is short sighted to not consider what using soldiers providing security entails in situations like that. Almost certainly it means lots of would be criminals getting shot, and that is also the sort of thing which leads to the local population resenting you. There is no perfect solution.

“The Powell doctrine had always been to go in with overwhelming force: enough to impose day-by-day, neighborhood-by-neighborhood law and order.”

I’ve never ever seen the implication of the “Powell doctrine”: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Powell_doctrine be that we would have sufficient force to impose law and order. In fact, a more full statement of the Powell doctrine than the breezy one you quote would indicate that the Powell doctrine would be to avoid occupations entirely. Frankly, I’m somewhat mystified how any military observer would at this time be a fan of the Powell doctrine. The Powell doctrine was a disaster virtually every where it was applied – beginning with Powell’s command in Beirut and continuing right on to Gulf War I and Somalia.

The Powell doctrine was less of a military doctrine than it was a political approach to the challenges created by the damage done to the American spirit by the Vietnam War. It required that all the following questions be clearly answered:

Is a vital national security interest threatened?
Do we have a clear attainable objective?
Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?
Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
Is the action supported by the American people?
Do we have genuine broad international support?

Essentially the Powell doctrine is only enter into wars which will be short, decisive, and popular. Superficially, there is nothing wrong with that, and there is nothing at all wrong with the above check list. But in practice, the Powell doctrine – whether Powell was in command or someone else was trying to implement it – could be shortened down to the statement, “Whenever you meet resistance, cut your losses and run.” This resulted in a series of seemingly minor failures over the course of two decades which were little noticed in America, but served to give notice to our enemies that America was a paper tiger that lacked the will for a long or difficult fight. It’s that apparent weakness which in the words of our present enemies led to their decision to attack the United States.
In practice, the Powell doctrine requires too high of a burden. It’s simply not possible only to fight wars which meet all the Powell hurdles. Under the Powell doctrine, the Union would have settled with the Confederacy after losing at Bull Run, the US wouldn’t have entered WWI, and would have negotiated peace with Japan after Pearl Harbor. How can you ever know what all the possible consequences of your action will be? How can you always be certain of victory? In the real world, you’ve sometimes got to take your chances. In particular, it notion of a “plausible exit strategy” means that the US is continually looking for some out other than victory and the surrender and destruction of the enemy. Most of all though, the Powell doctrine fails to learn the central lesson of 20th century warfare – never leave a war half-finished and your opponent unbeaten. That haunted the whole world in WWII, and will continue to haunt the US through the rest of this century – assuming we survive it.

“Make it clear that challenging US forces would be utterly futile. Have US troops on every other street corner for the first few weeks, capable of calling in immediate reinforcements to quell any disturbance. That makes the disturbances not happen in the first place.”

Not necessarily. US forces have overwhelming superiority anywhere that they are challenged whether they are ‘everywhere’ or not. The enemy simply avoids challenging the forces and employs asymmetric warfare. In any event, more troops simply were not available and could not have been available in less than say three to five years.

“This makes our troops into policemen guaranteeing law and order for the ordinary people.”

This stretches the point to the point of being ridiculous. US troops are not policemen. With some exceptions, they are not trained to be policemen. The requirements of being a police officer and being a soldier are completely different. In addition, they cannot be expected to speak the local language of everywhere we might send them. It is not the US intention to replace governments with our own colonial administrations, though granted some more thinking along those lines might be a good thing – especially by the state department. I think we are doing as best as could be expected considering the situation.

“We're doing this now, having started years too late, giving terrorists, insurgent, local warlords, and various other kinds of bandits the opportunity to build up groups of supporters who owe allegiance, safety, and prosperity to their local leader rather than to the central government.”

This is also ridiculous and it fundamentally fails to understand the situation before we arrived. It’s not like terrorists, insurgents, local warlords, bandits, smugglers and criminal gangs built up a base of supporters after we arrived. In many cases these were already operating in Afghanistan and Iraq. In many cases we learned of the identities of who were in the smuggling rings and criminal gangs, because we have records of the bribes that they were paying to the Baathist government to remain in operation. The local warlords didn’t just spring up overnight with militias after the Taliban fail. They preexisted us. These are tribal, clan based, hierarchal societies in which graft, bribery, and patronage were routine aspects of society long before we arrived.

And in any event, we did not wait ‘years’ to adapt to the challenges as they developed. Weeks perhaps in some cases, but the claim the US didn’t adapt or adopt the very things you praise until years into the conflict is not only unfair but a criticism based on ignorance.

“Rumsfeld's major act of professional malpractice was failing to anticipate and plan for this problem.”

Rumsfeld’s made several mistakes, large and small, including not anticipating the scale of anti-social behavior which would be boiling beneath the surface of places like Iraq and Afghanistan. But it’s not like there was no plan.

