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A Lib-Left Plan for Iraq

| 21 Comments

In Italy, reader Stefano emailed me this report from the "Interenational Crisis Group," a think-tank based in Brussels, Belgium. What Can the U.S. Do In Iraq? has some useful things to say and some foolish things to say, as you might expect from a body whose Board includes Chris "what Palestinian terrorism?" Patten and George Soros. Read it and discuss: which parts offer useful insights, and which ones are foolish.

21 Comments

Some random thoughts from quickly browsing the document:

- While reducing civilian casualities where possible should be a goal, tactically 5b + 5d sounds an awful lot like withdrawing the Coalition forces to static positions outside populated areas & severely limiting use of force if there's any possibility of civilians being hurt. Given the failure of the ARVN in Vietnam when they stuck to fixed defenses vs. guerillas, this sounds like a recipe for defeat.

- 6c: given their difficulties so far in putting together even marginally operational fighting units, insisting that the new Iraqi military be fully responsible for logistics, recruitment, etc. seems fanciful and counterproductive.

- 8c: So the emphasis is going to be on investigating human rights abuses by Coalition forces, presumably because abuses by the insurgents are either uninvestigatable or were done in a more noble cause by locals? Nice double standard there.

- The last paragraph before "Recommendations" basically says that only an Iraqi government which is hostile to the USA can be seen as truly autonomous. Good luck selling that one, guys.

- Throughout, there seems to be an emphasis on transfering authority to a "fully sovereign Iraqi government", yet it dances around whether any such entity could be recognized as such if elections were postponed. Would an unelected government be OK in their view if it had the rubber stamp of the U.N.?

(1c) national elections scheduled for January 2005 will change little unless they produce institutions that can address basic needs and prove their independence by distancing themselves from the U.S. and reaching out to all political components.

Taking into account were the think tank is based, presumably a "fully sovereign Iraqi government" hostile to the USA means a government that agrees to pay France the foreign debt of the Saddam years. Moreover, and unelected government would be easier to manipulate.

The whole document is a well constructed manipulation. In very soft words it says that the U.S. and allies must leave iraqis alone and negotiate with whatever government evolves there. Well, I guess that it would not be a democracy.

In my opinion, as long as the combats happen in Iraq and not in Manhattan, the U.S. are winning this war.

The essence of their 'plan' is for US forces to accept rules of engagement that turn them into police. Assorted bad guys will be free to ambush, take pot-shots, and bomb Americans with near impunity, while the Old-Europe, old media, academia and all the arabists in the State Department set up the drumbeat that this has failed.

In the process, Iraqi troops are to be cut off from working with the coalition -- so they don't get combat experience, they don't get battle-hardened, they don't get practical tactics. Then they do get slaughtered.

Outside the Sunni triangle--an area only two or three times the size of Connecticut--what are these folks talking about? Who are they listening to? Iranian agent-provocateurs, baathists, whatever?

Iraq has a criminal problem as well as a limited ethnic insurgency problem, yet the economy is growing far into double digits with very little inflation and a stable dinar. If the majority of Iraqis were fearful, pessimistic, or engaged in hostile activities, this would not be happening. Aggregate economic numbers put the lie to ICG's core assumption.

Not only is their assumption wrong, this is absolutely the wrong time to stop pressing the attack. Look, frankly we've killed most of the dumb ones by now. It's the ring-leaders and hard core who are left.

It's time to destroy them, not arrest them. If some civilians get killed, too bad. These thugs who see their economic monopoly grip on power slipping away by the day are killing civilians all the time. They must be destroyed. If we have to go into Syria to do it, so be it. If the Syrians don't like it, too bad.

If the bleeding hearts don't like it, as Pierre Trudeau once said when faced with an 'apprehended insurrection,' ... let them bleed.
.

"If some civilians get killed, too bad."

Is this a joke, Bart, or are you really unable to see that killing civilians (even unintentionally) might actually annoy their friends and loved ones somewhat -- like enough to take up arms against those that did the killing? As always, putting youself in the other person's shoes can help you to think things through a bit.

