This is James Dunnigan's take of the 20 year decay of IDF reserve formations from today's Strategypage.com:

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) are suffering the peace time blues, and having the details discussed, loudly and in public, for the first time. The last time the IDF carried out a large scale operation was in 1982, over two decades ago. Since then, the IDF has been engaged largely in police type operations, mainly against the Palestinians. At the same time, reservists did not like getting called up for active duty a lot. But reservists were needed for security duties in the Palestinian territories and on the Lebanese border. So combat training for reservists was cut back in many units. This saved money, and meant less time in uniform for reservists. It was popular, and critics (who knew this made reservists less combat ready) could safely be ignored. There were some pretty vocal critics to this over the last twenty year. They were brushed aside with the observation that Israel's likely enemies were in even worse shape. This is true, but it does not change the fact that the Israeli reservists who were sent into Lebanon last month did not perform as professionally as Israeli troops did in the 1980s. Cutbacks on reservist training were now visible, and the reservists were complaining about how the army listened to their complaints over the last two decades, and how that almost got a lot of them killed in Lebanon.

It all depends on what the objectives of the war were. If it was really a spoiling attack

http://powerandcontrol.bl*gspot.com/2006/07/spoiler-attack.html

that also amounted to a recon in force to gather intel

http://powerandcontrol.bl*gspot.com/2006/08/intel-bonanza.html

I'd say the job was done adequately if not well.

Former defence minister Mofaz agrees about the spoiling attack.

http://powerandcontrol.bl*gspot.com/2006/08/concourance.html

It may be that politics forced the political echelon into a wider war than was desired.

Fortunately the IDF problems will be fixed.

I'll have more to say after some errands.

I will ask this though - why do Olfart and Putz still have their jobs?

Trent's points are seconded by this article in today's Wall St. Journal (subscription req'd), "Israeli Reservists Lead Growing Protest Movement":

Reservists' gripes filtered out even before the fighting ended. They complained of inadequate training and a shortage of basic equipment, and said on some days they were forced to fight without food and water. Troops were kept idle for weeks and then sent into Lebanon only two days before the United Nations-brokered cease-fire went into effect. Intelligence, especially on Hezbollah's elaborate system of tunnels and bunkers, was inadequate or out of date. Some soldiers complained they were exposed to unnecessary danger by being sent on daytime missions that should only have been carried out under cover of darkness.

The failures have exposed a reserve army eroded by years of neglect and underfunding. With many fearing that the conflict with Hezbollah could be just the prelude to a bigger war, possibly with Iran's involvement, there are public demands that Israel hurry to address its military weaknesses -- including an upgrade of its reserves -- before the inevitable next round begins.

... The discontent bubbled to the surface yesterday when one group of reservists published an open letter lambasting Israel's leaders and demanding a commission of inquiry into their handling of the war. Senior commanders showed "cold feet" and "indecisiveness," the letter said. Operational plans weren't carried out: missions were canceled and war aims were changed during the course of the fighting, it said.

Thnx for the post, it fleshes out my layman feelings and instinct on the matter.

Israel must clean house now. I supect they won't. Ten years, there will be no Israel. The advances in missles and conventional explosives make it an untenable state, with no will to fight.

Pretty well a generation without active combat experience. In that part of the world. I'm not familiar with IDF promotion zones but it seems like they'd have no-one below O-5 or (more importantly) E-8 with real combat experience. And probably even a lot of untested light colonels.

Unless you've got astoundingly rigorous training that's probably not a recipe for much success in the field, especially at sub-batallion operational scale. By comparison we've made sure to rotate a lot of our E-5s and E-6s through Iraq and quite a few of them have been from reserve-type units. Cycling them back to the States to train follow-ons makes a huge difference in both the learning curve and "corporate memory."

I suppose the moral is that if you're a major power or live in a nasty neighbourhood you'd better stay on the scrappy side or your lower echelon officers and NCOs risk losing their edge.

