Very interesting.

Longer comments over at B5 tonight.

A.L.

Disaggregation is also the approach taking root in the Pentagon, in generally the same terms as you suggest. You touch on many of the key points, but I think you missed one. It relates to every point you made, but oddly, you missed it.

Disaggregation also includes actively fostering conflicts that act to keep our enemies apart and busy.

Muslim radicals from various sects engaged in shooting each other weaken Imperial Islam materially, morally and on the manpower front. They also make larger joinings very problematic because of the deep-seated local grievances and hatreds they spawn, thus reinforcing disaggregation on multiple levels without Western intervention. All of those things are good things from our point of view, and if disaggregation spreads to the state level it's worth looking again at Britain's modern-era strategy with the Gulf states as a useful model.

Of course, the British were about divide and rule, whereas this approach is closer to divide and don't bother.

I suspect David Blue will be seconding this notion.

IN CASE YOU THINK THE WAR AGAINST HATE IS ALL "OVER THERE"

MR. JOHN EDWARDS: You advertise on the RAW STORY for your 2008 presidential campaign. Here is a sampling of comments from a Jan 3, 2007 article about Michelle Malkan (are you sure you want to advertise here?):

FROM:
http://www.rawstory.com/comments/25036.html

Comments: [Add New]
January 3rd, 2007 at 13:03:30 From: Tom3
No body armor for Malkin.
If she got blown up and killed, it would be a great day for America. That skanky conservo-whore is a disgusting piece of shit. She supports illegal detention of US citizens. Malkin is a fucking c*nt.
January 3rd, 2007 at 13:11:27 From: Bobo the Clown

HI-larious
It's nice to see a true chickenhawk venture into Iraq, protected as she will be and not in the military. But it's all for show. Malkin is a P.O.S. whose only followers are slack-jawed, knuckle-dragging rethugs and christofascists.
January 3rd, 2007 at 13:12:07 From: Bobo the Clown

I hope she gets fragged....
January 3rd, 2007 at 13:47:40 From:

January 3rd, 2007 at 13:51:35 From: Jeanne
embedded...
So does this mean I get to see her on the Sean Hannity throne? Don't these people realize they are not considered reporters and they just look like dumba**es trying to get some attention? Who respects what they write or have to say? Embedded...bullshyt. Doesn't the military have better things to do than show these doorknobs around the greenzone?

January 3rd, 2007 at 13:56:28 From: Free thought
PLEASE GOD!
Three little letters: I E D And FUCK AP!
January 3rd, 2007 at 14:01:41 From: Jeanne

January 3rd, 2007 at 14:21:28 From: X
Bush only needs 19,999 more conservative keyboard commandos
If Malkin happens to not return I for one won't shed a tear. She's evil. That said, she's of military age and supports the folly, so get her into action!! Bush will only need 19,999 more conservative keyboard commandos.

January 3rd, 2007 at 14:54:27 From: FilthyGOPpederasts
CNN is paying for her security?
Michelle should be fighting on the front lines and let her family pay for her body armor and body bag, just like so many troops are forced to do so. Being that she is such vocal cheerleader for this war, she wont need counseling after getting gang raped in appreciation for her war cheerleading skills.

January 3rd, 2007 at 15:14:54 From: pious pete
to free thought
So you think the Party of Life is a big joke? Careful, or you may be laughing all the way to Hell. Fear not my young cherub, for the POL, fortified by it's holy warriors like Father Dobson and Rev Falwell, can save you. Note that everyone here wants Malkin to die over there. Amybe they are just jelious of both her journalistic entegrety as well as her courage and bravery. Remember, don't balme the messenger if she uncovers the left leaning AP for what it really is, a tool for wiccan satanist tofu eating baby slaughtering liberals

January 3rd, 2007 at 15:17:42 From: pious pete to January 3rd, 2007 at 15:14:02
Right on about WJM. Did you catch his admission of being a "closeted gay satanic seditionist"? To be fair, maybe someone hyjacked his handle, hopefully WJM will clear this up for us all today

January 3rd, 2007 at 15:27:18 From: Bobo the Clown
I don't have any damn kids
Nor would i be so irresponsible to bring them into this fucked up world. Pious, just STFU and return to your mom's basement where no doubt a huge stack of Big Macs, supersized fries and a bucket of KFC await you. Then again, maybe you are in a food coma now, what with the extra-inane babbling, there must be a reason. Malkin is evil, and SHE is the racist. She was in favor of the Japanese internment camp, one of the most embarassing episodes in the U.S.'s history. What would Father Dobson say? Oh yeah... probably that Jesus hates Japanese too...

January 3rd, 2007 at 15:34:12 From: madamab
get a clue wingers
Malkin is a pathetic loser. She doesn't have one scrap of integrity, and the only journalistic skill she has is being one of the few good-looking "conservative" women on TV. Thus, she deserves whatever she gets if she's stupid enough to go to Iraq. Here's a thought: since you all love her so much, why don't you join her? I'll bet your support of the war would last up to the exact moment you exit the Green Zone and the first IED blows your arm off. Awwwww, sorry, I was wrong to suggest you actually accept the consequences of your warmongering!!! What was I thinking?!!! It's okay, wingers, you can all stop crying and sucking your thumbs now... MORONS.

January 3rd, 2007 at 15:34:48 From: loretta
we can only hope
for some more "friendly fire"

January 3rd, 2007 at 15:40:33 From:
Malkin should make herself usefull
Malkin should "service" our troops while she is there. So heres a leftie that doesnt want her to die....I want to see her on her knees slurp slurp

January 3rd, 2007 at 16:02:02 From: GAG!
Oh Gawd!!
Who is the LOSER that thinks Malkin is "good-looking"? GAG!!! BARF!!! Malkin is a fucking chihuahua!!! I E D!! I E D!! I E D!! I E D!! I E D!!

January 3rd, 2007 at 16:15:04 From: Tom3
Michelle Malkin is good looking???
http://www.rodneyanonymous.com/archives/m3.jpg That ugly bitch whore is NOT a looker.

January 3rd, 2007 at 16:16:03 From: Tim
I don't wish for Malkin's death, that would be too easy, I want her to be maimed with loss of limbs and just enough brain damage so that she knows she is fucked up. That would be proper punishment for her spewing propaganda that helped kill and maim more than 25,000 of our guys.

