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Senator Biden [D-DE] took some deserved heat the other day for saying something really stupid, not exactly an uncommon occurrence for a politician. What is uncommon is an effort by a politician that actually makes a difference on the ground, and fulfills a moral calling. Which Senator Biden has also done recently... and so I'd like to cover that road less traveled, instead.
What he has done is going to save a number of lives, on the front lines, in both of CENTCOM's theaters of war. It's late, the reasons why it's late have shocked me, and this isn't where I expected help to come from. The bottom line remains, however: at long last, a festering issue is being addressed - and Sen. Biden deserves genuine, sincere credit and appreciation for helping to make this so.
Defense Industry Daily has been covering the issues with Hummers for years, noting the platform's inadequacy for its role in a theater where IED land mines are threat #1, and covering the global availability and procurement of better alternatives. (Hey, if you call them IEDs, people might think they're new - and not criticize you for lack of preparedness or wartime response against a staple of war for the last 600 years.) In March 2006 my frustration meter overloaded, and I stepped out of my understated DID editor role over here with a detailed "let me tell you what I really think, and why" piece called "Hummer Deathtraps Suck."
I assumed that the professionals in the US military were covering this issue in briefings and committee hearings, and that Senators, Congressman, et. al. were being told of the Humvee's basic flaws and the availability of alternatives by returning troops, or by their military-specialist staff aides after attending yet another local funeral.
Assume. Ass-u-me. Yeah, I know....
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What I'm finding instead, as I speak to members on both sides of the aisle, is a fuzzy level of awareness and understanding even after the issue has hit the floor in the latest supplemental - and when there are fully switched-on exceptions, they seem to be born of unplanned encounters in theater, or a chance briefing by someone outside the entire system. Rep. Gene Taylor [D-MS] has been a consistent supporter of the war and the troops, and is a Democrat I respect for a number of other reasons as well. Over 2 years before he became Chair of the House Armed Services Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee, he had this to say to SecDef Rumsfeld about inadequately armored vehicles back in May 2004:
"As far as IEDs, it was conversations with troops in the field that told me that that was their biggest fear, not a hearing in this room, not a statement from the secretary. It was troops in the field that told me that that's what they were afraid of and they didn't think the proper measures were being taken to protect them.
And lastly, it was a National Guard unit from home, shortly before Christmas, that showed me proudly their efforts to make their own up-armored Humvee, because apparently no one above was bothering to tell Congress, which writes the checks for these things, that they needed to be protected.
You're obviously a smart man. I mean, you're probably one of the smartest people I know... And what's troubling is how someone who is so smart and so detail-oriented, why does it take from January to May for this committee now to find out about this in the wake of all those other things that this committee should have known about?
I sent those kids off to get killed. I share in that responsibility. I also share in the responsibility to fix these things, but we can't fix these things if we're not told about them."
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Which seems to be the story of this entire issue, over and over again. It wasn't until 2006 that a retired Colonel explained the last piece of the puzzle to Rep. Taylor: that up-armoring wasn't enough, and that a Humvee taking a blast versus a v-hull vehicle taking one is like a flat-bottomed boat hitting a wave at speed versus a v-hull boat. State of Mississippi, remember - his light finally went all the way on. For Sen. Biden, it was an encounter in Anbar province, Iraq during the summer of 2006.
To Biden's credit, he began talking to colleagues about getting more vehicles like the one he saw into theater - and met a surprising amount of dismissiveness and resistance. His staff have told me that they, and he, have been somewhat bemused and a bit troubled by the fact that here they were, of all people, leading a charge on this issue in the Senate, at this late date. You can add me to that list of the bemused and troubled. But the bottom line is, they did lead it.
Meanwhile, commanders on the ground were finally beginning to request mine-protected vehicles, and some were included in the budget. The requirement grew from 185 vehicles in May 2006; to 1,185 vehicles on December 2006, to be formally requested in the supplemental funding bill by the military; to a contract for up to 4,100 vehicles issued on January 27, 2007, total dollar amount unspecified. A total of 9 contractors have been invited to submit qualifying MRAP (Mine-Resistant, Ambush Protected) Category 1 patrol vehicles and larger MRAP Category 2 squad vehicles for testing and procurement:
- Armor Holdings: a modified FMTV, which is the Army's standard medium truck. Looks like a v-hulled troop capsule on top of the standard truck frame.
- BAE: new RG-33, and RG-33L with a robotic arm to poke safely at suspicious objects. Early MRAP order placed to ship 90 of them to Iraq and/or Afghanistan.
- Force Protection: Cougar 4×4 and 6×6. Used by the US, British, and Iraqi armies in Iraq. That's a Cougar in the blast testing picture, above. Early US MRAP orders for 1,325 placed already.
- General Dynamics: RG-31 in partnership with BAE's South African subsidiary and GD Canada. Used by the US 101st Airborne in Iraq, by US EOD teams, and by the Canadians in Afghanistan. US has ordered about 450 - some under MRAP, many outside it.
