I think that Olmert's conduct of this war was disastrous. In every important respect except militarily Israel has lost.

However, they could still win, though I think that it will be under a different Prime Minister and despite themselves rather than because of any brilliant plan. If, as seems likely, Hizb'allah takes over the Lebanese government and army, the next round of the war will not be against a 4GW guerilla force embedded in a civilian populace, but against the entire nation of Lebanon including its civilian populace. Hizb'allah will have given up their greatest strength: the immunity granted by the loophole of not being a state, but being in a place where they cannot be controlled by the state in de jure control of the area where they are.

Actually, comparing Olmert to Chamberlain may be unfair - to Chamberlain. Britain's public was in no mood to go to war with Germany in 1938 and Britain's was military was far from ready for it in any event.

Yet Israel's public was begging for Olmert to win a decisive victory over Hezbollah and Israel's armed forces undoubtedly could have done so, though not cheaply.

Even Chamberlain's critics conceded later that the Munich agreement did give Britain another year of peace, which it used (finally) to begin a serious program of rearmament. The RAF benefited most, which proved crucial during the Battle of Britain.

Having squandered both military and diplomatic initiative, and having shattered the public's confidence in him, Olmert is hardly the right person to grapple with the crisis he has created.

Israel urgently needs to overhaul its military establishment. You can bet Syria and Iran are requipping and retraining Hezbollah as rapidly as they can. Israel's reserves are in bad shape, poorly equipped and lacking rigorous training (Israeli media have covered this well). Israel's regulars have never been counted on to fight a war alone and they certainly will not be able to do so next time.

The next time may well include fighting Syria's army, which is no bad threat right now, but the Iranian example of training, organization and equipping of Hezbollah will likely lead Syria to institute like reforms and methods in its army.

The next war will also see a substantial anti-aircraft rocket threat against the IAF as Hezbollah is equipped with modern, shoulder-fired AA missiles.

It is hard to know which would be worse: a snap-election, with all the distraction that entails, or a continuance for the craven fools of Kadima and Labor.

Perhaps in an election situation, the politicians might STFU and let soldiers fight the war.

Two points: first, Nasrallah is now the government of Lebanon. Let's not kid ourselves. Hezbollah is in the driver's seat.

Second: I'm amused that people seem so clear-eyed on Olmert's failure and so deep in denial on the Bush/Rumsfeld failure. Olmert fought a Rumsfeld war -- airpower dependant, casualty-averse, and just-enough-to-lose ground forces. At the end the Israelis rediscovered the Powell war -- too late.

Actually Chamberlain said "Peace for our time".

I think it is a line from a song sung in church.

Well it looks like I was 1/2 saved by the Israeli Army in the last days of the war. It looks like I'm going to be eating some crow.

I erred on Olmert being smart. I figued he would set strategic goals and let the Amy do its thing.

It turns out he was just as dumb as all my detractors said. They were right, I was wrong.

I must say though that quite a few people thought my plan if implimented had possibilities.

Israel Surrenders

This is depressing because it is going to make the bigger war harder to fight.

However, other wishfil thinkers are out there still.

Another Wishful Thinker

M Simon.

No worry, mate. Maybe I can cheer you up by buying you a drink.

What do you like with your crow? I've found a nice dry white wine to be the best. I know, because I've eaten quite a bit of it!

You know things are always changing. Next week things may look dramatically different.

I was very impressed with the degree of certainty you had.

Like i've said all along, I wish M Simon had been right.

As far as the analysis of the implications of this debacle goes, i'll go further: in a short time we will see Hezbollah tie their 'peace' demands to the Palestinians in Gaza. Then this Israeli government will have a real conundrum. Here's a prediction- Olmert will choose that opportunity to really alienate the electorate by allowing Hezbollah to hold the Palestinian issue trump cards, and thats when his government will fall.

Bravo, M. Simon!

When you make clear, bold predictions and then eat your crow like a man, it's good for you.

I'll never forget all the bold statements I made around 12 September, 2001: "For the benefit of idiots, Islam is not the enemy." (Of course I was the idiot and Islam proved itself totally to be the enemy.) "The honor and worth of allies such as Germany and France will now truly be seen, since this is the crunch." (That one was Delphic: perfectly true, but in the opposite way from what I thought.) The whole course of my thought since then was set by the education that events gave me in how the truth was the opposite of what I had thought it was.

The sting of embarrassment passes soon, the worth of increased wisdom endures.

Besides, only fools despise those who make definite lucid errors, and then admit to them and fix them. The superior man understands that wisdom is generally obtained in no other way.