January 3rd, 2007 at 16:22:16 From: NEVERVote RepublicanAgain
There is no place like Iraq for Michelle. May she provide cover to one of our troops and stop the bullet before it kills our troops. Take one for the military, Michelle, otherwise, STFUYSI and stay over there. We don't need unAmerican people like you here so just go away and hold the cross for the Bush crusades.

January 3rd, 2007 at 16:54:13 From: Bobo the Clown
Dobson is a pervert and an abuser
self-admittedly. And January 3rd, 2007 at 16:42:13 if you actually think there is GOOD NEWS coming out of Iraq, you must be on crystal meth. But then, most trailer trash is. I'm sure you're no different. Why don't you go look at the horror that is Iraq, pics are available everywhere on the web, and after you see a few blown up kiddies and mourning, screaming people, report back here and tell me what "good" is going on. And whoever above suggested I stop name-calling, go fuck yourself. My personal style is to call a spade a spade. If you don't like it, don't read it, moron.

January 3rd, 2007 at 17:26:47 From: Bobo the Clown
We're all grownups are we not?
Who cares about a little cussing? Get over it. The biggest intellectuals on the planet cuss so what's your point, anon at January 3rd, 2007 at 16:58:36, hmmmm? Do you think Henry Miller is a simpleton? Well, if not, then your cute lil' quote is invalid. Grow up. Swear words and name-calling is fun! Enjoy some yerself!

January 3rd, 2007 at 17:28:09 From: Tom3
AP told the truth
They're real journalists. Malkin, OTOH, is a neocon whore from the reich-wing noise machine and has zero journalistic credentials and zero credibility.

January 3rd, 2007 at 17:39:20 From: IEDs for Malkin!
IED! IED! IED!
Three cheers for Malkin: I-E-D!! I-E-D!! I-E-D!! Hooo-rah!!!

January 3rd, 2007 at 18:02:09 From: FU
I luv when wingnuts flock to this message board. It means they're scared shitless and on the run. 295?? sheesh, have some more fried chicken, lots more.
January 3rd, 2007 at 18:09:10 From: bb
Making a bad situation skankier.

January 3rd, 2007 at 18:11:07 From: Independent 295?
Sounds like you've gained some weight over the holiday's there Petey; doesn't look like Raw is getting too serious about their comment standards yet.......they're still letting you and that other no-name projectionist on here to make asses of yourselves. Hypocrites you say? Don't make me laugh. As for Malkin, she doesn't realize the AP is corporate conservative media......she better be careful and watch her back- the neo-cons are known for eating their own. A fragging of her would make the world a much better place. While she's at it, why don't we have her take Laura Engram along, too. Those are two bitches I wouldn't miss.

January 3rd, 2007 at 18:12:07 From: Yu Stin Ki Pu
FU as in fu*k you or in "it was" in manda rin ?

January 3rd, 2007 at 19:13:06 From: Bercebu48
Hope we don't see your face again. Go back to the Phillipines.

January 3rd, 2007 at 19:26:45 From: Malkin Hoe Patrol
Take Jeff Gannon.
Gannon made a claim he was a Marine on his male prostution resume. Jeff and Michelle can turn tricks for stray Iraqi farm animals and pets.

First, the laws of the sea were changed to make piracy easier to prosecute. Second, armies and navies eliminated pirate bases and actively pursued pirates. Finally, states extended their own power sufficiently that they no longer supported non-state actors.

Great article there -- did you want comments here? (didn't say...)

Biggest missing truth is this:
In a Limited War, only the Loser decides when the war ends. When the Loser decides to stop fighting. (That's how the US decided to lose in Vietnam. and Somalia. and even Darfur, losing before starting!)

On CIA, I think you're one third wrong:
"Oathbreakers should be searched out and prosecuted ferociously."
They need to be booted out of their jobs quietly, easily, in a nice but firm way -- so that they are not martyrs or new internal victims. Certain, small punishment rather than big, uncertain, ferocious punishment.

I really like your focus on honesty about genocide. You might have added a note to the Sunnis:
Stop supporting terrorists or else you WILL be driven out of Iraq or killed.

The Sunnis need to more often punished for supporting terrorists, including group punishment -- but with lighter punishment.

Sadr loses his need for a militia when the Sunnis stop AQ and other terrorist killers.

New elections, and new political compromises, would likely do a bit more good than harm -- certainly if Maliki is not the guy to lead Iraq. Too bad Sistini is calling for Shia unity. What Iraq needs is a strong Shia group who is able to ally with Sunnis and Kurds for the good of Iraq.

Too bad nobody talks about Proportional Representation supports extremists and sectarians. Geographic local districts would have much better served the Disaggregation goal.

I'll note that devolution might be a natural companion to disaggregation: No nation or ruler that sets up as an adversary to us should be given any assurance that its territory will be left intact after a defeat. UN or no UN, the people there should be offered their choice not just of governments, but of whether to remain part of the existing nation, go their own ways, or combine otherwise. Shoulda been done with Iraq, ought to be done with Iran and Syria when and if necessary.

It may be that the right answer is to keep the current polity in the current boundaries. But if we just assume that, vide Iraq, and make that assumption an unexamining component of our warfighting strategy, we set it up as an inviting fixed target for attack by insurgency, infowar, and all the rest. And attacked we have been, perhaps for no good reason. The dreaded neos may have sworn off 'stability' as strategy, but they let it return via the back door.

Disaggregation says to keep grievance and politics local. Devolution also reduces the scope of potential destabilization and inherently lowers the stakes for those struggling for power. We are dealing with cultures and 'nations' that have none of our notions of the limitations of state power and the inherent rights of citizens. If the state literally has the arbitrary power of life or death, then control over that power must itself become a matter of life and death. See Baghdad for a demo.

So not only should we being narrowing the geographic scope of defeated adversaries, we should also radically reduce the scale of the government. State socialized assets should be stripped at the point of a gun, to reduce the stakes of power and the incentives for corruption. Minorities that choose to remain part of a polity should know that the Bill of Rights put in place at our requirement is guaranteed by us until it becomes a cultural assumption. See Japan for the results.

All this would give extreme heartburn to those named already, as well as Turkey, SA and adherents to the UN's legitimation of current boundaries and regimes. Breaks my heart.

#2 from Joe Katzman: "I suspect David Blue will be seconding this notion."

Of course, and I was mulling with some confusion over such a long, thoughtful post by Grim, where the word "disaggregation" was emphasized but this implication was not drawn.