Imagine you watched your brother, mother or daughter get shot or blown up by a foreign army that was occupying Kansas. Would you really not feel the smallest desire for revenge against those who wear the occupier's uniform? Would you really sit back calmly and say, well, I know these soldiers are well-intentioned, and I know they didn't mean to kill my kid? If so, you are a very calm and passive man, though your post suggests otherwise.

Killing civilians isn't just "too bad", it is completely counter-productive to the goal of pacifying a country and bringing democracy there. Behind every dead civilian, there's a family and a neighborhood demanding answers, and, in many cases, revenge.

Joe A: "as long as the combats happen in Iraq and not in Manhattan, the U.S. are winning this war". Terrorism is global now in case you hadn't noticed; it doesn't just hide in Mideastern shadows anymore. What the US does in the Middle East gets back to Manhattan eventually, one way or another.

And, by the way, Joe K, Chris Patten has been a leading figure in the UK Conservative Party, hardly "lib/left".

Sorry TT, I have to agree with Bart. We can't let the perfect be the enemy of the good. We can and should try as best we can to reduce civilian casualties, but we should absolutely not let the possibility of collateral damage undermine the mission. We're dealing with a culture that respects strength even when that strength is used to brutally oppress them. And they despise weakness even when that weakness results from the most noble of intentions, like avoiding civilian casualties.

"are you really unable to see that killing civilians (even unintentionally) might actually annoy their friends and loved ones somewhat -- like enough to take up arms against those that did the killing?"

I am not only really unable to see it, but I think it wholly untrue.

The Iraqis did not take up arms against the dictatorial regime that murdered, raped, and tortured hundred of thousands of civilians. The Cambodians did not; the Cubans have not; the Hutu have not; et cetera, ad nauseam.

Few people will or do, unless they have some reasonable assurance that there will be no payback.

Maybe I can reframe this controversy more productively. The issue seems to be, at root, something like:

"Given the top priority many Iraqis put on the security situation, is it better to adopt a policy that:

A. Kills far more dedicated bad guys (incl. al-Qaeda, organized criminals, etc.), taking them out of circulation but increasing civilian casualties.

B. Reduces civilian casualties and thus hopefully having an effect on slowing jihadi recruiting, at a cost of leaving more al-Qaeda types and organized criminals on the streets."

When put this way, it's possible to advance arguments directed toward these options that show why A or B might be better at reducing the core problem. Such as:

  • The al-Qaeda cadre do a lot of recriting via bribes (pull off this attack and it's worth a year's salary to you), or threats (pull of this attack or your family gets it). But getting the cadre requires aggressive operations.
  • The ethnic dimension. The majority Shi'ites and the Kurds will react very differently to Sunni civilian casualties, and also to a policy they see as ineffective in protecting them in order to save Sunnis. The question may not be about having "Iraqis", ill-defined, pissed off at you, but which Iraqis and why. Shi'ites joining militias in large numbers because they feel unprotected could be a disaster to many parties, including the Sunnis as well as the Americans.

Etc.

TT: "Terrorism is global now in case you hadn't noticed"

Yes, it is. However...

First, Iraq is today the islamic extremists' relief valve, it's the great attractor of islamic militants, funds, islamic media coverage, etc. The longer the terrorists focus there, the calmer you live in America.

Second point, to murder iraqis is a bad marketing strategy for islamic extremist. They are already suffering even in Saudi Arabia because of this. Remember that the Jeddah attack was aimed to an American symbol in order to enlist more radicals. They are getting nothing killing muslims.

So it is extremely important to develop the main stages of this war on muslim soil, where the deficiencies of integrism compared to a classic liberal democracy are clearly shown.

If we keep on the offensive, the islamic extremism may colapse by itself when the people they want to "free" realise that it is just another tiranny, as it happened with the communist world or with the theocratic regime in Iran.

If we keep on the offensive, the islamic extremism may colapse by itself when the people they want to "free" realise that it is just another tiranny, as it happened with the communist world or with the theocratic regime in Iran.