- General Purpose Vehicles: Serjeant and Commander police vehicles.
- International/Navistar truck: new v-hulled MPV design based on their Workstar 7000 tractor-trailer cab, in cooperation with Plasan Sasa of Israel whose armor solution protects the Marines' MTVR trucks.
- Oshkosh Trucks: partnered with PVI for the Alpha in cat 1, and with Thales-ADI Australia for their Bushmaster in cat 2. The US military ordered 100 Alphas under MRAP, to be shipped to the front pending successful testing. Bushmasters have been used by the Aussies in Iraq and Afghanistan for years, and the Dutch also use them in Afghanistan.
- Protected Vehicles, Inc: new Alpha patrol vehicle, and the Golan squad vehicle co-developed with and used by the Israelis. the Golan is also designed to carry reactive-explosive armor for extra protection vs. the RPGs and shaped-charge side-firing Iranian IED land mines used in Iraq; the US ordered 60 in an initial MRAP order, for shipment to the front.
- Textron Land: stretched version of the M1117 Guardian Armored Security Vehicle that has been ordered, used, and liked by MPs in Iraq. Bad news: the only factory is in New Orleans.
Of course, talk in the Senate is cheap. But this wasn't. Nor were the efforts behind the scenes before this speech was made - even though none of the manufacturers involved are located in his home state of Delaware:
WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 28, 2007
Vol. 153 No. 54 Senate S4033-4034Mr. BIDEN: Madam President, I wish to begin by stating very simply that this amendment is literally, not figuratively, a matter of life and death. I have been here for many years. I have never begun a discussion of an amendment--and I have sponsored some serious amendments and pieces of legislation--by saying something as graphic and drastic as this is literally a matter of life and death. But it is. This is not hyperbole. This is not an exaggeration.
What my amendment will do is allow the military to put 2,500 more mine resistant ambush protected vehicles--known in the military by its acronym, MRAP--in the field by the end of this year.
Now, let me explain what I am talking about. First, I want to point out that the committee acknowledged the need for these vehicles and included $2.5 billion in this bill [JK Background: the 2nd-half 2007 supplemental military funding bill, currently the subject of political dispute]. But what I propose in this amendment is forward-funding money from next year's 2008 budget into this supplemental. In that way, we can build more of these vehicles which have one purpose--the specific purpose of saving lives, American lives. The fact is, as most of my colleagues know, 70 percent of American casualties in Iraq are caused by improvised explosive devices, or IEDs.
Many of my colleagues, including the Presiding Officer, have been to Iraq. They have had the same experience I have in my seven trips--visiting field hospitals. There, you see amputees and people with serious head injuries who, because of the incredible skill and triage capability of our military doctors and nurses, are able to be kept alive. Most of those injured at Walter Reed and at Bethesda naval hospital are victims of these devices, sadly now familiar to all Americans from the nightly news. We have tried very hard--although this administration has done so belatedly--to better equip our troops to withstand IEDs. God forbid they find themselves victim of an IED attack, but if they do, we want them to be able to survive.
MRAP vehicles provide four to five times more protection to our troops than up-armored HMMWVs. That statement, that these MRAPs provide four to five times more protection than up-armored HMMWVs, is not my estimate. That is the judgment of our military leaders. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, GEN James Conway, with whom I spoke as recently as this afternoon, wrote on March 1 to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said:
Multi-National Forces--West, that is, the Marines in Iraq [JK Background: specifically, in Anbar province], estimates that the use of the MRAP could reduce the casualties in vehicles due to IED attack by as much as 80 percent.
He went on further and said that even though the MRAP is not expeditionary: It is, however, the best available vehicle for force protection. He concluded by saying: Getting the MRAP into the Al Anbar Province is my number one unfilled warfighting requirement at this time.
Let me repeat that: Getting the MRAP into the Al Anbar Province is my number one unfilled warfighting requirement at this time.He went on to tell me today that although there is some disagreement in terms of priorities within this building, he was speaking to me from the Pentagon, he said, "I believe this is a moral imperative."
How many generals with four stars or three or two or one on their shoulders have you heard use that phrase? How often is something so fundamental it is called "a moral imperative"? This is a man who is heading back out to Iraq soon. He is talking about protecting his kids, his troops.
On my last trip into Anbar Province last summer, I went to Fallujah. I met with the commanding Marine general and roughly 30 to 40 of his commanders and noncommissioned officers. I was taken outside a building to see what they were trying to do to diminish the casualty rate of American forces required to patrol Fallujah. They showed me what they called a rhino [JK Background: he means a Buffalo, aka. "The Claw"], a big vehicle, looks like a Caterpillar bulldozer with a great big proboscis on it, a great big arm that is used when an IED is identified, to disarm it. It was interesting. I observed for the first time--maybe others knew about it--the hull. The bottom of it looked like a ship out of water. It had a V-shaped bottom. A humvee, like your SUV or your automobile, has a flat bottom. In a humvee, even if it is reinforced, it is still flat. The rhino had a V-shaped bottom or floor. I asked why. They said it made them much more blast resistant and it could protect the troops inside. That is the first time I heard about this concept. They did not have MRAPs yet, but they had this rhino, a much bigger vehicle for a different purpose.
