by Ben Moores. Links added by Joe for various military systems to improve reader comprehension; holding the mouse over any dotted line will also show what many acronyms mean.
This is an attempt to assess the Israeli Defence Forces' performance in round 1 of the recent war, based on a variety of published sources. The analysis will look at various components of the IDF in turn.
IAF Performance
The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has come in for considerable criticism during the conflict. The majority of this has been more in relation to the strategic use of the Air Force as opposed to its actual tactical utility. However, the IAF's tactical utility, for so long unquestioned in Israel, needs to be examined.
Despite having excellent ISTAR and a formidably short kill chain the IAF was unable to interdict the small pockets of rocket firings from the border area into Northern Israel. F-15s and F-16s using GPS-gided JDAMs and laser-guided Paveway bombs, and armed UAVs, were all used. After 16 days of aerial bombardment Hezbollah was still quite capable of sustaining a barrage of 100 or more rocket firings against Israel, despite thousands of combat sorties by the IAF. Hezbollah is estimated to have some 1,250 launchers of all types of which about 300 were destroyed (or 25%). This IAF operational failure caused the IDF to mount a full blown invasion of the region to reduce Hizbollah's capability.
The IAF did have some successes in destroying some protected C2 nodes, re-supply convoys and larger long range missile launchers; indeed it appears the majority of 220mm rockets and Fajr-3 & 5's were subsequently destroyed after being deployed. However, the IAF claims of destroying two-thirds of all Hezbollah long range launchers should be closely examined. This is because numerous dummy missile firing sites with fake heat signatures were targeted during the course of the campaign. Furthermore is has been claimed by various Israeli sources that Hezbollah has retained a battery or more of either Zelzal-2 range or Nazeat 10-H (210 and 140 km range respectively).
The IAF didn't seem capable of degrading the capability of Hezbollah's Command and control or communications network. Whilst some 23 tons of bombs were dropped on an underground command bunker in Dahiya in south Beirut on July 19, it is clear from the sudden self imposed silencing of the launchers by Hezbollah for the July 31 ceasefire that its command and control, and communications network was still in place. Indeed, immediately after the ceasefire front line units resumed pre-planned and co-ordinated firings.
UAV Applications
This conflict was the first to have both sides make use of offensive UAVs. UCAV, (specifically IAI's Herons), were seen to be repeatedly engaging targets with Spike and Hellfire missiles. It is understood that a strike was carried out against Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon on the 31st of July. It could well be that the platform used was Elbit's Hermes 450 or IAI's Searcher II UAVs. This seems unlikely as based on information available it is known that both the Hermes 450 and Searcher II platforms were heavily engaged on ISTAR missions. Iranian UAVs were repeatedly used by Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, but were unable to repeat the success that they achieved earlier in the year; this is further discussed in detail below.
Perhaps what is most interesting about this conflict is the lack of excitement about the use of UAVs.
The widespread use of ISTAR platforms by Israel hasn't been a focus of attention, no Sunday newspaper features on the use of “Robot weapons from the future” tells us they have become mainstream. A revolution in its own right.
Air Defence Performance
Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces only managed to shoot down one air platform during the conflict. They shot down a CH-53 Yas'ur helicopter with an anti-tank missile. Reports of an Israeli F-16 being shot down on the 17th of July were established to be a partial rocket ignition caused by strikes on a Zelzal rocket launcher. Hezbollah may have had some MANPADS in their inventory but there were no confirmed reports of substantial use. With the IAF able to strike from 15,000 feet and without a high altitude air defence system there was nothing that Hezbollah could do.
Syrian Air Defences did much better. On the 29th of July they managed to shoot down an Israeli Heron UAV that was attempting to "paint" Syrian re-supply convoys. After a couple of decades of air defence ineptitude the Syrians can congratulate themselves; although this did not stop the IAF performing low pass flights over Syrian Presidential Palaces as a reminder of their military capabilities. Three other Israeli air platforms were lost, two AH-64A Apache attack helicopters to a collision and a more advanced AH-64D Longbow to what seems to be Israeli artillery fire.
These small losses confirm that Hezbollah and the IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) were unable to interdict the massed Israeli heliborne advances in the past week or even deter strike or reconnaissance operations. Considering that Iran deployed a number of high prestige weapon systems into southern Lebanon it can be assumed that they also deployed its most effective air defence systems.
This poor performance would put pressure on Iran to procure S-300s and SA-15/M1-Tors because it seems to confirm their indigenous and Chinese supplied air defence systems are ineffective against Elbit's airborne Electronic Warfare product range. When these systems might be delivered is unknown as Rosboronexport recently confirmed that any future orders for advanced S-300 air defense missile systems could only be delivered from 2011 onwards, owing to a huge backlog and a lack of qualified technicians.