Neville Chamberlain became wise after Adolph Hitler made a fool of him, and not entirely too late, because Nevill Chamberlain then did everything he could to re-arm Britain and to support Winston Churchill.

We'll see if Ehud Olmert is as good as Neville Chamberlain.

On his performance so far, I'd say he's not even in the same class.

Neville Chamberlain, though a good-hearted man and in principle willing to learn, was a disaster because he didn't wake up to Hitler till the shooting started. Olmert has had weeks of war and shows no sign of a great awakening.

Like Ehud Olmert, Ambrose Burnside had a genius for snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. But Burnside knew he was incompetent. He did not want to be in charge. Ehud Olmert sought power, and after throwing away a war situation in which he had every advantage, he stays in office. If Olmert has leaned anything, he's giving no sign of it.

Calling Ohmert's war a "Rumsfeld war" could not be farther from the truth. It is nothing more than a bizarre attempt to shoehorn events into Bush administration bashing regardless of reality.

Ohmert's error was in a lack of strategic direction and follow through, you may not like how the Iraq war has gone but the administration has always had a strategic direction and has continued to pursue it.

Let me make a new prediction, and it's not a pleasant one. I foresee Israel going through a post-Vietnam-like experience of recriminations, probably with a Carter-like malaise on the part of their politicians, eventually to realize as the US did, that half-way military measures with "restraint" just won't cut it. I foresee them questioning their strength, watching as Islamic foes gain power and prestige, pulling in their horns and being unwilling to act against Iran until forced. I expect to see Israel in more and more desperate circumstances until the whole world seems to have gathered against her. The underlying reason above all others for anti-Semitism is Satanic, and the "time of Jacob's trouble" is yet to arrive. There will be no "peace in our time" or anybody's time until the last days. We're all just marking time till then. “For thus says the Lord, ‘I have heard a sound of terror, of dread, and there is no peace. Ask now, and see if a male can give birth. Why do I see every man with his hands on his loins, as a woman in childbirth? And why have all faces turned pale? Alas! for that day is great, there is none like it; and it is the time of Jacob’s distress, but he will be saved from it. It shall come about on that day,’ declares the Lord of hosts, ‘that I will break his yoke from off their neck and will tear off their bonds; and strangers will no longer make them their slaves. But they shall serve the Lord their God and David their king, whom I will raise up for them." Jeremiah 30:5-9

The Resolution is weak on Hezbollah's disarming, but not for the reason stated. Contrary to Sensing's analysis, the Resolution does call clearly for Hezbollah to disarm. But, it equally makes it clear that that is only a long term requirement, and it defines no path from the short term to the long term.

. . . it's quite unclear that the UNSC called for Hezbollah (which is never named in UNSC 1701) to be disarmed.

Not true. First, as Sensing notes, there's an explicit call (in para. 8) for "no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State". Second, the language in para 3 (which Sensing thinks is weak) is similar to that of para 8. Para 8 (as per Sensing) speaks of disarmament as part of "full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords"; para 3 likewise speaks of "the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with . . . the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords". Third, the Taif Agreement, under the heading "Spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories", calls for the "weapons of the militias" to be "delivered to the State of Lebanon". So even if para 3 is less explicit than para 8, both point to the same disarmament requirement.

On the other hand, the Resolution doesn't require disarmament in the short run. Para 3 merely "emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control" etc. etc.; para 8 calls on Lebanon to "support a permanent ceasefire and a longterm solution" [emphasis added] based on disarmament and other principles; para 2 calls on Israel to withdraw as the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL advance, without requiring prior disarmament of Hezbollah.

So in the short run, according to the Resolution, the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL must occupy southern Lebanon, the IDF must withdraw, but Hezbollah need not disarm (nor even move its munitions north of the Litani).

As for achieving the long run requirement of Hezbollah's disarming, para 11 instructs UNIFIL to assist the Lebanese armed forces in disarming Hezbollah -- if and when they get around to it -- and para 10 requests the Secretary General to present a proposal to the Security Council within 30 days.

There was earlier talk of a two-resolution scheme, and the Secretary General's proposal-to-be could fit into such a scheme, but for the time being disarmament is an aspiration not an operative requirement.

While I don't agree with M. Simon's analysis, he makes a good point in that there is more than meets the eye here. I also don't share the 'doom and gloom' scenarios. Olmert is not a fool and would not agree to a ceasefire that runs directly against Israel's interests - unless he had a reason.

The reason is Washington and their strategy for Iran. Washington simply cannot launch strikes against Iran with Israel bogged down and fighting in Lebanon. Therefore, Israel was forced into signing this ceasefire. Also note the pace of the withdrawal. And note Washington's public refusal to send cluster bombs to Israel over the last weeks. Washington wants Israel to be seen to be the honest broker in the ceasefire, must be seen to be making all the right noises regarding negotiation and must be seen to be genuinely interested in reconstructing Lebanon.