As a side note it's good to see Canada -- a country that punched far above its weight class for 30 years until Pierre Trou-d'cul ... er Trudeau ... came along -- back in the scrap in Afghanistan. When they really need 'em the Princess Pats will have what it takes. Welcome back to the Anglosphere, guys,

I will ask this though - why do Olfart and Putz still have their jobs?

Because the problem is generational, not strictly military. Israeli leadership is weak across the board, just as American leadership was weak across the board in the 70s. That's how Jimmy Carter got elected. Then the U. S. had its Aqua Velvet moment, said, "Thanks I needed that," and elected Reagan. Some of our institutions recovered quickly, the military and finance, others have not yet recovered like the media and academia and others appear terminal like mainline Protestantism and public education.

Israel's problem is that it doesn't have much time to turn this around. And there are lots of people in the current governing generation who won't change quickly.

This just in from the JPost Police investigators conducted a search of President Moshe Katsav's home and offices on Monday night as part of their broad investigation into sexual harassment allegations aimed at the president. Fundamentally unserious.

I always thought the next total war Israel would have to face was a nuclear one.

I hope it never comes that day.

Israel's problem is Europe's problem:

http://powerandcontrol.bl*gspot.com/2006/08/socialism-kills.html

Military spending or social welfare?

Which is why a bunch of lefties are in power. The Israelis voted for social welfare.

I also read a report that the reseerves complained that training was cutting in to their free time. The reserves got what they asked for. It was not what they needed.

The parliamentary system causes problems as well.

Just in:

Ex-IDF chief Ya’alon to join ranks of Likud Party

Also note that the Israelis developed an excellent system for defeating anti-tank weapons. It wasn't deployed. The money was needed for social welfare programs.

http://powerandcontrol.bl*gspot.com/2006/08/intel-bonanza.html

BTW I think it is conceded that the best fighters were the religious brigades.

I have heard some say that reserves with combat experience should have been more extensively used.

I think the idea of rotating the troops so a lot got live fire exercises was a good idea. Consider this a shakedown cruise for the wars to come.

Note: if Likud gets in Netanyahu for Finance Minister. He had that portfolio once and did an excellent job. Divested the state of a lot of businesses. Encouraged capitalism.

I also agree with Yoni, and I think all the requirements to classify the Israeli Defence Force as a hollow army are met.

This does not excuse Olmert. Even an excellent force could not have achieved results with such leadership. But it isn't possible to elect only good military leaders all the time forever.

I think we have to recognize the strengths of Islam yet again. Muslim aggression is perennial, and to be on your toes all the time, decade after decade, is a tough ask. That the targets of jihad should sometimes be off their game is a fair reward for an important asset that our enemies bring to the fight.

We won't win this fight by remaining defensive and hoping to be lucky and good all the time. And we won't break even either - our enemies are not fighting for a draw. Even if nukes, missiles and suicidal holy malignity did not invalidate the idea of an always-lucky, always-perfect defence as a long term solution, this idea would be broken anyway.

I take exception to one point on IDF combat capabilites. At the battalion and company level, IDF leadership was still quite good. It's at the General Staff and Inspector General level that their army is living off their reputation from 1967 and 1973. If you look at IDF casualty lists, a lot of the KIA's were sergeants, lieutenants, and a few Colonels. The culture of Leadership from the front is still there.

Again, I am not ignoring the empty warehouses and the lack of supplies for the Reservists. In that respect, IDF has become hollow.

IDF, indeed, the whole country, needs a collective kick in the ass. I think they've just got it.

Hollow force?

They did what they were asked to do.

When told to take the Litani they did it 48 hours. Because that was all they had.

Problems? A bunch. Hollow? Not quite.

Generalship? Hard to tell if it was really bad. It performed the tasks asked.

The problem IMO is the socialists at the top. They do not think in terms of calculated risk. Calculated risk is a capitalist virtue.