Joe & David:

As you note, the strategy implies that at every point. It does stop short of saying that we should try to create new conflicts, except when it points to fielding assassins against Syrian officials and training opposition figures in Iran. That is, it endorses just that sort of thing when it comes to established enemies.

If you want to go further than that, you run the risk of violating the other key part of the strategy, which is the information war. We have to project with every action that we are no one's enemy who isn't ours, though we are a terrible enemy to them. Going to places where we have no enemies and starting new fires -- which I think may be the only version of that strategy I didn't actually endorse -- is counterproductive in that regard. The information war is as important as the disaggregation, because it's the chief strategy of our enemy. We have to fight them on the information level, which means being as singleminded about presenting the picture we want presented.

(comment also posted at B5)

Grim, good, thoughtful post. I have a couple of issues and a few quibbles - let's talk first about the issues.

perception

OTOH, I think the notion of disaggregation is a terrific notion - but I'm not as sure as you or the author that it's readily distinguishable from the kind of adopting to local conditions Kaplan talks about in "Imperial Grunts". I'm no so sure that there are easy moves that will divide one faction of the movement from another - but I'm prepared to be shown how it might work.

I also think you're spot-on in identifying this as a collision between tribal and national societies. I'm not completely in agreement that the notion of adopting heroic language as a way of communicating with them - of letting them know that honor and heroism matter to us as well - is enough to get us past the door in those societies. We carry too much brand-name baggage.

I also think that you understate the impact of state action on empowering groups like this. They are - I believe - financially and politically cheap proxy warriors, and when the state support dries up, much of the power of these movements will as well.

Read the bio of Mao - in reality, it was Soviet-supplied cash, weapons, and military advisers that empowered the Red guerilla movement. Without it, Mao would have been marginalized and defeated.

A.L.

It seems Iran believes in disaggregation. (link) (link)

What You Want
* Terrorist groups are smaller and less dangerous
* Rogue states have more rather than less to fear
* Genocide and ethnic cleansing are rarer
* The enforcement of human rights is more certain.

How You Want To Get It
1. Information Warfare
2. Disaggregation
3. Consequences

Information warfare and disaggregation are in tension. Where they conflict, information warfare prevails, and to the extent of the incompatibility disaggregation is set aside.

Consequences are about making it clear what we will do. It is intended to shape hostile behavior. It is not a checklist of hostile things to be done now, regardless of how the enemy acts. (That is, it is consequences for future actions and not for past actions that can no longer be changed.)

Top Priority
"We have to remember how much of our enemy's efforts are pointed at making myths. Our first duty has to be to break them, here and everywhere. We must do what we can to prevent Muslims from believing that war against the West is the answer, or that al Qaeda can show them the way. We also need an information strategy, one that explains our every action as follows: we are the enemy of none, except those who would harm us or aid our foes."

A lot is built on these foundations. I haven't even addressed the idea of fighting terror by distributing war-fighting power through tribal society, for example.

At this point, I'm just recapitulating your foundations, so I can confirm we have this much understanding.

-

Understanding is not agreement.

My own list of things desired would start:
1. Break the enemy's will to fight.
daylight
2. Resource reduction for hostiles. (Roman thinking: not only do we want to win, we want to sterilize the threat potential. We won't leave open the possibility of needing to do this again.)
3. Consolidation and strengthening of anti-jihad forces globally, with rewards distributed at Islam's expense not America's.

That's a different wish list, which implies different means. For example, "Red on Red" fights are a key to my thinking but not yours, because I am looking to goals that can't possibly be achieved by just Blue on Red fighting and that will take decades longer to achieve than we can keep up a fight, but not longer than our bloodthirsty and implacable enemies can keep up a fight. And a typical, practical aim that follows from my wish list and would be facilitated by an umma paralyzed by Red on Red fighting and unable to transfer serious resources to fights against the infidel would be the destruction of Islamic authority in Nigeria and the transfer of oil and other resources to non-hostile, e.g. Christian hands.

The ideal consequence of a multitude of outcomes in this would be a "fight no more forever" alteration in the Muslim interpretation of jihad. We're whipped. We can't do this any more. It's costing us too much. We quit, and on any terms available. We'll rewrite the Koran if we have to, but "No more!" And I'd want to see no reservations like: "Except for the damned Jews. And apostates, those have to be torn limb from limb of course. And Western women are uncovered meat that invites rape. We can't corrupt our sacred values, so no cartoons or free speech in general for you. And..." None of that. The enemy's will to fight must not merely be decorated with hypocrisy - it already is - but broken. In this way, wars really end.

At that point, and not before, I will be all for magnanimity. I want an end to jihad, not mountains of corpses.

The enemy should know that they have made it onto our target list, they are being fought, and they are suffering permanent losses too great to tolerate any more, otherwise their will to fight won't break and the war won't be over till we break, or like the Europeans crumble democratically.

In this context, an information campaign conducted during the fight and aimed at teaching Muslims we are not opposing Islam would be at most pro forma, it could not be rational as the top priority. (We love the Japanese people - and by the way it's mighty smoky over Tokyo, Joe.)

So we are not on the same page. But I want to confirm that I leaned over and read the page you are on, and read it correctly.

The opposite of disaggregation, which we should do to the enemy, is aggregation, which we should do for ourselves.

So: Who are we?

Samuel P. Huntington had a good answer for this: we are the West.

That answer works well enough for many Americans, which is great because it mean that they have a door open for allies.

The answer works well for me as an Australian, because it follows from other values I have. What is really important? Mateship, a fair go, respect for battlers - these things are important. Enough other Aussies seem to have thought likewise to get John Howard (who is as pro-American as a practical man can be) re-elected.

The trouble is, the answer didn't work for Europeans. It should have. It made them blood brothers to the strongest military and economic force on the planet, for free. But people in states too important to bracket aside as "except for" think and feel differently, and have irrevocably taken a different course.

This makes hash of Huntington's key recommendation for the Americans not to allow themselves to be separated from Europe. It's already a done deal, from the other end. (And as Mark Steyn points out, "Europe" has a use-by date anyway.)

This is one reason I advocate a very militant line over values conflicts, such as freedom of speech in the cartoon jihad. We have to stand up for these values because it is right to, but also because if we don't we call into doubt who "we" are, and that's a weak point for us. As long as "we" are people who support the rights of people like Abdul Rahman, Salman Rushdie, Oriana Falacci and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, we know well enough who "we" are wherever we were born; but if we throw away the values that cause us to defend such people - and that make us insist we'll enjoy a cartoon, a can of beer and a ham sandwich if we want - we invite the "who's 'we' white man?" problem, and that's an old, familiar path to defeat.

