This is precisely why America has never been any good at imperialist endeavors. We don't have the stomach for it.

The only way to change entrenched corruption is to liberally use force when being civilized stops working. We aren't willing to hang and flog enough people to get the message across, and to weed out the bad elements who won't do what is right even after they've been properly instructed.

Sun Tzu understood what had to be done, and he had the stomach for it. Back in the day, the Brits had both the understanding and the knowledge as well, which is why their former colonies are doing so much better on the whole than the French ones. We don't have either the understanding of what has to be done or the stomach for it, and we never have.

The great failing of multi-culturalism is ironically, it assumes that everyone has basically the same culture you do, that everyone basically would do what you would do in the same situation, and that the only real differences between people are superficial things like clothing, food preferences, and idioms. Multiculturists never really consider that people might be because of what they believe and have been taught, truly different than they are, and will suggest that anyone who suggests that in fact people really are different is a hateful racist.

Unfortunately, it just isn't so.

They're going to miss us when we're gone.

Iraq has plenty of oil money, and very little culture. Maybe they should pay outsiders who are professionals to carry their packs for them. Now would be a very good time to be setting this up.

They do seem very good at protesting, whining, and stealing. Perhaps they could form a whiners brigade where they could go and complain to the terrorists.

It is interesting that the secular strife is ALSO caused by Iraqis. So somebody must be motivated, just not the ones coming in for the paychecks. I wonder if it would be better to fire all of them except the good one percent? I know that makes the numbers go down (and the pentagon and the press sure love those numbers) but I would rather have 500 good Iraqis than 500,000 lame-ass losers.

There are really good Iraqis, I am sure. Just not these clowns.

This is, at best, disconcerting. At worst, it's a losing situation. My impression is that the Al Queda types are more disciplined than the Iraqi soldiers discussed in this post.

That's a losing proposition.

How do you teach someone self-reliance when they depend on someone else to tell them how to live, or worse, what to live for? Nor can we teach them inspiration.

Almost sounds like Koranic verses.

It would be interesting to compare these comments with those of Lawrence of Arabia and his advise on setting up Arab militiaries. From his Twenty-Seven Articles, he appeared convinced that learning the Western way of fighting was not very productive:

Do not try to trade on what you know of fighting. The Hejaz confounds ordinary tactics. Learn the Bedu principles of war as thoroughly and as quickly as you can, for till you know them your advice will be no good to the Sherif. . . . In familiar conditions they fight well, but strange events cause panic. Keep your unit small. . . . Also their sheikhs, while admirable company commanders, are too 'set' to learn to handle the equivalents of battalions or regiments. Don't attempt unusual things, unless they appeal to the sporting instinct Bedu have so strongly, unless success is obvious. If the objective is a good one (booty) they will attack like fiends, they are splendid scouts, their mobility gives you the advantage that will win this local war, they make proper use of their knowledge of the country (don't take tribesmen to places they do not know), and the gazelle-hunters, who form a proportion of the better men, are great shots at visible targets. A sheikh from one tribe cannot give orders to men from another; a Sherif is necessary to command a mixed tribal force. . . . Do not waste Bedu attacking trenches (they will not stand casualties) or in trying to defend a position, for they cannot sit still without slacking.

Of course, these were bedouins, but the question might be whether to teach Iraqis Western ways of war in the first place.

(Other advise from Lawrence, don't mix units, only deal with the commander of the army, column or party in which you serve, and don't mix tribes that have poor relations)

Anyone remeber Von Lettow Voerbeck in the Bundu? German general who led the Askari. The Germans coopted all the tribes in their African holdings by making them a special class of soldier. Legislated tehir pay, and a man servant. Asked the tribes how they fought, and then incorporated modern equipment into the mix. Fought spectacularly from the beginning to the end of the war. Matched the Gurkhas man for man in urban combat at Daar es Salaam.

Three elements that I see:

Coopting the strong tribes. Recruit the guys who give you the most problems by tribe, not by faith.

Give them their cultural privilege. Mandated pay and authority. Not great authority, like land, or water, but a prestige item.

The most distasteful element is to let them retain their core tactics, and augment them with better gear. This won't happen, but investigating what you can and can't use might be a good idea.

