As I continue to think about Afghanistan, I'm continuing to read what I can.
Here's an interesting article by Nikolas K. Gvosdev, who examines the Soviet-Afghanistan war - from the Soviet point of view.
Then, in December 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed, taking down with it the gravy train that had enabled Najibullah to buy loyalties across the country. A series of defections followed, most notably that of Dostum, who, in the spring of 1992, joined forces with Ahmed Shah Masoud in an effort to block a Hekmatyar victory. These shifts in allegiance -- not superior tactics or greater popular appeal of the mujahideen -- ultimately brought down Najibullah's government.
The initial stability of Najibullah's government suggests that Afghans will assume responsibility for the fate of their government when the foreign footprint in their country has been sharply reduced -- but only if an outside patron is prepared to supply and equip Afghan forces. The central government in Kabul is strengthened when it sends gifts to the provinces rather than collecting taxes from them. But someone has to pay for this. The United Kingdom lavished resources on India in the nineteenth century; the Soviet Union sent billions of rubles to Afghanistan. Is Washington prepared to play such a role today?I don't think that Afghanistan is hopeless, if we define our goals correctly. I am concerned that it becomes a territorial proxy battle in a territoryless war, and that we may overemphasize it at the expense of other - potentially more important - things we ought to be doing.
But since I don't today know what those might be, I'll wait to comment until I do.
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