It would also be nice if we had a winning myth for this war. We have a losing one: Vietnam. And we have allowed ourself to be bluffed into treating the Crusades as a myth of Western guilt, of evil.

We have no good and nearly applicable myth except that of "the good war" in the first half of the previous century; and that used a style of ruthless, rational, effective winner-take-all war-making that we have put out of bounds by defining Islam as our friend and "moderate" Islam as the solution. Therefore it would not be applicable even if it matched our circumstances in other ways.

We are wedded to a self-hobbled style war-making developed after World War II, one that has consistently led to defeat and that therefore carries a severely limited glamor.

George W. Bush tried to create a new myth of universal freedom. That was a very optimistic, American thing to do. Again, it didn't work because it relied on other people acting on what we thought should have been their interests instead of on their actual religion, culture and values.

So, that's a gap.

I find myself in agreement with much of what Grim writes, and not surprised that I'm in agreement with David Blue as well. However, I believe that David Blue's goals are not a practical goal in the next 15 to 20 years. I'm focusing on the near war, the Counterjihad Infowar, as I believe that our Government will be worthless for at least 10 years, and will be unwilling and unable to take any effective military action against the global or most local Jihads.

Turning our government, press, universities, courts and other institutions around to where they are functioning to defend our civilization and freedoms will take every second of that 10 years. We had better start right away.

Regarding good Myths for this war... is there a better, more applicable story to follow than the Lord of the Rings?

Wolf Pangloss in comment #13: you have a point. I see no chance that the American government or any other Western government would adopt such goals over the next 15 years. This means they are moot, and thus irrelevant.

But if you confine yourself to what Washington insiders find familiar, you are on the road to the Baker report: bipartisan and thus "realistic" but asinine. That's not worthwhile.

I point to what I regard as sound goals, well founded in military history and basic principles of war, because the future does arrive. Many problems coming down the road toward you fall over before they ever get to you, and it's reasonable to exhibit a fair degree of complacency unless there's reason to think that a specific problem will be an exception, but the Muslim world has kept on coming at us and not falling over for a few decades now, and demographics say this is going to get much, much worse.

Sooner or later we are going to have to decide whether the defeat - not the mollification, the defeat - of our enemies is a satisfactory outcome for us, because they have certainly come to a conclusion about whether our defeat would be satisfactory for them.

Wolf Pangloss: "Turning our government, press, universities, courts and other institutions around to where they are functioning to defend our civilization and freedoms will take every second of that 10 years. We had better start right away."

Oh yeah.

Changing a tribal society to a modern one is the work of generations.

That's all right -- merely engaging a tribal society in modern economic life will do the work for us. We just have to be willing to wait. In the meantime, we play by their rules, and wait for the virus of freedom to work.

In "playing by their rules" it is material what their rules are.

Papua New Guinea is full of Melanesian tribes that are no trouble to anyone.

David:

I didn't expect to win your agreement; rather, I asked for your input because I cited our discussion about Hilali in the piece. It seems to me that the division between what I propose and what you propose is the same division here as there.

Our previous discussion was highly useful, I thought, in making clear what the opposing positions were, and what the consequences of those positions were. I'd like to try to do that again here.

On your clarification of my position:

It is right to say that IW and disaggregation may sometimes be in tension, although I think normally they are harmonious. It is also right to say that, in the specific case we were talking about before, I wanted to resolve the matter in favor of the IW need -- because we are fighting an enemy who primarily uses IW as a method, if we can defeat their IW we will have largely defeated them. You will be left with some terrorists, but they will not be able to aggregate to, infect, and direct the numerous insurgent movements around the globe.

On the other hand, I don't wish to endorse a general rule that 'IW is more important than disaggregation.' I'd like to say that we need to harmonize their needs. This may sometimes mean giving IW precedence, but there may be other cases we haven't imagined here in which the opposite is true.

For that reason, I also think that the position listed as "top priority" is not actually the top priority. It is a priority, to be sure, but there may be circumstances in which other things are more important for a time.

Now:

I'd like to hear more about your proposal to overturn Nigeria's leadership. I realize you've said that your ideas aren't practical for the world as it stands, but I'd like to hear about what you think we should do to make it practical. How should we prepare for the insurgencies that would follow the conquest, for example? What sort of forces should the West prepare to develop and put forward?

On myths:

You raise an excellent point here.

I think that I have proposed something of an answer, which is an adaptation of the Bush doctrine of 'universal freedom.' When talking about the tribes, I mentioned that the tribe has a native concept of everything -- social good, what makes a thing or a leader legitimate or illegitimate, etc.

My proposal is, in short, that we structure our operations so as to put ourselves on the side of the tribes' own myths. Our conception of universal freedom need not mean that the West says, "You must have freedom of religion." It can mean that the West says, "A free people should be able to define their own laws, and live by their own lights."

Indeed, that was the original American idea, at least -- it's pretty clear that our own First Amendment's clause against religious establishment was to prevent the national government from endorsing a single religion as the official one (as the UK did). The government of the northeastern states in particular was highly religious (excepting, mostly, Rhode Island -- but its reason for offering a greater liberality were actually rooted in Calvinism. They held (to express it somewhat flippantly), that given that everyone was predestined anyway, it would be almost an interference with God's will to try to force people to behave, and entirely pointless anyway).

This version of liberty means we don't have to say, "The people of Aceh are right to do want shariah." We can simply say, "The people of Aceh have the right to want shariah, their special version of it, and we won't trouble them in the least so long as they don't wage war against us or shelter and support those who do. Indeed, far from bothering them, we'll be happy to offer them aid and assistance (as for example after the tsunami)."

That myth has the following virtues:

1) It reaffirms a vision of liberty that is at the root of the Western Enlightenment tradition.

2) It doesn't force us into opposition with people in thousands of places like Aceh. Rather, it puts us on their side so long as they're not our enemies.

3) It allows us a peaceful space in which to engage them. The greatest strength of the West isn't its armies, which (though powerful and noble) finally drain the economic engine that supports us. It is the pursuit of happiness, so to speak: the freedom to innovate, to come and go as you like, and do business as you like. We've seen the disruptive effect of that culture on both tribal societies and closed ones; but unlike a military-based solution, the cultural 'warfare' does the work while helping to drive the economic engine.