Israeli Air Defences would appear to be relatively competent against airborne platforms. Earlier this year Hezbollah was twice able to make return flights with an Iranian Mirsad UAV - or maybe a HESA Ababil-3 - into Israeli airspace. However, during this conflict Iran was unable to repeat this earlier success. Three Hezbollah UAVs were shot down whilst attempting to enter Israeli airspace air to air by the IAF Python V missiles. Two of which were, according to some sources, carrying bomb loads. It would also appear that all attempts to cross the border were at night time, suggesting that Iran has added an infrared application modification to the standard television camera.
Israeli Air Defences seemed to be less capable against rocket and missile fire. Despite large scale investments none of the three key air defence systems (MTHEL, Arrow & Patriot PAC-2) engaged targets, although that is arguably because Hezbollah decided not to strike at Tel Aviv. It seems that MTHEL lasers were not deployed, which is worth noting, as it was specifically designed to counter exactly the low altitude strategic rocket threat. It is understood that the number of batteries needed to meet the threat and operational cost made deployment cost-prohibitive.
The Rocket Campaign
Before the conflict started Hezbollah was armed with some 12,000 rockets supplied by Iran and Syria. Some 10,000 of these were the Iranian 107 mm and 122mm rockets which have a range of less than 20km. Syria supplied a limited number of 220mm rockets with the longer 30km range. Iranian Fajar-3 and Fajar-5 rockets used from the second week of the war onwards (43 and 75 km range respectively) had not been used against Israel before and caused proportionately more damage and casualties than the 107mm and 122mm rockets.
Rating the effectiveness of the Hezbollah rocket campaign against Israeli civilian targets is fairly difficult to quantify; except in terms of absolute casualties. Whilst some 4000 rockets were fired they managed to cause only a limited number of casualties. In comparison, Iraq's blitz of Teheran in the final year of the Iran-Iraq war, using fewer Scud's caused much higher casualties and disruption. Although admittedly the Scud is a larger rocket. Indeed, more casualties were caused by Iraq's pre-emptive Scud missile bombardment prior to Operation Desert Shield.
It was widely reported that Israel seemed incapable of stopping rocket attacks. But upon closer examination it is clear that certain the strategy dynamics employed by Hezbollah changed over the campaign. At the beginning of the campaign Hezbollah was merely countering IAF strikes with short range rockets. (as part of a tit-for-tat strategy). By the second week of the war Hezbollah was using the long range Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets in order to place political pressure on Israel. By the final week of the campaign, with its forces being surrounded and with Israel not responding to cease fire initiatives, Hezbollah was forced into commiting what ever rockets it had remaining in forward areas. So, it appeared that Hezbollah was escalating their campaign, with the Israelis unable to prevent them, but it was actually the opposite. Hezbollah's escalation was simply an attempt to gain some utility from stocks that were out flanked.
Ground Operations
The performance of the opposing ground forces is difficult to rate because of the different strategies that were used in the different stages of the war. A review of events is followed by analysis of the operations.
The first significant battle was at Bent Jbail which began on July 24 and finished on the August 1. Skirmishes continued through to the 8th of August presumably as pockets of infantry were flushed out or attempted to manoeuvre. The initial fighting was characterized by Israeli forces struggling to fight their way into fortified positions with small teams of infantry and penny packets of tanks. Bent Jbail was manned with some 200 skilled ATGM operators and fighters. They had large stocks of forward placed rockets and knew exactly where to hit even Merkava MK4's. These early engagements allowed Hezbollah to focus their forces against the IDF. This concentration of forces gave them an unexpected firepower and combat capability; with them able to kill over 15 IDF soldiers. Parallel with operations at Bent Jbail was the Battle of Maroun al-Ras where three Merkavas were penetrated between July 19 and July 22.
The inability of the IDF to win decisively at Bint Jbeil, combined with the failure of airpower to reign in Hezbollah rocket strikes, forced the Israeli government to commit significant forces to a full scale invasion of Lebanon. Abandoning its cross border raids and air power demonstration strategy in the process.
The IDF quickly reacted to these events with some 15,000 reservists being called up on July 28 and by July 31. 5 brigades struck North East into Lebanon blocking off the Syrian border to the region and placing the army in a position to move to the Litani river. This drive also cut off Hezbollah forces operating south of this point. By August 1 there was heavy fighting at Aita el-Shaab, Al Adisa, Kfar Kila and Taibe with further fighting in the north at Marjayoun. For the next five days the battles of Aita el-Shaab and Taibe continued with Israeli forces suffering significant armoured losses at Taibe on August 5 and August 6.
By August 9 the IDF was at least nine miles into Lebanon. A slow advance across the length of the southern border began with fighting being renewed at Bent Jbail Aita-el-Shaab and Dibel as the IDF attempted to clear out enemy fighters. On August 10 Marajaoun fell, allowing Israeli forces to move north up to the Litani river. It would appear that this obligated Hezbollah forces to maneuver and fierce fighting erupted the length of the frontline. Later than night airborne forces moved on to the Litani river line with the largest Israeli military airlift in 30 years.
