So, a recent Los Angeles Times piece has this little tidbit in it:
"One defense analyst who regularly advises the military and who spoke on condition of anonymity said the administration was suffering from "buyer's remorse for this war." "They never really thought about what was required, and now they have sticker shock," the analyst said."
Some of us have been noting the utter stupidity of the Left's "Iraq bad, Afghanistan good, need lots more troops" mantra for years. But the dishonesty was characteristically irresistible to those who offer nothing else, and the lack of thought is standard across the board, and now here we are.
At the same time, I've also been banging on about the need to shift strategy in Afghanistan/Pakistan, because what we've been doing has been a slow road to failure and the breakup of NATO. Meanwhile, again as documented here many times, Pakistan is a growing problem. One that's starting to show progress, but still in a civil war.
I'll throw an odd ball into the room - what if you don't have to win in Afghanistan?
If the center of this whole thing is Pakistan and its nukes, because we (correctly) believe them to be under threat in its current civil war, then Pakistan is now the main battleground. Afghanistan is now the secondary battleground, and important only to the extent that its collapse makes a Pakistani solution so difficult. As long as we can kill lots of enemies in place, or fleeing pressure from Pakistan, and maintain our ability to be in Afghanistan, that's all we want.
If that's the thesis, there are at least 2 approaches.
One is McChrystal's classic full-scale counter-insurgency approach (see his report). In terms of insurgency orientation, it's about enhanced legitimacy, and denied control. Protect the population, raise both a Afghan army and local armed networks that can make the Taliban's life hell, shore up governance so that there's a choice that's clearly better than the Taliban from an Afghan point of view (note low bar there). If you succeed, you have fashioned an anvil, against which the Pakistani state can strike a hammer into its own problem. Which, if successful, further eases the pressure on Afghanistan. Ideal result? 2 wins.
Another says: "You know what? We don't have an orientation. We don't want legitimacy OR control. We just want to make sure the Taliban are denied the ability to gain either in Afghanistan. And we'll work with anyone, anyone at all, if we think it will help us achieve that goal over the medium term - defined as 5-10 years." Ideal result: a win (in Pakistan) and a draw (in Afghanistan). Preferably a win in Pakistan that does not include the Islamist ISI going right back to supporting and assisting Islamonazis in Afghanistan, as a way of raising a backdoor army for a Pakistani coup.
What approach #2 needs on the Afghan end is a link between ends and means, that makes sense per Afghan situation and culture. It's ironic that the Obama administration may actually be leaning toward the Ralph Peters approach (shared by Brits like Rory Stewart, who has some experience in the area). But to work, there are some logical bugs between "sure, our forces could happily operate in that mode for a long time, even if the government comes apart" and "...this is how."
I'm actually happy to see that the Obama administration, and SecDef Gates, appear to be thinking this one through. They can't dither about it indefinitely, but now's the time.
I don't think we have to win. But I want us to stay there until Pakistan settles out quite a bit more. If we are lucky there will also be a regime change in Iran. At that point we can leave the country to its own devices. If Pakistan and Iran want to argue over whose sphere of influence Afghanistan belongs to after we leave, that is fine with me. The place is too logistically distant to stay any longer than necessary.
Joe, there was an interesting thread over at DL on this topic a few days ago. The link there goes to a large review of Afghan force levels from AEI (Fred Kagan).
Bottom line from my comments there is that I don't think legitimacy is a possibility in a country where protecting the population costs more than the entire GDP.
Strategy Page has an interesting take: the proposed troop buildup would not establish decisive military victory or protect (all) of the population in a COIN strategy, but it would be enough to take down the opium funding of the Taliban - which they argue would in turn dry up other funding - a kind of financial systempunkt.
The SP read is that we have to worry less about our own legitimacy, and instead leverage the lack of Taliban legitimacy. Something to keep in mind.
Finally, keeping Pakistani nukes out of the hands of terrorists is necessary, but not sufficient. IMHO, denying Afghan territory to the likes of AQ 1.0 remains a priority.
lewy, I think this comment of yours deserves repetition:
I do wish DL didn't have such a dysfunctional comments display, though, which leaves no access to the original post. I'll add that this goal of yours:
..has obstacles of its own in Afghanistan, which must be negotiated.
On a different note, interesting angle by StrategyPage that I hadn't considered re: McChrystal's strategy. I'd need to be on the ground with access to the Us military's picture and personal local experience to decide if it could work, and if the system really hung together that way. If it does, and that really is the center of gravity, that could be a very interesting strategy. It goes against my general biases to date, which are that prosecuting the drug trade generally (rather than just hunting down those who work or trade with the Taliban) makes unnecessary enemies and is counter-productive. But the argument itself is interesting enough that I would change my mind if I thought its view of the system was correct.
Joe, FWIW, at DL there usually is no "original post"... if you scroll up and there is just a link at the top of the page, then that's it, there was no original post. That's the "one link - all comments" format of the DL hippo. By convention, the first comment is often a "post" of sorts.
The link at the top of that particular DL comment thread goes to Fred Kagan's AEI presentation on the Afghanistan strategy.