It seems to me likely you'll get your change in Nigeria that way -- maybe not 'the oil in the hands of good Christians,' but 'the oil in the hands of people who'd rather do business than make jihad against the West.' The difference is, you don't have to wage war or support armies to get there.

We do need to wage wars sometimes, and we certainly need a strong military. However, there is a benefit to bringing the rest of our power to bear as well.

Re: Red/Red v. Red/Blue

I'm not sure engaging "Christians" against the Islamic forces in Nigeria is a Red/Red conflict anyway. That sounds like a Red/Blue conflict. A Red/Red conflict would be, say, convincing a hostile tribe in Pakistan to fight the tribes who are sheltering al Qaeda.

That sort of thing is endorsed by the proposal I have offered -- raising and training local allies to carry the fighting against those who have decided to be our enemies. What I'm not advocating is starting fights where we have no enemies.

Very persuasive post, I particularly agree with the diagnosis here:

Changing a tribal society to a modern one is the work of generations. That's all right -- merely engaging a tribal society in modern economic life will do the work for us. We just have to be willing to wait. In the meantime, we play by their rules, and wait for the virus of freedom to work.

I think this is an argument against fostering conflicts. If the long-term goal is to bring tribal areas into a post-tribal world, then armed conflict will be counter-productive. I don't disagree with divide and conquer techniques and maybe some of those techniques run the risk of producing conflict, but aside from fostering conflict to undermine enemy states, I think its a bad idea.

Re: #17 from Grim.

I was just clearing up any misunderstandings before properly addressing your post: two possible misunderstandings would be: I have misconstrued what you said (which I slightly did, so thanks for clearing that up, and a third party reading might not know my reservations, so I thought it best to register a few of them yet again.

That done, let's proceed. Later ... actually it's difficult to proceed. On how you see the world, your plan looks pretty well flawless.

Defeating the enemy requires breaking its myths. But its myths can be made anywhere, in any village, in any house.

It's strange that we are fighting such a rootless foe, whose myths can be made up anywhere, like blowing soap bubbles. But, for the sake of this argument, so it is.

OK then, I think information warfare as a top priority along with disaggregation, should logically be promising. The foe fights for ephemeral myths, which suggests that what comes into existence anywhere, freely and from nothing much can go back there just as well. If we pop soap-bubbles faster than the myth-creators form them, then there'll be less bubbles, and consequently less out and out warfare, and that's what we want. Well - consistent with us getting what we want.

And, fortunately we're fighting, essentially tribalism, which is backwardness as such, which in the nature of things fades away in favor of the more advanced, meaning us.

So, why should we do anything other than you suggest?

OK, good plan.

I gather you'd like to say something like, "I totally disagree with your fundamental assumptions about the nature of the enemy." Which, in fact, is what I was hoping you would say. I'd like to examine those assumptions, which seem right to me according to my own experience. However, I know you don't share them, and I've found you to be a thoughtful and insightful fellow.

David Blue:

The Melanesian tribes you refer to are indeed pretty vicious, some of them, and they are no threat to anyone for two reasons; there aren't enough of them and they have nothing anyone needs or wants, which means they have no money for weapons.

Why is this relevant? Simple. The astronomical amount of money that has been given to the Arabs is the root cause of the problem of expansionist Islam. Cut down the money tree and the problem goes away.

Which means that the real, long-term, solution to the jihadist problem is to find another reliable and abundant source of energy. There are many ways to this; all it requires is the will. Not all of them are blue (or black!) sky - one of them ocean thermal, was first demonstrated in 1930. (!!)

It is my opinion that the big oil companies have some culpability in this matter - if they hadn't been working actively for decades to suppress any research, and funding for that research, into alternative energy sources then the situation might be very different now.

#17 from Grim: "I'd like to hear more about your proposal to overturn Nigeria's leadership. I realize you've said that your ideas aren't practical for the world as it stands, but I'd like to hear about what you think we should do to make it practical. How should we prepare for the insurgencies that would follow the conquest, for example? What sort of forces should the West prepare to develop and put forward?"

I have no proposal to overturn Nigeria's leadership. Nor would I foment Muslim-Christian conflict there. Nor would I see a Muslim-Christian civil was as "Red on Red".

Rather, I see Islamic forces as so aggressive that someone is going to get conquered no matter what happens. I desire that as many of these inevitable jihad campaigns as possible be Muslim vs. Muslim and not directed against non-Muslims, and the remainder result in crushing defeats with lasting negative consequences for the resources available to jihad forces.

The Croatian campaign in the breakup of Yugoslavia is a decent picture of what I want. Given how the Serbs were acting, there was going to be war and ethnic cleaning. The Croats hung back as long as possible, playing "let's you and him fight", then when everybody was ground down and had burned all their diplomatic goodwill several times over, they struck quickly, annexing lasting gains. For the rewards they scored, the amount of fighting they did was trivial.

The current Ethiopian campaign is also good, though it will result in no lasting gains. We did not create a war. Militant Islam made war inevitable. What we did was prepare the right side to win decisively, or as decisively as possible, with the least casualties and the most lasting effect in drying up Islam, sharia and jihad in that region.

For this to be a regular winning method, you need insanely bloodthirsty enemies, who even if they can see you doing this will keep going for the gusto anyway. We have such bloodthirsty enemies that not only is this the way to fight them, but it's almost the only way to fight them, because otherwise they'll grind us down.

Grim: "That sort of thing is endorsed by the proposal I have offered -- raising and training local allies to carry the fighting against those who have decided to be our enemies. What I'm not advocating is starting fights where we have no enemies."

I'm all for that.

All that we disagree on in this formula is "where we have no enemies".

#21 from Fletcher Christian:

David Blue:

The Melanesian tribes you refer to are indeed pretty vicious, some of them, and they are no threat to anyone for two reasons; there aren't enough of them and they have nothing anyone needs or wants, which means they have no money for weapons."

I think it's a far more dangerous doctrine - which is different from a simple sentiment of belligerency, as dangerous as that can be, plus synergies of multiple elements of power: military, economic, cultural, demographic, organizational, and geographic, plus the initiative, so often the key to success in war.

#21 from Fletcher Christian: "Why is this relevant? Simple. The astronomical amount of money that has been given to the Arabs is the root cause of the problem of expansionist Islam. Cut down the money tree and the problem goes away."