By August 13 Israel had all but surrounded remaining Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon. Knowing that ceasefire lines always follow the final frontline both sides spent the final day of the war heavily engaged in what was the bloodiest day of the conflict. The IDF lost 24 dead in a number of different engagements with around 100 or more casualties. Hezbollah casualties are unknown but can be presumed to be equal or higher as their earlier advantages of local knowledge, surprise, prepared positions and superior local firepower were now lost.
Thus, there are three distinct phases of the campaign.
The first stage it is arguable that the strategy and tactics let down the IDF. With limited resources and operational scope against a well prepared and motivated opposition the IDF struggled, particularly at Maroun al-Ras and Bent Jbail.
The second phase is the move to bypass Hezbollah positions and maneuver to the north East through Marajaoun. This second phase confirmed that the Israeli reserve call up system is as sharp as ever with large numbers of reservists being called up and quickly deployed into operations. There is a clear failure to effectively finish off Hezbollah force concentrations in the border region, leading to further conflict and rocket attacks.
The third phase is an operational and strategic success for Israel as they manage to maneuver around Hezbollah and give them no further advantage in continuing the fight.
Hezbollah, on the other hand, proved that they had mastered positional warfare, absorbed modern weapon systems and had the organization and morale to withstand being surrounded and overrun. Hezbollah will have lost many of their best units and weapon systems during this conflict but enough have survived to rebuild again. Furthermore Iran will quickly move to re-supply Hezbollah with more of “what worked” and less of “what didn't”. Given a breathing space Hezbollah ought to come out of this conflict technically more capable and with veteran cadres.
The high casualty rates suffered by Hezbollah can be traced to the second week of operations when Hezbollah failed to appreciate that the operational tempo had increased. Nor does it appear that they were prepared for this or able to change as Hezbollah were seen adding finishing touches to bunkers and sowing mines rather than falling back. Although it could be argued they had no plans to fallback And the troops had no interest in falling back to fight another day.
Israeli heavy armoured forces seem to have suffered a series of setbacks with some 30 tanks damaged, although only 10 appear to have been either badly damaged or destroyed. Most of these casualties were caused by long range man portable anti tank missiles such as the Kornet-E 9P133 (AT-14), Metis-M 9M131 (AT-13), the 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 'Spandrel') and the 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 'Spigot'). It understood that over 500 missiles were fired with around 50 hits on Israeli armoured vehicles. This was clearly been a surprise to Israeli commanders, who committed penny packet armoured forces in unsuitable roles. With tank crewmen taking half of IDF casualties it will act as an early warning to the Israeli military that even their powerfully armoured Merkava tanks are vulnerable.
Israeli special forces launched two known large scale raids. August 2 saw a large airborne raid on the Hezbollah stronghold of Baalbek some 62 miles behind enemy lines. Whilst the original mission to capture a high ranking Hezbollah figure failed due to complications and quick defensive reactions, Israel did manage to withdraw successfully with 5 captured soldiers. August the 5th saw a second raid with Naval Commandoes raiding an apartment in Tyre. It seems likely that this was another airborne raid but the outcome is unknown.
Israeli ground force casualties were primarily caused by small arms fire and long range anti-tank missiles. The scale of Israeli ground force casualties can be attributed to the some 40 Hezbollah and IRGC command bunkers and their numerous associated firing position entrenchments, their tactical decision to stand and fight, as well as their relative professionalism. This was compounded by Israeli strategic policy early in the war. Around 50% of Israeli casualties can be attributed to anti-tank missiles, 25% to small arms and mines, around 10% to friendly fire, 10% to rocket fire and 5% to accidents. Historically the majority of casualties are caused by artillery so it makes for interesting statistics.
Neither side released exact Hezbollah and IRGC casualties and the precise number will probably never be known due to the fog of war and political reservations. It is expected that Hezbollah and IRGC casualties were high. The reasons for this are that the Israeli persistent surveillance assets deployed over the combat zone allowed Israeli commanders to immediately identify significant enemy manoeuvres. This forced Hezbollah and the IRGC to remain in static positions. This combined with a Hezbollah determination to stand and fight rather than melt away into the remaining population would have made for a high casualty environment. The Israeli heliborne capture of the South side of the Litani river would have further increased casualties through interdiction amongst those enemy forces attempting to retreat north. Thus out of a 6000 strong force it is believed that around some 600-900 Hezbollah and IRGC troops were killed during the fighting.
Naval Operations
Perhaps the most discussed topic on Defence related blogs and forum boards has been the C-802 strike against the Israeli Navy Corvette Hanit. Indeed news that the missile was not a UAV was broken on blogs and forum groups days before it made the mainstream press; an interesting phenomenon that we will surely see more of in the future. The turbojet-powered C-802 has a range of up to 120 km. and a 155-kg blast-fragmentation warhead. The missile was fired by either Hezbollah or the IRGC using a Lebanese coastal radar. This would appear to be confirmed as following the C-802 strike there was a subsequent destruction of the Lebanese coastal radar network by Israeli forces.