Trent,

I wonder if you would agree with a different possible reading of the two things that have occurred. The two things are:

1. Israeli forces did not perform up to the standard once characteristic of them.

2. An Arab force performed better than any Arab force in the past.

Unless the performance of Hezbollah was not the result of independent improvement in Arab fighting skills, the question Israel needs to answer is:

3. Whether changes on the Israeli side can restore an Israeli advantage sufficient to neutralize the changes on the Arab side if the latter changes are permanent.

What seems to be happening in Israel is a search for deficiencies in the IDF and senior civilian leadership that can be remedied, but Israelis may be worried that fixing these won't be enough. And indeed, they may not be enough.

The other surprise in the recent conflict was the vulnerability of Israel to prolonged missile attack. If Hezbollah can replace its spent rockets and supply itself with new ones, as seems likely, Israel will face an endless cycle of short wars and ineffective ceasefires that render the northern half of Israel uninhabitable. If Israel decides to occupy southern Lebanon again, Hezbollah might simply use longer-range rockets from base areas north of the Litani river. An Israeli strategy of occupying buffer territory cannot succeed if missile ranges increase in response.

Under these circumstances, I wonder if Israelis need to rethink the most fundamental assumptions about their national security and international relations. In particular, Israel might ask NATO what if anything Israel might do in exchange for a real NATO commitment to the peace and security of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon.

It may be that neither the United States nor its NATO allies want to make a stronger commitment to peace in the Levant, even if Israel offers more radical concessions on territory to the Arabs. But it is hard now to see a solution to the military tension in the region unless the outside world intervenes more strongly. If it is true that Israelis are building bomb shelters against Iranian missile attack, there may not be much time to head off a larger confrontation.

The problem IMO is the socialists at the top. They do not think in terms of calculated risk. Calculated risk is a capitalist virtue.

That is a fascinating observation. I've long thought that most of the dispute between reasonable members of the "left" and "right"* seemingly devolve to a belief on the left that either a) there exists some alternate decision that would have avoided every problem or b) if there was no ideal solution outcome the endeavor should never have been attempted.

(I'm specifically thinking of the endless Iraq War debates, but I'm not limiting my oservations to that).

It's often hard to convey the thought that sometimes the best case is just the least bad one and that usually the best decision is the one that minimizes adverse outcomes as opposed to maximizing positive outcomes.

Now, it's valuable to have a group that's arguing for something better. There's nothing that humans do that couldn't be improved upon, and it wouldn't be good to become complacent. But that cuts both ways; while we must always be looking for ways to improve, we can't let the inevitable lack of perfection cause paralysis.

But I've never connected those thoughts to a more general acceptance (or rejection) of basic capitalist values. At first glance it seems to fit quite well. I wonder which way causation flows?

*I don't really care for the whole left/right dichotomy, but it's useful shorthand.

David B,

The Israelis fought stupidly in the name of political correctness.

See below:

bq.Jewish World Review August 10, 2006 / 16 Menachem-Av, 5766

How Israel fights
By Jonathan Kay

On June 26, Israeli infantrymen assaulted the outskirts of Bint Jbail, a major Hezbollah hub near the border. Israel could have flattened the town easily prior to its soldiers' advance — it lies well within range of its army's artillery, not to mention the Israeli air force. But according to a high-ranking Israeli officer, the carpet-bombing option was ruled out because several hundred Bint Jbail civilian residents had ignored Israel's warning to flee. As in Tyre, Hezbollah was using them as human shields.

The result? Battalion 51 of Israel's Golani Brigade was ambushed by dozens of Hezbollah gunmen wielding anti-tank missiles. In the hellish close combat that followed, eight Israeli soldiers died. Like the 23 Israeli soldiers who lost their lives in the warrens of the Jenin refugee camp in 2002, the men of Battalion 51 died so that Arab civilians could live. Not one of Israel's enemies would have taken the same risks under similar circumstances.

Compare and contrast this with how America's military fought in Fallujah.

Sure, we leafleted Fallujah to get people out, but after that, the gloves came off.

It also points out the relative poverty of the IDF ground forces compared to America's.