#21 from Fletcher Christian: "Which means that the real, long-term, solution to the jihadist problem is to find another reliable and abundant source of energy. There are many ways to this; all it requires is the will."

That would help. But some posts by Steven Den Beste long ago convinced me it's not going to happen.

Willpower and strategic need won't change engineering realities.

#20 from Grim: "I gather you'd like to say something like, "I totally disagree with your fundamental assumptions about the nature of the enemy." Which, in fact, is what I was hoping you would say. I'd like to examine those assumptions, which seem right to me according to my own experience. However, I know you don't share them, and I've found you to be a thoughtful and insightful fellow."

First you are gracious and thoughtful as always. Thanks for the kind words.

It's difficult to argue with experience of course.

Though sometimes it's hard not to. People who visit Lebanon - I haven't - report a system of delicate balance. But demographics in the Lebanon are stable only in the way that an object in free fall is. The macro picture does not catch the micro. And I don't think the macro picture is wrong.

Victory in this conflict will occur when the vast majority of muslims (>98-99%) consider violent jihad to be unIslamic. Let's face it, the people suffering most are muslims. They've got a dog in this fight too.

I keep going back to post-Reformation/pre-Enlightnenment Europe. Lots of wars between various sects of Christianity. Eventually (30 Years War), conflict got so destructive that everyone tired of it and reinterpreted their doctrines to allow the heretic and the apostate freedom of conscience.

Now it's just an analogy and it breaks down in the details. The Eurpoean conflict was completely internecine, whereas the curtrent conflict is not soloely (nor even most relevelanly from my perspective) solely within Islam. Islamic theology may make the accomodation that Christianity evetually found impossible.

But I look at what's happening in Iraq, and think it's a model for the future. Lets let, even encourage, Islamic sects to go to war with each other. If jihad is what Islam compels, they can have it, but muslims also have to eat the fruit. One of two things happen, either Muslims find a way to reinterpret jihad without violence (the spiritual struggle that Sufis preach), or (after much internal bloodletting) they unite against the non-Islamic world. Either way is better for us strategically. In the first case, the problem is solved and not at our expense. In the second case, we have a weakened foe and we are freed from the good Muslim/Bad Muslim dance that makes fighting in the current situation untennable.

Mr. Blue:

You say that the Ethiopian campaign will result in no lasting gains. I agree entirely with that. They lack the resources for power projection over time, which means they aren't capable of sustaining an occupation of Somalia even if there were no insurgency to speak of.

That said, I think we both agree that the defeat of the Islamists was useful -- I think we agree that the mythbreaking element is important. Even if Ethiopia can't hold the line, and certainly couldn't contest a real insurgency, it is useful to have the spectacle of Islamists retreating on the news. That seems to underline the importance of information warfare, yes?

On the other hand, what about Aceh/Indonesia? They have recently settled a Red/Red conflict, with the GAM laying down arms in return for concessions towards autonomy. There are plenty of pro-Qaeda factions in Indonesia outside of Aceh. Then there's the government, which is trying to sort out a better relationship with the US and Australia, while dealing with these various factions -- Jemmah Islamiyah, Hizb-ut Tahrir, FPI, the Indonesian Mujahideen Council (MMI, Bashir's group), and so forth.

Do you think it would be helpful to, essentially, try to set up the GAM as a Muslim resistance force in Indonesia -- to distract JI and its allies, by giving them shariah-loving Muslims to fight over issues of doctrine and precedence -- accepting that the government will then have to divert some of its focus from the Qaeda-style radicals to deal with GAM? Or do you think that it's better to have GAM stood down, and to focus on trying to get the government to crack down on the militant and radical groups?

I think where I'm pointing is that we recognize that GAM/Aceh is a situation where we have Muslims of a fairly radical stripe, but ones who are no concern of ours. So, for us, it's good to split them off from the JI/MMI types by letting their own disputes divide them, and not giving them reasons to think of the US/Australia as a common, uniting enemy. Perhaps, in an earlier stage of the conflict between GAM and the government, we might even have backed concessions to GAM in the interest of removing them from the picture. Then, to the degree we have influence in Indonesia, we can push them to deal with the radicals who do preach hatred of the West.

Do you think that's wrong, and if so, to what degree? This is the sort of difference I'd like to explore.

#26 from Grim: ...That said, I think we both agree that the defeat of the Islamists was useful...

We do agree on this.

I think people are making terrible mistakes in thinking about this war, and all sorts of wars since World War II, when the atomic bomb sparked a lot of new military thinking that has mostly been bad thinking - fancy, fanciful, and out of keeping with fundamentals and military history.

Winning is good. Beating up hostiles is good. Giving the enemy a free run is bad.

#26 from Grim: "Do you think it would be helpful to, essentially, try to set up the GAM as a Muslim resistance force in Indonesia...

I would never recommend anything like that. The correlation of forces - in this case "forces" of manipulation - would be bad. History shows that such ideas lead to fiascos like the Zimmerman telegram.

And what instrument would we use for such elaborate manipulations? The CIA? I think it's partly because the CIA has been enthusiastic for ideas that reek of hubris and over-complexificatedness that it's become a disorderly shop.

And, we don't need to manipulate people. Our enemies are unreasonable people, and they have doctrines and attitudes that lead inexorably to vicious conflict. If if was not so, what I'm advocation would be needless as well as ineffective.

What we need to do is seize every opportunity and do all we can to see that our allies - real ones, motivated by self-interest - win big and in ways that damage the global jihad machine permanently. This is an old, very old and successful kind of thinking.

Wars generally are won by means that George S. Patton Jr., a well-read man, understood clearly. Keep it simple, sir. And if we can't keep it simple, at least we should try to keep it within the bounds of things that historically, normally have worked.

I advocate patience, opportunism, sound old-fashioned doctrine and a crystal-clear agenda on who we need diminished, and who are the allies that we can favor in relative safety.

It would be hard enough to keep something as modest as that on track long enough to get results that would bring us nearer to what SG talks about in comment #25.

Anything fancier has little chance of success with the tools that we have (CIA), or with any tools, against enemies as doctrinally committed and brutally primal as what we are up against now.

I agree, David, on the need to avoid a focus on clandestine/covert operations. What I've advocated for the most part are open, but low-intensity operations. I think we are better off relying on an open presence, as of by our Special Forces, than secret operations that are prone to failure (as well as being portrayed as 'dirty tricks').