If you look at this simply by the numbers, Iraqi troops suppressed a Shia revolt after getting pounded in Gulf War I and all this with no air support, and a Kurdish rebellion in the North, and with some real morons running the show. They killed and purged 300,000 and locked down Iraq permanently. Hussein wasn't in any real danger of overthrow when they were done. So, Iraqis can be effective, but it's associated with mind boggling brutality. If we can keep the effective and remove the brutal... however that can be done... Ah, screw it, element 3 is a wash. There is no way I would want to make those tactics, the tactics of generalized extermination, more effective.

Point of clarification: the Askari saw action in WW I.

Also, the strong tribes were approached, but eventually the Askari became their own quasi tribe through a developing esprit de corps.

Prior to and during WW1 the Germans spent a lot of time and energy in trying to train and "reform" the Turkish army. They were met by open hostility and disdain by the anatolian peasants they were trying to train and where ignored by the corrupt officer corps.
And yet, Ataturk and his "young turks" eventually forged a viable fighting force.
Hopefully this will happen in iraq ...fingers crossed.

#1: agree with you, esp your last paragraph. There's a famous quote (which I can't find) to the effect that very few of us--saving the true non-conformist--can escape from the ideas and beliefs of our time and upbringing. How much more so then the values and customs of the general culture?

In Viet Nam there were many RVN units, up to company/batallion size who fought well (eg, Rangers, Marines) if they had the right officers and were somewhat sheltered from higher-ups by Americans. Interestingly, many of the good officers were Catholics from the North or for other reasons had a revenge motive for fighting Communism. But officers stealing their men's rations, pay, etc was generally all too common.

#2: I've often mused of the US forming a Foreign Legion--well-screened mercenaries led by US officers. As you suggested, maybe such a force could be used in Iraq with them paying the bills. Never work but I often think about it ...

Further on culture/military: in one of John Keegan's books he points out how different the Greek style of battle was from that of the Oriental--usually Persian. Not so much formations and arms as tactics: they went for the kill and aimed straight at the enemy leader. They came home either carrying their shields or on them.

These were the ancestors of Western warfare, democracy, philosophy, etc. We're back to culture again. Can anyone imagine American soldiers openly and generally behaving the way this Marine describes the Iraqis?

Lawrence comes a cropper when larger forces are required. His suggestions don't work for anything larger than raiding parties which is what nearly all Muslim forces resemble.

In order to run a modern Air Force, Tank Force, Artillery force etc. militaries must be modern and western. All the Arab-Muslim (such as say non-Arab nations such as Pakistan, Iran, etc) tribalism must be exterminated in favor of unitary nationalism and technocratic professionalism of the highest order.

This is primarily why Israelis have been largely successful; their opponents were not uniformly Westernized, only partially (even the Egyptian Army which was the best).

BUT ... none of this matters if you can combine raiding part style fighting with WMDs. Even a largely failed state such as Pakistan, or Iran, can acquire ballistic missiles and nukes and use that as one gigantic terrorist threat coupled with raiding parties.

Until a Westernized neighbor has enough and focuses the modern military on killing a large enough part of the population so that it has no more desire for war at all.

Ever wonder WHY Western Europe is so pacifist, feminized, and well, different from the US?

It's the demographic legacy passed down from the slaughter of mostly young men in WWI and WWII.

Raiding parties have their advantages, but also disadvantages. If the American Public were ever to decisively turn on Arab/Muslim nations as a mortal threat (say after losing several US cities to jihadi nukes) all that self-restraint would go out the window and an appalling number of people would die. To me it's a bad bet to depend on the self-restraint of your opponent, but that's just me.

Jerry Pournelle (who has generally opposed OIF) made the same suggestion as Gordon D., about 3 years ago, regarding an "American" Foreign legion. A "dirty blue shirt" army, that would not generally observe all the niceties of the Geneva protocols, and such.

The observations made by the writer (non-com) are probably all too accurate. The more basic question is:

1) are these qualities amenable to training?

2) are these qualities endemic to the "Iraqi" culture?

I think the writer believes the answer to be (2). And this may be the result of years of Saddam/Baathist rule, corrupting the general civic morality, and generally true of most of the Arab/Middle East societies. It may be a generation before really reliable troops can be raised, that function as a Western army functions. Tragic, no doubt about it.

With respect to comment #3 from tblubrd, the 'discipline' of the Al Qaeda "troops" may be better because there is only one punishment for disobedience/insubordination; death. That will focus anyone's attention.

