Let's look at what is happening to USAF budget priorities within the American Department of Defense as a result of the Afghanistan campaign.

1) Carriers Forever. The political realities that made the huge investment in large deck carriers pay off in the Afghanistan campaign won't go away. The USAF case for transferring money from the USN at the expense of large deck carriers has been destroyed for the next 10-15 years, A.K.A. when the F22 is being procured and the F35 is being readied for production.

2) B52s forever -- NOT! Two B1s could deliver more JDAM than an entire carrier air wing. And no one believes that the B52 will last until 2040. The performance of the B52 and B1 during the campaign (72% of the ordinance delivered!) has reopened the debate over restarting the B2 production line just as the F22 is about to get on the production line. Odds are we will get more B2s to replace the B52s.

3) C17 production forever. The wings fell off a C141 last year during a refueling and the whole C-141 fleet was grounded pending wing crack inspections and repairs. The C5 transport fleet is averaging less that 60% availability due to various structural design and age issues. The upshot is that the USA *will* build more than 300 C17, not the 200 odd the USAF plans in budget documents. This means the C17's production run will go on for at least the next 10-15 years to replace both the remaining C141 fleet and the C5A fleet. That is, right through the "procurement hump" of the F22 in the USAF budget.

4) Jammers Forever. The 1950s era EA-6B Prowler's wings, like those of the C141 fleet, are wearing out. The Prowler is the primary jammer for any American air campaign. Kosovo showed even stealth aircraft need jammers; so replacing it is more vital than the F22. The Prowler replacement has to operate from carriers, so it will be a F18 variant. And the EA-6B had to be replaced _NOW_. The procurement money for this plane is much higher priority than the F22 at DoD level and it will be built simultaneously with it.

5) Armed UAVs & High Altitude "CAS." The emergence of armed UAVs in Afghanistan, plus the recognition with both UAVs and the bomber fleet that the key feature of modern close air support is the ability to _loiter_, endangers the short legged, manned, air superiority and strike fighters. The A10's big wing that slows it also makes it an outstanding loiter performer. For the price of a single F22, the entire remaining A10 fleet can easily be upgraded with digital data links and smaller 250 lb JDAM bombs (24 plus carried per A10!) to become a high altitude 'close' air support star. For the price of a single F22, scores of Hellfire armed Predator drones can be purchased and modified to carry data links plus 100lb or even 50 lb JDAM bombs.

6) Ground Forces are still needed. The Afghanistan air campaign did not get effective until special forces spotters made it so and the escape of Bin Laden from Tora Bora, and Marine projection of forces to the air field that became Camp Rhino, underlined both the US Army's need for transformation and the USMC's need for the V22 like transport capabilities. Raids on the Army's and USMC's procurement budgets for the F22 just got much harder. And stealing from the US Army's operations budget for heavy forces runs smack dab into the Congressional anti-base closing, it's 'pork in *MY* district,' buzz saw.

7) New tankers and the O&M 'Death Spiral.' The USAF logisticians in the late 1980s overlooked a key point in their insistence on keeping the old 707 airframes in the USAF fleet for the sake of 'commonality.' Now that the old 707 has been retired from airline service around the world due to noise pollution issues. The USAF is finding that part commonality with the _airline fleets_ is far more important than commonality across the _air force fleet_. That is why the oldest 707s are going to be replaced with leased 'KC-767s.' The problem in doing this via the operations and maintenance budget, rather than procuring them (at 30% less cost!) to protect the F22 budget, is that the maintenance 'death spiral' with older planes is really starting to bite.

Ths brings up a major problem for keeping the B52 in service. When the early KC-135 tankers leave the force, so do their 1950s vintage turbojet engines. These engines are the same as those that power the B52. Once all the support costs for those 1950s era engines are placed on the B52 fleet, they will cost more to operate than the B2 with its exotic stealth coatings. The huge support costs for these engine has already forced the USAF's 707 based "Big Safari" recon planes to be reengined. Given the need for bombers, either the B52 will be reengined at the price of several F22s, or more B2s will be bought at the price of several F22s per B2. (It is rumored that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld considers the B2 to be a more of a "Leap Ahead" technology that the F22.)

This will leave the oldest F15 air superiority fighters as the highest cost to operate tactical fighter planes in USAF service when the F22 isn't being produced fast enough to replace them. If the choice is operating two F16 or a single F15, the choice will be to operate two newer F16s to keep the pilots. The structural reduction this will cause in the single mission F15 force will also reduce the total number of F22s built.

8) Missile Defense. The major American military procurement of the 21st century will be the deployment of theater and national missile defenses. The USAF Brass has been actively purging air force advocates of orbital missile defenses (necessary for boost phase ICBM intercepts) and space planes (which would service orbital constellations and be delivery platforms for both spy satellites and kinetic energy weapons) as threat to the F22. This has delayed missile defense, but it is also making the case to military space advocates in Congress that a new military space service, with a non-fighter pilot service culture, is needed. The ability of the US Navy to get a huge piece of the theater and national missile defense budget pie via upgrades to their Aegis cruiser fleet means that the missile defense delay game will get the USAF budget killed.

The Fighter Pilot Generals face the following choice. Either they give up power in the USAF in favor of the service evolving in other directions. Or they are going to see the end of the USAF. There are no other choices open to them. If the USAF brass fights for more than 100-150 F22s, there may be no more USAF.