As I talked to them, I remember asking the question, why aren't we building more of these things? You know, the folks on the ground, these kids and many not so young women and men who are climbing into these coffins, know that even in an up-armored vehicle if they are struck, deadly force may be exerted, scrambling their brains or outright killing them. The number one requirement of the Commandant of the Marine Corps is to get more of these vehicles. I respectfully suggest to all who care--and every one of us cares about the fate of the troops--if there is any place we should not consider the cost--emphasize again, not consider the cost--it is when there is a consensus that what we are purchasing can save lives. We have made no sacrifice in this country to fight this war except for the families of those who have gone to the war. We should not hesitate to save the lives of those who are sacrificing because of cost.
A couple of my colleagues off the floor, none of whom are on the floor at this moment, have told me it might not be cost effective because the military is working on a new vehicle [JK Background: the JLTV, which might be ready in 5 years or so if you give them a lot of R&D dollars, instead of using that to buy safer, proven vehicles right now. Typical Pentagon]. Give me a break. Cost effective? I wonder how many people asked, when we were talking about the invasion of Normandy in World War II: You know, we better be careful. We may build too many landing craft. We might have some left over. What are we going to do with them after the war?
We have no higher obligation than to protect those we send into battle. We have received a pretty good dose of this administration's willingness to send people into battle not prepared. Rumsfeld's famous comment: You go with the Army you have, not the Army you like or need. That is paraphrasing him from a couple of years ago. When we find a way to protect people better in battle, then it seems to me we have an overwhelming obligation to act.
Let me explain the specifics of the MRAP. Each vehicle can hold 4 to 12 troops. Like the rhino, these vehicles have raised steel, V-shaped hulls and chassis. The raised hull is valuable because it gives the blast more time to expand, lessening the impact. The V-shape pushes the blast up the sides of the vehicle and away from the occupants. With an up-armored HMMWV or any humvee, the flat bottom sends the blast through the floor right into the occupants. In addition, the vehicles have side armor and bulletproof glass, and they also have tires that can be driven when flat.
Ever since the military began using MRAPs in Iraq, the requirement has grown, as commanders realize how much better they are at protecting their personnel. In May of last year the requirement was only 185. By July, it had risen to 1,185. By November, it had risen to 4,060. By February of this year, after the supplemental request was submitted, it rose to 6,738. One month later, the requirement went up again to the current level of 7,774. At this point every one in the military agrees, we need 7,774 MRAPs.
The Marines are the executive agents for this program, meaning they are managing it for themselves and the other services. Every service has a need for the vehicle for explosive ordinance units as well as regular patrols. The Marines need 3,700 of them. The Army needs 2,500. The Air Force needs 697. The Navy needs 544, and the Special Operations Command needs 333. The cost of 7,774 MRAPs is $8.4 billion. This administration's current plan is to spend $2.3 billion this year and $6.1 billion next year. But I believe we can and must do much better, and so do the Marines. If we simply put more funds up front, spend them in the supplemental rather than allocate them a year later in the 2008 budget, the same money that we are going to spend anyway next year, if we move it up, we can accelerate production drastically.
Some have said the extra production capacity does not exist. Again, speaking to the Commandant of the Marine Corps today, he indicated that there are eight companies they are dealing with and he has confidence that they can build all they can purchase, all they can afford. That is also what the Chief of Staff of the Army thinks.
On March 14, General Peter Schoomaker told the Appropriations Committee that with the MRAPs, "We can build what we get the funds to build. It is strictly an issue of money."
Let's assume the Commandant of the Marine Corps and General Schoomaker are wrong. Let's assume they have made a mistake. Let's assume we can't build as many as the money we give them. So what. So what. We are not talking about building a highway on time. We are talking about an informed judgment by the United States military, to build not a new weapons system, but to build a new protection system for their forces.
I respectfully suggest, if we are going to err on one side or the other, for God's sake, for a change, let's err on the side of doing something that will protect American fighting women and men.
Quite frankly, if the Marines believe we can do it, then my money is on the Marines getting it right. If General Schoomaker says he needs it, and more money will get the vehicles, then I take him at his word. I would rather take a chance, and I believe the American people would also, to protect more Americans under fire than not.