I believe the Israelis thought most highly of the British trained Jordanians..
During WW 2 the US trained 3 highly competent Chinese divisions in a matter of months because THEY held the purse strings and made sure the soldiers were paid, fed and clothed PROPERLY...and succeded in purging the more egregious corrupt officers.
And in the end, thats what will make the Iraqis successful or not. Weeding out the corruption.

It's standard military practice in most of the non-Western world to hit subordinates. A friend of mine who was in South Korea says he once saw a Korean officer deck a platoon sergeant because one soldier in the platoon was out of uniform. The platoon sergeant then got up, saluted, and decked the man's squad leader. After the formation was dismissed, the squad leader beat the shit out of the offending soldier. Vicious beatings go right down the chain of command.

Beatings of soldiers were also common in the Soviet military culture that Ba'athism adopted.

Richard (#12) makes a good point - A major cause of poor performance in the armies of Allegedly Developing Countries is not harsh discpline or danger, but the fact that soldiers are regularly robbed of food and pay by their superiors. Control that and you eliminate many other problems.

A problem that US troops have in training these armies is that our own military culture is based on professionalism and maximizing individual safety, whereas eastern armies tend to rely on mass psychology techniques in which individuals are irrelevant.

We are NOT trying to form an Iraqi force that is capable of challenging a US or western force. All we are doing is teaching them some basics giving them some equipment and training so they will at least feel able to confront the Radicals and that is it.

We don’t need an Iraqi beat all force we need a large infantry force with enough confidence to stand their ground against some Jihadi’s with AK’s and RPG’s.

Let’s try to keep the expectations reasonable. Iraq is not Germany after WW2 its Iraq and will be Iraq when we leave. We are not going to sweep in and revolutionize their culture in 5 yrs. We may set the foundation for such changes but it wont be this generation or probably not even the next assuming we stay on good enough terms like Germany & Japan until that time to continue to train and exercise with their forces.

The Iraq army and police need only control their own territory I think anyone who is paying attention realize that both we will have a massive troop presence at least until this Iran situation comes to some type of conclusion or even direction & we will have a heavy armor equipment structure (see Kuwait) based along with major air bases to protect Iraq from any conventional threats from the outside. Iraq wont be ready to confront a conventional threat for quite some time indeed (ohh and even then they wont be up to a western standard force but at the sometime they will be a world better than the other ME style forces they would face).

You may cut Sirloin into shapes that look like Filet Minion and even fool the eye into such belief but it will still be Sirloin when you try to chew it. But even so a Sirloin if done right makes a dam good steak dinner and it beats the hell out of a burger huh now.

#13, Glenn - you wrote,

>>A friend of mine who was in South Korea says he once saw a Korean officer deck a platoon sergeant because one soldier in the platoon was out of uniform. The platoon sergeant then got up, saluted, and decked the man's squad leader. After the formation was dismissed, the squad leader beat the [blank] out of the offending soldier. Vicious beatings go right down the chain of command.#13, Glenn - you wrote,

>>A friend of mine who was in South Korea says he once saw a Korean officer deck a platoon sergeant because one soldier in the platoon was out of uniform. The platoon sergeant then got up, saluted, and decked the man's squad leader. After the formation was dismissed, the squad leader beat the [blank] out of the offending soldier. Vicious beatings go right down the chain of command.<

This is absolutely accurate. I saw the same thing during my tour in Korea, though for a different reason. It was also routine when in the field on an artillery OP to see ROK lieutenants punch their sergeants. I saw one Lt. knocj his sgt. 15 feet down a hill one day. I have no idea what for.

And don't even bring up the extreme violence in the Russian army...

This is all very depressing.

Readers here - and I include myself - hope for the best; but there seems to be a huge Elephant in the room that nobody wants to acknowledge.

Dave writes that:

"The "'discipline' of the Al Qaeda "troops" may be better because there is only one punishment for disobedience/insubordination; death. That will focus anyone's attention."

That seems like wishful thinking to me.

Al Qaeda is made up of volunteers, many of whom travel a long ways to risk their lives in an adopted cause. Many of them willingly launch suicide attacks. And harsh discipline is our best explanation as to their staying power?

None of the forces that we are trying to overcome - be they Al Qaeda, the Bathists, or the Mahdi - are better trained, better supplied, better manned, better paid... better anything.