Washington convinced Olmert to abandon the military assault on Hizbollah in Lebanon and to negotiate a ceasefire and then suddenly withdraw. This is because they plan to attack Iran - and soon.

For more views on this topic - for those who are interested - check out my blog, http://goingroman.blogspot.com/

My question is: will the Israeli people stand for it. I'm with M. Simon -- although I disagreed with him on Assad's competence, I had assumed greater on Olmert and cabinet's part. Public reaction in Israel? Have seen almost nothing except from political cadres yet.

This may not pave the way for total Shiite domination of Lebanon, but it certainly packs the tar and asphalt within a mile of the worksite, and makes Lebanese "hot" civil war much more likely.

Robert McDougall: I'm reminded of the commitments made by the nuclear powers in the Non-Proliferation Treaty to disarm their nuclear arsenal. I'm not holding my breath.

BTW the disarmament of Hizbollah is included in 1701 by virtue of including 1559.

And as some one pointed out above things can change by the day.

Hizbollah looks like it wants to restart the war and the pause has given Olmert time to reassess how much political trouble he is in.

Round 2 will not be fought in the same way as round 1.

The Bekaa and Syria may still be put on the table.

But just in case I'm getting that bottle of white wine. Celebration or clearing the palette of crow? It appears too soon to be certain.

#13 Robert McDougall

The problem with 1701 comes in interpretation of 'the Lebanese State'. Hezbollah has two cabinet ministers and 14 MPs. Is that enough to be part of the State? That's up to the Lebanese. And from the sounds of it, the answer is 'yes'.

Neville Chamberlain was the PM of one of the worlds top powers - given the then current state of US, German and USSR armaments, arguably the British Commonwealth was in fall of 1938 still the globes strongest single military power. If it was not, it was close to it. And it was economically one of the top 4 powers.

Israel is a small country, of 6 million or so people, in a hostile region. ANY Israeli PM has to deal with that fact, and Bibi did when he was in office, and would have to do so again if he regains that office.

Olmert certainly appears, at this juncture to have mishandled the war, by dithering about a ground invasion.

However in accepting UNSC Res 1701, he really had no choice. To reject it would have cost far more in terms of relations with the west, and most especially the United States, than would have been gained by another week or two of battering Hezbollah positions. And that is ignoring the impact of more weeks of war on the Lebanese polity.

Will Hezb get more shipments of missiles from Iran. Yes, just as they would have if Israel had spent another two weeks clearing out the area south of the Litani. Hezb would just have melted back to Beqaa and to Beirut, and into the civ population. They would have reemerged when Israel left. Unless you think Israel could have again occupied a large portion of Leb for years. If you think that was in the cards, you really dont understand the Israeli polity.

Given where things were last weekend, and given world opinion (including the position of the US) 1701 was about as good a deal as Israel could get.

No, theres no commitment to disarmament. But it does commit to having Leb troops on the ground in S Lebanon. That in itself could represent the beginning of the erosion of Hezbollah power. The leb govt is going to have to be stronger to take on Hezb.

Olmert may not be able to remain in govt much longer, depending on the outcome of the investigations - again, the dithering looked really bad, the pointless public statements, etc.

But calling him (and by extension, any Israeli leader to the left of Netanyahu) a Chamberlain is not only unfair, its deeply misleading.

Y'know, it's highly instructive to go back and review PajamasMedia's 24/7 coverage of this war. From the very beginning, not a day has gone by without at least one pundit proclaiming prematurely "It's over and Israel lost."

Well, it's not over and they haven't.

Let's look at what the players had at the start of this contretemps:

Israel
Deterrence: No state is willing to directly attack Israel (Assad blustered a lot, but put not one toe over the border). They may support/encourage terrorist proxies, but as states take on Israel? No.

Hezballah
Armaments: Millions of dollars' worth of rockets, guns, explosives, and sundry military gear.
Bunkers: Extensive (and expensive) bunkers and tunnels built up over 6 years.
Minefields: Extensive (and expensive).
Veterans: ~1000 trained, experienced fighters.
Infrastructure: Hez could point to homes, schools, mosques, etc. they had given the Lebanese Shia.
SEP field: Since they were a problem only for Israel, Hez was invisible to the rest of the world. 1559 had long been forgotten.
Arab street: The flying monkeys of the Arab street adored them.

Lebanon:
Deniability: "Hez a rogue militia, we can't control it."
No pressure: There was no real pressure, internal or external, to do anything about Hezballah.