Typically, if you're trying to deny the enemy something, and you don't want it yourself, you destroy it. If (in WWII) the Japanese are coming in overwhelming force, and they're going to take these oil fields you're standing on, you sabotage them as thoroughly as you can. Or if you're feeling really nice, you wreck oil production to a date when all conflict between you and your enemy will surely be at an end.
Crushing the economy is a vital part of beating a jihad insurgency (link).
Let's assume that we want to take from Al Qaeda everything we can, and give them nothing in Afghanistan (or anywhere) but a cup of ashes, without the cup.
What are we doing that's intentionally, purposefully economically destructive?
Why not?
I think the answer to that "why not?" boils down to "because we're in a vicious circle of weakness of will and self-delusion about the nature of the enemy system".
As usual, I am with Diana West (link). I think the conversation going on here, between what I once called "Fjordmen", is the right one.
All the link-age here is valuable, but I'll single out "Further thoughts on Diana West's criticisms of Gen. McChrystal", which contains the "Rajapaksa Model of fighting terror".
McCrystal says he's only spoken to the president once since taking the job. His report has been officially shelved. It seems to me that in fact a decision has been made, and moreover it was made some time ago.
There are different kinds of legitimacy. I think that a US military presence which devolved into "salting the earth," would quickly lose legitimacy in the eyes of the American people and I think statements from various leaders in the military indicate to me that they don't want to be a part of it.
And I think to be another tribe in the area requires its own sort of legitimacy in the sense that these are people who can be trusted to bargain with and they will be here to perform their end.
Now, I think this type of legitimacy can be obtained, while fighting with a smaller footprint, but I suspect it has more to do with the United States working with tribal leaders in Pashtunistan and not Kabul.
"Now, I think this type of legitimacy can be obtained, while fighting with a smaller footprint, but I suspect it has more to do with the United States working with tribal leaders in Pashtunistan and not Kabul."
I don't think this is true at this point- maybe in 2002, but not now (the generals seem to agree).
We've established the chess board we are playing on in Afghanistan, I don't think we can successfully shake it up at this point, at least not in a short period of time. We've created relationships with tribes, villages, and individuals. We've established resources and services. If we pull the rug out from promises we've already made or implied, we will lose a huge amount of support and faith to the Taliban. We will be the weaker horse.
For the immediate future our options are to double down and try to replicate our Iraq success in Afghanistan, or to try to mitigate the disintegration of the region. This will require backing friendly despots to the hilt (whatever they decide to do) and hope they can keep the Taliban/AQ too busy in the power struggle to exert their strength against either Pakistan or ourselves at home.
The deep, deep irony is that those advocating this choice and many of the same voices that were screaming invective about our abandoning Afghanistan to its fate after the Soviets left, and how that led to 911. History loves to repeat itself.
PD Shaw:
If we believe we can be effective enough within the rules we've established to reverse our fortunes in the jihad wars and secure our future, then "we can't do that, it's against our rules" may be a good enough answer, even if the cost of not doing whatever is is turns out to be high.
If the habits, attitudes, restricted language codes and so on that we've been laying down ever since President George W. Bush made a tepid address in reply to the 9/11 attacks are leading us to defeat, then we have to challenge and overthrow them.
My opinion is that we are playing by "Phoney War" rules (link) and our enemies are not, and that no good future awaits us in this direction.
Mark B:
My position is relatively status-quoish. I think our mission has been primarily denial of space with a chimera of nation-building on top. Maybe this is muddling, but I think "doubling down" with 40,000 more troops is just as likely to lead to eventual withdrawal. I don't think Afghanistan can be won (which is the President's mindset), but it can be managed for denial of space.
We can't deny space from outside of the country without becoming Kabul's death squad to kill it's enemies. We'd probably end up losing access through Pakistan too. Is there a problem with muddling through on this one? Of course there is, but it seems like the least bad of the options to me.
I think the generals are trying to tell us that the status quo is untenable with the current forces. We will need extra troops just to maintain what we have now. Wars like this are all about momentum, and (not to belabor a cliche) we are at a tipping point. Look at Iraq- things are always either getting better or getting worse. There is no stable equilibrium when the enemy has a safe base he can draw resources from and build his strength.
The more of the countryside we lose the more we are going to lose. The more attacks on our supply routes, the more forces necessary to secure them, the less forces available to secure the countryside. This is a classic insurgency death spiral just as the Russians saw.
Our decision isn't whether to risk casualties, we are risking casualties in the future by doing nothing. Higher casualties are inevitable if we stay in any form. The question is whether those casualties will produce any benefit or not.
OK, assume we escalate to any level needed to use the Iraq model in Afghanistan. That means paying tribute. We have to buy the insurgency, and there will be a monthly rate to get the faithful to tolerate our hated existence. We won't call it tribute, but that's exactly what it is, and if we don't keep up the monthly payments in terms of projects, jobs and so on, there'll be trouble.
How much tribute will Afghanistan require each month, roughly? Which added to the tribute paid to Iraq comes to what?