That's not to say that clandestine operations don't have their place. It's only to say that the place is a small one; I don't think you can hang a strategy on it. (I think that may be a restatement of Armed Liberal's objection to strategies that focus on super-ninjas killing terrorists).

This is particularly true given the 'culture of oathbreaking' I mention in the post and have railed against before. It exists at State and DOD as well, but how often have we seen the details of CIA operations in the newspapers? As long as that continues, I can't see how we can hang anything weighty on the secrecy of our intelligence services.

I don't think we can do what needs to be done any other way than openly and honestly. There are parts that must be secret, but the largest part has to be done in the clear, at least on the larger scale. We may not say exactly what we're doing, but we won't hide that we're in a country and that we have operations ongoing there.

Grim:

You wrote, "we won't hide that we're in a country and that we have operations ongoing there."

As a matter of law, if we openly announce that we're conducting military operations in another country, isn't that an act of war? Doesn't being open about it invite congressional (War Powers Act) and even international (international protests, endless UN debates and resolutions) scrutiny? How would those political dimensions affect the ability to perform a military operation?

"As a matter of law, if we openly announce that we're conducting military operations in another country, isn't that an act of war?"

To announce it? :)

If the operation is an act of war, it's an act of war whether it's secret or not. However, the US military normally conducts operations with the permission of host governments. For example, we have ongoing "Long War" operations in Columbia, the Philippines, etc. These are not acts of war against those countries, because they know about it and permit it.

Similarly, we conducted military operations in Aceh province after the tsunami. These were important from an information war perspective (as well as the, primary, humanitarian one). They were not acts of war against Indonesia, however, who was only too happy to see us.

Grim,

When you speak of defeating the infowar, you hide a critical bifurcation.

There's defeat of the infowar within friendly nations, the Leftist/Islamist co-belligerency. There are a number of profitable approaches there - and so I'll set it aside.

Then there's defeat of the infowar within the irrational and conspiracy-laced dialogue of Muslim countries. Which begins, from the enemy's side, with a religious frame of reference that says infidels are unclean and the heroic epic is to conquer them. And builds on a base that will believe in, quite literally, anything at all within their religious victim frame without regard for the most elementary logic.

This makes the notion of an effort that can bring such people within frith and family fanciful at best until key elements of their worldview and belief set are broken. Pretending we can address this problem without addressing Islam itself - and by addressing it I mean make it less trusted, less influential, less prevalent in orthodox form - is a fool's errand in my view.

That difference in proposed ends leaves a lot of tactical ground untouched, and much room for agreement, but it does have influences.

For instance, while infowar operations on enemy territory can be useful within the context of troops on the ground in such situations, or fomenting discord to the effect "you can't trust x," or simply asserting confidence in our own civilization and its merits to a global audience, efforts beyond that are likely to prove ephemeral and ultimately not much use IMO. The effect of local preachers drumming home a message of hate day after day will inevitably overpower showing up in a time of need and providing aid, or otherwise trying to make nice at a general level. Indeed, the most likely result in these situations is to help sustain one's enemies by transferring resources to them that they could not otherwise obtain.

On a granualar level, of course, one may decide that Grand Ayatollah Sistani's approach of not wanting to bring religion down to the stupidity level of politics has its merits, and see value in supporting him and his supporters abroad in various ways. But the support must be targeted to people who can make a big enough difference to justify it - not just "x preaches non-violent Islamic conquest and dhimmitude instead," but something more fundamental like the beginning of a cleavage between mosque and state, or specific factions we consider worth supporting in a particular area.

Grim, note also the focus on "abroad" in that last paragraph. You and I differed sharply in the Hilali thread because I see serious problems with tolerance of medievalist, theocratic, hostile mindsets at home on the grounds that "others might be worse." At home, the InfoOp priority is preservation of our Enlightment values and way of life. Period. No ifs, ands, or concessions. Abroad, people have their own values and so tolerance of that sort may acquire some usefulness.

So, what does this choosiness abroad mean in practice? Perhaps a couple of hard recent example may help.

Aceh/Indonesia was useful tactically, because the radicals had not reached critical mass and there was still room for a positive message - one that will, I predict, be steadily eroded until it has little salience within about 10 years. But useful within that period.

Pakistan is tactically useful because of the war in Afghanistan, otherwise spending treasure and effort there post-earthquake would be a fool's errand in my view - one that does little except transfer resources to our enemies. I would have preferred to help India directly absent a tactical need; the people helped would still be mostly Muslim, but we would have strengthened a long-term real ally, and not a double-dealing future enemy. As it happens we had an immediate tactical need, so fine.

To offer a hypothetical example: if Northern Nigeria were hit by drought and millions of people started dying, my recommendation would be not to send aid. All that aid would do is increase the later suffering of Nigeria's Christian community in the coming civil war, and they do not deserve that from us. The north can get aid from the Muslim ummah, and if that spawns more radicals then the best approach is to simply back Nigeria's Christian south (with the oil) unequivocally when that happens, and make sure the Muslims lose badly.

Exception: a situation in which Christian aid organizations made efforts to deliver aid in northern Nigeria might be worth private fundraising, because then the aid is explicitly tied to a group and belief set that would weaken Islam among those accepting it.

As David points out: this is a war. Our enemies must be disaggregated, yes, but ultimately they must be broken, too. Disaggregation is a means toward that end by minimizing the immediate problem set, making better use of our resources, making it harder for the enemy to coalesce, and placing the value of helping along Red on Red conflict in context. But it's a means to an end, not the end itself. I don't believe an end-state of general frith and friendship is achievable with Islam in its present state - though it is certainly achievable with individual Muslims, especially those working to improve the religion and make it compatible with modernity. Which leaves us with more traditional notions of victory.

I'll close by going back to the home front.

Of equal importance to everything we do abroad, the rents that have left Western civilization on its deathbed since WW1 need to be fixed. Right now, we're like an AIDS patient who survives a host of diminishingly serious diseases, always wondering if this illness will be the one that kills him - and knowing that sooner or later, the right infection will come along and finish the job.

"Civilizational confidence" is going to be 50% of the infowar, and that's going to grate on some Muslims and their co-belligerents on the Left (while gratifying truly progressive Muslims) - and so be it.

I agree with everything Joe said - and why not? Since he expressed my view so much better than I did, and without typos too.

I would add something.

