4GW: Small Wars

You may not think of the US Marine Corps as a bunch of intellectual types. You may be wrong.

Vodkapundit pointed out in an email yesterday that "back in the '30s, the Marine Corps saved its existence by inventing the doctrine, training, and equipment for amphibious assault warfare". You've got to admire their prediction record, given the importance of amphibious assault warfare 10 and then 20 years later. They've also had a great deal of success in organizing and preparing for Expeditionary Warfare, a fact that has made the Marines "first to fight" in a number of key situations. Exhibit #1 is Kandahar, which is nowhere near any seacoast I can see.

Stung by this loss of relevance, the U.S. Army has been trying to catch up with measures like its "Light Divisions" and the Interim Brigade Combat Teams. These are worthy efforts, but the Marines led the way on sustainable expeditionary operations... and still do.

Indeed, when it comes to counterinsurgency, the Marines have done a lot of work.

Long involved in combatting insurgents and guerrillas in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Corps finally published its "Small Wars Manual" in 1940. It vanished more or less without a trace, to be republished in 1987. In between the Marines continued to do interesting things, including the Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam (see also this historical summary). More recently, they were one of the first services to begin publishing articles on 4th Generation Warfare.

Now "Small Wars" are back. Several are in progress right now (the Philippines being the most oft-reported), with more to come after Iraq and its aftermath. If you want a good synopsis, start with this short piece by Johnathan Rauch. After that, I recommend moving on to the USMC Small Wars Manual itself.

Real expertise comes from having done this stuff - no report can give that to you. That said, I highly recommend a 1989 work by Major Andrew J. Budka of the USMC called "Low-Intensity Conflict And The Marines: A Seabased Solution." Budka starts with a good basic briefing on "Small Wars," then goes on to discuss some innovative approaches that still make a great deal of sense. Over a decade later, his ideas remain highly relevant to military transformation issues.

The Table of Contents is:

    I.   Low-Intensity Conflict:  Its Dimensions and Characteristics
    II.  U. S. Response Towards Low-Intensity Conflict: General 
  III.   U. S. Response To Low-Intensity Conflict: Specific
   IV.   Seabasing a Low-Intensity Conflict Effort 
    V.   Seabasing and the Marines
   VI.   Seabasing, Mobility and Support
  VII.   Intelligence Support
 VIII.   Conclusions

Budka's work is long, probably too long unless you're a serious student of military affairs and/or foreign policy. But if that describes who you are - or who you'd like to be - then this is a very worthwhile read.