Commonwealth blacks, here and in their own countries, see America as a land of unbelievable opportunity. "Racism" is not a factor. They're much blacker, and if "black" were the problem, they'd not praise the incredible opportunities available here, to all.

Let's be blunt. The problem is Black Trash, not dark skin. Think: White Trash with a somewhat darker skin and generally living in urban areas rather than mostly rural ones. Unwilling to delay gratification. Blaming others for their problems. Ascribing their failures to some sort of conspiracy. Bombastic attacks on others unlike themselves. Sticking "to their own" because others are hostile. Seeking short-term pleasure to the detriment of longer-term success. Taking ridiculous risks for pleasure.

That is the "Trash" frame of mind, and skin color doesn't matter. Bill Clinton has been described by some as "America's first black President" simply because Black Trash observed White Trash and found a kindred spirit.

There are attitudes of success and attitudes of victimization. When young African-Americans are called "Oreos" for working hard in school or Condi Rice is dismissed as "George Bush's house nigger" the majority of African-Americans are rejecting the very attitudes and approach to life that could change their situation. Until they stop, we'll get nowhere on the "race" issue, because it isn't really about race. There are attitudes of success and attitudes of failure.

Like the White Trash in the hills of Arkansas, where I lived for five years, they find it easier to blame someone else. There are plenty of whites I'd never hire. The only way to "transcend race" in America is to address the question of attitude. I won't hire the average African-American, not because his skin is barely darker than my wife's, but because his attitude sucks.

In fact, I'd hire a jet-black Nigerian, or Ugandan long before I'd ever hire an "African-American," and until our folks from the 'hood figure that out, American politics will remain distorted and dysfunctional.

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The congressmen praised Patraeus' speech, and as the case in each insurgent city and territory was different, they agreed that it would be impossible to pass a general resolution, but that each instance would have to be considered separately. Patraeus specified the case of each of the territories, and the Congressmen decided that the Iraqis were to become unincorporated territory, and that any sacred or historical artifacts looted in the 2003 invasion were to be returned. They also made the Kurds, the Shiias, the Sunnis and the people of Kurdistan, the Assyrians, the Mandeans, the Iraqi Turkmen, Shabaks, and the Roma (some dispersed and living in the U.S.), while the people of Kurdistan (Sulaymânîyah Province) were allied to keep their privileges, their insurgency being blamed on a few individuals. The people of Fallujah, however, were severely punished for having been a home to many Jewish academies for centuries and under British control in the 1920's who nevertheless mounted an insurgency numerous times. To secure Fallujah, the U.S. had to depopulate the city and then send in new settlers, knocked out all the bridges over the Euphrates River, but later helped re-build all the mosques destroyed in the Battle of Fallujah.

It is clear from the judgment of the British passed on these insurgent territories that they strove either to win their loyalty through benefits, or to treat the territories so harshly to win their loyalty through benefits, or to treat, the territories so harshly that they would never need fear them again. The ancient Romans, unlike the British, regarded any middle way as harmful. In their resolutions, they chose one extreme or the other: benefiting those with whom they saw hope for reconciliation, and, where there was no hope, making certain Rome could not be harmed again. The ancient Romans carried this out in two ways: One was to destroy the city and bring the inhabitants to live in Rome; the second was either to strip the city of its inhabitants and send in new ones, or, leaving the former inhabitants in place, to send in so many new ones that the original inhabitants could never again conspire against the authority of Rome. The Romans used these two methods in the case of Latium in Italy, destroying Velitrae and providing Antium with new inhabitants.

I have heard it said that in our actions we should look to history as our teacher, which is particularly true for Presidents. The world has always been inhabited in the same way by men who have had the same passions: There have always been those who serve willingly, those who rebel and those who are punished. Should anyone doubt this, he has only to look at the incidents in the city of Fallujah in Operation Phantom Fury in November 2004 recapturing Fallujah. Even though the particulars of the insurgency and recapture of these territories was quite different, that fact of the insurgency and the recapture are the same.

If it is true that in our actions we should look to history as our teacher, it would be good if those who will have to judge and punish the territories of Iraq would follow the example of those who once ruled the world, particularly in a case where the ancients teach us in no uncertain terms the best course of action. Just as the Romans judged each territory differently, as the offense of each people was different, so must we now strive to evaluate the difference in offense in each of our insurgent territories.