This battle, conducted by Americans, would have had thermal site equipped, 25mm autocannon armed, Bradley fighting vehicles in overwatch positions to kill Hezbollah ATGM launchers plus racked and stacked UAVs with JDAM armed F-16s top cover to take out suppressed positions Bradley's could not kill. Not to mention US Army OH-58 and AH-64 gunships on station as well.

The IDF does not possess Bradley style infantry fighting vehicles because they cost a great deal more than the M113 and converted tank chassis's they use to transport infantry.

The IDF also lacks the stocks of PGMs to use on the scale America does for ground combat.

The American infantry have far more night vision devices than the active duty IDF infantry formations, let alone IDF reservists.

And American National Guard and Reserve formations are now as well trained as active duty IDF ground formations.

America has been far more serious about fighting wars than Israel has for the last 15 years and it shows.

I don't think people here have picked up on this point I made in my post:

For Israel to survive, a similar IDF military renaissance must be started and it needs to begin with a systemic audit of the real state of the IDF's reserve formations and, in particular, the reserve stocks so vulnerable to corruption, plus a purge of the IDF officers and bureaucrats involved with that poor troop equipping and preparation.

My day job is as a Defense Department Quality Specialist. I am part paperwork auditor and part technical equipment inspector.

I can smell the stench of IDF military procurement and operations maintenance corruption from the IDF reservist stories half a world away.

Military stocks don't just sit. They require maintenance and periodic replacement as equipment ages and ammunition deteriorates. This requires a constant stream of cash to keep these stocks current and militarily useful.

Yoni's description of how his IDF unit shot 300 rounds of ammunition a day to maintain proficiency and IDF reserve units sent to Lebanon were given 60 rounds to shoot and were sent to the front. Then those reservists fought with out food and water resupply. This screams of old reserve stocks being depleted and not being replaced, while political elites pocket the cash to update the stocks.

A sure sign that this has happened will be the Olmert and successor government's refusal to conduct a real audit of IDF stocks or to conduct the kind of training Yoni has been advocating on his blog -- all done to hide Israeli political elites complicity with this corruption.

This is not the first time Israel has been caught short in its military stocks. In 1973 Richard Nixon had to divert huge supplies of American stocks from Europe to reprovision a badly battered IDF.

I think Israel current war stocks are as depleted as the IDF post 1973 war stocks due to Israeli political corruption.

Trent,

How do we know that reserve stocks weren't depleted because of shifts in grand strategy?

For instance:

A former Air Force commander, Halutz said at the beginning of his term that he envisioned a new technological army that would reduce the need for foot soldiers.

Here

Yes Northern Israel is very vulnerable to missile attack.

But the reverse is also true, Lebanon is very vulnerable to Israeli AIR attack and an Israel taking missiles may decide to kill a few cities if afraid and feeling the breath of another final solution on it's neck.

If the IAF wanted to kill everyone in Beirut it could well do so, without Nukes.

this unfortunately is the terrible logic of modern warfare. Hezbollah did quite well dug in but could not deny the airspace over Lebanon nor could it deny the IDF the ability to move where and when it really wanted to.

Comments above about corruption are undoubtely correct; but fear of ahnilliation are likely to produce reform results. Who will reform Hezbollah to the point where they have skilled mechanics to maintain air defenses let alone pilots or highly trained radar operators, the like.

Fundamentaly Israel is a small, pressed nation that can't afford either too much nor too little military spending; nor prolonged attrition warfare with heavy casualties.

So I fully expect tragically another shooting round with an IDF not caring about civilian casualties and events on the order of Hamburg or Tokyo.

Trent,

There certainly are differences between American and Israeli forces. Do you think that Israelis can recover an advantage on the ground by upgrading to American levels?

I respect your knowledge and experience in the field of military procurement. Do you think that all modern militaries (including our own) have a certain irreducible margin of loss due to unauthorized activity or excessive billing? If Israel's problem is greater than this, how can Israel change to reduce the problem in the future?

