With American politics at the height of its silly season and much attention being rightfully devoted to Iran, developments on other fronts tend to receive less attention. That's natural but unfortunate, because al-Qaeda is definitely paying attention to Africa, and developments in places like Somalia and Nigeria could become rather consequential in the coming years. Also paying attention? The US military, which may be about to set up an African Command that's distinct from CENTCOM. The anti-black genocides by Sudan's Arabs are well known - here's a few other snapshots from the front:
- W. Thomas Smith Jr. has "Global danger from the Dark Continent," an interview with Africa expert Dr. J. Peter Pham. See esp. Pham's comments on why Africa is promising to al-Qaeda, and the future of piracy (which is already a growing problem). Question for readers: if "nation building" is not a viable future strategy, what exactly are our options in Africa?
- J. Peter Pham also writes: "Nigeria at the Crossroads." al-Qaeda has designated Nigeria as one of its "6 most qualified" targets. Meanwhile, despite more than $300 billion in overall oil revenues over the past quarter-century, per capita gross domestic product (GDP) has collapsed by more than 75% over the same period. Last fall, I heard Christopher Hitchens also designate Nigeria as a key country to watch. Here's why, and some of what's going on.
- An African Taliban. Covers developments in Somalia, where a very Taliban-like situation is emerging.








Joe:
They're going to have to move to a backup strategy pretty soon, because Iraq is all-but lost to them. Even if there's ultimately no western-style democracy the place is closing down on them. They know that Africa is off the radar for many policymakers, and it's also the scene of several of their major early successes. But ultimately I don't see an equatorial region being a decent place from which to mount a global movement. Anyway, the Nigerians will hook them into some banking internet scam and they'll lose what passes for shirts in Arabia.
I'm having flashbacks to the Cold War now.
Didn't Nigeria play for our team back then?
It would be screamingly funny if al-Qaeda ended up pouring tons of money into Nigeria and getting fleeced out of most of it. In fact, that sounds like an excellent proactive measure to take - start up fake 'jihadi' groups, build some cred, ask for money, abscond, spread the word in Nigeria that this works. Pretty soon the enemy has no idea whom to trust, and since al-Qaeda is at its core an evil government granting agency they end up badly handicapped.
I'd hand that op to the British - it's their kind of thing.
As for Iraq... for a bunch of people supposedly in sync with the Arab world, al-Qaeda's cultural ineptitude and huge missteps re: tribal politics has been nothing short of stunning. And very, very costly.
Thanks Joe: good post, and all three linked articles are interesting.
"The US military, which may be about to set up an African Command that's distinct from CENTCOM..." I think that's good news if it goes ahead.
Demosophist, I'm thinking something similar, but from our point of view as well. (link) (comments #1, #2, #5) I think we're about done in Iraq, and we've worn out our welcome so we should be making preparations to leave on the assumption that the war is won. Saddam Hussein is as dead as Iraqis want him to be, the country is about as secure as Iraqis want it to be, and it is being reconstructed as well as Iraqis really want it to be ... given what growing majority support for attacks on Americans shows about Iraqis' real values and priorities. Iraq is as much of a model as it's ever going to become, given that our initial assumption that Islam would not be all that big an influence in Iraq has been refuted by history. Al Qaeda is beat in Iraq, and it's not going to make a comeback because it's made itself unpopular. Less American input will only mean the Shi'ite war against it and its supporters in Iraq will be less humane and more effective - which does not greatly trouble my conscience. In fine: game over and goodbye.
Al Qaeda needs another front, and has good memories and relatively promising conditions in Africa (compared to the Iraqi quagmire).
We equally need a new place to carry on vigorous attrition against international jihadis. It remains true that we can fight the enemy in active military operations, or in situations like the one faced by the passengers of United 93.
I think we also need a place with potentially friendly populations; where Fatah out doesn't mean Hamas in, and where dissident clerics under the Taliban aren't calling for Christian converts to be killed under the newly democratic government we helped install. If there were people we could be nice to without that constituting an almost automatic transfer of funds and practical aid to the enemy, that would be good.
In Africa, everyone who is potentially neutral to us hasn't already been ethnically cleansed.
This is the right fight, if we play it well, and the main thing we need to do to play it well is stand off and keep our costs down and our ambitions modest. As long as we don't define our goals in ways that mean we're beaten before we begin (given that this is Africa) and as long as we aren't willing to sink our forces in the African quagmire (which I don't think Donald Rumsfeld is), then this should hurt militant Islam much more than us.