Iran/Syria:
Beachhead: A well-equipped and trained military force with a large operations area right on their enemy's border. And few outside Israel paying much of any attention to it.

UN:
Unaccountability: The world ignoring yet another UN failure.

And now?

Israel:
Deterrence: It may be weakened, but for all the usual Black Knight triumphalist rhetoric, I don't see any states rushing to challenge Israel. An ironic benefit there of all the overhyped claims of the 'destruction of Lebanon.' The Palestinians are emboldened enough to talk about starting another intifada -- apparently they're even more eager than usual to die at a 10:1 ratio to Israelis and further the setbacks of the past half-century of 'struggle.' Still, the proxy game is nothing new.
Unity: A stake has been driven through the heart of the pacifist Israeli left.

Hezballah:
Armaments: Severely depleted.
Bunkers: Located and destroyed (or, one hopes, boobytrapped into next Tuesday).
Minefields: Located and neutralized.
Veterans: Badly mauled. 50%+ dead, another dozen or so captured, and who knows how many wounded.
Infrastructure: Hez has now given damaged/demolished homes, schools, mosques, etc. to the Lebanese Shia.
SEP field: Gone. Israel (and Hez itself, boasting about the pogroms coming when they take over) has made it clear Hez is very much Lebanon's problem.
Arab street: Still dancing.

Lebanon:
Deniability: Gone. This is one of the two primary goals of 1701. Lebanon has signed on to it. Lebanon is now explicitly, officially responsible for the actions of any armed individual within their borders. To whatever extent and in whatever form Hezballah is allowed to continue to exist as an armed group, Israel can hold the Lebanese government accountable.
No pressure: Gone. Lebanon is now under significant internal and external pressure to act against Hezballah.

Iran/Syria:
Beachhead: Severely degraded militarily and with considerable international attention fixed directly upon it.

UN:
Unaccountability: Gone. This is the second primary goal of 1701.

The need now, mostly for Israel but for the US and everyone else as well, is to continue to hold Lebanon's and the UN's feet to the fire. The usual attempts at fudging have already begun. Israel has already declared they will not stand for them and that hostilities will recommence if Lebanon fails to live up to its end of the deal.

The next few days will tell the tale. Maybe Lebanon will live up to their word. Maybe Israel will make the potentially-fatal mistake of blinking and letting 1701 become yet another useless bit of UN paper. Or maybe Israel will demonstrate by deed as well as word that they are done dicking around on this matter.

I'm betting on the latter. Bear in mind that the sea blockade is still in place and we don't really have solid information on IDF troop placements and movements. Maybe I'll be disappointed, but the ball is still very much in play, so keep the wine and crow on ice for now, M. Simon.

Neville Chamberlain was the PM of one of the worlds top powers - given the then current state of US, German and USSR armaments, arguably the British Commonwealth was in fall of 1938 still the globes strongest single military power. If it was not, it was close to it. And it was economically one of the top 4 powers.

I think that unfairly exagerates the British position. Britain had still not been able to pay off its WWI debt to the U.S. (a lot of money at a high interest rate) and had stopped payments in 1934. Its empire was built on world finance and it had focussed on trying to right its finances in a hostile worldwide depression to the detriment of its military.

Britain stood in potential isolation. WWI was a virtual stalemate, but another total war might have Italy and Russia on the other side and the U.S. refusing to join. Moreover, another great war would necessitate borrowing from the Americans who had passed laws preventing such loans.

I think both the British position and the Israeli position are sympathetic. Like Chamberlain, Olmert has promoted a diplomatic resolution, which fairly or unfairly will be judged by the subsequent actions of . . . evil men.

PD Shaw:

I'm reminded of the commitments made by the nuclear powers in the Non-Proliferation Treaty to disarm their nuclear arsenal.

There is this difference, that (as noted by Achillea in #20) Israel is maintaining a blockade of Lebanon; which the resolution allows, at least until the "Government of Lebanon . . . secure[s] its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel" (paras 6, 14). Whether or not the blockade prevents resupply, it's a bargaining chip.

M. Simon:

the disarmament of Hizbollah is included in 1701 by virtue of including 1559.

True. But 1559 states no time limit; and anyway, since it doesn't invoke Chapter VII authority, its provisions are "recommendations" not "measures".

Colt:

Hezbollah has two cabinet ministers and 14 MPs. Is that enough to be part of the State?

It's not enough to make the "resistance forces's" arms "weapons of the Lebanese state".

As Sensing suggests, Hezbollah and the Government of Lebanon could make them "weapons of the state" by enrolling the "resistance forces" in the Lebanese Army (though unlike Sensing I don't expect that to happen swiftly or soon).