The Irrational Tenth made the argument that there is a certain undefinable quality of decisonmaking in war that can only be had through vigorous contact with the enemy, and comprises something separate from "strategy" as we usually conceive it.
But there is more to the "irrational tenth." If an over-reliance upon ideal notions of plans leaves something missing strategically, then our understanding of warfare itself also leaves something out: the same quality that allows superb leaders to make the smartest of intuitive decisions also animates the attitudes of those who encounter war on a daily basis. The evolution of this intangible feature of warriors today is one of the more unremarked-upon aspects of the all-volunteer military.
Consider the philosophy of the Greeks, brilliantly explicated by Paul Rahe in his work Republics Ancient & Modern
Among the Hellenes, as Aristotle emphasized, honor was esteemed not for its own sake but as "virtue's prize." This conviction underlay the Greeks' willingness to face and, sometimes, even welcome war. If the gods "gave up the bodies" of their offspring "to the necessities of nature," Isocrates observed, then, by way of compensation, "they made immortal the memory of their arete[virtue, excellence, or courage]. In similar fashion, he was prepared to suggest, "one of the gods" had brought on the Persian Wars "out of admiration for the arete of those involved -- lest those by nature so blessed escape notice and end life deprived of renown."The gods have brought war out of a desire to allow the virtues of the best to be easily noticed? A far cry indeed from the "why do they hate us" lamentation. The Greek conception of warfare was tied intimately to the quest for glory. Pericles famous funeral oration makes this abundantly clear:
They gave their lives in common; and each on his own received in return both a praise that never grows old and the most remarkable of tombs -- not that in which they lie buried, but rather that in which their reputation is laid up forever, always to be remembered on every occasion which calls for speech or for deed. For men graced with fame have the entire earth for a tomb: not only does the inscription on the columns in their own land mark them out; but in foreign climes, and an unwritten remembrance lives on in men's hearts though not graven on stone. Let these men be your model; and supposing happiness to be freedom and freedom to be stoutness of heart, take no notice of the dangers of war.Perhaps it is that "stoutness of heart" that composes the commonly-felt aspect of the irrational tenth that Lawrence described among generals. How different then was the American conception of military service during the middle part of the 20th century, when mass conscription was common in the US. John McCain's speech in May at the New School for Social Research contemplates an entirely different view:
Our country doesn't depend on the heroism of every citizen. But all of us should be worthy of the sacrifices made on our behalf. We have to love our freedom, not just for the private opportunities it provides, but for the goodness it makes possible. We have to love it as much, even if not as heroically, as the brave Americans who defend us at the risk and often the cost of their lives. We must love it enough to argue about it, and to serve it, in whatever way our abilities permit and our conscience requires, whether it calls us to arms or to altruism or to politics.McCain knows all too well the loss of friends, life, and innocence of which he speaks. Yet today, when an all-volunteer force is now nearly three decades old, a different conception of warfare altogether has expressed itself: warfare as a calling, a sort of vocation no different from that of the priesthood. It does not sentimenalize war as McCain warned against, but instead feels a sense of being drawn toward it. The irrational tenth arises yet again. A certain flavor of this feeling is expressed by General James Mattis, as quoted in Tom Ricks' FIASCO[ . . . ]
War is an awful business. The lives of the nation's finest patriots are sacrificed. Innocent people suffer. Commerce is disrupted, economies damaged. Strategic interests shielded by years of statecraft are endangered as the demands of war and diplomacy conflict. Whether the cause was necessary or not, whether it was just or not, we should all shed a tear for all that is lost when war claims its wages from us. However just or false the cause, however proud and noble the service, it is loss--the loss of friends, the loss of innocent life, the loss of innocence--that the veteran feels most keenly forever more. Only a fool or a fraud sentimentalizes war.
: "Computers by their nature are isolating. They build walls. The nature of war is immutable: You need trust and connection." He dismissed the net-centric emphasis as "a Marxian view -- it ignores the spiritual.""The spiritual" is that irrational tenth.
