Via Simon World's recent "Asia by Blog," I found an interesting article by Winston Marshall of Power Politics called The Option of Last Resort:
"When the North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in late 2002, the Bush administration set into action a complex sequence of events that it felt would best resolve the situation. At the time, it appeared that Washington was depending on a combination of pressure from Beijing and six party negotiations to denuclearize Pyongyang. Now, two years later, a more complete picture has emerged, and it is clear that the United States did not expect the negotiations to be successful. Instead, Washington had used the time it bought with negotiations to lay the extensive groundwork necessary for the containment of a nuclear-armed North. As it stands, this strategy may very turn out to be most optimal."
It's an interesting argument, and an excellent discussion of the 4 main options under consideration. As for his conclusion, we'll see. Containment strategies have built-in instability, and the risks in this case are extremely high. Is containment Plan A for the United States - or Plan B?
Thanks Joe. Your second link is also back to Asia by blog; I think you meant to point to the actual article.
Joe Katzman:
1. I appreciate the link. :-)
2. As I argued here (under "General Rak"), containment isn't as dangerous as you would imagine. While it is true that the consequences of nuclear proliferation are extremely grave, it is highly unlikely that Pyongyang will voluntarily share weapons or technology with subnational groups. More likely, North Korea will attempt to sell the technology to other rogue states (such as Iran), or the technology will be stolen. Towards the first concern, there is forceful containment (interdiction through the PSI, or destruction if necessary), as well as the fact that Pyongyang would be wise to consider whether incurring the ire of the international community it so hopes to trade with is worth the (comparatively) minor profits of a sale. As for the second point, North Korean society is so insular that it would be very difficult for an Al Qaeda agents to infiltrate it.
3. Of course, that's not to say containment is without risks; it's certainly a potentially perilous route that must be handled very delicately. But, compared to the other options, it seems to be optimal. And, as I noted in my concluding remarks, Pyongyang emerges as the real winner.
4. I'd imagine that negotiation has always been the "preferred" route, but that Washington quickly realized that negotiation had only a small chance of success.
The problem with nuclear weapons is that once you have them, you have them. No nuclear armed nation has ever been conquered or even seriously invaded (Israel being case in point). This is precisely the reason we have to get on the prevention end, disarming is considerably more sticky considering the military option is realistically off the table and everyone involved knows it. Imagine the crap Iran will pull with a nuclear deterrant.
China is the key here. China can rattle KIJs cage to any degree they wish, and indeed were China to seal the border and cut off trade NK would wither on the vine in months. Unfortionately, China is happy to see us expend energy containing NK as it makes our position in Asia weaker (you paying attention John Kerry? This is how international politics work. Try sharing your feelings with Hu Jintao and see how far it gets us.) We could embargo NK, but without China it would fail. This issue is going to take a much larger overall plan. NK is a less pressing matter at this point than preventing Iran from getting nukes to begin with. That is priority #1.
"Pyongyang would be wise to consider whether incurring the ire of the international community it so hopes to trade with is worth the (comparatively) minor profits of a sale."
True, however... I have often heard (and felt myself) it remarked that NK's actions do not appear to be entirely rational from any viewpoint. In this sense I do not mean just logical, but rational as "reasonable" and encompassing some small measure of emotion. Some go so far as to say they are simply crazy. Perhaps to make such a judgment is too harsh, unnecessary, and even ridiculous. But it does seem as if NK's reality is somewhat tangential to the rest of the world. Thus what is "wise" to us might stand for Pakistan, China, France, and most of the rest of the world (who are more-or-less engaged with the world), but it is a hard call to say what NK might see as wise.
An ironic consequence of containment: China has outsmarted itself.
As part of the containment package, a developing US/Japanese BMD is inevitable. This will very likely also have a significant capability vs. China's BM arsenal. (And possibilities of extension to Taiwan?) And a possibility of Japan going for nuclear armament.
The Chinese policy over decades, of maintaining NK as a lever, has guaranteed an outcome likely to significantly decrease China's regional relative military power.
Ooops.
While its technically accurate that "[n]o nuclear armed nation has ever been conquered or even seriously invaded," this may not remain true forever. In particular, the deployment of an effective laser-based missile defense system in optimal spots around the launch area would render a small arsenal useless. Considering that Pyongyang possesses only a small number of devices (and lacks the wherewithal to procure many more), and that the waters around North Korea are optimal for deployment, I'd say that an invasion would be possible (if one were willing to wait a few decades). By that point, an invasion might even be preferable.
This may very well have been true just a decade ago. However, in recent years, China has lost much of its influence over Pyongyang. As I noted in my essay, North Korean trade with other nations has skyrocketed. South Korea is not only willing to provide emergency aid, but is eager to begin comprehensive commerce. Russia is now willing - desiring - to send energy into and through North Korea. Japan is similarly willing to trade, and Prime Minister Koizumi has gone as far as to say that normalization of relations should occur by 2006. If Beijing unilaterally isolates Pyongyang, North Korea would be fine (trade wise). Disadvantaged, obviously, but still fine (and nuclear weapons are definitely worth more than the incurred costs). China's leverage revolves around security policy (particularly the security umbrella Beijing provides to North Korea). However, since a nuclear armed Pyongyang negates the main advantages of that umbrella, China's leverage is limited at best. I doubt it's enough to sway Kim.
Additionally, China uses North Korea as a buffer / counter against the American power bloc. However, these strategic advantages are outweighed by the very real possibility of Japanese, Taiwanese, and / or South Korean nuclearization. Beijing wants to avoid a nuclear arms race at all costs.
Even if China was convinced to respect an embargo, the effort would still fail. South Korea, Japan, Germany, and others would be unwilling to abide by such a measure.
Stephen A Fuqua:North Korea is eminently rational when it comes to foreign relations. Kim desires power, wealth, and prestige (with, I suppose, unification as a long-term objective). Kim's actions are well within accordance for obtaining these. He gains power through building a nuclear arsenal and trivially contesting South Korea (e.g. trading minor fire over the DMZ, toying with Seoul's navy, etc.), he gains wealth through Pyongyang's burgeoning trade relationships, and he gains prestige with his tough rhetoric and cult-like emanations. Voluntarily threatening the survival of his regime through the sale of nuclear technology or components would be entirely nonsensical for Kim.
John Farren:1. The kinetic energy kill vehicle system being installed in Japan and Australia (if not others) is primitive and ineffective. China's arsenal is substantial enough to make it a non-factor for Beijing. The only system capable of defeating China's nuclear arsenal is a dense grid of high powered laser-based anti-missile batteries. However, such a system will take decades to come to fruition.
2. The anti-missile shield will not be extended to cover Taiwan. The political delicacy involved in the Sino-American-Taiwan relationship precludes it.
3. Another reason why China's unwillingness / inability to resolve the nuclear crisis will hurt Beijing is that the North Korean crisis gives the United States an excellent pretext for the effective deployment of powerful forces. Were North Korea a non-issue, it would be much more difficult (politically) for Washington to maintain so many forces so close to China (particularly in places such as Japan and South Korea).