Regardless of the degree to which the 'hollow military' hypothesis is true, if we're discussing this seriously, consider the degree to which Israel's deterrence capability has been eroded in less friendly quarters.

Realistic training can create excellent units. The Army units that fought so well in Panama and Kuwait already had precious few combat veterans at the LTC and 1SG level and virtutally none below.

I am having a real hard time figuring out what happened in Lebanon. From the press accounts, I am not able to determine what the strategic, operational, or tactical objectives were. So every thing I write below is speculation.

Logistics hiccups are inevitable. We had many units without food and water for varying periods during the Iraq invasion. The fact that reserve units were finding out that they didn't have all of their equipment until after they mobilized speaks more to training doctrine deficiencies than logistics problems. Reserve units should train with all of their equipment at every opporutunity. This is expensive and messy, but it pays big dividends for the US.

My gut feel is that command and control, planning, and synchronization were poor at the brigade level and above -- possibly in some battalion-sized units as well. In the US Army, we created JRTC, NTC and a hell of a lot of wargaming tools to address these deficiencies. The tempo and complexity of modern operations are extremely high. Commanders and staffs that are not prepared will do poorly.

"I am having a real hard time figuring out what happened in Lebanon. From the press accounts, I am not able to determine what the strategic, operational, or tactical objectives were. "

Asked and answered! Debka's account is probably pretty close to the mark, although i dont know that the US angle can really be blamed so much. If Israel didnt like what Bush was telling them they could easily enough ignore the White House, as they have many times in the past. Victory settles things pretty well most of the time. Like they say, its easier to get forgiveness than to get permission.

Many here seem to be focusing on the trees while ignoring the forest. The military details of fixing the problem CANNOT be adequately addressed if the degree of moral corruption by Israeli political elites is what Trent surmises.

The real story here is that Trent's professional instincts concerning procurement corruption indicate across-the-board corruption by Israeli political elites over the past ten years, i.e., including Netanyahu's 1996-99 government.

If that is the case, the IDF cannot significantly improve until one of Israel's major political parties has almost all of its senior leadership replaced and then assumes power nationally.

This indicates a much lengthier turn-around process just at the time that the external threat to Israel, from Iran, is peaking. Israel is too geographically small to survive even a moderate nuclear attack.

That seems to be why Trent said Israel's continued existence is no longer a given.

The real story here is that Trent's professional instincts concerning procurement corruption indicate across-the-board corruption by Israeli political elites over the past ten years, i.e., including Netanyahu's 1996-99 government.

Israeli politicians have always been corrupt to one degree or another. For the most part, their corruption didn't extend to diplomatic moves and the army. After Oslo, that changed.

If that is the case, the IDF cannot significantly improve until one of Israel's major political parties has almost all of its senior leadership replaced and then assumes power nationally.

Regarding that, apparently some officers don't think they can wait:

Some senior officers have been mentioning the C-word in private conversations. They have been saying that a coup d'etat might be the only way to prevent an outcome in Lebanon that could embolden the Arab world to join forces with Syria and Iran in an all out assault on Israel, given the fact that such a development would be spurred entirely by the Arab and Moslem world's perception of Israel's leadership as weak, craven and vacillating, and therefore ripe for intimidation.

Tom, that is one reason why Yoni is trying to start a new Israeli political party... to replace the existing elites who have lead Israel down this path. I think that the Israeli leadership has come to rely too much on their nuclear arsenal for preventing attack. Its weakness, attack through proxies below the state level, has been shown. Unless Israel is willing to nuke the puppetmasters in Iran, its Nuclear arsenal will not save it from the likes of Hizb'allah.

Thanks for that link Colt. Perhaps it was good that the weaknesses in Israel were revealed now, rather than after Iran had the Bomb.

Iran has nuclear weapons now. The trick is making warheads sturdy enough to be launched on ballistic missiles. Iran has only a few of those now (perhaps only 1-2), all with U-235 gun-type triggers (the Little Boy type used on Hiroshima).

