One of the main issues I have when looking at various models of how al-Qaeda operates is that at the end of the day you have to ask whether or not such models are actually useful as an approach to understanding the group. Towards that end, I intended to note what I determined was the two main schools as far as understanding the network in their "purest" forms after reading a couple of paragraphs in Imperial Hubris - the Burkean and Gunaratnan schools of understanding al-Qaeda. Now I myself, for reasons I've explained on a number of different occasions (here and here for instance) am of the Gunaratnan school.
I would also note the following excerpt from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report contained in the latter link:
There is no consensus among experts in and outside the U.S. government about the magnitude of the threat to U.S. national interests posed by the Al Qaeda organization. Virtually all experts agree that Al Qaeda and its sympathizers retain the intention to conduct major attacks in the United States, against U.S. interests abroad, and against Western countries.
So I figure I have at least as much chance of being right as the next analyst.
With that in mind I see this interesting story from the Washington Post on how the tiny Belgian town of Maaseik turned into a base for the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), which supports al-Qaeda's war against the US.
What the city elders did not know at the time was that the women came from households in which several men had embraced radical Islam and joined a terrorist network that was setting up sleeper cells across Europe, according to Belgian federal prosecutors and court documents from Italy, Spain and France.Over the next nine months, Belgian federal police arrested five men in Maaseik, a town of 24,000 people tucked in the northeast corner of Belgium. Each was charged with membership in a terrorist organization, the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, a fast-growing network known by its French initials, GICM.
With each arrest, investigators uncovered fresh evidence that placed small-town Maaseik at the center of a terrorist network stretching across Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. The town had served as a haven for suspects in the Madrid train explosions that killed 191 people in March 2004, for instance, as well as an important meeting place for the GICM's European leadership.
The Belgian investigation underscores the challenges that authorities in Europe face in tracking down sleeper cells and in sorting vaguely suspicious behavior from imminent danger. Police have made scores of arrests in Berlin, Paris, Rome, Stockholm and Amsterdam in the past two years to disrupt what were described as terrorist plots, although in many cases it remains unclear whether the threats were overstated or false alarms.
... Despite an investigation that has reached into eight countries, Belgian authorities remain uncertain about the Maaseik cell's true mission . Police found no bombs, no guns, no blueprints for an attack -- just lots of worrisome evidence that the defendants were consorting with terrorism suspects from elsewhere and could have been planning something big.
"We are quite sure that we have proved that they were a logistical support cell," said a senior official with the Belgian State Security service, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "But the fact is, the potential was there to do something more serious."
... At first, intelligence officials suspected the Maaseik group was a ring to smuggle illegal farmworkers into Limburg. The agents dubbed their mission Operation Asparagus, after the vegetable that is widely grown in the region. As months passed, concerns grew.
In November 2003, several key figures in the GICM traveled to Maaseik from Spain and France for a rare meeting, according to Spanish and French court documents.
The GICM's European cells normally avoided direct contact with each other so that they wouldn't attract attention from police. But the network had seen several of its leaders arrested in Morocco after terrorist bombings in Casablanca six months earlier and was trying to regroup, the court documents show. Maaseik was emerging as an important hub.
As the case of the Maaseik cell illustrates, the GICM is more than simply an ideology or symbol - it's a real organization with an established leadership, logistics infrastructure, and a network of wide-ranging cells set up across Europe. As I've noted before, terrorist plots do not simply appear through a process of spontaneous generation or the mere fact that the inhabitants of a given area are Muslim - someone is doing the planning, supplying the direction, and providing the cash. And in the case of the GICM's European chapter, it seems that Lahoussine Haski was one of those providing some of the former two:
Among those attending the meeting was Lahoussine Haski, a Moroccan with a history of fighting for radical Islamic causes in Chechnya, Afghanistan and other places, according to Belgian investigators and court documents.Haski arrived in Maaseik holding a false passport, on the run from authorities in Morocco who had issued a warrant for his arrest on terrorism charges. In Saudi Arabia, he was listed by the government as one of the 26 most-wanted terrorist suspects in the kingdom for his alleged role in a series of bombings.
After months of hiding out in Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey, Haski needed a refuge. Maaseik seemed safe. He married a local woman. Later, she would become one of the half-dozen women who caused a ruckus in town by donning their black burqas.
