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DID has written in the past about the British GR7 Harrier II's performance in Afghanistan, so the recent controversy over their performance in the wake a soldier's email deserves attention. Newspaper reports described a leaked email from a British Major serving in Afghanistan, which reportedly said that:
"Twice I have had Harriers in support when c/s on the ground have been in heavy contact, on one occasion trying to break clean. A female harrier pilot 'couldn't identify the target', fired 2 phosphorous rockets that just missed our own compound so that we thought they were incoming RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades), and then strafed our perimeter missing the enemy by 200 metres."
Nor is that all. He reportedly added that "the US air force had been fantastic", and "I would take an A-10 over Eurofighter any day."
As you might imagine, that sort of talk is a bit of a shock in Britain. The implications are both less radical than was generally reported, and more radical than is generally believed.
with Paveway bombs
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The British Ministry of Defence responds:
"Like many others published in recent weeks, this is a moving and at times humbling account of fighting in a part of Helmand province, Afghanistan. It reflects both how intense the fighting can occasionally be, and the enormous courage, dedication and skill of the British troops operating there. As the Secretary of State said only this week, British soldiers in Helmand are, in some cases, working to the limits of endurance, but their morale is high and they are winning the fight."
"The comments this Major makes about the RAF are, however, unfortunate. They do not reflect the view of the vast majority of soldiers about the Harrier Force in Afghanistan, which has consistently performed brilliantly in defending coalition forces, so much so that it is in regular demand not just from British commanders on the ground, but from our allies too. It must be remembered that this is the opinion of only one man.
The general view is very different...."
The release then adds some assessments from infantry officers as well as the local military spokesman in Helmland Province, the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, and the Chief of the General Staff. You can read the full response here.
Now, Let Me Tell You What I Really Think...
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British Harrier pilots have had difficulty identifying ground targets before; this was an issue in the 1982 Falklands War, for instance, and at least one pilot (Sqn. Leader Bob Iveson) got shot down trying. American Harrier pilots now rely on their LITENING surveillance and targeting pods to make their Harriers effective amidst the urban warfare challenges of Iraq; British Harriers use a Thales-Vinten Joint Reconnaissance Pod instead, which lacks the targeting functions and may not have been carried as integral equipment on the flights in question.
In this case, as in so many others, the aircraft's ancillary systems like targeting pods, weapons, et. al. can be as important as the aircraft choice itself when it comes to determining battlefield performance. When the military talks about "weapon systems," it isn't just bureaucratese.
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The good news is that British Eurofighters will also be equipped with the LITENING pod, just like the USA's Harriers, A-10s, et. al. On the other hand, the O/A-10 "Warthog" has the additional advantage of armored protection, a purpose-built design that allows slower speed forward flight, and longer loiter time over the battlefield. This is what allowed it to do a substantially better job in Desert Storm than fast-moving fighters like the quickly-abandoned "A-16" F-16 experiment, and it's a combination that's currently keeping them very busy in Afghanistan.
It kept them busy in Iraq, too. A July 2003 report in Air Force News quoted Lt. Col. Dave Kennedy:
"Kennedy said during a Pentagon interview that in the first week of the war, close-air support requests went to the Combined Air Operations Center "open-ended" -- meaning no specific aircraft type was requested. After the first week, he said, 80 to 90 percent of the requests for close-air support were A-10-specific."
As one can see, the British Major is hardly alone in his preferences. Why is this?
As this National Defense magazine article notes, fast jets simply aren't an ideal choice for close air support, and the British aren't alone in having this issue. US Army Sgt. First Class Frank Antenori discuss his recent experiences in Iraq:
"The aircraft that we have are awesome, but they are too awesome, they are too fast, too high speed. The older technology, the A-10, is far better than the new technology, Antenori said. "The A-10s never missed, and with the F/A-18s we had to do two or three bomb runs to get them on the target," he said, recalling his recent experiences in combat."