I realize you're on a roll, Joe_A, but the mullahs in Iran are clicking along just fine, thank you, and show no signs of going away on their own or being removed in a velvet revolution any time soon.

As much as all of us, I'm sure, would like that to happen.

Unfortunately, tyrannies frequently have a way of persisting long past the time when their crimes have become apparent cf. Hussein, Saddam and Castro, Fidel.

Imagine you watched your brother, mother or daughter get shot or blown up by a foreign army that was occupying Kansas. Would you really not feel the smallest desire for revenge against those who wear the occupier's uniform?

If they came to liberate me from the likes of Saddam, or the ayatollahs, or even many of the leaders of today's left -- especially after nearly a generation of tyranny -- no, I wouldn't seek revenge.

I would mourn my relatives, deeply, and do my best to get the real bad guys, which is what a lot of Iraqis are doing. Or I would work towards the new democracy, even at great risk to my own life, which is what a lot of Iraqis are doing. Or I would build my business and try to prosper in a free and democratic future, which a lot of Iraqis are doing.

TT may be one of those naive folks who says "Visualise World Peace" (meaning to them the absence of conflict, instead of the absence of threat).

I say instead, "Visualise World FREEDOM" and know that it has a cost ... sometimes even to me and my family, which it has.

5 d) (d) making clear that the military priority is not to destroy the enemy but physically to protect civilians, in particular by limiting military operations that imperil civilians ...

If anybody can think of a better way to get more of our people killed, and a whole lot of civilians and Iraqi police killed, please let these Belgian geniuses know. Playing a game of sitting duck is hard to beat on that score, though.

5 b) b)redeploying troops to ensure a more dispersed and less visible presence, while maintaining a rapid intervention capability;

Security is the number one concern of Iraqis, and I don't see how it will help to have the security forces hide. What goddamn difference does it make how rapidly we intervene, after the car bomb has gone off and thirty of them are lying dead in the street?

David Schuler: Unfortunately, tyrannies frequently have a way of persisting long past the time when their crimes have become apparent cf. Hussein, Saddam and Castro, Fidel.

Fidel? Have we already tackled Fidel? Castro is fostering sexual tourism in his prision-island because his government has no foreign reserves enough to keep running even its pathetic socialist economy.

How did Saddam survive? Bribing half of the world's diplomatic services with petrodollars. Who fought for Saddam when the US Army and the Marines began to move northwards?

These are empty regimes, they keep going internally through fear and propaganda. OK, Iran has not completed the change yet but, do you think its students will fight for the Ayatollahs?

Tackle them, if necessary avoid direct confrontation, but always keep the pressure. That's what Reagan and Thatcher did, it worked and it is apparently working now in North Korea.

John: "The Iraqis did not take up arms against the dictatorial regime that murdered, raped, and tortured hundred of thousands of civilians. The Cambodians did not; the Cubans have not; the Hutu have not; et cetera, ad nauseam."

Yes, your policy can be so brutal, your rule so absolute and terrifying, that people cower in toal fear and don't fight back. But is that really what you are suggesting as the American model now for Iraq? You think that if the U.S. would only act like Pol Pot or Saddam, all the problems of Iraq would be solved and the US could live in peace?

Fred: "We're dealing with a culture that respects strength even when that strength is used to brutally oppress them. And they despise weakness even when that weakness results from the most noble of intentions, like avoiding civilian casualties."

So, the US has to show its strength by killing civilians? Hmmmm... I'm not sure how much time you've spent in war zones and post-conflict countries, but if you have, you'll have heard this language a lot, usually from people who do not understand much about the history and culture of the other side and are therefore unable to make reasoned judgements about their motives or intentions. Every side in a war produces those with arguments along the lines of, "hit 'em hard, because their kind only understand strength". I've heard that same argument on all sides of the wars/conflicts in Kosovo, Macedonia, Cyprus, Israel and Afghanistan. More importantly right now, it's exactly the line used by Al Qaeda: the US only understands power, they bark, and so jihadis have to hit Americans hard. I don't think it serves America's aims to use these arguments if America's aims are more than destruction, which they certainly are.