But Iran will have more than a dozen missile-ready warheads, almost all with implosion-type plutonium triggers, using a design the Chinese passed around in the 1990's, within @ 100 days +/- 30 days, of the first nuclear test by Iran or North Korea. The nuclear weapons programs of those two countries have been merged and I believe they are sharing weapons-grade fissionables.

By the way, it is August 22 and Iran has today denied the IAEA access to Iran's uranium enrichment facilities.

"POINT OF NO RETURN IN THE IRAN NUCLEAR CRISIS...? [Mario Loyola]

I am trying to track down more on this AP story by George Jahn, who is based in Vienna (where the IAEA is) and has written pretty extensively about Iran's nuclear program. The story in essence is that Iran appears to have blocked access by IAEA inspectors to an underground facility where it has been enriching uranium. So far as I know, both the U.S. government and the IAEA are refusing to comment on the story. But if true, this represents a point of no return, which Iran has staged deliberately to catch us off guard while everyone is studying its lengthy answer to the EU3+3 offer. In my piece in the current (August 28) print edition of National Review, I described precisely this eventuality as a point of no return, and argued that the United States should invoke preemption if this ever happened.

I think the Israelis can retain the advantage on the ground by upgrading to Israeli levels. This handles ant-tank weapons, rockets, etc.

Trophy creates a hemispheric protected zone around a vehicle such as a tank which intercepts and destroys incoming threats. It has three elements: The Threat Detection and Warning subsystem, which consists of several sensors, including flat-panel radar placed at strategic spots around the vehicle to provide full hemispherical coverage.

Once an incoming threat is detected, identified and verified, the Countermeasure Assembly is opened and the countermeasure device positioned so as to intercept the threat. It is then launched automatically into a ballistic trajectory to intercept the incoming threat at a distance.

Trophy is marketed by General Dynamics, which plans to install the system on every new and existing combat vehicle it produces, including Stryker, M-1A2 and FCS.

Trophy is an invention of an Israeli arms consortium and is marketed by General Dynamics.

The money was spent on social programs.

I keep asking Yoni about candidates, platform, www site.

All I get are requests for donations.

Whatever Yoni is doing, it is not yet serious.

I think we should also be realistic. Hezbollah can fire rockets at Israel, extremely serious if they are large ala Iran-Iraq "War of the Cities" but then IAF will simply pursue Area Bombing and denude Lebanon of any ability to harbor said missiles.

The idea that Hezbollah could advance on Israel's tank formations (most of the problems were Tanks unsupported by infantry, an easily correctable mistake) with no air cover is laughable.

A tribal levy can ambush several legions in the Teutoburg Forest; or dig in against an assault prepared for years. Hezbollah is totally incapable of mustering the logistics, air, radar, artillery, tanks, and other assets against Israel.

the real danger is NOT Hezbollah. It is Egypt, and an Egyptian coup that is designed to make war on Israel in surprise. Doubtless Israelis have thought of that which is why not much assets will be expended in the North when the main threat is Egypt.

Unlike Hezbollah Egypt has a large, well trained officer corps that has command of a modern, capable army. Their sappers are generally good and the artillery and armor acceptable and larger than Israel's by orders of magnitude. Their air force is dangerous.

Loss of image is a threat, not from Iran immediately but Egypt which has never wavered from wanting to wipe out Israel.

Politically I expect Olmert to step down after some face saving and even a retread like Bibi to understand that survival depends on fighting. To win.