A glimpse of the result can be seen in 'The Bravest Guy in Anbar Province', an email dispatch sent from a Marine officer in Anbar to friends back home. It is primarily matter-of-fact, but with large doses of humor thrown in.
I posit that the all-volunteer force feels this sort of a relationship to war: professionally drawn to it, but when engaged, not unduly burdened by either a lust for glory or excess sentimentality. Pericles would probably not understand.
I can tell you where the irrational tenth lives: in the NCO. Officers are political appointees of the President, but the NCO's authority originates in the rights of the people. The moral authority to lead troops into battle has always and will always rest on the NCO. The "last hundred yards" belong to the NCO. The nut-cutting is the job of NCOs. And mostly, the dying is done by NCOs.
Why don't we see NCOs advising the President? Why don't we see NCOs giving analysis on news programs? Easy. NCOs don't bullshit. They’re impolitic. That's why we lose them after every war, and have to relearn their lessons the hard way --- by losing lives.
We fail to understand how NCOs pass on their knowledge. For the all the debate about "leadership styles" that one reads in officer materials, the NCO has only one style: lead by example. The NCO creates the standard of courage, cunning and killing BY EXAMPLE. The NCO does not tell, he shows. He has only one demand: do as I do. More than one 18 year old private has been chastened to realize that his 40 year old sergeant can outrun, out climb, out fight, out shoot, and yes out drink him --- and on half the sleep, half the food, and always with an impeccable uniform and perfectly maintained equipment. More than one private has realized what a motivated human being can accomplish, by observing the amazing American NCO in action.
The NCO teaches by passing on EMBODIED practices, not all expressible in language, to new troops and new officers. He is obedient to his officers but patiently corrects their mistakes and trains them. The NCO literally embodies victory.
The forgotten irrational tenth is in the American NCO. And I’m damn angry that the "war intellectuals" still don't know it.
Jeff, you can be glad that the Marine Corps does know it. Indeed, if there's a difference between leadership in practice for Marine officers vs. Marine NCOs, it's this: officers must set the example as you describe above, while at the same time giving as much space to their NCOs as possible to lead their Marines.
I can't speak for the other services.
You are right on your overall point: that sort of professional spiritual quality does live on in NCOs.
You might like a post I did a while back, The President's Sergeant Major
We beat the Japs on Guadalcanal and decided from that experience that taking all the Jap held islands was a bad strategy. The island hopping strategy was the result.
Iraq is having a similar effect on current strategy.
I do believe Iraq will ultimately turn out OK. Still it is not something to be repeated. At least not often.
Which may be the reason we are focusing on economic warfare in our dispute with Iran. No occupation required. Little opposition in America.
Cash Flow Jihad
The Greeks were probably closer to a tribal style of warfare, in which glory is a more important element.
The American style (since we are quite far from a ribal sensibility) is more business like. Ananlyze the problem, gather the resources, apply the resources.
The Greeks knew nothing of the OODA loop.
What the Greeks did know and the Americans have not forgotten (in the Armed Services at least) is that without the proper spirit the whole of the Army is useless.
The best eqpt. and logistics is nothing if the men will not fight. Which is what makes the jihadis such formidable enemies. They refuse to give up in the face of defeat.
We had a similar problem with the Japanese and they were better equipped.
http://powerandcontrol.bl*gspot.com/2006/09/tribalism.html
Looks at those questions from a somewhat anthropological viewpoint.
Aristotle had a lot to say about the irrational part of the soul, and its uses. However, I think it's also fair to say that, in the case of virtue and ethics, he believed that the irrational part could be trained by the rational part. By consciously developing your "second nature" in accord with rational virtue, even the irrational decisions can become virtuous.
That is to say, Aristotle held that a fully ethical man would, finally, do the same thing both in the case when he had time to think it through, and when he didn't. That took training, but it could be achieved.
I don't think the USMC disagrees, do you? It wants 'the irrational tenth' to be fully developed in its fighting men -- but it also wants it to be expressed in accord with the Corps' own notions of honor. That is why the Corps teaches every Marine not only ferocity, but history, tradition, duty, and the example of those who have gone before.