Haski fits the classical description from other terrorism investigations of an al-Qaeda emissary, the guy who takes members of a local group and turns them into truly international terrorists. One can already see this process well on its way in the Post's description of the GICM's evolution:
The GICM was founded in 1997 by Moroccan veterans of the jihad training camps in Afghanistan. Its goal: to take the fight back to Morocco, overthrow the monarchy and establish an Islamic republic, according to Moroccan and European counterterrorism officials.After the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, the Moroccans scattered. Many returned to their homeland. Others traveled to Europe, where they blended into the continent's fast-growing Moroccan immigrant communities.
On May 16, 2003, a dozen suicide bombers recruited by the GICM detonated explosives at several targets in the port city of Casablanca, killing themselves and 33 other people. Less than a year later, the GICM struck again -- this time in Madrid, carrying out the first major terrorist attack in Europe since the Sept. 11 hijackings.
Spanish and European intelligence officials acknowledged they had underestimated the presence of the Moroccan radicals. "We didn't see what was going on in the shadows with the Moroccans," said Claude Moniquet, director of the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, a Brussels research organization. "In Europe, agencies were not paying them that much attention. The idea was that they were just logistical cells."
In the past two years, police have broken up GICM cells in Italy, Belgium, Spain, France and the Netherlands. Moniquet estimated that the GICM has a few hundred committed followers in Europe and North Africa, as well as 1,000 to 2,000 sympathizers.
Some intelligence officials characterize the GICM as a loose alliance of cells that operate independently. Others say there is evidence that the network is more structured and that the sleeper cells bide their time until they receive orders from the central leadership.
In April 2004, French police arrested six alleged GICM members in Paris and charged them with supporting a "terrorist enterprise." As in Maaseik, however, investigators did not find evidence that a specific plot was in the works.
Moustapha Baouchi, the alleged leader, told French interrogators that the cell raised some money and sporadically kept in touch with counterparts in Italy, Spain, Belgium and Britain. But otherwise it was content to wait, knowing that an assignment would eventually come.
"In effect, we were a group united in jihad," Baouchi said, according to a transcript of his interrogation. "This jihad could well have taken place in Morocco, or in any other country that we chose to destabilize. Our group was ready because we possessed the military training."
Emphasis mine. As we can see, whatever its original objectives the GICM is no longer focused on Morocco, as can be seen from the fact that their members are actively involved in both logistics and operations that have little if anything to do with achieving their purported objective.
Note that the difference between the Burkean and Gunaratnan interpretations of the data are present among European intelligence officials every bit as much as they are their American counterparts - they're simply the two main ways that different groups of people interpret the data. While I disagree with Burke's take on this one, others have found it valuable and I certainly think that teaching the two views concurrently with one another (as well as being able to recognize the differences) should be an essential element of any modern counter-terrorism training course. The main criticism of Burke is that he over-stresses the ideological component at the expense of the actual organization while the main criticism of Gunaratna is that he over-stresses the organization at the expense of the ideology. Since I'm with Gunaratna on this one, you can guess where I come down on this one.
This brings me back to the issue of which model I think is more useful. By using a Gunaratnan model, you can actively trace the GICM network to see its links with other terrorist cells loyal to other groups, identify the connections between guys like Haski and the rest of the al-Qaeda network, and so on. For instance, there's this Middle East Newsline report stating that Syrian-based al-Qaeda members are trying to revive their Moroccan counterparts. Whether or not that's true, I have no idea, but it's a lot easier to track back those kind of connections using Gunaratna's model rather than that of Burke.
Nor is its usefulness limited to the Maaseik cell. For instance, the recent Spanish arrest of a GSPC support cell included 8 members in Torrevieja that according to the Spanish were part of a network spanning into Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, Belgium, and Denmark. While I would consider that proof in and of itself that there is more to the GSPC than just an idea or ideology, what is even more interesting is that back in 2004 another Algerian, Moussa Laoual, was also arrested in Torrevieja:
Authorities allegedly found equipment used to produce false documents, bank statements showing movements of large sums of money and extremist propaganda in the suspects' homes.The Interior Ministry has accused them of stealing, falsifying and producing all types of identification documents used by al-Qaeda members.
Authorities say some of the documents may have been used to carry out the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington.
I don't know about you, but I'd be very interested to know whether or not this GSPC gang was involved in or even aware of Mr. Laoual's activities.
Great article. The real issue is whether the justice system can get these people convicted of any crimes. If they do, how do you keep them away from their religeous advsers.
Torrevieja (Old Tower)... a name probably regarding a surveillance post built in order to alert the neighbouring towns when the Algerian pirates came plundering the coast.
Now it is a massive turistic city full of foreigners, many of them Russians (the kind of them that have a lot of money, not the ones that seek for a job, you know what I mean). A good place to go unnoticed.