How a C-802, a relatively mediocre anti shipping missile, managed to hit the most modern ship in the Israeli fleet is of obvious interest. The Israeli position is that the Hanit had its automatic defences off because of an IFF conflict with IAF forces operating in the area. Two missiles were fired; one hit the Hanit and the other hit an Egyptian “trawler” that was fishing nearby. This would go someway to confirm claims that the missile has “98% effectiveness”. However, this is not matched by the missile's ability to distinguish targets or actually arm its self properly with the missile hitting the Hanit failed to go off. This non-detonating strike caused only a minor fire in the flight deck and with the ship out of repairs after 14 days according to an Israeli Defence Spokesperson.
Conclusions
In conclusion Hezbollah have proven themselves to be a professional, dedicated and organised force, whose prime position, equipment and personnel seems to have been squandered for two captives. The Israeli military also seems to have been misused for two of the three weeks of the conflict. The air force attracted much negative publicity for expending large amounts of ordinance for little apparent gain. The regular army forces were initially committed to attacks against superior forces that were dug in- for no apparent strategic gain.
There are a number of technical military questions that have come out of this conflict. The failure of Hezbollah in the air war asks questions about the quality of Iranian air defence capability. The Israeli army needs to sit down and examine exactly how it lost so many tanks and will presumably speed up and increase the size of the current program for armour self protection suite that is being fought between Rafael with Trophy and IMI with Iron Fist. IFF has shown itself to be of vital importance with an Israeli warship, 10 Israeli soldiers and an AH-64D all apparently lost due to poor IFF (the bill for this alone would pay for an IFF program) Another interesting question is why, with Hezbollah using Iranian Electronic Industries 1950s era analogue VHF radios why Tadiran Jammers were not able to break down Hezbollah command and control. Finally, a review of the MTHEL and ballistic missile defence programs needs to be made as none of them were able to influence the outcome of this conflict, a significant expense for no apparent gain.
Ben Moores is a defence analyst with a specialisation in European defence electronics and Iranian military capability. Any queries should be sent to ben.moores, over at btconnect.com
This is an interesting post for two reasons. First, beginning an assessment of actual performance and capability is good policy. Second, it clearly shows that a large number of intelligent and educated people don't understand the problem. The IDF failed in its mission, fundamentally because this was a political; not a military problem. Fail to learn the difference at your peril.
I've got a few issues with the post, although there is some very good analysis. But i'll just address this first:
The third phase is an operational and strategic success for Israel as they manage to maneuver around Hezbollah and give them no further advantage in continuing the fight.
I think this is way overly optimistic. The biggest problem with it is that it (and the Israeli quasi-strategy ) ignores the Tyre pocket, including the Palestinian Camps surrounding it. Aside from a naval commando raid on August 5th, Tyre was never seriously addressed by the Israel on the ground.
Tyre was arguably the Hezbollah center of gravity, and inarguably its most important supply node in the South of Lebanon. The city is a scant 15 miles from the border, putting the border towns in Katyusha range and much of the rest of Northern Israel in missile range. Tyre ended up being the launch pad for many if not most of the long range missiles that hit Israel. Basically, the rest of Southern Lebanon was superflous if Tyre was available as a base of launch.
The bottom line is that Israel never established the fact that they were willing to either bomb the city flat or invade it street by street, all under the eyes of the international media embedded in the city. I think it is impossible to claim Hezbollah felt that the IDF had attained strategic dominance of the situation with that puzzle unresolved. In fact I think just the opposite. Despite the authors description of the 3rd stage of battle as dynamic, it seems more likely that Hezbollah had been allowed enough initiative in the previous days to decide where they intended to fight to the bitter end and otherwise withdraw basically unmolested to either Tyre or North of the Litani. To suggest Hezbollah was surrounded and cut off seems false to me, their lines of retreat were never really closed (though air interdiction was always a threat, it never lived up to nearly its promise).
If the Israeli efforts were actually a reconnaissance in force then the evaluatiion is not totally correct.
One brigade was given numerous conflicting orders. This might have been an effort to find out where the comms leaks were.
No mention of the Trophy tank protection system. Was it used? How well did it work if used.
A recon in force might explain the hesitations. It is possible that Israeli politics drove the last stages of the war. Which would explain the final dash to the Litani as opposed to the originally planned withdrawal.
http://powerandcontrol.bl*gspot.com/2006/08/jabbing.html
The ordinance the IAF expended was done to create refugees. A financial and political drain on Hizbollah.
The #1 weapon of America in this war is the financial blockade.
Joe calls it the Cash Flow Jihad. So do I.
