A Chinese submarine came close to the USS Kitty Hawk carrier group in the Pacific Ocean last month, a top U.S. naval commander confirmed Tuesday, adding the encounter could have triggered an "unforeseen" incident. ...
The aircraft carrier and its supporting ships were conducting exercises in an unidentified location when the encounter occurred, Adm. William Fallon, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command, told reporters.
The carrier group was not engaged in anti-submarine exercises, but if it had, "and if this Chinese sub came in the middle of this, then it could have escalated into something that could have been very unforeseen," he said.
Diesel subs were thought to be no threat to the carrier battle groups at the core of U.S. naval theory. After all, the nuclear-powered 688-class hunter/killer subs were protecting the carriers; what could diesel subs do? Actually, quite a lot. Although diesel-powered subs are tied to the surface in order to recharge their batteries, there are times when they're actually quieter than a nuke boat. The nuclear reactor is essentially a big heating element for a steam kettle. The heat from the nuclear reaction heats water, which becomes steam, which is then used to drive high-speed turbines, which use reduction gears to turn the screw. All that machinery can put high-frequency noise into the water.
But below the surface, diesel boats operate on battery power. Mike was assigned at one time to one of the few diesel-electric boats in the US Navy, USS Blueback.
[T]here was nothing quieter in the U.S. fleet than the USS Blueback running on batteries. Because so many of our potential enemies fielded conventionally-powered subs, we usually played the bad guys in war games.
We routinely penetrated the outer screen of destroyers protecting the carriers, avoided the nuclear subs shadowing the battle group, and got our killing shots off at the massive targets.
As quiet as we were, the Japanese were even quieter. ... They'd put their massive [diesel] engines into egg-shaped cocoons of sound-deadening material. The Japanese had taken our designs and improved significantly on them.
When we conducted joint operations, we discovered that as quiet as we were, they were like a hole in the ocean. And this was more than 20 years ago.
And as Mike explains at the top of his post, the Germans are now launching submarines that use fuel cells to power the electric motor, making them almost completely silent underwater.
One of the central issues in managing the defense department is how much do we transform the force structure from one oriented toward fighting another superpower to one that is agile and light enough to deal with insurgencies. What is the main military threat that the armed forces will have to cope with in the next five years? Ten? Twenty? There seems to be little doubt that China can't seriously challenge the US in the short term, but over the long term (say, greater than 15 years) they may pose a very serious threat indeed. So we can't toss out all the Cold War force structure just because the Cold War is over; the legacy systems are well suited to counter the rising Chinese tide.
Anti-submarine warfare is a game of measure and countermeasure. The incident with the Chinese sub illustrates that we can't slacken in that discipline.
Of course the Kitty Hawk group wasnt engageing in active submarine detection as they surely would be in wartime. We've known and trained for years against diesel boats that are a nasty threat in the opening hours of any conflict, particularly in shallow waters. There is always a possibility they could get in a Pearl Harbor type shot against a carrier group to open a shooting war. After that, however, their job becomes increasingly difficult. They have to surface daily to recharge their batteries, and become easy meat for P3s and helicopters. Once the war starts they also have the issue of locating moving ships and getting in their path- Kitty Hawk is the oldest and only non-nuclear carrier we have left and she's still capable of outrunning any Chinese sub and then some. The enemy has some advantages but they would quickly be erased if they didnt get their licks in early. I think missile bombardment is still the threat to look out for from China.
I have it on excellent sources that we HAVE slackened in that discipline.
What Mike writes is all good, though directed at people outside of his community; all submariners and submarine hunters know that diesels are a threat, and that they are quiter than nukes. Their downside is range, and that need to recharge on the surface.
We should have some; we don't. Rickover demanded that all our boats be nuclear... because... because... OK, I never really understood why.
But that would be offense, anyways, and we're talking about defense here.
Here's the thing: when the SU collapsed, their open ocean attack boats dissapeared shortly thereafter. They didn't leave port much, and when they did, they didn't seem to want to play.
The Viking guys became tankers, and the P-3 guys started hauling the mail and Maine lobster.
Fortunately the next generation carrier born ASW platform is coming online...
Uh oh.
I can't believe your falling for this non-news event. Why do people continue to equate stuff that happens in peacetime with what would happen in war?