In addition, the harbour of the neighbouring city of Alicante has a direct ferry service to Oran, in Algeria; which might explain why that area is a perfect spot for North African radicals, especially those dedicated to logistics or keeping a network; something about the local population complains.
The damage caused by al-Q is limited only by the size of the weapons available to them. Once Iran produces the A-bomb, duck and cover.
Because Iran is so stupid that they would leave their finger prints all over the murder scene so that we - and the rest of the world - could agree to obliterate them?
Excuse me if I don't buy into your paranoia.
Hell, the Pakistani Khan was running all over the globe covertly whoring out nuke tech. We didn't even issue more than a sigh over that.
A nuclear Iran isn't any more likely to use those nukes than any other nuclear armed state; deterred for the very same reasons.
In all seriousness, Dan, why can't both schools of thought (from an academic perspective I wouldn't really call them models) have some validity?
I would say that the Burkean school is generally the way things operate in the real world.
However, the Gunaratnanian school is the way things sometimes are in the real world. Furthermore, it is a useful perspective with which to be familiar because it is the way that Bin Laden and other core AQ leaders would like things to be.
One of the aspects of the conduct of the "war on terrorism" that frustrates me most is that, to the extent that the Gunaratnanian school is valid, the Bush Admin really blew it in Afghanistan. We should have gone in big and we should have taken measures to ensure that the individuals central to organizing and funding were eliminated (e,g, Bin Laden).
At any rate, there can be little doubt that a hard core of global jihadists exists and that they are highly centralized. I would estimate that this hard core comprises no more than 15% to 20% of all terrorist/jihadi activities.
But sure, with that % you can find examples to support your hypothesis.
The rest is all a la Burke.
The danger is that if we don't exercise good judgement in our actions in the muslim world we could increase increase the % that conforms to the Gunaratnanian perspective. Clearly, a Jihad operating from an ordered and centralized command and funding structure could be a far more serious threat and a far more eduring threat.
On the other hand such a structure would probably be more vulnerable to counter attack. Furthermore a well targeted counter attack - to the head of the snake - could easily prove fatal.
My obilagatory snark impells me to remind you - as a good gunaratnanian and Bush supporter - that it was the Bush admin that not only let the head of the snake get away, but later declared that the head is not relevant.
averdis: (1) Who said Iran would leave its fingerprints? (2) If Iran says that it has a plan to take down the U.S., doesn't that make it more likely than any other country to use nukes against us?
PD, no,I don't think so.
Iran is famous for hyperbolic political rhetoric.
Talk is cheap.
To some extent they are merely replying in like manner to similar talk from our side. I mean it's kind of hard to maintain an image of strength in the public eye if you don't talk tough back to the guys who name you as part of an axis of evil.
But finger prints? absolutely. Even if there are no missiles to show up on radar or that sort of thing, there are number of reliable means to trace the source of material used in a nuclear blast.
I see, Iran's stated intentions should be dismissed as just talk and in any case, its justified under the circumstances. They're rational actors I suppose; nobody wants to die, right?
avedis:
I classify it as a school of thought rather than a model because it's more an issue of conceptualization than anything else but is critical to establish when going into this stuff. You also need to be careful of going from extreme decentralization (i.e. viewing al-Qaeda as simply a symbol or ideology) to extreme centralization (i.e. al-Qaeda as SPECTRE). One can view al-Qaeda as a bonafide organization without falling into the trap of believing that every act of international terrorism is personally engineered and approved by Osama bin Laden and Gunaratna makes it quite clear in his book what exactly it is that the al-Qaeda leadership does and how its structure differs a lot from what you would traditionally conceive of as a centralized organization. If you can stomach yourself to read through my back posts, there's probably enough of his work excerpted to give you an idea of how this works.
We can quibble back and forth as to the issue of how much terrorism is the work of an organization, but let's just assume your 15-20% figure is accurate. If that's the case, than the end-result is that those 15-20% are the guys whose are going to be carrying out anything on the scale of the 9/11 attacks. Mass casualty operations like 9/11 and the preceding attacks that removed terrorism from a local or national to an international security threat can only be accomplished with planning, logistics, and infrastructure that require an organization. Both the GICM and the GSPC, to go back to the examples cited in the post, seem to have recognized this as far as their European operations are concerned.
Dan,
It actually sounds as if we are not too far apart on this one.
A couple of observations and then I'll get to my main point.