The press and analysts seem to be missing the importance of this aspect since it takes time to work.
#4
The press usually misses the point.
The financial angle will fail. We are more reliant on sound finances than they; if/when the dollar collapses, America is hosed. As for Hezbollah and Hamas, they will make do, just as the Haganah and the Palmach did earlier.
Ignoring or spinning facts doesn't make them go away, it simply means you cannot effectively grapple with them.
Could Israel have used a hammer-and-anvil approach, with forces at the Litani serving as the anvil?
#5,
Making do is generally more expensive and less effective.
The Germans in WW1 were defeated by a naval blockade.
BTW Hamas is being defeated by the money blockade.
Iran is being hurt by the money blockade.
And a track back to here
Remove asterisks in the URLs when they come up, and replace them with "o".
At my blog:
The operational effectiveness of the Trophy System of tank defence is discussed
(remove asterisk).
#5 Cives Romanus Sum,
The wealth of America is not dependent on the value of the dollar. It is dependent on the human and physical capital of the nation.
I might note that when Hizballah was handing out cash it did not use Euros, Syrian, or Iranian currency.
They handed out greenbacks.
Here is my larger critique of this posting. Although I could quibble with a few of the items, overall it is sound. In and of itself. The problem is that you cant break a war down into its components and expect to be able to tell much about the outcome. Nothing happens in a vacuum.
War is about coercive politics. From that point of view, how successful has Israel been? How effective their tactics and weapons systems were is an interesting question, but how effective towards what end?
For instance, there has been a great deal of discussion over how effective (or not) Israel was at seeking out and destroying Hezbollah rockets and missiles. But statistics on how many platforms Israel has destroyed vs how many Hezbollah started with is flat out trivia. Why was Hezbollah able to fire more rockets on the last day of the war than any other? Not because they needed to 'use them or lose them' obviously, the end of the war was in sight!
The critical facit is the obvious- Hezbollah was constantly resupplied via Syria. This is a microcosm of the entire breakdown in Israeli strategy. How many rockets and missiles you can destroy is not the important question. How many you can destroy vs how many are being resupplied is what is germaine. But Israel made a POLITICAL decision not to cut Hezbollah supply lines via boots on the ground. It then became politically expediant not to think in terms of rocket resupply, and hence the entire analysis gets framed in a way that bears no resemblence to the true situation on the ground.
It is important not to grade Israel's success based on factors that are ultimately meaningless. What is important, is to grade Israel's performance based on whether they achieved their objectives. The answer to that is a resounding NO. If you get into the question of 'why', one of the most critical answers is that Israel put too much stock in analysis like the above. IE how many weapons can be put on which targets etc. But you cant build a successful war from the bottom up (we have better guns, better soldiers, better officers so all you need to do is match them up on the field of battle and 'victory' surely follows). It needs to be built from the top down- specific goals that lead to realistic operational designs which culminate in successful tactics, because where there is failure it is obvious and can be corrected.
At the end of the day Israel failed to meet any of its political goals. That is a defeat. Whether they were successful at any specific facit is basically immaterial, because this war wasnt lost at any specific encounter anyway. It was lost because of a disconnect in what the politicians were willing to do and what the circumstances required to meet their goals.
I publish my long awaited (in internet time) confession of incompetence here:
http://powerandcontrol.bl*gspot.com/2006/08/deception.html
#10 Mark,
Excellent point.
From what I read, despite obvious difficulties and bad generalship at the command level, the Army felt it could accomplish what ever task assigned it. The casualties might have been higher than liked, but no task, including IMO the defeat of Syria, was unachieveable.
#12,
My guess is that the logistic problems and tactical doctrine problems will get fixed quickly.
General Staff Revisions will take longer.
The improvements will probably give confidence in a move against Syria.
My take - the original strategy of jabbing was not bad for a recon in force. The bombing gave Syria and Iran financial and logistic problems.
However, political pressure was building to "do something". That was when they left the script and became confused as to objectives, means, and method.
Actually #10 Mark.
I dont think the IDF will ever have confidence in the current administration. I know I dont. You cant teach a novice politician how to fight and win a war in a few months.
I cant endorse any Israeli military operations until Olmert is removed. I've got the guy pegged: even if the IDF can turn things around and the general staff put together a good plan, Olmert will walk you right up to the threshold of victory and call off the dogs. He's a negotiator at heart, and you never get nor expect complete victory in a negotiation. Decisiveness is shunned instead of encouraged. In short, Olmert will manuever his forces with the intent of gaining the upper hand in diplomacy, instead of putting his foot on the enemys throat and producing the result required.
I have this horrible premonition of the IDF in the suburbs of Demascus and bombing Iran into submission suddenly turned around so 'peace talks' can begin.
There have been time when novice leaders have learned the art of war, Abraham Lincoln being the classic example. But not everyone is equipped for it. You need a certain fortitude of character and strength of will to tap into that leadership. Olmert has shown no sign of this. He is more dangerous to Israel than to Iran or Syria. Olmert has to go before its too late.