Let's take a look at physics for example. In wartime, a carrier would not be sitting around in the same place all the time. A carrier typically travels at about 18 knots but can obviously go much faster. A submerged diesel sub can travel maybe 8-10 knots underwater depending. Now, pretend you're a diesel sub captain trying to catch a carrier during wartime. First, you'll have to predict where the carrier will be and then get ahead of it since you have no hope of catching it. In peacetime this is easy - in wartime, not so much.
And finally, this wasn't the biggest "incident" with a Chinese sub. We played with and chased a Han-class sub for several hours in 1994. You can read the story about it in the December 14, 1994 edition of the LA Times.
Just a quick reply to thank Rev. Sensing for posting, and a hope that I bump that comment on the front page with the long URL that is messing up the layout. ;)
If that's the case the carrier group commander should be relieved of duty.
We have hurt ourselves in regards to ASW over the past decade. No replacement for the outgoing S-3 available and the possible replacement for the aging P-3, the Multimission Maritime Aircraft will probably have less capacity for in air time than the P-3 (Should have gone with a 767ER instead of basing it on the 737 airframe.
If the PRC sub really wasn't detected, why on earth did it reveal itself, and its capability?
If the fleet really wasn't being vigilant because 'we aren't at war', somebody needs their head handed to them, because (like in 1941) the first hit in a war will not be made in wartime. Not to mention, we ARE at war (just not with PRC).
And regardless of whether the sub was or was not detected, we probably should not be told.
From the cache of a Spring 2005 Naval War College Review article, a link to which is not available at this time:
U.S. Navy exercises with diesel submarines since the mid-1990s have often proved humbling. South African Daphné-class, Chilean Type 209, Australian Collins-class, and other diesel submarines have penetrated battlegroup defenses and simulated attacks on surface ships, including aircraft carriers, often without ever being detected.29 The 1982 Falklands War may be the best available indication of how a U.S. Navy ASW operation might go today. ...in 1982, as we have seen, and despite such steady emphasis on conventional submarines, British antisubmarine forces in the Falklands were not up to the task. An Argentine Type 209 diesel submarine stayed safely at sea for over a month while the British expended more than 150 depth charges and torpedoes against false contacts. British antisubmarine forces scored no hits on the submarine and failed to prevent two attacks on surface ships, which were saved only by defective Argentine torpedoes.31
Davebo and Glen...
I don't know that there's any basis to the idea that the fleet wasn't screening for subs. That's not how we do business.
So in a sense I both agree and disagree with Andy. Is this the first time a sub ever got close to a carrier? I'm sure we'd like to believe that... how would we know?
But is it non-news? I don't think that's quite the case either. I think the key is related to your question as to "why on earth did [the Chinese sub] reveal its capability."
Think about that: you're a Chinese boat captain. You do your duty, you slip past the destroyers, the Vikings aren't looking (there somewhere in the stack, topping off the next cycle), and score! You're there. Now you surface, and let you're presence be known.
Does that sound like the kind of individual initiative and cowboy-like swagger that goes down in the Chinese armed forces?
Deterrence cuts both ways.
This was apparently a Yuan class submarine, one of their new diesel-electrics with a fast teardrop hull and anti-sonar coating.
The good news, for now, is that they probably have only two of these things. Since there's no sane reason for the sub to give away its ability to creep up on a carrier group, they must have been forced to surface by technical problems.
Whatever happened, this was a really stupid time for the Chinese to make us notice their new submarine capabilities, which are still in infancy.
:)
Just goes to show, the old saw is true. You can lead a horse to water...
> Since there's no sane reason for the sub to give away its ability to creep up on a carrier group
Of course not, no one ever tries to affect the morale of the opposing forces. There are other good reasons to reveal parts of your capabilities.
Remind me - why do militaries invite observers to exercises?
No one gets invited to observe submarine or ASW operations, at least not in any way that would permit discovery of capabilities such as those involved here.
I suspect that a Chinese sub commander who revealed his ship's capability by surfacing after getting within striking distance of a US carrier, just to deflate the Americans' morale, would have a lot more to worry about than merely being relieved of command.
And don't believe anything you read about whether or not the sub was detected. We have as much interest in keeping our ASW capabilities secret as the Chinese have in keeping their subs' capabilities from being known. Why would we expect or even want our government to tell anyone the truth about this to anyone without need to know?