I threw out 15% - 20% more to accomodate your predelictions and facilitate discussion than to accurately reflect my opinion of the . In my opinion the must be much lower or AQ's will to create mass casualty attacks is not as strong as you make it out to be. That or we are talking about 15% - 20% of a rather small number.
I say this because, despite all the threats, AQ attacks since 9/11 have been rather ho hum.
It is not at all difficult or expensive to stage a mass casualty attack once you have personnel who believe thoroughly in the cause and who have the will to make the sacrifice.
These attacks do not even require a well organized centralized command structure.
Witness Timothy McVie, witness Om shrinko.
Most anyone with the right mil. training could, like McVie or like AQ specialists, can relatively cheaply and easily inflict a deadly and symbolic attack on US soil.
Do not take what follows the wrong way. I love my country and I am a law abiding citizen, What follows is for purpose of discussion only: If I wanted to I could launch a pretty spectacular attack against Wall Street (during business hours). The attack would use explosives that would be made in the garage and might cost, total around $15,000 (but I don't know because I'm not serious and I haven't actaully priced this out or anything). The explosions would kill thousands and perhaps totally destroy buildings. You can imagine the ramifications. Obviously there are infinite variations on the theme, but you get the point.
If I can do that, so can AQ. But they haven't. If Om shrinko can make poison gas in the basement, so can AQ, but they haven't. If a 1st year bio student can grow anthrax in the basement, so can AQ, but they haven't.
The London attacks were pretty lame by the standards of mass casualty attacks.
So there are two take-aways here. 1) It doesn't require the large centralized international network of Gunaratnanian thought to physically create a terrorist attack.
2) Given that you believe the Gunaratnanian perspective is accurate, why haven't there been more and deadlier attacks, especially against the US in the US?
Another question I have for you is; Given Gunaratnan, why would invading Iraq be a good thing to do when it was done? The more centralized an org the more susceptible it is to effective decapitation. The head was in Afghanistan. Resources and will dedicated to decapitation were scant enough, but then even those were drained to fuel the invasion of Iraq.
Finally, returning to one of Eric Martin's points; Given a Gunaratnan perspective and given the vulnerability of centralized org to decapitation, why would Bin Laden, et al come out and establish themselves as the directors of Iraqi politics. How could they maintain centralized management of such a large endeavor without exposing themselves.
I would say that, at that point, if a network conforming to Gunaratnan existed, it would collapse of its own weight.
The network would have to expose itself, thus either transforming itself into a legitimate entity through purging of personnel associated with past crimes or it would have to openly confront the US and other nations in armed conflict that it could not survive.
Thus, again, I am forced to conclude that Gunaratnan is valid only for certain stages of organizational life; specifically the nascent stages and while operations remain covert and small scale.
I see a significant conflict between Gunartnan and the state theory of terrorism.
I'm interested in your thoughts.
Its a mistake to equate Iran with Cold War models of states. First of all, the Iranian State may be regarded as a rational actor, but all of its leaders cannot. I think we all agree that people like Bin Ladin and Zarqawi would use nukes against the West if given the opportunity, even at the cost of their own lives. So such a person does exist. What are the odds that such a person exists within the Iranian leadership? Pretty good if you listen to their rhetoric. Even better if you examine their support for terrorism. Darn worrying if you factor in that they are currently hiding a number of very wanted Al Qaeda members.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly you have to factor in the potential instability of the Iranian regime. If there were to be a democratic uprising Lebanon style, or a more violent coup, the fate of the nuclear weapons controlled by the hardliners becomes precarious indeed. At the end of the day, the West will have little choice but to support stability in an Iranian regime actively inciting terrorism against us. A nice new talking point for future lefties about how the evil US once again propped up fascists against democratic forces, with few reminders of the nuclear blackmail inherint in the equation.
Finally Iran doesnt need to use a nuke to make it terrifyingly effective. Iran is the number 1 terrorism supporter in the world today. Its rhetoric would make Krushev blush. Imagine what Iran will do with a nuclear umbrella.
avedis:
I used 15-20% because that was the figure that you threw out, we can use a smaller one if you prefer, not that it really matters.
McVeigh was not an international security threat. He blew up the Murrah Building, but he was apprehended in short order soon afterwards and if he had plans to carry out any additional attacks, I don't recall hearing about them. Aum Shinrikyo is a different bird altogether, as it was a fairly centralized operation as the information contained here indicates.