What does this mean specifically? Well, by adding $1.5 billion, which my amendment does, to the supplemental today, the Marines will have $4 billion to work with. Based on their estimates, that will mean 2,500 vehicles get to the field 6 months sooner than under the current plan. You may say: What is 6 months? Ten of thousands of lives is what 6 months is. Figure it out: Four to twelve people in 2,500 more vehicles. Add up the numbers. That's 10,000 to 30,000 Americans. Look at the casualty rates that come from IEDs striking up-armored HMMWVs. Do the math, and tell me if their lives are not worth taking a financial risk to protect.
If we move this money forward, on October 1 of this year, instead of having only 2,000 MRAPs, we would have 4,500 in the field. On January 1, 2008, instead of 3,500 MRAPs, we would have 6,000 in the field. By February, we would fulfill the entire requirement, instead of waiting until next July. We are still going to spend $8.4 billion, but spending it faster will make a major difference.
If you want to be callous about this, it would also save the American taxpayers a whole lot of money because for every one of those injured soldiers who comes back--to put it in Machiavellian terms--who needs a lifetime of medical care, there are hundreds of thousands of dollars committed per casualty. I can find no logical argument for delaying this.
Let me end where I began. This is a matter of life and death. Madam President, 2,500 more vehicles means literally that 10,000 to 30,000 more Americans will have a four to five times greater chance of surviving a hit with an IED while on patrol than exists today if we do not act. Madam President, 10,000 to 30,000 Americans will not be added to the casualty and death numbers if we move this money up.
To use the phrase of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, at 3 or 4 o'clock today, on the phone with me: This is a moral imperative.I agree. It is a moral imperative that we protect these troops as soon as possible.
So tomorrow, when I have my 1 or 2 minutes to speak to this issue before we vote, I will urge all my colleagues to vote for this amendment."
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The amendment passed in the Senate, and has solid support now on both sides of the aisle. The contemptible politics and deeply dishonest 'slow-bleed' strategy surrounding the supplemental make the exact timing of funds unpredictable, but on this issue the funding numbers will be there as soon as the needs of forces and commanders in the field trump the needs of politics.
Following House-Senate reconciliation, the amendment's value is down to $1.2 billion (the House had not included the full amount in its bill), but the Marine Corps believe they can shift $300 million from other programs over FY 2007/2008 to buy these vehicles, in order to meet their goal of making every single vehicle riding "outside the wire" (i.e. outside American bases) in Anbar province a blast-resistant vehicle with MRAP-level protection. Up-armored hummers would then be restricted to operating under explicit commander's waivers.
The Army remains predictably slow in this respect, and their request for only 2,500 MRAP vehicles in FY 2007-2008 won't begin to replace about 19,000 Hummers in theater. But they're moving in the right direction at last, toward blast-resistant patrol vehicles like the 101st Airborne's RG-31 Mk5 Chargers (one of the approved MRAP vehicles), rather than restricting these designs to Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams. They're also going to get more of these vehicles, sooner than planned.
That's going to save lives. You may like Senator Joseph Biden's political and policy choices, or you may hate them - but no matter what you think of him, he deserves real credit and sincere appreciation for this.
Long, long overdue. Still... better late than never.
Biden will catch hell from his base and fellow Dems on this one. Good for him. But I'm sure Harry Reid and others plus of course Kos, Dean-o, and Moveon will give him a good talking to.
That's worthy of respect and gratitude from every American of every political stripe. Thanks for bringing attention to it, Joe.
Now if Joe could just do something about the horrid M-16 ... really an atrocity of a battle rifle.
Troops deserve a rifle more reliable than the AK-47 with better range and power.
Good to move in this direction.
However, the "cost is/should be no object" mantra is just silly. Cost is always an issue, until such time as someone invents the Unlimited Budget. Just do the math: using Biden's figures, the average MRAP cost just over $1 million. Let's use 8 troops as the average capacity (Bidens says they vary from 4 to 12.) That gives about $135,000 per seat. That's way more than Humvees cost, so the extra money does have to come from somewhere.
Joe, I understand your frustration on this issue.
One comment and I'll leave it at this: I think you fail to acknowledge the training and logistical issues associated with any new equipment. What may seem like commander stupidity or sloth or indifference has a very different face when seen from the perspective of balancing immediate need against the implications of changing.
The deaths in Iraq due to Strykers overturning in some conditions is an excellent example of the side-effects of new vehicles.
Add in training and logistical tail costs to that $135,000 per seat cost, as well.
At Jim Roquefort #3: Have you ever even fired a 16 or AK?
The M16 is a fine battle rifle and the choice of special forces units from a number of countries; units that can select whatever rifle they want. There is a reason for this........
The M16 is accurate and has a flat trjectory (very important for hitting targets at unknown ranges and that making themselves small).
Neither can be said about the AK.
The M16 is - contrary to the hot stove league's opinon - very lethal at normal combat ranges. You just have to hit your target center of mass. It is more lethal than the AK47 round.
The AK47 is, in my opinion, a piece of junk.
After action reports from Iraq show the M16/M4 as being more reliable than the AKs.