Mark,
IMO the leadership failure is more systemic - don't confine to Olmert or his coalition.
I did find this technical comment interesting, and will explain why:The IDF's failure at electronic warfare is an indication that the corruption causes of its known major ground force deficiencies might extend to the air force.
This one is definitely worth watching given that Israel might have a go at Iran - see this link headlined on Drudge today
EW capability will be critical in such an operation.
Tom, you are probably right, but we are still talking about the IDF here. There are NCOs and high ranking officers still intact from the old days, a little good leadership from the top can turn things around very very quickly. Remember who backward the US military was in the post-Vietnam/Jimmy Carter days, but that was all surface rust. The hard, veteran backbone was still available and rejuvinated by the Reagan adminstration and utilized brillianted in Gulf War 1 (and 2).
I think my point is that you can have a perfect instrument and if the hand the wields it is a goat its going to fail. On the other hand if you have a strong and decisive leadership, mistakes are quickly identified and those that dont cut it are given the boot. One of the first things that happens in every war is that peacetime generals start 'retiring', and not voluntarilly. But if your civilian leadership doesnt give clear instructions, and especially if it has its own political favorites high up, the scapegoating tends to hit the good as well as the bad, and thats a disaster. Lousy leaders simply dont understand why their policies fail (which is why they attempt bad policy in the first place), and hence have no idea how to makes corrections.
Mark B. -- great comment and analysis on this post and throughout the whole series of posts on the fighting in Lebanon.
Ben Moore's analysis is well written, thorough for a high level overview, useful at the tactical and even operational levels, and gets the strategic assessment of the combat completely wrong.
This is a feature, not a bug, of most conventional Western military analysis. Much of this is due to the artificial separation of military analysis from geopolitical analysis that Mark Buehner has already criticized. Geopolitical strategy drives military strategy: If you don't achieve your strategic goals, then all the tactical and operational successes are for nothing.
The other source of the problem is the unwillingness to acknowledge the ruthlessness required to really defeat militant Islamic forces. Unit destruction, not unit decimation, must be the standard for success. Note Moore's contention that a 10-15% kill rate indicates a substantive Israeli victory:
"Thus out of a 6000 strong force it is believed that around some 600-900 Hezbollah and IRGC troops were killed during the fighting."
What about the other 85-90% of the Hizballah forces that weren't killed?!!! Some will be severely wounded, but most are still combat capable or will be combat capable in a month or two. All will be re-armed and re-equipped in a few weeks or a few months.
Most importantly, the vast majority of Hizballah's force is intact and will be available to train new recruits, provide lessons learned, and serve as living examples that you can fight the Israelis and survive. This is completely unacceptable in the context of the long war with militant Islam.
War is both an art and a science. The more your people practice against good opponents, the better they get -------- as long as most of them survive the experience. Western militaries are going to have to re-learn the importance of waging battles of annihilation or we will soon face far more dangerous Islamic forces.
#15,
The current belief is that the radios were just for show. There was a parallel fiber optic network.
BTW the tubes for those 50s radios must be really hard to get these days.
Hmm . . . I think this post actually confirms my thesis, first posted on July 22, that Israel never had a real strategy to fight Hezbollah.
I read a couple of places that the general staff had started a contingency campign plan against Hezbollah no later than 2003. This would be standard procedure, of course; during my own service on Corps and Army staffs we had a number of contingency plans working ar any one time.
But a strategy is more than military. The political and the military must be unified in goal and aspirations if a strategy is to be, well, a strategy.
Because the Olmert government had no political vision or goal in striking Hezbollah, there was no way the campaign could succeed in any non-temporary sense. Israel's security challenges cannot be met by means either purely military or purely political, but in this war there was nothing but military. Hence, Israel failed to enhance its security except for the moment, and possibly not even then.
#7 & #9
Agree that making do is harder. Yet, it is very far from capitulation.
The Germans in WW1 failed to achieve victory in an avoidable contest of arms. They self destructed economically due to exceptionally unsound policies particularly after 1916, then were soundly defeated in the Balkans and Western Front, the vast expanse of conquered territory was becoming increasingly ungovernable, the other Central Powers collapsed, and Germany wisely capitulated. Etc.
A better blockade example is Japan in WW2. When they surrender, they still controlled huge quantities of natural resources, but couldn't move any of it. Foolish warmongers. Isn't interesting how often that resort to solving a political problem with the military works so poorly, especially for the aggressive initiator.
To be sure, Iran et al suffer economically due to Western efforts. Yet it is more like Strategic air power than ground forces. Economic blockade and strategic bombing require the enemy to cry uncle. Ground forces only can compel capitulation by force, yet it is still tricky. WW2 especially, usually gives people the wrong conception of war.