Just to highlight my point with your example, if you carried out the attack you mention above, you would either be apprehended in short order or you would spend the rest of your life on the lamb a la Eric Rudolph. Either way, you wouldn't be a major threat to the security of the United States because you wouldn't be in a position to carry out another attack. If that's all you have to worry about, then you're in a pretty good situation as far as counter-terrorism is concerned because even if something bad does happen, it only happens once rather than multiple times.
"If I can do that, so can AQ. But they haven't. If Om shrinko can make poison gas in the basement, so can AQ, but they haven't. If a 1st year bio student can grow anthrax in the basement, so can AQ, but they haven't."
Al-Qaeda has made numerous efforts towards WMD R&D in a variety of locations, as have been well-documented in any number of sources. If one is to believe the Jordanian government, back in 2004 they were planning to gas the good people of Amman. Either way, they don't have the freedom of movement or organization that Aum Shinrikyo did pre-Tokyo, which has probably cramped their style somewhat in this department. Then again, I don't know what Midhat Mursi is up to these days, do you?
The London attacks were not the core al-Qaeda network but rather appear to be the work of another group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, acting at the behest the al-Qaeda leadership. It is that ability to coopt and utilize the resources of previously local terrorist/guerrilla groups that makes al-Qaeda so resilient according to Gunaratnan thought. As for 2, the general answer is that they've tried and their attacks have been thwarted.
As far as how al-Qaeda would establish itself in Iraq, scroll back up. They always rule through stand-ins, allies, or puppets, whether it be in Afghanistan through the Taliban, Sudan through Turabi, or the Mujahideen Shura in Fallujah. An al-Qaeda victory in Iraq would not consist of bin Laden taking up residence in Saddam's old palaces, they simply aren't that stupid based on past experience.
Actually, I would argue that Gunaratna becomes more valid, not less as al-Qaeda develops since the bigger the network gets the more centralized it becomes - it was far more centralized in Afghanistan, for instance, than it currently is today. Gunaratna's school of thought is also quite consistent with the state theory of terrorism, though the main difference is that the terrorist act as equal partners rather than mere subordinates or patrons of the state sponsor in question.
"Actually, I would argue that Gunaratna becomes more valid, not less as al-Qaeda develops since the bigger the network gets the more centralized it becomes - it was far more centralized in Afghanistan, for instance, than it currently is today"
You lost me here.
If AQ more centralized when it was Afghanistan and the bigger the network gets the more centralized it becomes, then are you saying that AQ is smaller today than it was back in 2001?
Also, your references to co-opting and outsourcing seem to be indications of decreased centralization.
As a counter to Gunaratna I would say that most likely the bigger the organization becomes the less centralized it must become for reasons of pure management logistics.
Furthermore, I would say that especially in the case of AQ where they are co-opting and outsourcing etc. there is a likelyhood that the focus could dissipate due to various non-aligned interests, competing bottom lines and incentives, etc; resulting in a more Burkean outcome.
Finally, I did not follow you in your response to my comments about creating bombs, attacks, etc.
The guys who piloted airplanes on 9/11 aren't around to commit any more atrocities. They are as dead as McVie. What was your point there?
Additionally, I think you missed what I was saying about the capability of planning an attack. The weapons would be better produced domestically (in the geography of the intended target) than lugged across the seas, etc. Far less chance of interception. More simple logistics overall.
At bottom I agree with your comments that attacks have been planned, but were foiled. However, this points to the efficacy of the J. Kerry approach to combatting terrorism than it does to the neocon approach (assuming such an approach would have involved an adequate prosecution of the effort in Afghanistan in the months immediately following 9/11.
Iraq has not made us safer. To the contrary - witness events of the last 24 hours - it has probably made matters worse.
I remain unconvinced of the value of you outlook. I will try to keep an open mind. Will follow your arguments as posted here and and elsewhare.
"Secondly, and perhaps more importantly you have to factor in the potential instability of the Iranian regime."
"At the end of the day, the West will have little choice but to support stability in an Iranian regime actively inciting terrorism against us."
Mark, that is one of the sad realities of life. As for what lefties say or think I can't comment.
Hopefully there is a happy medium. I am opposed to violent regime change, like we did in Iraq, because I think that such is doomed to induce a backlash more serious than the problems it was intended to correct.
Also, the eventual backlash that ensues when our strong men fall renders that approach long term unsatisfactory.
Obviously, Afghanistan was an exception because an active threat was present there. AQ in Afghanistan had acted with deeds, not just words. The risk/benefit equation favored immediate intervention by force of arms.
There must be a middle road in places like Iran. We can try to encourage, incentivize and help to induce by other soft means, the emergence of preferable forms of government. Carrots and sticks, with an emphasis on carrots first.