The only major negative pertaining to the M16 occurred shortly after it was introduced in Vietnam and, due to various factors, it was overly prone to jamming. Those factors were addressed, successfully, about forty years ago, Jim.
As for stories of men shot by M16s not going down immediately and, perhaps, requiring followup hits before dropping, this may be occassionally true. Most often, though, a man shot solidly by an M16 will drop quickly. No hand held weapon will drop a man every time with one shot. Not an AK, not an M14. There will be always be those inviduals who, through unique physiology, narcotics use, mind set, or freak shot placement (maybe nothing vital hit even though center of mass) will keep going and require multiple hits.
Read the stories behind USMC Navy Cross/MoH awardees. Some of these Marines took multiple hits from .30 cal weapons and kept advancing to achieve their objective before succumbing to their wounds. Soe men can just do this. Most die fast.
Back on topic......good for Biden. This is long overdue. Why not from the "support the troops" repub.s??????
Avedis -- I have variants of BOTH.
HAving extensively shot BOTH (at rifle ranges), here is my observations:
EVEN AT THE RANGE, the AR-15 JAMS JAMS JAMS. Because it is direct action, i.e the dirty/hot exhaust gases directly on the bolt. Which is the devil's own to clean.
It is quite accurate for punching holes in paper which is exactly what Eugene Stoner, a target shooter, designed it for.
Meanwhile, while less accurate the AK-47 civilian variant (Saiga Rifle) was quite reliable and easy to clean.
BOTH under single shot i.e. semi-auto have equivalent recoil. The AR-15 is quite lighter, has better ergonomics. I am told that firing the M-16 in it's three shot burst (no longer will it fire fully auto) it's fairly controllable, the AK-47 requires more control.
Here
Is an assessment of Marines in combat on the well known complaints against the M-16:
"He hated the 5.56 round based on very poor performance on what they found to be "pharmacologically enhanced" Jihadists. He did not know what they seemed to be on, but some said it seemed like they were crank heads. He said numerous times, it would take many many hits to stop an advancing enemy even with solid torso hits. One in particular had 17 5.56 holes in him. He did say they would often find guys dead some distance away from the fighting with what appeared to be 5.56 bullet holes in him, but that they never killed "fast enough" for the Marines to be comfortable in the results. He said that the M240 on the hummers was a great weapon as was the mk 19 saying it did more to stop fights than anything short of Air support. "
This was the complaint in Somalia (not enough range, less than lethal effect against guys under light cover or under drug use). I can recall many of Yon's posts having soldiers complain about the same thing: need to hit a guy shooting at them five or six times to drop him when more than 200 yards away.
The AK-47 was designed for reliability, sacrificing accuracy. The M-16 was designed for accuracy, sacrificing reliability. M-16s constantly jam, jam, jam in the dust of Iraq and Afghanistan, which is compared to fine talcum powder. Kalashnikov, a soldier on the Russian front, designed deliberately great amounts of space to account for mud, dust, muck and keep the gun functional. Guys on Patrol in Iraq and Afghanistan will routinely take AK-47s. What does that tell you? No one has confidence in the weapon under combat conditions.
The AK-47 also has what all other (except for the execrable M-16) battle rifles have: a gas-piston system instead of direct gas. This has more moving parts but does not put hot and dirty exhaust gas on the bolt and firing pin assembly (it takes me under no stress about 25 minutes to disassable the bolt-firing pin assembly and clean out the gunk after about 100 rounds on the AR-15; cleaning my Saiga is done in about 5 minutes and is dead simple).
The .223 cartridge is NOT getting it done, the 7.62X39 AK-47 cartridge has more punch at greater ranges. This is a consideration given that body armor available to the enemy NOW will stop the .223.
Army doctrine holds to the utility of lighter ammo (you can carry more) while sacrificing the ability to hit harder at longer distances. This hasn't worked for us in wars where the ability to put relatively few rounds on the target to stop it decisively is required. [Fear of killing/injuring civilians]
Most US special forces will have some M-16s but also prefer the old M-14 with the .308 and it's superior ballistics.
What IMHO is needed is something akin to this
I.e. the HK 416. You can fire a full magazine, take out the bolt, the bolt is cool to the touch. Gas doesn't touch it. Read the article in the link, it discusses in detail the shortcomings of the M16/M4 system. This system in .308? IMHO a winner since it gives our guys BOTH range and power AND reliability and accuracy with the M-16's better ergonomics and lighter weight.
Yes this weapon was featured on Future Weapons on Discovery.
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Biden? Still a tool. He thinks Iran needs nukes for it's "emotional needs" yet is OK with them killing our guys.
Since I'm getting the word out you might as well have it too.
Despite David Blue.
Haditha Bombshell - Intel Evidence
".... hated the 5.56 round based on very poor performance on what they found to be "pharmacologically enhanced" Jihadists. ....."