The more I look at the situation the clearer it becomes that the war in Lebanon against Hezbollah is nothing more than a side show in the greater scheme of things. While it is obvious that Israel lost this battle because of the many reasons provided in this thread, that is not the principal loss. The principal loss is the loss of time; time from the total amount of time available to prepare for the final and truly existential confrontation with Iran. All the weaknesses of the IDF which were revealed by this conflict need to be addressed and probably most of these weaknesses will be addressed in the future. My concern is that, as resources are finite, whatever will be used to fix the “new” problems brought to the fore by the war in Lebanon, the will not be available for facing Iran. While everybody focuses on Hezbollah, Iran progresses towards its goals.
If I am correct, the war in Lebanon has succeeded in forcing Israel to focus on Hezbollah which in reality has been a relatively MINOR nuisance to Israel. That is really good strategy for Iran!
If you read carefully all the comments about the Israeli loss to Hezbollah, they really describe a minor loss: a few civilian casualties and slightly more military ones but really nothing of any consequence. Hezbollah cannot invade and/or occupy Israel, what Hezbollah has achieved militarily is a pittance which has been raised by practically everybody to an unreal level of significance. Again, brilliant strategy FROM Iran!
Israel, except for loss of prestige with its obviously attendant dangers, can afford to loose many battle against Hezbollah. How many can it afford to lose to Iran? That is the problem!

luc,

The deficiences uncovered will help against Iran.

from M. Simon on August 23, 2006 07:04 AM
"The deficiences uncovered will help against Iran."

I am sorry to disagree with you. But the deficiencies uncovered are related to a local land war, which is not going to be the war between Israel and Iran if there is one. As I said in my post, I believe the whole thing was a smoke screen for Iran getting ready to strike at Israel. Initially, I rejected that hypothesis because I understood it expressed as a way to divert attention from Iran’s nuclear weapons program and it seemed as too simplistic an explanation. Just consider what the focus of discussion today is: Israel and Hezbollah; and when Iran is mentioned it is as weapon supplier to Hezbollah.

#33,

The US will handle the ground war aspect. The intel is of immense value to the US.

http://powerandcontrol.bl*gspot.com/2006/08/intel-bonanza.html

Assad is predicting a resumption of hostilities in weeks or months.

http://powerandcontrol.bl*gspot.com/2006/08/assad-un-stay-out-of-bekaa.html

So Hizbollah may be back too.

I look at the action in Lebanon as a recon in force, rather than a real war. At least that is the way it looks from the way it was fought.

Nobody is invading Israel proper. Have you guys forgotten the nuclear weapons card? The fact that Hezbollah cant beat Israel in a stand up conventional fight is simply irrelevant. The only legitimate threat to Israel's existance is a nuclear strike, which would be retaliated against to such an extent that Pyrrhus would roll in his grave.

Israel cant muster the political will to rout out Hezbollah making life unliveable in a good chunk of Israel whenever they wish... that is the relevant issue at hand. This is important because Hezbollah has pulled a seat up to the regional table. Any time they dont like the way Israel is treating the Palestinians, rockets start dropping. That is the immediate implication of the latest war.

Trent got it exactly right. Here is an excerpt from Ralph Peters' column in today's New York post confirming Trent's professional opinion based on his day job:

"The serious news is that the IDF's reserve forces were a shambles when they mobilized. Information from an inside source reveals that, when the reserves' warehouses and depots were opened, key stocks were missing - stolen.

What was gone? Fuel, weapons, ammunition, food, spare parts - all that a modern military needs to go to war. And I doubt it ended up in Iceland."

Mark,

Have you guys forgotten the nuclear weapons card?

The Arabs forgot it in 1973, and Syria has said time and again (at least once in the last few days) that they do not consider Israel's nuclear arsenal a bar to an attack. Assad (and other senior Syrians) have referred to their own WMD stocks as creating a balance with Israel.

M. Simon,

Whatever Yoni is doing, it is not yet serious.

Not if he's still in the U.S.

Mark got here first with the Peters link. +1 Trent.

Oops, I meant TOM got here first. But still +1 Trent.

"The Arabs forgot it in 1973, and Syria has said time and again (at least once in the last few days) that they do not consider Israel's nuclear arsenal a bar to an attack. Assad (and other senior Syrians) have referred to their own WMD stocks as creating a balance with Israel."