The wealth of America and other countries is dependent on many imponderable factors. The connection between physical and human capital, and wealth no longer works as per your description. Globalized capital markets that trade through the mediation of one primary reserve currency leverages control of wealth. We reap the benefit and risk of an over valued dollar, it will be a huge shock if it collapses. Because then we will have to live on our own human or physical capital, or less. But until that day the dollar makes us feel rich, and others poor.
Anyway, discussions of tactical problems, and technical issues masquerading as strategy is a diversion from what is important for Israel's survival. What is the Grand strategy of Israel? I can't find one. If there is one what strategy will be used and how will it be executed operationally?
#20 Donald,
If the attack was to spoil Iran's plans for 22 Aug and gather intel (with a side of creating economic and logistical difficulties for Hizbollah) then a missing wider strategic goal is explainable.
However, that is not how Olmert sold the war to the Israelis. So then he got caught by public expectations with a plan that was not the one the public expected. He promised a strategic victory and may have actually deliverd one. It was not the strategic victory the Israeli people expected. To lay this all out might compromise intel sources. So Olmert is stuck.
Thus - confusion in the political echelon causes confusion on the ground.
It was a strategic defeat for Iran because 22 August passed without a bang or a whimper. Based on the Turkish grounding of an Iranian resupply mission - my guess is that a conventional rocket attack with large rockets from Lebanon was the Iran plan.
The political assessment by Mark is right on, and meshes with Maj. Sensing's (ret.) points made throughout the war in his analyses here. As an aside, Donald's stuff was consistently the best analysis I was seeing anywhere throughout the war.
One thing Ben missed: add the European Milan anti-tank missile to Hezbollah's arsenal, which can be equipped for remote firing. This is a very effective tactic when defending known approach routes, which is after all what it was designed for during the Cold War. See this ABC News article:
This article adds that RPG-29 rockets, with dual warheads to penetrate advanced armor, were also used.
#20,
The purpose of the blockade is not the direct defeat. That, as you pointed out requires boots.
The purpose of the blockade is to weaken the power of resistance. So you get surrender or defeat. In the case of Iran the purpose may be to create the conditions for an internal revolt.
Political strategy then becomes the driving force in the war.
Take Iraq. In its current state political strategy may be decisive even though military force is necessary.
So let us take as a given that military defeat of Islam can be accomplished. Easy or hard but done.
How do we solve the political problem?
How do we turn tribes into nations, relatively peacefully?
Blockades do tend to weaken the targeted nations gross power, but also is accompanied by a relative increase in the power of the government. I would suspect a blockade of Iran would cause factions to set aside differences for the sake of the homeland.
The way to get Iran is to integrate them further in the world system so that their own government has a stake in it. Revolt comes from unevenly distributed prosperity, like Iran 1979. Domestic government authority of the targeted state is augmented by the blockade, like Saddam's post war Iraq(Iraq v. Kuwait et al, or Cuba.
The people and government are not identical. You must target something of value to the government to get the government to comply. Targeting the broader civilian populace will make them hate you and fight for their homeland as we just saw with the exchange of ordnance over Lebanon's border.
I do not follow your meaning in terms of political strategy in Iraq?
#24
Lets say indeed that military defeat of Arabs is possible, I think that is what you mean? At least that is what I can address because religion is almost impossible to root out.
The map as currently arranged is disadvantageous to Israel, not just because of the obvious, but because there is no Arab country great enough that it can negotiate peace and make it stick. Israel's ultimate security will come not from an ever vigilant army, but a political settlement that has value to both sides.
I would suggest a deal with the Hashemites and the creation of an Arab nation that encompasses Jordan, most of Syria & Lebanon, perhaps with a greater hinterland eastward. I think this would lead to an Arab nation big enough to accommodate displaced persons permanently, and have the power/authority to ward its borders and too much to lose by fighting with Israel. Israel can smash the Syrian state, but not conquer it, the Hashemites could save the Arabs from further catastrophe by creating the state they were promised 80 years ago.
This fight is about land and whose people will live on it where. Arabs current anti Israel feelings are to me, very different from Europe's malignant anti antisemitism. Religion adds fuel to the fire, but only true believers have the sand to continue fighting when all seems hopeless. However religious power will be undermined by peace and prosperity. Some Arabs will have to find benefit from the existence of Israel, that benefit could be Israeli help in creating an Arab nation that is free or foreign humiliation and an economy that is regionally emeshed. The Arabs must do the work, and that cannot happen under the current circumstance. There would be upheaval on the Arab side for awhile.
Israel cannot go forward while tied to America's apron strings. America has power over Israel due to Israel's financial dependence. Israel's attempts to a/ keep the subsidy but b/ lessen America's power over them has led to lobbying and unsavory practices that risk an abrupt turnabout in relations.
Peace does not come from a vigilantly guarded frontier like the DMZ in Korea, it comes from a fundamental view that the other guy has legitimate interests too, that peace and prosperity yield more than war, like the U.S. & Canada.