Joe K is right to say there's a balance to be struck. There clearly comes a point where killing civilians starts to feed an insurgency more than it helps eliminate it by wiping out near-by bad guys. The question then becomes: how do you tell when you are at that point, the point of counter-productivity? Certainly, you'd have to look at the military strength of the insurgency (growing or shrinking?), and you'd have to see how the average public is feeling (are they siding with you or against you?). I'm not in Iraq at the moment, but from what I make of it, it seems at least possible that the US has moved to the wrong side of these questions now. So, a bit of strategic rethink is in order if the US wants to win this thing.

That doesn't mean cut-and-run. That would be the worst possible thing to do right now. But it does mean fighting a bit smarter, and it means accepting what you are going to end up with if you establish democracy in a place where the majority now mistrust you at best and hate you at worst.

TT, thanks for the acknowledgement, agree with the goal of fighting smarter all the time and winning. Quibble a bit with your method, though:

"The question then becomes: how do you tell when you are at that point, the point of counter-productivity? Certainly, you'd have to look at the military strength of the insurgency (growing or shrinking?), and you'd have to see how the average public is feeling (are they siding with you or against you?)."

Yeah, except that would tell you very little - and might not be telling you what you think.

What we really need to know is the answer to questions like what are the mechanisms by which insurgents are recruited (if bribery and threats are primary, disaffection isn't your biggest problem the cadre are), why the public is feeling the way they are (what if they're siding against you because you aren't preventing enough attacks and they're angry that you don't seem to be doing enough against the insurgents?), and the other dynamics (including tribal and ethnic) at play.

Depending on the answers to these questions, a growing insurgency and growing Iraqi disaffection could well be likely consequences of a "casualty-minimizing" policy.

Unless those things are grasped, it isn't possible to even begin to evaluate what effects a different approach might have... but they could be very different than you think.

My take: Backing off was the approach taken in March 2004 to Fallujah, too. All present in Iraq (outside the insurgency) are generally agreed that this was a big mistake.

The enemy is going all-out before the elections, and is fighting a war. The allies should do the same, and keep the pressure on relentlessly so the enemy is as off-balance as possible and the maximum number of atacks are disrupted.

No hudnas, please.

>>The Iraqis did not take up arms against the dictatorial regime that murdered, raped, and tortured hundred of thousands of civilians.

Somebody should tell that to the Shias and Kurds who bought it in the aftermath of GWI.

>>The Cambodians did not
uhh...

>>the Cubans have not;
Cuban exiles in Florida have a history of using the USG to make life for Castro interesting.

>>the Hutu have not;
The Hutus were the ones that launched the genocide. It was stopped by the Tutsi military.

What others said about this report being tailored to produce a Neo-Saddam regime that will pay off France (and friends).

What it fails to take into account is the ethnic and religious dimensions of the terrorists.

Sunni/Baathist/Al-Queda terrorists are killing US forces, Kurds, Shia, and Sunni people willing to work within the Iraqi government.

Goal? Make Iraq ungovernable and produce a Neo-Saddam regime, or even bring Saddam back. Bring back the mass graves, killings, and suppression of 80% of the population along with robbing people blind.

This is a goal destined to fail, now that the US broke the back of Saddam's military; the only question is will it play out with a lot of bloodshed, or managed with a minimum of killing.

This was inevitable with the fall of Saddam and his regime ... however only aggressive actions against irredentist Saddam-ists will work to keep the killing to a minimum.

And no, the Sunni Baathists will never love or agree with us or the Iraqis; but they can be made to stop killing with enough force.

The problem with the left in general and specifically in their foriegn policy is a lack of understanding of human nature. We must apply what we know of what motivates individuals to national levels, because ultimately nations act just as individuals do. The character of who rules a nation obviously reflects in how that nation behaves. Most human beings are decent, good people, which makes democracies fundamentally better nations. But good prosperous people often become complacent and indeed cowardly, preferring to hide their heads in the sand rather than face hard truths. Know anyone like that?