Dispatches from Afghanistan add an additional edge, and reinforce the point:
The A-10 combines some of the best of today's high-technology Air Force with a solid, low-tech foundation. The addition of a targeting and laser-designation pod was a huge boost to the plane's capabilities, but still no substitute for the pilot's eyeballs.
"Most other aircraft rely heavily on (electronic) sensors to find and target the enemy," said Capt. Rick Mitchell, deployed here from the Air Force Reserve Command's 442nd Fighter Wing at Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo. "In the A-10, it's not unusual for a pilot to use binoculars."
Despite advances in technology like the LITENING pod, Brimstone missiles, et. al., if we were doing what the Major was doing in Afghanistan and needed close air support, I'd share his preference for an A-10 over a Harrier or a Eurofighter. It's purpose built for the close air support job, far better armed, and more survivable. This combination means it will be flown differently, giving it a far better likelihood of seeing ground targets and accurately attacking them. Though it isn't ideal,1 you'd be crazy to choose any other current or planned Western fighter in its place.
Britain has invested a great deal in the Eurofighter as its multi-role fighter of the future, which may make the Major's criticism a sensitive point for some. Still, no serious observer could expect anything else. If there is a larger question triggered by the Major's email, it needs to address force mix amidst the demands of modern conflicts rather than "this aircraft vs. that aircraft."
An A-10 certainly can't perform air superiority missions or strike missions as well as the Eurofighter, which is arguably the world's second-best air-air fighter behind the F-22A Raptor. On the other hand, if the kinds of failed state/ peacemaking conflict represented by Afghanistan are indeed a future norm, the same Western militaries that are rethinking their wheeled patrol vehicles may also wish to rethink the balance and composition of their air assets. In order to provide the support required by their troops on the ground, "new" items like "Bronco" type forward air control aircraft (currently under US consideration) at the low end, purpose-built aircraft like the A-10 or lighter options like options like the Brazilian Super Tucano et. al., and even light gunship aircraft may be necessary, in order to handle forward observation and light precision attack roles properly.
For a more in-depth treatment along these lines, see also "Effects-Based Airpower for Small Wars: Iraq after Major Combat" by Major Robyn Read (ret.) in the Spring 2005 Air & Space Power Journal.
FOOTNOTES
1 Experience in numerous wars also suggests that close air support aircraft are most effective with a crew of 2, which allows ground targets to be spotted and tracked more accurately and reliably. The A-10A, GR7 Harriers, or British Eurofighters all lack this advantage for the forward air/close support role, and the 2-seat night/adverse weather A-10 Thunderbolt II never saw production. A 2-seat O/A-10D using a 2-seat conversion plus the same upgrade set used to create the O/A-10Cs could fill this role.
Some observers have even suggested a 2-seat O/A-10F "SeaHog" to plus up US Marine Corps squadrons, which will be dropping dangerously low on aircraft as the defense procurement death spiral of fewer and more expensive aircraft continues to bite. I can't speak to the challenges of getting an A-10 carrier-ready, which may make the whole idea ridiculous - but the overall concept of a 2-seat dedicated observation/ forward air/ close air support aircraft that can operate from a carrier makes a hell of a lot of sense to me.
Second the motion for a Guy In Back.
The Warthog is one of the greatest things ever to roam the skies. And to think that they've repeatedly tried to retire it. It's exactly the kind of thing we need for the future. The super-jock advanced fighters are neat, but what really are we supposed to use them for?
Good post. I love this stuff at Winds of Change.
It's natural that in an organization where killing targets in the air is the most exciting idea A-10s are less loved than fast jets.
I think there should be more organization by function. The army should long ago have said: killing planes is your job, air force, and killing targets on the ground in sight of the army is ours. Give us your creepy-crawlies, your slow-moving barely flying tanks like the A-10, and commit to supporting future generations of creepy-crawlies for the army; and in return take our anti-air assets.
If A-10s and future generations of creepy-crawlies were the pets of people whose most exciting idea was to attack the targets they typically hit, then nobody wold be talking about taking them to the vet for a last visit.