1. Israel ALWAYS fights with future negotiations in mind. That was true in 1967 (see Michael Orens "Six Days of War", it was true in 1973, and it will be true in the future, even if Bibi becomes PM. The question is what theyre planning to negotiate, with whom, what they need to achieve, and if they have matched sufficient means to meet those ends.
2. As a recon in force, with the intention of making marginal changes in the situation on the ground in Lebanon (including the introduction of the Leb army backed by international forces to S. Lebanon) this may well have been a marginal Israeli victory. If you asked before the war, would it be worth the level of casualties Israel incurred, to achieve the level of changes achieved, (noting the Hezb casualties) I daresay most Israeli strategists would have considered it worth it.
3. The problem was that Olmert positioned differently in his rhetoric - he suggested repeatedly that the goal was to destroy Hezbollah. Given that goal, the means employed were clearly inadequate. Now it may or may not be the case that the political and other costs of using greater means would have exceeded the benefits - the point, however, is that by the mismatch between means, and asserted goals, it hurt Israels reputation, in ways that were not necessary.
4. It may well be that Olmert, given time, could learn this lesson. Its not likely that the Israeli polity will allow him time, so that is academic.
5. Given the political complexity of the region, Israel needs the capability to engage in different levels of force - therefore the assertion that tactical considerations are irrelevant, all that is required is to focus on grand strategic mistakes, is a false one. The tactical discussion is quite important.
"Because the Olmert government had no political vision or goal in striking Hezbollah, there was no way the campaign could succeed in any non-temporary sense. Israel's security challenges cannot be met by means either purely military or purely political, but in this war there was nothing but military. Hence, Israel failed to enhance its security except for the moment, and possibly not even then."
I think Olmert DID have a political vision. He saw (in large part correctly) that Hezbollahs military strength on the ground is one of the key obstacles to consolidating the new Lebanese state, and thus to elminating Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon. His ultimate goal was the fulfillment of the US-French vision for Lebanon, as embodied in UNSC 1559 - a Lebanon dominated by Hariri, Jumblatt, et al, genuinely sovereign. Which would no longer be base for Syrian, Iranian, or for that matter Pal sponsopred attacks on Israel. In which ANY attack could be laid at the door of the Leb govt, which would then have incentive to stop any attacks - as do ALL Israels other state neighbors.
To attain that, Olmert wanted to crush the military strength of Hezb. To kill 90% of its troops, destroy its C2. This would involve some alienation of the leb pop along the way, but would be offset by leb pop hatred for Hezb - but the main goal would be actual destruction of Hezb forces. Inevitably the war would be ended by a UN ceasefire (as both '67 and '73 were) so the IDF would have to achieve results within a reasonable time frame, and the ceasefire would optimally include provisions that would reinforce the political goals.
The problem was that Olmert believed that this could be achieved, against the heavily fortified Hezb forces, with air power, and limited ground raids. This proved to be wrong.
Liberal Hawk makes good points, I cant disagree.
I think the problem with Olmert is that he didn't have the experience to say "that's a bunch of bull" to guys like Halutz who assured him that Israeli military objectives were achievable under the given conditions and constraints. He also wasn't able to see that the IDF lacked accurate intelligence on HA's capabilities. You need somebody in that job who has the credibility to second-guess the generals.
A lesson "again" learned was that conflicts based on a regional and global "political vision of defense", without a full and rational comprehension of the will & determination of the enemy, knowledge & facts of ALL of his assets, "ideology", may unwillingly give the "advantage" and strengthen the will to fight back to the enemy. The U.S., as example, has learned this first hand in Iraq.
Moreover, forces and leadership, militarily and politically MUST have the WILL to take the fight to the enemy both strategically and with superior forces - boots on the ground from day 1, without regard for the "politically correct vision" of the media.
Fighting with constraints from day 1 undermines the effectiveness of forces and its morale. In this conflict, IDF was damned if they do and damned if they don't so they must "do".
An enemy's will to fight is greatly diminished when his forces, assets and base(s) are turned into dust bowls and all supplies lines and suppliers' capabilities are like destroyed. The result today is Iran and Hezbollah declaring victory despite all of the best weapon technologies deployed against them.
These points are demonstrated in this conflict, like shown to be true in Iraq, and it will be shown in again in Iran until political will is in sync with military and Intel capability to destroy the enemy.
Withdrawing from a conflict that was defensive in nature to start with allowing the enemy to retain 90% of its soldiers and significant weapon resources, relying on the UN who once again shows it has no will to engage an enemy; to disarm Hezb shows a lack of understanding of the idealogy of Hezb and Iran.
This engagement and resulting world observation & opinion has only strengthed the will of extremism and provided a recruitment poster for Jihad.
World Leadership, U.S. leadership needs a reality-check!
T