FD: "I suspect that a Chinese sub commander who revealed his ship's capability by surfacing after getting within striking distance of a US carrier, just to deflate the Americans' morale, would have a lot more to worry about than merely being relieved of command."
So... you're suggesting that he's destined for a Chinese goulag? Or that he was forced to surface - at the carrier's deep six, in ideal firing solution - by a mechanical problem?
Come on folks. He did what he was ordered to do, no more, no less.
wastelandlive,
Is the six of a bird farm really an optimal angle of attack, given that there is multiple close in weapons support at the stern of a carrier, the boat presents a narrow target, and finally as stated before the carrier can out run the sub? If I had to guess, and remember guessing we are, the sub was forced up by the group ASW assets and command initiatives about creating bonds with China might be damaged should we announce the US Navy forced a Chinese sub to bob up like an apple. Again, remember, we are just guessing.
This really seems to me to be one of those tailor-made "too soon to tell" situations... Perhaps someday declassified documents will show up; in the mean time it's worth examining as many possible explanations as we can.
Good discussion. Thanks!
(The Newly-minted) Marshal Nortius "Big Tuna" Maximus
One minor point of correction: the fuel cell's don't contribute anything to the sub's quietness--and Mike's post in fact doesn't make that claim. Rather, he states (correctly) that it increases their submerged range.
I think missile bombardment is still the threat to look out for from China.
Oh yeah, I'm expecting that any day now myself. Hopefully not before I get my shelter finished, though. And I'm thinking of moving to San Francisco; since that's now the 'most Chinese city in America', I'm hoping it won't be targeted.
But I've heard that the Chinese have a rather high average IQ, so maybe the fact that the US has thousands of megaton class warheads that could be rained down upon China after such an attack might be seen by them as something of a deterrent.
I can't believe your falling for this non-news event.
You can't? Then maybe you better browse this site more often, as it appears the unbelievable regularly shows up here.
Bryan,
"Is the six of bird farm really an optimal angle of attack?"
More or less. I'm guessing 5 or 10 degrees off might be optimal, but you'd have to talk to a submariner.
It's not about a wide or narrow target: it's about rates of closure and radial rate of turn.
Carriers can outrun subs, but they can't outrun torpedoes.
CIWS is an anti-missile system, BTW. It would have a hard time targetting a torpedo.
Finally, how would you "force up" a submarine in international waters with ASW assetts during peace time? Play Sammy Hagar really loud? Wag your wings at it? What?
Your faith in our invincibility is flattering, though.
______
We're not guessing about much, here. I suppose there is a chance that we did detect and track that boat all the way in, and WE don't want to reveal that capability to THEM.
I doubt it. Then again, I'm not a submariner, and I've no need to know.
We should have some; we don't. Rickover demanded that all our boats be nuclear... because... because... OK, I never really understood why.
Since no one has answered this, I'll toss out the stock reply: because there wouldn't be a point.
There are 3 main missions for attack boats (I'll assume the reasons why missile boats should be nuclear are self-evident for everyone).
1) Killing enemy missile boats. This requires your attack boats to be able to shadow enemy missile boats around until war breaks out, where they should then kill them as quickly as possible. This requires your boats to be able to keep up with the perpetually deeply submerged missile boats for very long periods of time. Advantage: Massively Nuclear. Diesel attack boats are simply completely ineffective here.
2) Force protection. Protecting valuable targets (read carriers) from enemy attack boats. This requires an attack boat that can stay with the carrier group, detect, and engage hostile subs. The key phrase there being stay with, the boat has to fast enough with long enough endurance to stay with carrier battle groups. Advantage: Massively Nuclear. Diesel boats simply aren't fast enough to stay with the groups, even surfaced, and even if they were fast enough on the surface, the whole advantage of a sub escort is having something down under the surface that might have a better sonar look at other sub-surface targets than your surface escorts (or aircraft).
3) Destroying enemy shipping. This involves getting in range of and destroying enemy ships (and hopefully getting out alive). Diesels have an advantage here in being better at breaking tough ASW targets, but are slower, and considerably less strategically capable. Diesels have an advantage if your either playing in your own front yard, or know where the flash point will be, in which case their strategic speed isn't a problem. For the USN, none of our opponents really have the tough ASW defended targets which the extra stealth of a diesel pays off against, and the strategic speed and ability of the nuclear attack boats to quickly run from hot spot to hot spot is more useful. Also, our attack boats have much better stand off missile attack capabilites to compensate should it be needed. Advantage: depends.