Let's say it outloud, folks: they believe in their cause. Those who serve in the army and national police that we are trying to create don't.

It's not looking good, in Iraq or anywhere. As long as we refuse to respect the enemy - as long as we cling to facil and superficial views of his ideology, such as those espoused publicly by our CINC - we are going to be continually surprised by his virility.

Yep - the Arab's are a bunch of corrupt, tribal f'ck ups. I've been there, I've got the t-shirt to show for it. So how have they commanded such military and diplomatic resources of the West for so long?

Let's not exaggerate the "discipline" of Al Queda members. There are varying estimates of how many people went to Al Queda training camps in Afghanistan during the years that they operated freely there but certainly many tens of thousands did.

But nowhere are there Al Queda forces in the field in those numbers. There is no 50,000 man Al Queda field force in Iraq and never has been. Their numbers are probably best numbered in hundreds. When Al Queda terrorists operate in Europe, they have been doing so in teams that are best numbered in dozens.

The bulk of their trainees melted away when things got hot for them. Al Queda never was a rigid hierarchical force, and there are some affiliates that are larger than others like Abu Sayyaf but today by and large Al Queda operates as a terrorist organization besides that's the only kind of warfare one can do with the small numbers they can actually count on.

It's not looking good, in Iraq or anywhere. As long as we refuse to respect the enemy - as long as we cling to facil and superficial views of his ideology, such as those espoused publicly by our CINC - we are going to be continually surprised by his virility.

"Virility"?

How the average suicide bomber feels about his trouser trout is of very little concern to me. I will respect our side a lot more when we get past the whole freudian analysis of the ongoing conflict and figure out how to win what seems pretty damn obviously to be a clash of civilizations.

Otherwise, I suppose we as the fat ladies just need to open our legs and put on a veil.

Damn, I knew there was a reason I felt good about leaving academia....

If there is one thing that OBL, Saddam, perhaps Mr. Amindinajad, and yes, George W Bush, have in common is that they each have a vision of establishing their version of the Caliphate.

The problem with the Arab countries is indeed that they have been successful at the "raiding party level" but that they have historically lacked the organization to achieve pan-Arab national greatness. The "Middle-Eastern problem" is not that the Middle Eastern countries are militarily strong, it is that they are weak, and different leaders have emerged who have had some vision of what to do about it.

OBL had pursued a kind of Messianic goal in the form of Al-Qaeda; Saddam pursued a more secular version but with religious overtones when it suited him in his vision of building a large army with conventional and perhaps WMD arms; George Bush's Iraq polic is pursuing the same thing -- a powerful, unified Iraq that will spread its democractic idealogy to its neighbors.

If George Bush's plan is getting hung up on the culture clash between Iraqi men and Western or perhaps U.S. ideas of military organization, don't you think that Saddam encountered similar problems (he didn't acquit himself standing up to the U.S. on a large-unit basis for all of the arms his oil money bought), and who knows what problems Al-Qaeda is encountering. Maybe a counter example is the degree of military organization offered up by Hezbolah that was such a surprise to the Israelis.

To the extent that George Bush is failing, he his failing at what Saddam, OBL, Nasser, and perhaps T.E. Lawrence also failed at -- going beyond the raiding party to a cohesive national army to becoming a regional superpower. Saddam's army fought Iran to a bloody standstill. Think of Iran with its nuclear bluster if it were faced with that same army, but equiped with American arms and American indoctrination and training.

To the extent that George Bush is failing because he is ignorant about Arab culture and about the impossibility of imposing discipline and cohesion on an Arab army, that same ignorance was possessed by Saddam and Nasser and perhaps to a lesser extend by OBL and Lawrence who thought they could draw on models native to the culture to do a similar thing.

But owing to ties of language and shared culture, some form of pan-Arab unity and national greatness is an inevitablity -- the question is do you want OBL, Saddam or someone in his mold, or George Bush to bring it about?

Wow, Mark.

Does that word make you uncomfortable?

Or was interpreting it so narrowly and dismissing it as "Freudian analysis" (??) just the easiest way to avoid reflecting on an unpleasant reality?

I agree with you entirely: a clash of civilizations. Civilizations rise and fall, and it isn't always those with the gold or the technology who win in the end...

Ideas. Passion. Conviction. And yes, there is something particularly "virile" about the ideology we are fighting... if not, we'd have drowned it in money and overwhelmed it with our military might by now.