War is no different. Human beings generally are motivated by two things, greed and fear. Somehow it has become a sort of conventional wisdom that our enemies motivates more people to become enemies and in turn be killed. The so called 'cycle of '. THis is absurd and unsupportable, in fact it is virtually a tenent of faith amongst the left. Humans seek revenge, yes, but only when the cost for revenge is not inordinately high. Our problem is that we have not made that price high enough.

On a larger scale, we need to start playing true hardball. Because Americans have legendarilly short memories, we seem to be thinking in terms of the Iraq moddel for dealing with Iran and Syria. THis is foolish. America has the most powerful sword the world has ever known short of nuclear weapons. With precision munitions, we can utterly and completely grind a nation to a halt with no threat to ourselves and very few enemy casualties.

For instance, imagine the threat to Iran of us destroying all of their oil facilities. It would wreck the nation for years, they would be broke in days. Now if you combine that threat with an actual limited attack on nuclear facilities, you put Iran in the hot seat. Do they want to go toe to toe with us knowing they will doom themselves instantly? That is the kind of thinking we need. How to manipulate these rogue nations, kick them into a corner, and accomplish what we need for our (and world) security. We need to get tougher mentally, and smarter. We need to be willing to pile our chips in and dare Iran and Syria to go all in. EVery great poker player knows that when you have the biggest stack, that is the time to lean on your opponent, not allow them to stick around and catch a miracle. We need to be more agressive, not less. All things being equal, initiative is the most critical element in war.

My take: Backing off was the approach taken in March 2004 to Fallujah, too. All present in Iraq (outside the insurgency) are generally agreed that this was a big mistake.
Joe, I was not sure before, but I'm more sure -- we do NOT know if it was a mistake.

Letting Falluja alone the first time was the right strategy IF the USA needs Iraqis to decide to fight for freedom, to kill, to die, and even to kill innocents. Were the US to have flattened it the first time, it seems likely the Iraqis would cower, kiss up to, and hate the Americans a bit more, but more importantly, they would NEVER do any heavy lifting themselves. Nor believe it was necessary.

After the election, and the Majority Shi'a FINALLY start ruling Iraq, the arms and problems of Fallujah will be justification for the IRAQIS to get much, much tougher.

And take over Abu, replacing US with usual Arab methods.

Only the Iraqis -- the majority Shi'a Iraqis -- can win the "war for democracy in Iraq". Human rights, and minority rights, may come with the elections, and may not.

I'm re-reading the Fallows Jan/Feb article about Blind into Baghdad. Every "plan" seems like imposing the planner's will on a possibly uncooperative populace. The current plan, impose an election, seems more reasonable to me.

This thing needs to be fisked down to the last therefore and whereas - I don't claim to have done the whole job here, but it's a start.

Regarding the ICG report and the discussion going on here at WOC, you can find some further challenging arguments here:

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050101faessay84102-p10/james-dobbins/iraq-winning-the-unwinnable-war.html
and here:
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050101faessay84103/edward-n-luttwak/iraq-the-logic-of-disengagement.html

"Yes, your policy can be so brutal, your rule so absolute and terrifying, that people cower in toal fear and don't fight back. But is that really what you are suggesting as the American model now for Iraq? You think that if the U.S. would only act like Pol Pot or Saddam, all the problems of Iraq would be solved and the US could live in peace?"

No, I'm suggesting that the level of armed rebellion against a government is not a reliable measure of its popularity.

"Cuban exiles in Florida have a history of using the USG to make life for Castro interesting."

As I said, people are quite willing to be nasty if they think that there won't be any payback. Those willing to join the Warsaw Uprising are rather fewer.

"The Hutus were the ones that launched the genocide. It was stopped by the Tutsi military."

Possibly you're thinking of the genocide in Rwanda; I'm thinking of that in Burundi, which may have been before your time. After all, who remembers the Armenians, either?

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