A better approach involves great staesmanship and global cooperation. Perhaps when we have a new administration that possesses the right stuff we can move in this direction.
"Iraq has not made us safer. To the contrary - witness events of the last 24 hours - it has probably made matters worse."
That is impossible to say. Worse, it relies on the assumption that things would remain static had we not attacked Iraq. The thought that the same suicide bombers blowing up Shiite Mosques in Iraq would be sitting home peaceably herding sheep if we never attacked is absurd. Was this butcher Zarqawi intending to sit in northern Iraq forever? These bombs blowing up in Baghdad and Amman would in all likelihood be targetted in Paris and London if not Washington. There can be no question that AQs resources have been poured into Iraq like water on sand.
If Iraq has proven anything, it is that a network of jihadis has been training throughout the middle east for many years. Many of those are now dead, particularly the most zealous. Recent operations have exacted a fearful toll on AQ middle management if Bill Roggio is to be believed.
avedis:
Well, let me try again and see if this makes any sense.
"If AQ more centralized when it was Afghanistan and the bigger the network gets the more centralized it becomes, then are you saying that AQ is smaller today than it was back in 2001?"
In many ways, yes. They certainly don't need all of the bureaucracy that was set up in Afghanistan to house and vet recruits, maintain the camps, and according to Gunaratna manage "complexes in Kabul, Khost, Mahavia, Jalalabad, Kunar, Kandahar" and so on. All of that isn't being used any more, as those functions have been farmed out to groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jemaah Islamiyah in the South Philippines, and in the case of live-fire training, Zarqawi's al-Qaeda in Iraq.
"Also, your references to co-opting and outsourcing seem to be indications of decreased centralization."
I don't necessarily see it as such. Groups like the GICM or the GSPC, for instance, were originally set up as or derive from local organizations that were set up with a local agenda in mind, in this case Islamic revolution in Morocco and Algeria respectively. While both had more than a passing animosity towards France, neither had any intentions of targeting Westerners.
Bin Laden's greatest success, as Gunaratna has written, is that he has been able to lead a campaign consisting not only of his own group but also a broad coalition of more than 40 other terrorist groups of which the GICM and GSPC are among. That's why (per Cordesman) you see an increasing number of North Africans turning up in Iraq, why the GICM is more interested in supporting the jihad in Iraq and targeting Europe than it is at going after the Moroccan government at present, and why the GSPC is fanning out and forging alliances across much of North Africa.
"As a counter to Gunaratna I would say that most likely the bigger the organization becomes the less centralized it must become for reasons of pure management logistics."
I agree, but that's why I say that in order to view the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism as far more centralized campaign than Burke is willing to allow has to take in the role of al-Qaeda far more than it does that of any one individual within it. The goal of the al-Qaeda ruling council, as both Gunaratna and Scheuer have explained, is far more to orchestrate strategy than it is to deal with matters of tactics (except on mass casualty operations) for individual attacks. See also the videotapes that CNN recovered with al-Qaeda emissaries sending in regular progress reports on the status of Islamist campaigns and insurgencies as far afield as Chechnya, Somalia, Eritrea, and Burma.
"Furthermore, I would say that especially in the case of AQ where they are co-opting and outsourcing etc. there is a likelyhood that the focus could dissipate due to various non-aligned interests, competing bottom lines and incentives, etc; resulting in a more Burkean outcome."
Except that hasn't happened yet, at least as far as any of the groups that signed on to bin Laden's 1998 declaration of war. As a result of 9/11 if nothing else, if you're an Islamist who wants to kill people, you go to al-Qaeda to back your cause.
"Finally, I did not follow you in your response to my comments about creating bombs, attacks, etc.
The guys who piloted airplanes on 9/11 aren't around to commit any more atrocities. They are as dead as McVie. What was your point there?"
The hijackers are dead, but they consisted of 4 pilots and 15 Saudi muscle. The people who planned, funded, and ordered the attacks, from KSM to Ramzi Binalshibh to Said Bahaji were all still out there post-9/11 and continued to be active in terrorist activities, some of which appear to have been on the scale of 9/11. That simply wasn't a problem with regard to McVeigh and other domestic terrorists like the Order.
"Additionally, I think you missed what I was saying about the capability of planning an attack. The weapons would be better produced domestically (in the geography of the intended target) than lugged across the seas, etc. Far less chance of interception. More simple logistics overall."