I'm not an academic, BTW. And I found your fat lady analogy amusing, if worrisome. I'm not sure we're arguing... we probably agree on more than you know.

Wasteland:

(a) Money isn't a problem for the jihadis.

(b) We HAVE overwhelmed it with our military. that's why they use terror tactics. "Asymetrical warfare", remember?

The romaticization of the "noble warrior" against our sterile, mechanistic culture does bother me. It's the whole "gangsta" idolization written way too large, considering the heat these bad boyz may be packing in the near future. (See: "Money isn't a problem".)

Semantics count. Some sweaty, insecure, inbred, dead-end hoodlum who blows his own ass up for 72 heavenly virgins is not, IMHO, some epitomy of virility. And also in my humble opionion, we shouldn't give the dumbf**ks more credit than is their due.

Does any of this make sense?

Just in case anybody has not seen it, here is the article titled Why Arabs Lose Wars.

And here's a British analysis of the situation. The Marine seems to be of the opinion that sloth and heathan folly will bring all our hopes to nought.

Which is kind of a shame becaus then all we are left with is The Three Conjectures.

Mark -

No offense, but no, your commentary doesn't make a lot of sense to me. And yes, I agree with you that semantics count: I chose the word "virility" with great care.

It seems to have hitten a button!

We "HAVE overwhelmed our enemies with our military?" "That's why they use terror tactics?" That statement in itself seems like a symantic game. How do you define victory Mark?

"Romantization of the noble warrior?" Is that what you think I'm doing?

"Money isn't a problem for Jihadi's?" OK, apparently not. Whatever the disparity in wealth between them and us, they seem to be able to maintain operations. We've spent, what? $180B in Iraq? (I can't keep up with spending estimates) Yet they still don't have basics like water and electricity: a unity government: security from death squads and terrorists of every stripe. The other side seems to get a lot of bang for its buck!

Suicide bombers are "insecure, dead-end hoodlums... dumbf*cks," not examples of virility? I'm not sure that I'd agree with that entirely, but I'm not sure why you direct it at me; I wasn't describing suicide bombers as "virile." My point is that we are fighting an IDEOLOGY that is very virile. It inspires true believers... maybe in ways our own world view no longer does. As a big fan of the liberal, humanistic world view that defines my culture, I find that worrisome.

Maybe you do too?

Yet you seem to vacilate wildly between warning us of the grave threat to our civilization - a clash of cultures - and dismissing the enemy as being a bunch of insecure, incompetent, inbred morons.

I guess I see that as somewhat inconsistent.

And I worry about the consequences - as I wrote earlier - of underestimating the enemy and dismissing him with facil interpretations that are more wishful than analytical.

Wastelandlive:

Yet you seem to vacilate wildly between warning us of the grave threat to our civilization - a clash of cultures - and dismissing the enemy as being a bunch of insecure, incompetent, inbred morons.

I guess I see that as somewhat inconsistent.

Give a suicide bomber no weapons and he's a fool blaming the Great Satan for his own poverty.

Give him a vest made from C4, and he's "virile", according to your formulation.

Give a bunch of them a Yeman-flagged yacht with a "Little Boy" bomb made by Iran, they become a threat to my civilization. (Because once it's used, all bets are off on the sea change it will produce in my culture.)

The problem is, if we allow the guys with C4 vests to win (and they ain't gonna do it unless we allow it, and the first step in allowing it is to accept their passion as some form of justification for the brutality) the guys with the yacht are pretty much inevitable.

Conceded. It's always easier to destroy than to build.

But doesn't all this talk about virility and cost-effectiveness argue in favor of maximum brutality from us? Somehow I think if the United States had just decided to nuke Iraq back to the Sumerian Age that wouldn't have made us more virile in your eyes, but we certainly could have done it, and at a fraction of the cost.

Next question: How do I define victory? Well, for one thing, we've had a number of victories. Taliban; out in the caves. Saddam; sitting in jail. Libya; coming clean on WMDs. The trouble is, too many people assumes this is a game with a defined end-point. If and when Iraq becomes fully self-governing (which is I believe the official goal of the administration, and is therefore how it would define "victory"), we're still going to be heavily engaged in the region as long as threats come from there. Since we don't know how the nature of the threats will change, we can't know in advance what a "successful" end-state will look like.