We may be able to help Africans to some modest extent (depending on how much they are willing to be helped), and George W. Bush is the most Africa-friendly American President ever. So that part adds up.
At some point, you've got to hope that Black, non-Muslim, non-Arab Africans will notice that what they are facing as Islam advances amounts to genocide and decide that it's not in their interest to go along with that. So it is not beyond hope that at some point self-interest may start to cut our way.
The sooner we start trying prudently and carefully to tease things into sliding in our favor rather than against us, the better. (Not that we're doing nothing now. But a higher military awareness and priority would be good.)
One quibble: should be, "Distinct from EUCOM and CENTCOM." It's EUCOM that deals with most of Africa now. That, of course, makes not much sense, but combatant commands are expensive to run as separate entities, and the lines have to get drawn somewhere. (For example, it probably makes less sense to have Pakistan in CENTCOM, while India is in PACOM. One command or the other should surely do both, given their relationship...)
I assume Joe knows that, as he is obviously on top of the game. I just thought it was worth mentioning for others who aren't clear on exactly how the US military 'divides the world.'
See this graphic for a visual.
Oh, and I think Al Qaeda's chances of getting scammed in Nigeria are excellent.
Ours too. Every African seems to "know" that every Westerner is filthy rich and undeserving.
But we're a bit adjusted to it.
The jihadis really seem to believe they are lovely fellows, and that if anyone does not love them it's because of a Jewish plot, or because the government is a slave to the great Satan.
"Ironically, it is some of Obasanjo's achievements that have, however unintentionally, sown the seeds of trouble over the horizon. His policy, especially during his first term, of cashiering military officers who were particularly egregious in their corruption resulted largely in the dismissal of northern Muslims."
Islam, resentment and a resilient culture of the deepest corruption - this could be the beginning of a beautiful friendship - from our point of view.
Monkboy, sorry about those flashbacks. But y'know, they DID warn you not to take the brown acid....
Take a look. OEF T/S
Thanks for the link, Gundek.
"Operation Enduring Freedom ? Trans Sahara (OEF-TS)" looks desirable in that it's engagement, but worrying in that it's so abstract. It looks as if our poltically correct inability to name the enemy is being built in to the root of our military doctrine in Africa. It's all about enhancing state military power vs. non-state transnational actors. In other words, people are going to be fighting and dying for deliberately otiose formulations chosen because they were politically palatable rather than because they correctly addressed the root of the problem. (I assume the long war we are in simply isn't about state-vs-nonstate military power at root.)
Thus successful information warfare on a cultural level ("you can't say that!") affects the target's effectiveness and chances of defeat in a struggle that superficially looks just military and therefor a matter of brute force - who has more, better equipped and better trained troops and so on. Jihad is synergistic.
Still, I shouldn't exaggerate the problem. Al Qaeda is named, and that's good; and the basic ideas are reasonable. I respect that, and it's a hopeful sign.
"Key Tasks
Main Effort:
Enable other countries to effectively combat terrorists in their region.
Improve partner nation capabilities to support GWOT-related coalition operations.
Deny safe havens to terrorists in the EUCOM AOR.
Assure Access throughout the AOR for basing and logistics to support operations.
Supporting Effort
Find Al-Qaeda and other terrorists, their networks, and potential safe havens.
Capture or kill known terrorists in the EUCOM AOR.
Neutralize known terrorist networks operating in the EUCOM AOR.
By arranging operations sequentially beginning with Trans-Sahara Africa as the main effort, SOCEUR will sequence cycles to drive the terrorist threat south and east, away from the continent of Europe, displacing terrorist networks from their indigenous habitat while isolating terrorist operations in the Arabian Gulf Region from expanding westward into the EUCOM AOR."
This next bit was inevitable. Formulas chosen to "square the circle" of military reality and political correctness are of interest only to us. Locals are going to go after what they perceive as their interests, as bluntly as the dare and with no regard for our so-diplomatic concepts.
"Some of the governments have embraced counterterrorism as a means of suppressing legitimate dissent and Islamic groups. Chad's leaders assert that the transnational networks of anti-Western Islamic extremists feared by America are not their main problem. Rather, they cite foreign-backed rebels as their main terrorist threat. They believe that Sudan and other countries are supporting a group of about 4,000 anti-government rebels near Chad's eastern border with Darfur."