That's part of the al-Qaeda MO, as Gunaratna illustrates in his book. Ideally, cells are supposed to be able to assemble explosives and the like with whatever they have available rather than smuggle it in from outside.
"At bottom I agree with your comments that attacks have been planned, but were foiled. However, this points to the efficacy of the J. Kerry approach to combatting terrorism than it does to the neocon approach (assuming such an approach would have involved an adequate prosecution of the effort in Afghanistan in the months immediately following 9/11."
If you're referring to terrorism as a law enforcement matter, Gunaratna addresses this at the conclusion of the book. An effective strategy for fighting al-Qaeda must involve military, intel, and law enforcement - you can't over-emphasize any part of that paradigm and not expect to fail. Similarly, focusing on Afghanistan alone after early 2002 would be to completely ignore the global nature of al-Qaeda, as can be seen by how many senior leaders have been apprehended in Pakistan since then.
Dan, Ok. I think you/Gunaratnan make some very well reasoned arguments; some of which - despite their appeal - I am not totally prepared accept 100% only because I don't have sufficient information to make an informed choice. I don't buy anything without viewing all the angles.
"An effective strategy for fighting al-Qaeda must involve military, intel, and law enforcement - you can't over-emphasize any part of that paradigm and not expect to fail."
Again, reasonable.
However, I will continue to call you to task on an important point (and please do correct me if I am mistaken in assigning certain policy subscriptions to you).
I imagine that you supported the invasion of Iraq as much, if not more, for establishing a re-ordered middle east than for WMD.
What I see much of in your writing is a mis-ordering of cause and effect.
Much of what you are calling Bin Laden's success and much of your evidence for proof of a Gunaratnanian style operation seems, to me, to be the result of our invasion of Iraq. A result that would not have occurred to anything like the extent it has had the invasion not taken place.
This would be Iraq as a rallying symbol for Jihad and for AQ.
There is a lot to suggest that the changes in AQ operations - the ones you see as most ominous, came only after we opened the live fire training center that is Iraq today.
Mark B. is typical of this mis-ordering, "The thought that the same suicide bombers blowing up Shiite Mosques in Iraq would be sitting home peaceably herding sheep if we never attacked is absurd"
Negative. Such events did not occur in Saddam's Iraq because Saddam would not permit it. Only after Saddam was removed did the ethnic, religious, and economic tensions emerge in the form of terrorism.
Now, we can all agree that Saddam was a bad man that killed politically active opposition Shiites. However, again, the killing was not in the form of terrorists organizations. Nor was AQ involved. The door was closed to AQ.
Whatever minor AQ presence was in Iraq was a) in the Northern no fly zone and was a problem the Kurd could have/should have solved (though they themselves engaged in ample amounts of terrorism) and b) occurred only after Saddam was left defeated and stifled in the 1990s; essentially a targeted enemy of the US.
In many regards it is remarkable that Saddam, for all his vileness, did not engage in active terrorism against the US and its interests.
"Negative. Such events did not occur in Saddam's Iraq because Saddam would not permit it. Only after Saddam was removed did the ethnic, religious, and economic tensions emerge in the form of terrorism."
That may be so... if i was talking about Iraqis. But im referring to the stream of Syrians, Saudis, and North Africans that are doing the vast majority of the suicide bombings. We know that there was a jihadi training network in place for years before the war, and that they have fed this pipeline of suicide bombers. We also know that Hussein took in many of them before the war, Syrians in particular, to help fight the Americans. So my point is that there was already a network of Jihadis in place in the middle of the Arab world, and unless we intended to tuck special forces into every nation from Kuwait to Saudi Arabia to Syria, to Egypt to Algeria, we had no way to combat them. Instead we brought them to us, and we have killed hundreds and probably thousands. Can you think of another scenario that would have taken so many suicidal jihadis off the board?
"In many regards it is remarkable that Saddam, for all his vileness, did not engage in active terrorism against the US and its interests."
Interesting choice of words. Is peace in Israel in the American interest? Is harboring some of the most wanted terrorists in the world 'actively engaging' (Abu Nidal ring a bell?)? Hussein was part and parcel to the terrorist network of the middle east. While he may not have handed C4 to the local jihadi cell, what he did if anything was more useful, providing what only a state can provide such as safe harbor and right of passage.
avedis:
That is of course your perogative, so long as you are willing to accept that school of thought makes sense.
"I imagine that you supported the invasion of Iraq as much, if not more, for establishing a re-ordered middle east than for WMD.
What I see much of in your writing is a mis-ordering of cause and effect."