For our enemies, diesels make perfect sense, as they'd need to break our carrier battle groups to stand a chance. And they'd be fighting us in areas they can predict, and would likely be close to their bases. For us, none of our opponents even field anything comparable, and if they did, we'd use airpower against the tougher targets anyway. Our subs would be busy on their merchant marines, support shipping, and other targets inside their land based air cover umbrella. In which role being able to move about rapidly and stay submerged is a huge advantage. Plus the force protection and boomer killing roles.
Remember we won the battle of the North Atlantic not with better close in convoy ASW, but with the addition of cheap little carriers to provide a couple hundred mile radius air cover for the convoys, which forced the U-boat skippers to either stay at snorkel depth and render themselves entirely ineffective unless they got horribly lucky and happened to be right in front of a convoy, or they could surface and maneuver to get in front of the convoys, and risk destruction from said aircraft. Die or be ineffective is pretty much the epitome of a perfect defense.
It does make sense to pick a few up for training purposes, but it's probably a lot more cost-effective to train against our allies than develop our own.
Well said, although one of Rickover's less inspired pet projects was the nuclear mini-sub. Fascinating piece of engineering, but for a billion dollars (in 1969!) and travelling at 8 knots the NR1 just didnt make a lot of sense (couldnt travel independantly). That particular project seemed an example of Rickover doing something to prove he could.
It's been a long time since I chased subs in P-3's, but it would seem to me that in wartime, active sonar would compensate for the diesel sub's quietness. With active sonar, you don't care how quiet the sub is - if you can get an echo off it, you can locate and kill it. For example, we used to carry PDC's (small explosive charges) that we could drop to provide echo detection and ranging - those make a whole lot of noise, and I wonder if even the best anechoic coating would be enough to defeat them. We also had big (and expensive) sonobuoys that could actively ping, in addition to our many smaller passive buoys.
ASW capabilities are among our most closely guarded secrets. Until the Walkers gave up the information, the Sovs had no idea that we essentially knew the location of every one of their subs, every minute. Our passive sonar was better than they expected, so we could hear prop cavitation at levels way below what they expected.
I remember when the Pueblo was grabbed. A Sov sub was shadowing the Enterprise (IIRC) battle group which was on ops off of Hawaii. The squadron I was visiting had a scramble because they temporarily lost the sub just as the big E was hauling for Korea. They found it again pretty quickly, and that sub was mentioned in the UN debate over the incident. It had been bird-dogging the Enterprise. The P-3's (and probably carrier assets) had been quietly following it. Did the sub know the P-3's had it pegged? I doubt it.
We may find out if the Chinese sub was or was not detected. It will (hopefully) be a lot longer before we find out if it would have been detected in wartime.
Regarding killing a sub... we carried approx 10kt nuclear depth charges. You don't need very much sonar data to use one of those effectively.
I agree that the main threat to a carrier battle group (or whatever they call it these days) is a missile attack - especially in a limited nuclear war such as is possible with China (i.e. tactical nukes used only at sea). There, the question would be whether the Aegis ABM capabilities could stop an attack by a flight of long range nuclear tipped missiles.
All that being said, the diesel subs are not to be ignored. They won't be picked up very easily by the passive screens (and SOSUS or whatever else is down there). They might be able to slip past active sonar if it isn't active enough, and they make good use of thermoclines.
As to attack subs, there was one other important mission left out of the list: protection of boomers. Nuclear probably wins there also.
Yep, Treefrog, that's one answer.
I find it unsatisfying.
"None of our opponents field anything comparable? [to our battlegroups?]"
That sounds reasonable - now - but it may not be reasonable within the next decade, and it certainly was not true throughout the Cold War. How then did it serve as a justification for ignoring that value of diesel boats during that period?
I don't think that it really did. The most honest explanation I've ever heard is that Rickover believed that building diesel subs was a slippery slope... they're cheaper, of course, and he worried that in the innevitable budget wars to follow, diesel's would become the mainstay in a Navy run by brown shoes.
That might be true. But it's still a lame methodology by which to build a navy. It seems like the optimal blend of weapon systems would be... the optimal blend: not some decision forced through because of political considerations or a need to beat the other services to the trough.