So what evidence is there that a different round would have been even more effective? None. A 7.62 round would have probably had the same failure to stop immediately with these hopped up individuals. There are many documented cases of larger than .556 failing to stop an attacking enemy even after mutiple torso hits.
"HAving extensively shot BOTH (at rifle ranges)" As I thought, no combat training or experience. So you are relying on unscientific reports from dubious sources floating around the internet. You do realize that an official after action report (post Iraq Invasion) - re-printed in Stars and Stripes - specifically questioned Marines about the .556 effectives and the typical answer back was that it "definitely delivered the mail". Marines responded that if an enemy was shot in the torso or head he would go down reliably.
"Most US special forces will have some M-16s but also prefer the old M-14 with the .308 and it's superior ballistics." Negative. This simply isn't true in the overwhelming majority of cases.
BTW JIm, most of the time when an M16 jams it is due to bent magizine lips and/or a follower that has been replaced backwards.
Of course, you may be using some civi ammunition that doesn't develop sufficient pressure, wrong powder mix, ect.
Use new GI issue magazines and use GI ball ammuition and your jam problems will dissipate.
And clean your weapon thoroughly! This means removing the extractor and the ejector and using a brush to remove any build up. Also, be sure to oil the ejector thoroughly so that it doesn't stick.
Sorry to stray off topic............sometimes this whole M16 debate just bothers me because there is so much misinformation, misunderstanding and so much pure BS being thrown at a pretty darn good piece.
Christian Loew at DefenseTech has a differing view: he thinks the MRAP is poorly suited to "tactical vehicle" mission.
Check out the article yourself and, please, post responses.
Note: I'm not knocking the MRAP. The troops seem to love them. I'm just tossing an opposing viewpoint out.
Thanks, Joe, for the fair-minded kudos. Credit where credit is due.
Meanwhile Jim Rockford [#1] makes a testable prediction about the behavior of Liberals:
I've long noticed that Jim's model of Liberals is, shall we say, a bit stark and simplistic. It doesn't correspond with my experience with liberals, and I suspect I have more first-hand experience than Jim does, though I suspect he gets more second-hand reports from sources I might not read.
But here's a real, testable prediction. Do we have any data in response?
The data on my side is pretty negative. I haven't seen anyone on the liberal side criticizing Biden for that position. But I don't have a comprehensive picture of what the blogs are saying. Can you provide examples (with URLs please) of Biden "catching hell" from Liberals?
But before we present data, let's calibrate what "catching hell" might mean. Notice that in this (non-Liberal) comment thread, among the nine messages after Jim's prediction, one [#2] favored giving MRAPs to our troops, three [#4,5,10] were critical or skeptical, and the remainder commented on different topics. So, to conclude that Liberals were giving "hell" to Biden for sending MRAPs to the troops, their comments would have to run significantly more than 3-1 against, or demonstrate significantly greater heat than the criticisms above, or some weighted combination of the two.
OK, now. Let's see how Jim Rockford's model of Liberals fares against the data.
Beard,
This has a number of supporters on the Democratic side of the aisle - one solid supporter is John Murtha, whom I consider to be one step removed from Benedict Arnold. But having said that, no, that does not validate Jim's predictions re: the behaviour of Democrat politicians in response. In fact, and yes this surprised and annoyed me too, the Dem politicians I speak to seem much more switched on and passionate about this issue than the GOP pols I've been in touch with thus far. And I'm talking to supposed supporters from both sides.
The GOP is still leadership-deficient on the GWOT front, and this is just one of the ways.
Jim's experiences with the AR-15 and AK-47... well, those stem from a deeper base of personal knowledge, agree or disagree as you may.
Meanwhile, speaking of poor models, DefenseTech:
The Marines' request for 3,700 stems from a policy decision that will have ALL vehicles outside the wire being MRAP-class vehicles by 2008. Up-armored Hummers would go off base only with explicit commander's waivers. THAT is what prompted the request to Congress, and the exact number.
So Mr. Lowe is just egregiously wrong. He will also find these vehicles being used, successfully, as tactical vehicles, by:
to name just a few. In short, he hasn't a freaking clue what he's talking about here, and his claims are testably false.
As for the extra $135,000 per seat, yes, MRAP vehicles cost more. No, the budget is not unlimited. Yes, death benefits are $500,000 per soldier. Which means 10 soldiers = $5 million. You could spend $750,000 to put them in 3 crappy but fully equipped up-armored Hummers, or $1 million to put them in a fully equipped MRAP Category 2 vehicle that is significantly less likely to cash those death benefits (or about $1.5 million to put them in 2 MRAP Category 1s). As Biden correctly points out, the math is not as lopsided as it seems.
Finally, training et. al. Sorry, not buying. At all. It seems now that the system is able to move very quickly once it makes up its mind. The 101st Airborne has been using its RG-31s for years. The Marines' Cougars have been on the ground since early 2005, and that's after delays getting them ordered.