Besides:

1. Shutting down all aid of all kinds to the enemy till the war is won (as illustrated but Joe's hard cases, where my recommendations would be the same), and

2. Fighting to win using the ancient, historically valid military approaches of beating the tar out of the enemy, and "divide and conquer" tactics, with no self-crippling Vietnam style "sophisticated" approaches allowed, and

3. Boosting Western and American civilizational confidence for all we are worth (and a bit more)...

We must end the fatal habit of pressing our allies to compromise and make concessions.

It didn't help Chiang Kai-shek when the Americans yanked hard on his choke collar when he was making his neck-or-nothing charge in China, and it hasn't helped anybody since.

The Americans are terribly dangerous allies - and the Ethiopians may be in some danger now - because the Americans are often ready to win "peace" and the approving smiles of their enemies by giving away what's not theirs. They seem to have no sense of timing or regard for the missed tide in doing this either. Momentum in a make or break situation seems to nothing to them.

The second worst thing after a hopeless strategy is disrupted alliances. The Americans undermine their own alliances where and when they need them most, where the fighting is.

I wish they'd stop that.

This global war must be fought and won mostly by American allies, because only they can occupy territory, raise local taxes to pay for its defense, and change how people are educated there.

It would be better if America's diplomatic opinion on what concessions should be made to members of the Islamic Courts Union was that it had no opinion on any such topic.

George W. Bush's deliberate deafness during most of Israel's fight in Lebanon was perfect. The fault was all on the ally's side there. (It's not always the Americans that are wrong. It's only that they are always blamed...)

Joe:

"There's defeat of the infowar within friendly nations, the Leftist/Islamist co-belligerency. There are a number of profitable approaches there - and so I'll set it aside."

Fair enough. However, it is something I've written a bit about. The comments to the PAO Conversation includes a discussion between myself and several others (including a couple of Public Affairs Officers) on the interplay between surviving Cold-War Communist NGOs and the Islamist movement.

"Then there's defeat of the infowar within the irrational and conspiracy-laced dialogue of Muslim countries."

That's why I think we need to develop an understanding of the tribal nature of many Islamic societies. Honor is an irrational process, but it does have rules of a sort, which can be learned. One of those rules is that you trust the word of a friend over the word of an enemy, almost regardless of supporting evidence; or a stranger, unless on the strongest evidence.

This is one reason to favor an approach based on building honor relationships. Having a working relationship on local issues gives you credibility when talking about larger issues. It doesn't give the President credibility; but the sergeant they know locally can talk to them, and they will believe him.

"This makes the notion of an effort that can bring such people within frith and family fanciful at best until key elements of their worldview and belief set are broken."

I'm unclear on the antecedent for "such people." You've here moved back and forth between "the enemy" and "Muslim countries." If you mean we can't expect to win over radical Islamists, I agree.

On the other hand, to take a Philippines' point of view, I think we can develop working relationships with organizations like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, amusingly enough). I've been watching their "peace process" with the RP government for several years. Even though they broke away from the Moro National Liberation Front b/c they thought Islamic issues deserved more focus, there's nothing in their demands or desires that make them anti-American. I think both we and the RP could come to terms with them.

More, I think they are potential allies against actual Islamist movements who have been hiding in their region. If it's in their interest to help us, we can use them to deny Mindanao to groups like Abu Sayyaf -- while also defining "a successful Islamic movement" (i.e., a movement that wins honor among Muslims) as one that isn't anti-American/Western.

"The effect of local preachers drumming home a message of hate day after day will inevitably overpower showing up in a time of need and providing aid, or otherwise trying to make nice at a general level."

That's true. Radical preachers are a problem. The solution in some places (as perhaps Australia) is to deport those of them who aren't citizens. The solution elsewhere is not as clear. Kilcullen suggests building/encouraging competing networks of moderate preachers. That runs into the problems we talked about in the Hilali post -- a guy who is moderate on one issue may be an extremist on another; a guy who is in the right place on terrorism/jihad may be in the wrong place on the position of women.

I don't know that there are any Muslim figures of prominence who espouse a line we would find really desirable. My position has been to work with the best available ones; I think we get more out of working with them than out of simply conceeding the ground. But we've had that discussion in full, I think.

"At home, the InfoOp priority is preservation of our Enlightment values and way of life."

I don't think the government should run information operations against its own citizens. I'm not sure you're suggesting that, but I'd like to be clear on the point.

I agree w/ the importance of Enlightenment values. I do think it's worth noting that the Enlightenment was a more religious time than we live in today, however; even vigorous religion is not incompatible with the Enlightenment. I'd like to see us trying to expand them even at home.

There is a piece I'm going to write soon on the subject of Jim Crow and viral freedom, which may better explain this aspect.

"To offer a hypothetical example: if Northern Nigeria were hit by drought and millions of people started dying, my recommendation would be not to send aid. All that aid would do is increase the later suffering of Nigeria's Christian community in the coming civil war, and they do not deserve that from us. The north can get aid from the Muslim ummah, and if that spawns more radicals then the best approach is to simply back Nigeria's Christian south (with the oil) unequivocally when that happens, and make sure the Muslims lose badly."

I'm going to be honest enough to punt on this example. Nigeria is not one of my areas of expertise, and I will need to read up on it to consider the issue.

I thank you, though, for a useful example of what sorts of policies we ought to pursue re: a Muslim state struck by a natural disaster. The DOD normally looks for occasions to render aid, not merely to Muslims but to anyone -- it's one of the things we do that is most successful. It seems to ease the irritation of American hegemony (so to speak) if those aircraft carriers are seen to have a positive use in helping the suffering.

"Our enemies must be disaggregated, yes, but ultimately they must be broken, too."

This is a point of disagreement. Our enemies must be broken. Those our enemies are trying to recruit into their cause should be disaggregated from the enemy whenever possible.

It was necessary, as the article notes, to have broken Fallujah and its defenders, although most of them who stayed to fight were local Sunnis and not foreign terrorists. Yet they had bought into the ideology and devoted themselves to it.

Where there are not yet Fallujahs, it would be better to try to prevent the enemy from seducing social groups of Muslim men. Honor-based militant movements can do that: consider the Banser of the Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) in Indonesia. It's quasi-militant, at least, with uniforms and marching and whatnot. It's linked to a Muslim religious organization (in fact, the NU is the largest in the world). It deploys to protect churches from anti-Christian violence and has suffered fatalities from other Muslims in that role.

That's what we should be looking to build. It's not perfect, but it represents good movement in the Muslim world.