On the other hand, it's quite easy to identify ways in which we could badly lose.

My problem, WL, is you seem to admire the jihadis. That is the button you've hit. I find that attitude truly appalling. I may be misreading your comments; I hope I am, and if so I apologize for going off on you. But if I'm not, you really are a fellow traveler with those who would see my culture destroyed. That is reprehensible.

Lets not cry over news that is at least partly good.

Our official war doctrine, applied in Iraq and everywhere, if that Islam is the religion of peace (and when we are begging for the lives of hostages, mercy), terrorists are un-Muslim or at least marginal figures trying to hijack this noble religion, and we will secure our safety by helping moderate Muslims to get what they want. What they really want is assumed to be democracy, and as a part of that efficient armed forces to defeat the hijackers trying to infiltrate Islam, so that true Islam can prevail to the benefit of all. (Yay!)

This doctrine is a bunch of lies.

It has turned out that Islam is implacably malign. We can do what we like, but it will still be our enemy, and it will still include as a core component the its perpetual call to jihad, which is the taproot of Muslim terror.

It has turned out that when we back off from killing individuals supported by Muslims, such as Moqtada Al-Sadr, we are simply giving immunity to our enemies. It is because they are our enemies that they are loved by enough of their fellow Muslims to make us back off.

Whether in Lebanon or Iraq or anywhere else, Muslims fighting for goals endorsed by Islam - such as jihad, which is in effect both a means and an end - can fight longer and harder that Muslims fighting for pay alone, or for pay plus values that we hold, and that our false doctrine says Islam shares, but which in face Islam does not share. A massive superiority of numbers and arms may let self-interested and tepid forces overcome virile, dedicated Muslim killers, but that is how the moral balance stands.

The nation building part of our strategy is broken. However well we arm our enemies, they will still be our enemies.

Only, it wasn't clear - how effective are our efforts to arm our enemies?

Not very effective, as it turns out. The same culture that fuels them with implacable malice against us (and of course Jews, local Christians, Hindus and so on forever) also limits their absorption of the kind of military training we give them.

Thank you God. Our efforts to arm and train our own executioners have failed - this time.

We should probably think now about what an Iraq remade by Moqtada al-Sadr's al-Mahdi Army resistance movement, and forces sympathetic to it, might look like.

This has been enlightening. Perhaps you'll appreciate why, Mr. Poling? I'm generally a conservative on foreign policy issues. And perhaps just enough of a "neo-conservative" to have supported the occupation of Iraq.

So you see, I find myself somewhat surprised to be on the receiving end of this argument. And the view from this angle is not so good.

To put your mind at rest Mr. Poling, I don't "admire" the "jihadis." If that is the burr under your saddle, relax: I spent a few years of my life patrolling the skies over Iraq in a tactical jet.

So yes, you have been misreading me just a tad. Their cause is not mine. I'd like to feign ignorance as to how you might have concluded that I "wish to see our culture destroyed," (?!?!) but that would be disingenuous: I suspect that your reaction is inspired by my thesis that the Islamists have a powerful ("virile") ideology which seems to be very inspirational to a significant number of people.

That seems self evident to the point of banality. But it seems to be upsetting to you.

Sorry.

I thought it was germaine because the post on which we are commenting emphasizes a lack of professionalism, the cravenness, and ineptitude of the forces we are training to presumably take over our responsibilities. At least one poster here has linked an article - a good one, based on my experience in the Middle East and the developing world in general - describing the problem as cultural.

Yet the insurgents - who share that same culture - blow themselves up, plant IED's, risk the wrath of Marine Corps and Army Patrols (and that is some SERIOUS wrath...) Against the weight of our armed forces, psyops teams, a huge inflow of cash and resources, they have maintained this bloody insurgency.

Does that seem odd to you?

I agree with David Blue's comments above.

Wasteland -- Muslims are faced with two choices: die spiritually as their culture is erased by globalization (driven by America) or die as a true Jihadi. It's not a virile culture but one extremely fragile and desperate. Think Kamikaze or Werewolf Brigades.

If they weren't desperate they would not care about much of anything; since they'd be getting ahead. For example, no Mexican or Brazilian cares about Northern Irish Catholics. Why do Iranians care a fig about Palestinians (hint: Islam in all quarters is being erased by Globalism).