For those who say (in essence) the solution to Afghanistan is "just get out," the obvious question is, "and if Al Qaeda moves back in after the Taleban and we get hit again, you'll say what?"
If I thought there was a satisfactory answer to that question, that's where I'd stop, with "get out".
For those who say (in essence) "pay what it takes to stay," the main question is not "how many monthly payments of how much?" but "why is this not going to lead where paying the danegeld always leads?"
I'm sure there's no satisfactory answer to that. We're in Afghanistan because of a historic event. In paying to stay, we're buying one thing, that is that they refrain from killing us for now. That's tribute. This game makes things worse. No good will come of it, only harm.
For those who say, "do something and then get out," the first question is "what?" When the answer comes, as it must, "we reduce the pile of resources that the most active hostiles within the enemy system will gather up when we leave," the objection - and it's a good one - is: "but the political leadership, the military from top to bottom and the sentiments of the people are against that."
If you don't agree that it's possible and vital to overthrow the rules that our foes and we ourselves have set for us, we're back to options A and B.
"How much tribute will Afghanistan require each month, roughly? Which added to the tribute paid to Iraq comes to what?"
It's a good question, and one the generals would have to answer. I object to the term 'tribute' on some level. To some degree, you are right. But the alternative would appear to be be pumping all that tribute money into one particular despot (the traditional method) and hoping he can hold the pieces together.
Our Iraq model is better because it funnels much of the resources directly to the people, which is the ultimate source of strength for either side. When we build a road or install a generator, that isn't exactly running guns to the strongman. The people in that village now have something the Taliban can't give them, and in fact would see taken from them. Thats an incentive.
Now obviously there is a good deal of payoff and kickback to keep the local warlords somewhat friendly, but that's part and parcel to playing in this sandbox. It may be distasteful but i'm happy to hear an alternative that wouldn't require it.
After thinking more... I concede. Salting the earth will not happen, because nobody will agree to it. Therefore the possible merits of the policy are irrelevant. It's not serious. And of course nobody can be criticized for not doing it, because it can't be done.
Here's a fourth option, which is also very bad (but if I had a good option I would never suggest anything like salting the earth), and which also may not be possible.
Simply: everybody against the Pashtuns, with a "minority rights" spoils system for rights, government jobs and every kind of goodie.
Al Qaeda's partners need to be diminished. The ethnic / tribal base of the Taliban needs to be out of power and unable to bestow rewards. That's the Pashtuns.
We know how to run racist regimes where Affirmative Action gradually kills the key ethnic group in the country, while it rewards every group that nurses grievances against it, because we ourselves increasing run such regimes.
Good enough for us, good enough for our enemies.
The Italians paid the Dane-geld, without even informing anyone of their own side of the payments. The French came in, without knowing who they had to pay or how much, and under the deliberately created false impression that the area they were taking over from the Italians was quiet. Result: massacre in the manner of Muhammed (PBUH), with mutilations of course (link).
Paying the Dane-geld is a natural consequence of subordinating war to a big lie: that the enemy is in fact friendly (just in need of nation-building, sensitivity, self-censorship on our part etc.).
My opinion is the opposite: we must be doctrinaire about defining the enemy as the enemy and not friends who we haven't appeased enough yet, and we must be doctrinaire about not paying the Dane-geld.
What the Italians did is our global war policy in miniature. They maintained a lie.
In the context of the lie, it's not really worth fighting. Casualties are a political embarrassment.
It can even be embarrassing to kill the enemy, as they are after all our friends. And experience has shown them that we are so feeble that simply claiming that the victims were a "wedding party" can be awkward for us.
The lie weakens us, and our weakness makes the lie politically necessary.
As a result of success in maintaining the lie, friendlies are deluded and come into greater danger. This applies to the kuffer civilian populations. They too make a catastrophically incorrect threat assessment. This affects many other issues, such as immigration policy.
In due time, the enemy exults.
This is a rotten game. We should stop playing it.
I don't think we should leave without salting the earth in Afghanistan, but since we don't have the will to do that - or anything else of value there - we should get out, and focus on a rectification of names and building a new global anti-sharia defensive war policy.
If you want to win, or take your best shot at it, and never mind what you win, then given that no alternative adds up very well, you might as well trust an expert. Here, General McChrystal: have all the troops you want, and don't bother explaining to me what you want to do with them. Just do it.
If that is your attitude, then decision-making takes no time at all. (Which is great for the general.)
There are those who used to say that for the war on terror to go better, the Democrats had to own it. (This was obviously desirable, as ththe were tremendously effective in undermining it.) But their price came high. They had to own everything, every branch of government, before they would take responsibility for anything.
That's making it hard to test your theory, but anyway the test condition has been met, and ample time has gone by for the results to come in.
I have a question now for anyone who claimed that the democrats would take full ownership of the war on terror, once they had everything on a platter. Did the buy-in occur?
Is Obama acting like a man who believes that the war is his now, and is determined to win it?
If you generated predictions based on that, like Obama will meet with General McChrystal early and often, and give him everything he wants, how are those predictions going?