Given the USAF's opposition to the program, the amazing thing about the A-10 is that it was built at all. Coram tells a little of the tale of the A-X program in his biography Boyd. A lot of the rest can be read here.
I like the SeaHog concept, but I'm sure that would require new airframes. The newest A-10 has already seen a lot of service, and carrier planes have to tolerate the trauma of catapults, landings, and saltwater. Only the US operates the A-10 but I'm sure that in todays environment, many countries would look twice at the chance to buy a new A-10.
However The production line has been closed for more than 20 years. Fairchild no longer exists. Sadly, I don't think it's any more realistic to begin manufacture this fine airframe again than it is to put the Saturn V rocket back in production. The tooling is surely gone. Much of the human knowledge is gone, too, or scattered to the four winds. Even if these obstacles can be overcome, institutional opposition to the A-10 by the Air Force would be overwhelming. As the linked article shows, it was only through small-minded pork that the plane got funding to begin with.
I suspect we're all missing the point here. The issue as described is probably not a matter of technology, but training. CAS is not rocket science by all accounts, but it is difficult to do well. I suspect the pilot concerned here was somene either with insufficient training or a product of a gender normed environment where failure by females is considered unthinkable...
The overall concept of a 0-seat lower cost, more persistent, ground troop controlled, dedicated observation/ forward air/ close air support aircraft that can operate from a carrier makes a hell of a lot of sense to me.
Just one true yet false comment for Rory
REPUBLIC - not Fairchild (yeah - I know they had merged by then)
Gad there is a COSTCO on the old site where the A-10 was built (well, some of the old buildings on the north side of the road still stand - abandoned
No more aircraft building in Bethpage - No Republic - No Grumman
No A-6 (all weather mud movers for the Navy? Why do we need THAT), no F-14, A-10, we don't want that...
Gahhh
The A-10 is becoming a bit of a legend - like it's predecissors - the P-47 and F-105
Rupert has a point. Its a combination of training and equipment. Fast strike platforms like the F-16/Eurofighter can be very effective, but they require great training. The Israeli pilots dont have A-10s and they have been as lethal in close air support as anyone. I hate to say it, but it sounds like if you put the Brit harrier pilots in the A-10 you might just end up with more blue on blue judging by that particular account.
Its important to remember the current inventories were designed if not built during the Cold War when prime strike fighter/bombers were earmarked with deep penetration 'Air/land' missions, not tank busting/close air support. That it was assumed would be handled by massed artillery, helicopters, and A-10s. Our AFes are being called upon to do some things they really arent designed exactly to do, largely because we seem to have given up on artillery support, which is unfortunate. A precision bomb is nice, but nothing rattles the enemy quite like a barrage of 155mm HE. I could go on and on about the classic tried and true low tech we have virtually abandoned in the GWOT to our detriment, everything from massed artillery to landmines.
Hmmmm...
MB: "The Israeli pilots don't have A-10s and they have been as lethal in close air support as anyone."
Really? I've certainly never heard that opinion before.
Israeli pilots are often considered the best marksmen in the world. As I understand it their standards for accuracy are much higher than US pilots. Its a small country with viscious enemies, not a lot of room for error.
Well, that clears things up. Thanks.
The new A10 project should be given to the Skunkworks.
Additionally. Very few aircraft are built with a primary mission of ground attack. The A10s pilot protection and system redundancy gives the pilots a level of comfort not available in other aircaft. This must have an effect on the way a pilot attacks a target even more than specialized ground attack training.
CAS missions in high speed aircraft make things twice as hard as an aircraft such as the A-10. The time it takes to focus outside the cockpit and discern targets is quite problematic. Going twice the speed makes it near impossible.
EO pods can help (Litening, Sniper, or ATFLIR), but only with accurate target coordinates or some sort of designation from laser target markers or spot trackers. Otherwise, the Mk I Mod 0 Eyeball is about the best thing going, especially when visible marking of the target is possible. Without one of these cues, finding the target is very very difficult no matter how much training or what gender the pilot is. The extra speed just makes it tougher.