Unfortunately what this is coming to is "Cowboys and Muslims." The nation that in the chaos of the Old West gave birth to the Vigilance Committees, Regulators, the Earps, etc. is one to be feared. Men (and women) will go to extraordinary lengths to protect and hold what is their own. Including if it comes to that "non-governmental" bodies that are "disavowed" by the State in a brutal game of reprisal and revenge with nuclear weapons. If ordinary men in San Francisco could form up committees, self-organize, seize National Guard armories and weapons, and storm through criminal neighborhoods or the City Jail to haul out powerful crime bosses and hang them (while William T Sherman looked on sitting on his hands) ... imagine what ordinary people fearing a nuclear bomb from Iran carried by a Muslim fifth column would do?

Particularly since Hamdan says ANY non-governmental organization (Al Qaeda, Aum Shin Rykio, Branch Davidians, various Militias etc) MUST be given full Geneva Convention rights. Hamstring a vigorous response by PC rules and Americans will revert right straight back to Vigilante Rules (the actual real historical ones not the PC pap in Hollywood movies). With a legal framework (Hamdan) that protects them from any real legal consequences.

ESPECIALLY since a "nuke em all and shoot em in the dark" approach is likely a sure-fire electoral winner after the next mass-casualty attack, likely coming soon since "Azzam the American" gave his "convert or die" speech.

Yes I am quite certain Americans will sign off on killing hundreds of millions of Muslims rather than give up beer, cheerleaders, football, hot dogs, and bacon.

This is the ultimate folly of the raiding party. At a certain point the raiders become an irritant that are simply wiped out Roman-style by an enemy without limits and mind-boggling resources.

"Yet the insurgents - who share that same culture - blow themselves up, plant IED's, risk the wrath of Marine Corps and Army Patrols (and that is some SERIOUS wrath...) Against the weight of our armed forces, psyops teams, a huge inflow of cash and resources, they have maintained this bloody insurgency."

No, just desparate.

I'm in total agreement with Jim Rockford; this is about facing a crisis before it becomes a crisis. If we don't have the collective will to do it the nice way, we'll get it when the desparate side gets the means to really hurt us.

Thanks for your service, btw.

Islam is being erased by globalism?

Hmmmm... that's not - to my knowledge - a fact, but a proposition. There seems to be some debate as to whether it's the fastest growing religion, or not, but you are the first to tell me that it is being erased.

Islam is not virile, but fragile, and desperate... and this desperation is demonstrated by their support for the Palestinians' cause? I'm not sure I follow that: the corollary then is strong, confident Mexicans and Brazilians who could care less about the Irish peace process?

Jim... would you sell your mother that allegory? :)

Well, we seem to have meandered far from my point, or the author's.

Here's a thought: I read the article on the iterative destruction, too. I thought it was plausible and chilling stuff, but a little less assured than the author would have us believe.

I'm not sure its assumptions about the availability of nuclear weapons or the Islamists willingness to use them are accurate.

"Islam is not virile, but fragile, and desperate... and this desperation is demonstrated by their support for the Palestinians' cause?"

Got a problem? Blame a Jew! Or a neo-con! (Woops, same thing....)

How, BTW, did the "Palestinian Cause" pop up in this conversation? I thought this was about U.S. policy in Iraq....

First thing we must do is to give Geneva back her conventions. They are only useful when both sides adhere to the principles. Secondly we must realize we are at war with Islam, which to us is, represented by Al Quida, Hizbolla. Hamas and all the other nut case Jihadists cults composed of Muslims.

To me, we have been attacked by Muslims or non-Muslims converted to Islam. No Catholics Protestants, Jews, Sun worshippers, Californians or Animists. How much plainer can it be. You target Muslims under the suspicion of "If IT waddles and quacks like one". If profiling is the answer so be it.

Islam is not virile, but fragile, and desperate. Time, industry, modernization and the components of a modern existence has bypassed the Islamic nations and the prime reason for the religion seeking a return to the fifth century. It is the driving force in the conversion of all humans to Islam. Islam is in a box built of their own greedy design of wishes and wants. Islam is an anachronism, a dinosaur in the twenty first century, yet to the Muslims waging the war against the West perfectly logical if they can get the Dinosaur back to the Fifth Century.

I realized in 1951, in South Korea, what a wonderful country the USA is and what a wonderful place to live. I also learned what the Koreans were doing to exist free of their northern enemy. If it takes being nasty to keep it that way well, by God, I am willing to do anything under the Sun without any trepidation. No holds barred!