For all their limitations, diesels are quieter, and more lethal when it comes to protecting the littorals. And we don't have any, because we have no littorals, I guess. I can think of a few places where it would be nice to have some forward deployed: Bahrain, for example.
But there it is. I suppose we rely on our allies to provide that kind of support, but its still not optimal.
I find your reminder of how we won the battle of the North Atlantic startling. I can understand your points 1-3, and I certaintly acknowledge that those arguments were publicly made, and perhaps a lot of smart people believe them.
But we won the battle of the North Atlantic by forcing German Uboat commanders to either expose themselves to air patrol and get killed, or to be inneffective?
History in the eye of the beholder, I suppose.
I've never heard that one. No doubt air patrols, radar, convoys, and the ability to strike the sub pens themselves towards the end of the war helped enourmously. But I think we won the battle of the North Atlantic by building ships faster than the Germans could sink them, period. But the notion that we rendered their Uboats inneffective would be surprising to the more than 22,000 men killed by the wolfpack. Over 1300 ships sunk! I wonder how many tons that was...
But the notion that we rendered their Uboats inneffective would be surprising to the more than 22,000 men killed by the wolfpack. Over 1300 ships sunk! I wonder how many tons that was...
We did render them ineffective.
Source material on this is the History of United States Naval Operations in World War II by Samuel Eliot Morrison, my edition is the 1990 by Little, Brown and Company. Volumes 1 and 10 being the relevant ones, respectively "The Battle of the Atlantic" and "The Atlantic Battle Won".
From the tables in the back you quickly see where I'm getting this from. US forces were involved in the killing of 139 submarines (May 1943-May 1945, not counting a bunch destroyed at pens late in 44 and early 45). Of that 139, 121 were either killed solely with airpower or in conjunction with aircraft, and 53 of those were from the little jeep carriers, the rest being land based patrols. This is out of a total of 385 Uboat losses total for the same period (compared to 140 losses total from Jan 1942-May 1943). All figures for the Atlantic area only. If, proportionally, the British figures hold similar (and I see no reason why they wouldn't) this means the vast majority of Uboat kills were airborne driven.
Here's the per 6 month figures on average shipping losses by submarine for the Allies (Atlantic theatre):
Period Sunk Gross Daily Operating UBoats (Avg)
Tonnage Per Month (Avg)
1942:
Jan-Jun 463,886 54.2
Jul-Dec 486,148 91.2
1943:
Jan-Jun 264,419 105.25
Jul-Dec 57,087 77.6
1944:
Jan-Jun 31,379 55
Jul-Dec 29,787 40.1
1945:
Jan-May 52,620 45
The jeep carriers started hitting active service in mid-late 1943 by the way.
You have to read it though to get the full feel for it, when the Allies introduced total air coverage, the Germans actually had to introduce entirely new operating doctrines to handle it, which resulted in notably less effective operations.
We didn't simply outbuild the Germans, we actively beat them. Better convoy tactics, surface ship tactics, and better sensors all helped alot, but the real killer of diesel subs during WW2 was...aircraft. They really are that vulnerable to air attack while on/near the surface.
Formatting got a little messed up, the columns are time period, avg gross tonnage lost and average daily operating Uboats respectively.
but it may not be reasonable within the next decade, and it certainly was not true throughout the Cold War. How then did it serve as a justification for ignoring that value of diesel boats during that period?
I've never heard the Soviet surface fleet being referred to as anything more than interesting target practice. I believe the betting pool was on whether they'd even make it TO the Atlantic, let alone pose any credible challenge to anybody.
As for the coming decade, China looks to want to be a naval power, but I'm not seeing anything credible in the next decade, 50 years maybe...
But regardless, I think the stronger point still holds, a minor tactical advantage doesn't offset the massive strategic deficiencies of the diesel boats. The classic mistake while playing armchair admiral is to overemphasize tactical advantages and overlook strategic ones. Strategic speed and low logistical needs are huge advantages not to be glossed over.
A lot of very interesting comments here. I noticed there was no mention of how the leased Swedish submarine based in California was never discovered during exercises with the US Navy.
There was also the example of a Pakistani sub that was
shadowing a task group south of Iraq. It was a Canadian frigate that detected it.
The above just shows that protecting naval assets is vital and not to be ignored.
I think the more classic example is... just playing armchair Admiral. But it's been interesting Treefrog! :)