This could have been done a LOT quicker than it was. Driving an RG-31 or Cougar is NOT some arcane art that can't be mastered very quickly by those familiar with Hummers et. al. Many of the basic automotive and electronic components are also found in the USA's vehicles and truck fleets, which means maintenance isn't some arcane art, either. The Army was just stupid and slow on this one. They are still slow, ordering just 2,500 MRAP vehicles in 2007-2008 next to the USMC's 3,700. Despite having many more people and vehicles in theater. Imagine if the urgency was even comparable...
Joe,
I'll definitely defer to you and Jim and many others on the relative merits of the AR-15 and AK-47. I've shot some pistols and a few rifles, but I have nothing like the experience others have.
On the extra investment for the MRAPs. Suppose, for purposes of argument, we forget entirely about the personal cost of death and injury, and consider only the strategic cost. An important part of fighting against an enemy like this is to make them feel impotent against you. Even if a casualty means no suffering or loss of capability on our side, inflicting damage is a benefit to theirs. If they can try to inflict damage, but fail, that is a major morale-sink for them.
In another context, I said that "Don't get killed" was an important part of the strategy for fighting terrorists. Reaped a lot of scorn. But this is what I meant then, and it's still true now.
The value of IEDs to their side is that they can see the resulting damage to us. Therefore, the improved armor design on the MRAPs is a strategic tool for eliminating a significant benefit to them of one of their major weapons. Independent of saving our boys and girls much grief, it's a benefit to our side. It's a no-brainer even without that factor.
Add on the personal loss and grief from injury and death to our soldiers, and it's malpractice not to have it.
#13 from Beard: "In another context, I said that "Don't get killed" was an important part of the strategy for fighting terrorists. Reaped a lot of scorn."
None of it from me. (And I didn't notice anyone else being scornful, or I would have disagreed with them.) My opinion is the same.
We should be trying to sap hostile resources as severely as possible, in the most lasting and strategic ways possible, as the minimum friendly cost.
Apparently, we are unable to define the enemy as hostile and act accordingly, so the vast bulk of the attrition has to be red on red. Fortunately, the same ultra-high level of aggressiveness that makes the enemy the enemy makes them surprisingly willing to go in for that. But to encourage it, we have to do lots of things that can't be sold as grand crusades in the style of World War Two.
I think we should fight this global war as much as we can in Africa, where Arab ethnic cleansing against blacks is something we can fight with a good heart, and where there are non-Islamic forces in play, thus potential real "friendlies", which we will never find in adequate number in fully Islamic regions. Most people don't want to fight in Africa.
Africa and the vital need for red on red attrition mean slender casualty budgets and scant endurance.
That means that acquiring the tools to make the kind of war we need is all about putting casualty reduction first. That means, among other things, v-hulled vehicles.
And if Democrats are the ones pressing for the proper tools, then on this issue, go Democrats.
David Blue [#14],
I'm glad we're on the same page on this one.
However, let me respond to your point:
Part of our current problem, is that we haven't been able to tell the difference between friends and enemies, so our genuine enemies set up scenarios where our responses alienate our potential friends and turn them into actual enemies. (This is partly due to the problem of "false positives" in any attempt to figure out whether someone is an enemy.)
The key is to realize that the vast majority of the population really want peace and quiet, law and order, so they can go about their business. They will reluctantly mobilize against pressing threats, but they really just want to go home and get back to family and work. Call them the Forces of Peace.
There are vocal, energized, fanatical groups that really want to make war against the Outsider. As you say, they are so aggressive, that for lack of any other accessible Outsider, they will happily wage war among themselves, between Shiites and Sunnis, or any other group, if need be. Call them the Forces of War.
The Force of War is a small minority compared with the Force of Peace, but they are far more energetic. And they have a great tool for converting an individual from the side of Peace to the side of War. Make sure that something terrible happens to that person's loved ones, for which the Outsider can be held responsible. Aside from sheep or saints, that person is likely to be filled with murderous rage, and is then easily recruited to the Force of War.
How do we defeat the Force of War? First, we make it clear that we are on the side of the Force of Peace. That we stand for law and order, peace and quiet, justice and prosperity. Make clear to the general population that this is true, and is consistently and even-handedly enforced, and the vast majority will support the Force of Peace. (Not support the USA. They support the Forces of Peace, of which the USA is a part.)
Second, we work to make it clear that the Force of War is impotent. This can be an up-hill battle, since they have genuine weapons and can do serious damage. But ordinary people have to know that they can side with the Force of Peace without being slaughtered.
In the conduct of the Iraq War, we seriously blew the first part when we failed to ensure law and order after Saddam's fall. We should have clamped down on the population immediately, with major police presence and enforcement. (This is why it was so foolish when people said that our troops are soldiers, not policemen. If they wanted to win this war, they had to be policemen too.) Arguably this is 20-20 hindsight, but lots of sensible people were saying this at the time.