Back to the point that Afghanistan provided a false model.

a) The reason that CIA was able to identify and liaison with real political leaders in Afghanistan was the CIA had a lot of field experience with those same people. It had worked with them during the Soviet invasion. The CIA’s people knew their people personally. It was just a matter of renewing old ties. But in Iraq, with the exception of Kurdistan, the CIA had no real field experience. The CIA war reliant on exiled dissidents to provide them information on the political structure of Iraq – in other words who could actually command followers and respect. As we all know, the intelligence that the CIA had on Iraq was highly flawed, contradictory and confusing. Rumsfeld should have recognized that the CIA didn’t have the same quality of intelligence on Iraq as they had on Afghanistan and planned accordingly. That was his most serious mistake, but in the scale of mistakes it seems a rather understandable one. The big weakness in the WoT so far has not been the Pentagon, but Langley.

b) Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq had a creditable standing army and few internal armed dissident groups of any note except the Kurds. In northern Iraq, things worked pretty much like they did in Afghanistan. US forces worked with local leaders and used US airpower to obtain a victory while creating no political vacuum because local people were there to fill it. But on the whole, the US had to rely on its own forces to provide military mass. This meant that the US would go in with a ‘large footprint’ and would inevitably be seen not as partners, but as occupiers and conquerors. It meant that US caused collateral damage would be higher, and that the daily frustration of life under an occupying power would create a lot more friction – if only from the check points and getting muscled off the road by convoys of military vehicles. The US plan was to draw down forces to a lower level as soon as possible and in fact attempted to do so in Feb. 2003. Unfortunately, this plan assumed that no creditable insurgency would arise. In Feb. 2003, that seemed reasonable. In March 2003 when Fallujah erupted and the Badr brigades took to the streets, that seemed utterly unreasonable, and the US has been fighting those unforeseen insurgencies ever since.

c) The US plan assumed that Saddam Hussein would be basically as unpopular as the Taliban, and once ousted and his immediate supporters put down that most people would – as they did in Afghanistan – breathe a big sigh of relief and try to get on with their life. The real problem here was that although this was true of 80-90% of the population, 10-20% of the population that had benefited from Saddam’s patronage actually liked the old system. In addition, another 10-20% of the Shiite’s weren’t content to simply see Saddam removed from power, but wanted to put their own dictator in charge.
The people of Afghanistan were so poor that humanitarian aid proved really easy to provide. Coupled with the lack of a serious insurgency, this made it easy for the US to win hearts and minds (at least outside of Taliban strongholds with strong family connections). In Iraq, the US had received rather bad advice on the nature of the humanitarian support it would need to provide initially. NGO’s advising the US military on humanitarian needs had told the US to expect up to 5 million internally displaced refugees that would need food, water, and shelter. Accordingly, the US stockpiled tents, water, and food on the border. None of it was ever used for the purpose intended, as in fact the US found that refugees actually flooded into Iraq in the wake of the US advance. Additionally, the NGO’s advised the US that epidemics (particularly cholera) would break out in Iraq in the wake of disruption of water services. What the US discovered was that the water infrastructure of Iraq was in such bad repair, that most everyone boiled their water anyway. The thousands of stockpiled cholera vaccines went unused. The poor state of Iraqi’s infrastructure took the US by surprise. The US had anticipated that it would be occupying a rather modern country which would only need some small amount of help to get back on its feet. We’ve learned some hard lessons on what 30 years of Stalinist dictatorship does to infrastructure and people’s culture. Even so, things probably wouldn’t have gone badly at all on the reconstruction side had not the internal security problem been so bad.

“As far as I can tell, he thought Baghdad would be Paris in 1944, and had no plan for alternatives. In fact, he gutted Shinseki for standing up to him and suggesting otherwise.”

This is unfair. For much of the advance on Baghdad, US forces were greeted as liberators – flowers and everything – although in point of fact it was not the US administration that made predictions like that and the administration itself was publicly far more cautious. (I’ve heard that they had expected major military operations to last 6 weeks longer than they did and generate at least 500 more fatalities.) Certainly in Kurdistan we are still treated as liberators. It’s quite possible that the unplanned for speed of the advance – and the logistic strain it created - stranded MP and Engineering units further behind the advance than was intended. This is a damned if you do, damned if you don’t situation. Both slowing the rate of advance and speeding it carry negative consequences. There is no perfect solution.

In any event, security has only been a serious problem in the 30% of the country that is predominately Sunni. And Shinseki is guilty of McClellan-ism. (Incidentally, McClellan would have most certainly approved of the Powell doctrine, and his version of it likely led to an extra hundred thousand or so US dead.) More troops do not necessarily simply military situations. This is a frequent mistake of amateurs. More troops mean a greater logistic burden, tend to lead to operational immobility, and represent a harder boot on the back of the occupied people. In Shinseki’s defense, since he’s not an amateur, what he really seemed to be saying was not “We need more troops.”, but rather, “I don’t think we should fight this war.”, but even so, if that’s what he really wanted to say he should have said it. The reason he didn’t say it is that he knows that in our system, generals are not supposed to set policy.

“Your point (b) is interesting, though I'd want to see the data, and you didn't provide a URL.”

The data was worked out with a former Israeli colleague on an excel spreadsheet and unfortunately I don’t have a copy, or even the extensive from which the information was gathered.

“Measured response, tit-for-tat, focused on responsible parties, is effective. Collective punishment like bulldozing the houses of the parents of suicide bombers is much less so.”

I would like to see your evidence for that. Reports I’ve heard indicate exactly the opposite, and if I may be so bold the underlying flaw here may be the same sort of flaw which is typical of Americans – assuming that everyone thinks and acts like Americans. I believe that you are simply assuming this to be true because it fits your assumptions. If you can show me some evidence that this does not in fact deter suicide bombers, I’d be happy to see it. However, let me point out the obvious since you seem to be overlooking it. You can’t deter suicide bombings with the threat of death. You also should consider that you have a society which is geared to turning its best and brightest into suicide bombers, and which richly rewards them by showering their family with gifts and prestige. Saddam Hussein was known for contributing large sums to the families of suicide bombers. It seems to be rather logical, that if monetary compensation for ones family represents and inducement to becoming a suicide bomber, that the threat of economic retaliation at l