Not actually. I supported the invasion of Iraq on the grounds that Iraq, like several other countries in the region, maintained ties to al-Qaeda and therefore constituted more than sufficient casus belli in my opinion. Because I am aware of your likely opinion of this, I have no intention of debating the point because I feel it would detract from the otherwise productive conversation we're having, but I just wanted to make sure that my rationale was understood on this one. In the interest of clarifying positions, Dr. Gunaratna opposes military action in Iraq at the conclusion of his book (published in May 2002) because he regards Iran as the greater threat.
"Much of what you are calling Bin Laden's success and much of your evidence for proof of a Gunaratnanian style operation seems, to me, to be the result of our invasion of Iraq. A result that would not have occurred to anything like the extent it has had the invasion not taken place."
Not as such, because a lot of the co-opting had already occurred prior to Iraq, particularly if we're talking about GICM, GSPC, LeT, and so on. These organizations were already tied at the hip to bin Laden at least as far back as 1998 if not beforehand. What the invasion of Iraq did, at least according to the critique of it by Gunaratna and others, was to provide these groups with a far greater pool of active recruits and then to provide "green" Islamists with combat experience that can then be carried back to the West. One of the reasons that these Iraqi alumni are considered so great a threat, however, is because the infrastructure that they would normally take them years to set up on their own is already fully made and in place as a result of more than a decade of work by bin Laden and his allies.
Mark, I don't know where you get you info., but most try a new source. You're simply 180 degrees wrong on most of it.
Saddam didn't harbor Abu, he killed him.
No evidence of these big terrorist training camps......
Dan, I will read more and think about. Will rejoin you later.
Avedis, try educating yourself:
"The Iraqi government later said Abu Nidal had entered the country using a fake Yemeni passport and was not there with their knowledge, but by 2001, at the latest, he was living there openly, in defiance of the Jordanian government, whose state-security court sentenced him in absentia in 2001 to death by hanging for his role in the 1994 assassination of a Jordanian diplomat in Beirut."
Christopher Hitchens interviewed Nidal in a government office in Baghdad. This man, regarded as the most dangerous terrorist in the world before Bin Ladin, was harbored until he became inconvenient. That is a fact.
Big terrorist training camps? Please point out to me where I said anything about camps? Of course we do know that Al Zarqawi received medical attention in Baghdad on his way to a terrorist training camp in Northern Iraq. Whether or not this existed under Saddams blessing is debated, but not the fact that Zarqawi stopped in Baghdad on the way. But I didnt mention camps. I talked about a network
"Syria has been an important base and way station for these foreign fighters. Interviews with arrested "jihadis" and transcripts of interrogations obtained from Iraqi security and intelligence show that a typical jihadi's journey from his city in Syria, Jordan, Sudan, Yemen or any other Arab country until the moment he blows himself up goes something like this: After deciding that he wants to fight the Americans in Iraq, he contacts mosques in Damascus known for recruiting mujaheddin for the holy war in Iraq. Often these recruitment campaigns are funded by senior Syrian officials.
After deciding that a person is fit to conduct a "martyrdom operation," Syrian intelligence trains him on how to disguise his identity and how to handle explosives and ammunitions. Radical mullahs supplement this with heavy doses of hard-line religious teaching. The volunteer is then taken across the desert in eastern Syria, through the porous borders, into the Sunni triangle in Iraq, where he is housed by members of the former Baathist intelligence and security network. The second leg of the journey is to a safe house in Baghdad, where he is assigned a target to blow up or sent to certain areas to fight the Americans or the new Iraqi army and police forces."
"Abu Nidal died of between one and four gunshot wounds in Baghdad in August 2002, believed by Palestinian sources to have been killed on the orders of Saddam Hussein"
That's from your first link. Just as I said Saddam killed Abu. They were not allies. Just because someone is passing through or holed up in a country for a period of time does not automatically imply a sinister relationship between that country and the terrorist. Think about it. Even the US had (has?) dangerous Islamic terrorists within its borders for years.
Furthermore - and this is a point where I think Dan has a tendency to go overboard - a conversation between a terrorist and a government official does not imply state sponsorship. There are many reasons for conversation that fall far short of state sponsorship or even approval.
The second link you provided describes Syrian involvement post US invasion. It says nothing about terrorist networks pre US invasion. Again proving that I was correct. The US invasion has opened the door for terrorist involvement and growth. It also proves my point that you are of sufficiently compromised intelligence that you cannot a) read with comprehension and b) cannot grasp the concept of cause and effect.
Thanks for playing.
Next.