Then we have failed to make the opposition visibly impotent. Providing suitably armored vehicles is only one part of that, but an important one. There are many other ways in which the Forces of War in Iraq know it is fruitless to try to attack American troops. But IEDs work. We have to make sure they stop working. (Developing and deploying this technology is like the search for code-breakers and radar during WWII.)
It would have been difficult, but perhaps possible, to follow this recipe starting with the fall of Saddam. Is it possible any more? I am skeptical. The Forces of War in Iraq have made the place so chaotic and dangerous that the Forces of Peace are now a beleagered minority. This recipe works for protecting civilization from a threat, even a serious threat. But when civilization is gone, it isn't applicable. It's not wrong: it's just not applicable.
So, David, I agree with you about the value of carrying on the effort in Africa. But I disagree with your implication that our goal is to foment "red on red aggression". That amounts to being one faction in the Forces of War. Our goal is to visibly establish ourselves as representing the Force of Peace, helping the indigenous members of the Force of Peace to eliminate the local Forces of War.
That means we need to be honest, just, and incorruptible policemen in environments where dishonesty, injustice, and corruption are rife. We need to demonstrate a level of power and untouchability that makes the local Forces of War visibly impotent.
Is this straight-forward? Of course not! It requires brains, integrity, training, technology, and knowledge of the local culture, among many other things. Is it dangerous and risky? Of course! War is always dangerous and risky.
Is the USA capable of fighting and winning a war this way? Yes, indeed. And perhaps the USA is uniquely capable of fighting and winning a war this way, because of our lofty national ideals, and the fact that more of our people still believe in them, than in many other countries. (I believe that it is these ideals that power WoC and similar sites.)
Is the Bush Administration capable of leading the USA to fight and win a war this way? No. That has been demonstrated with perfect clarity over the last six years. Those leaders, at the top, have demonstrated a consistent pattern of dishonesty, injustice, and corruption that makes them incapable of anything but continuing to make things worse.
#15 from Beard: "Our goal is to visibly establish ourselves as representing the Force of Peace, helping the indigenous members of the Force of Peace to eliminate the local Forces of War.
That means we need to be honest, just, and incorruptible policemen in environments where dishonesty, injustice, and corruption are rife."
I disagree, but on the issue of v-hulled vehicles, the difference doesn't matter.
It wasn't until 2006 that a retired Colonel explained the last piece of the puzzle to Rep. Taylor: that up-armoring wasn't enough, and that a Humvee taking a blast versus a v-hull vehicle taking one is like a flat-bottomed boat hitting a wave at speed versus a v-hull boat. State of Mississippi, remember - his light finally went all the way on.
That's the point.
David Blue,
As I'm sure you saw, you and I agree on v-hulled vehicles. Then I go on in [#15] to make a larger and more contentious point about how to win the GWoT.
Beard,
I was simply outlining why my perspective on the current war led to seeing force protection as a dominant value, when ordinarily other values such as mobility and high tempo of operations should be seen as more important. In other words, I was justifying a bit of doctrine that I'm embarrassed about.
I wasn't trying to press a broader, contentious point.
It's just a coincidence that if we both outline where we are coming from, it points to force protection as a high value.
David Blue,
Guess so. On to the next.
Best wishes . . .
Ditto. :)
The up-armour issue is a great searchlight to look in the dark corners of the military beaurcracy and our own hearts. However, the dishonesty and shallowness of the media as well as the hypocracy among Democrats means that there is a lot of war fog.
I assume Biden was just covering his usual anti-war position with a gesture of concern for our troops. Hilary seems to have chimed in on this too. This is an easy two-fer; show concern and attack the military and the war at the same time. So you can see I don't think much of old Joe.
I worked on up-armour for the Hummve. I was appauled by their canvas doors. It was easy to see that the irregular part of the war in Iraq was going to make these doors dangerous. Up-armour represented change, and was resisted by the military establishment. Part of the enemy we fight in the war on terror is ourselves. To change and respond and improve all create discomfort. It takes honesty and strength of character to meet this challenge, but change is the only way to win this war.
Still there is always a balance to be struck. You can add armour until, you become immobile. You can make your base so secure that you fail to go outside the wire and win the ground war.
I have talked to Marines who did not want heavier Hummvees. They wanted to win, and thought focusing on armour would slow down what they were trying to do. Of course this is why I respect Marines so much.
Our soldiers will adapt. There will be IED jammers and bomb resistant vehicles, and General Patraeus will lead his troops outside the wire to confront Al Qaeda. That is important.
As for the hypocracy and spin of politicos like Biden and Rodham and the ignorance and shallowness of the media that distorts the realities of this war on terror and enables elected officials homesick for the defeat of Vietnam to prosper, I am sad but confident that they are on the losing side of history. I believe that despite the challenges our soldiers deserve our confidence and support and that these strange compromised politicians do not.