Of course the Arabs didnt know for sure whether Israel had a working arsenal in 1973, much less a stockpile cabable of obliterating all the Arab and Persian capitals and then some. The loud hints Israel and the US made to the Arabs succeeded in impacting the way they ultimately fought the war- it was not launched as a war of destruction but as a limited attempt to retake the Sinai and the Golan Heights. No-one was as suprised as Egypt and Syria by how successful their initial attacks were, so succesful they very nearly triggered an atomic response.

Now everyone knows about Israels nuclear reach. Syria can say they arent intimidated until they are blue in the face, but that is impossible to believe. Baby Assad is not going to 'take one for the Muslim team' by seeing his nation (and his hide) go up in a nuclear response. The declaration that their own WMDs are a deterrant simply proves they are talking about a deterrant to attack- it makes no sense to assume MAD can protect you from a nation already in its death throws, thats the point of MAD in the first place.

Iran is perhaps more likely to sacrifice itself, but even that seems dangerously loopy. Its far easier to call for somebody else to strap on the suicide belt than to do it yourself. The power players never quite seem to get around to their own martyrdom.

There certainly are differences between American and Israeli forces. Do you think that Israelis can recover an advantage on the ground by upgrading to American levels?

I respect your knowledge and experience in the field of military procurement. Do you think that all modern militaries (including our own) have a certain irreducible margin of loss due to unauthorized activity or excessive billing? If Israel's problem is greater than this, how can Israel change to reduce the problem in the future?

David,

Tom Holsinger's posts upstream and Colt's #24 pretty much covered the problem.

Israeli politicians have always been corrupt to one degree or another. For the most part, their corruption didn't extend to diplomatic moves and the army. After Oslo, that changed.

Israel needs a "Big WAR" IDF and it has a hollow force instead. The cure is on the political level and not the IDF level.

For Israel to survive, it needs what amounts to a populist political uprising from its people to clean out the current corrupt elites.

I don't know that it has the time.

PD Shaw asked:

How do we know that reserve stocks weren't depleted because of shifts in grand strategy?

I believe Ralph Peters column, Yoni the blogger's move to start a new political party and Colt's post above answered that question.

We are looking at the fruits of a 20 year long orgy of Israeli political corruption.

Can Israel recover in time is the question.

Thanks for the follow-up comments, Trent.

I wonder if you would agree with a different possible reading of the two things that have occurred. The two things are:

[...]

2. An Arab force performed better than any Arab force in the past.

It is important to remember that in the past, the IDF has faced regular, uniformed troops of a national military, not geurillas hiding among civilians.

[...]

3. Whether changes on the Israeli side can restore an Israeli advantage sufficient to neutralize the changes on the Arab side if the latter changes are permanent.

[...]

-David Billington

There is basically one change the Israelis can make that will neutralize Hizbullah's guerilla tactics.

Do not be deterred by human shields.

Leaflet the area 24 hours in advance. After the warning period has passed, strike targets of military value regardless of the presence of civilians.

That's pretty much it.

Regardless of the degree to which the 'hollow military' hypothesis is true, if we're discussing this seriously, consider the degree to which Israel's deterrence capability has been eroded in less friendly quarters.
-Tim Oren

Israel needs to get it's act together, pronto.

From http://www.bigpharaoh.com/-

Kifaya: Cancel Camp David
Kifaya is working towards collecting one million signatures on a petition demanding the cancellation of the Camp David peace agreement between Egypt and Israel.

[...]

iirc, Israel faced a similar "crisis" of miltary
erosion back in the 1950's. Isn't that when
Arik kicked some butt and formed an 'elite' unit
to reform the then hide-bound IDF?

And even with the rotten supply situation, the
IDF has it's boots on Lebanese land, and not
the other way around.

Dunnigan's site estimates Hizbollah KIA at
least 5 times that of the IDF. For a dug-in
force with 5+ years to prepare - against an
evidently poorly supplied and untrained reserve
force - seems to be more of an Arab military disaster
than the other way around.

We should pay more attention to Trent when his professional instincts go off.