Sistani says he can't stop civil war

This defines the situation in Iraq, illustrates how Islam has worked historically, and also shows how natural and human it is.

Islam is not some religion of aliens, it just gives certain directions to things that are always in the human heart, and historically it provides clear and practical guidance to situations that really do require clear direction. Some situations do call for violence. Islam doesn't find this a tough call.

What we're looking at now is what Jim Rockford and Mark Poling suggest the Americans and others may do when they get sick enough of a "reasonableness" that isn't reasonable because it doesn't work. A new policy of effective "unreasonableness" will appeal to people who need real solutions now, nice or not, and different leaders who promise such a policy will receive popular acceptance. That will be a path to power that they could not otherwise have obtained.

Sabah Ali, 22, an engineering student at Baghdad University, said that he had switched allegiance after the murder of his brother by Sunni gunmen. "I went to Sistani asking for revenge for my brother," he said. "They said go to the police, they couldn't do anything.

"But even if the police arrest them, they will release them for money, because the police are bad people. So I went to the al-Sadr office. I told them about the terrorists' family. They said, 'Don't worry, we'll get revenge for your brother'. Two days later, Sadr's people had killed nine of the terrorists, so I felt I had revenge for my brother. I believe Sadr is the only one protecting the Shia against the terrorists."

People go to the Godfather for results. This should not be an alien concept to us.

I don't blame Americans who set policy for the fact that Iraq will be unfriendly to us. Iraq is a Muslim state, it's going to be unfriendly. And I don't blame our leaders for the fact that Iraq will assume its new shape simply through a Shiite victory. That is how the war had to end.

I do blame bad policy for the fact that the winning leader is worse than Sistani. If you want moderates to win, you must crush immoderates. And you have to let your clients be fierce and ugly enough to solve their problems and maintain their own clients. If you say "to be our friend, you must disarm, you must mot have a militia" and your would-be clients disarm, and then you don't crush those who do build militias, you guarantee that those who will win are contemptuous of what you say they have to do, and that they will gain power by demonstrating to others your weakness as a patron and the humiliation of those who did what you said.

It's as though the sherif in a Hollywood Western went around the town and confiscated all the guns from his friends, but only his friends.

Even the Iraqi army seems to have accepted that things have changed. First Lieut Jaffar al-Mayahi, an Iraqi National Guard officer, said many soldiers accepted that al-Sadr's Mehdi army was protecting Shias. "When they go to checkpoints and their vehicles are searched, they say they are Mehdi army and they are allowed through. But if we stop Sistani's people we sometimes arrest them and take away their weapons."

I blame our bad policy for the fact that it's Moqtada Al-Sadr that's forged ahead. We should have killed him. And forty times as much, after we said we were going to kill or jail him, we should have killed him. Gods that was shameful.

I don't blame people for turning to Al-Sadr. The story shows why. These are normal human reasons. People need patrons. "Godfather..."

According to al-Sadr's aides, he owes his success to keeping in touch with the people. "He meets his representatives every week or every day. Sistani only meets his representatives every month," said his spokesman, Sheik Hussein al-Aboudi.

"Muqtada al-Sadr asks them what the situation is on the street, are there any fights against the Shia, he is asking all the time. So the people become close to al-Sadr because he is closer to them than Sistani. Sistani is the ayatollah, he is very expert in Islam, but not as a politician."

And why is Moqtada Al-Sadr, as a patron, getting the job done for his clients? One reason is that, culturally, his armed forces make sense. He tells people to do what they are good at, and what will make them proud and happy, and what will be effective within their culture. This is how Arab military culture works, and he is working with the grain.

The Ancient Romans, who were exquisitely sensitive to whether they were coming across as strong or weak patrons to their clients, regardless of morality, would never have made the mistakes we are making. They would have planned all this vastly better. But our military culture has its weaknesses too.

Oh by the way - that was a great post of info passed on from Nortius Maximus.

I think it's worth a lot to us to get the plain and straight version.

Letting go of such realities in favor of fantasies that are more politically acceptable does us much harm.

Well...

That's three to one on the fragility of Islam: it's an anachronism, a dinasour, the whole thing is going to come apart anytime now.

Demographics be damned!

I want to smoke what you guys are smoking...