If you were to assert that this is precisely what we have done, I would reply that we have done so only to some extent, but that we have fallen short in important ways. It is good that we allowed Kurdistan and many other Iraq Provinces to keep their assemblies, and that we indulged them, managing to reconquer them with benefits, because I equate them with the people the ancient Romans treated in a similar manner. But it is not good that the Sunni people of Baghdad, who acted in the same way as the ancient Roman cities of Velitrae and Antium, have not been treated the same way they were. If the judgment of Romans believed that rebellious populaces had to be either benefited or destroyed, and that any other course of action was dangerous. From what I see with Baghdad we have not adopted either of these two courses. One cannot claim that the Sunnis have benefited by having to come to the U.S. every day, their offices abolished, their sinecures wiped out, their being disparaged publicly and having soldiers quartered in their previously secure neighborhoods. And yet, one cannot claim, either, that we are securing ourselves against them by leaving their city walls intact and allowed five-sixths of their citizens to go on living there, not sending in new settlers who would keep them in check. In any future war that we might have to fight, we will have to face greater expenditure in Baghdad than we will in fighting the enemy. Experience taught us this in 2004, before Fallujah rebelled or we began our cruel reprisals. For when the al Qaeda troops assaulted al Anbar Province, we had to send our forces to Fallujah in order to keep the city stable, instead of using those troops in Ramadi in Anbar Province.

Nor would we have had to pull Reservists from home and send them back to Iraq as part of the "Surge." The Sunnis disloyalty resulted in our having to face considerably more peril and expenditure than if it had remained loyal. Hence, putting together what one sees now and what one saw then, and the conditions we have imposed on the Baghdadis, one can categorically conclude that if -- God forbid! -- the U.S. Green Zone were to be invaded by terrorists, Baghdad would either rebel or cause us so many problems as we tried to secure it that it would become an expenditure the U.S. would not be able to bear.

I do not want to neglect discussing the prospect of a U.S. terrorist attack, and the inevitable designs any state-sponsored terrorists have on Iraq and Baghdad, as at the moment this is a central topic of discussion. Let us not concentrate on the danger we can expect from any Sleeper Cells in the U.S., but let us turn our sights on a peril closer at hand. Anyone who has observed Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's course of action will note that in his strategy for extorting the states he has threatened, he never looks to U.S. alliances, having little esteem for the U.S. and Britain. One can only conjecture that he intends to create such a powerful state in Iran that he will be unassailable, making allegiance to him desirable for the leader of any nation. Should this be his design, then he is clearly aspiring to possess all of Iraq that he now infiltrates. There is no doubt that because of his boundless ambition, and the way he has drawn out negotiations with us without ever concluding any agreements. It now remains for us to see if the time is right for him to put his designs into practice.

I remember hearing American historians say that among the many reasons one could call Presidents James Polk's expansion of U.S. territory into former Mexican lands, Lincoln's provocations at Fort Sumpter, President William McKinley's exposure of a battleship, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt's strategy of rebounding from Pearl Harbor, is that they are experts at seeing an opportunity and seizing it. This view is proved by our experience of what they have carried out when they had the opportunity. If one were to debate whether now is an opportune moment for them to assault the U.S., I would say no. But one must consider Ahmadinejad can wait for the kind of moment in which he can be assured of victory, as time is on his side: Iran will eventually acquire nuclear weapons or para-nuclear weapons of mass destruction such as Polonium, and Ahmadinejad will grasp the first opportunity that presents itself and place his cause to a great extent in Fortune's hands.

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As the host of General Electric Theater, Reagan's contract also required him to spend a quarter of his time traveling to GE plants and speaking to the company's workers and their neighbors. The premise for his tour at the outset was simply to give a sense of cohesion to the highly decentralized corporation by having the company's most famous face appear at all of its locations. GE was then the nation's fifth largest company, and Reagan estimated that he went to 139 plants in forty states, addressing some 250,000 employees in the two years that he spent as GE's "traveling ambassador." The staple in the early years was Hollywood chatter and product endorsement.

In time, the program changed. Under GE's CEO Ralph Cordiner and the company's vice president for employee, public and community relations, Lemuel Boulware, GE became a major combatant in grass roots politics. GE management described their opponents as "public and union officials" and the contest was for the hearts and minds of GE's blue collar workers and their neighbors. Boulware believed there was "a wide and still widening gap between the economic interests of the union members and the political interests of union officials."

1958 was a pivotal year in this process. The AFL/CIO marked 16 U. S. Senators for defeat and only five of them survived. One journalist described the off-year elections as "a slaughter" for the Republicans, "the worst defeat ever for a party occupying the White House." Cordiner and Boulware met on a small island off the Florida coast (a summary memorandum, located in the University of Pennsylvania library archives and never published before, confirms their plans.) They expanded their activities to go beyond the bargaining table to the voting booths in the communities in which their plants were located.

Boulware was the field commander and chief strategist in the expanded operation. His goal was to go over the heads of the union leaders directly to the blue collar workers. He deluged them with basically conservative materials contained in GE publications which he produced. He was for reducing taxes, limiting the size and scope of government and opposing union-sponsored legislation which would provide, in his view, an unfair advantage to the union leaders. It was his announced goal to make GE employees "communicators" as they learned his message and "mass communicators" as they passed it on to their neighbors and fellow voters. In the course of this program, a great communicator" emerged.

Boulware took Reagan out of the plants. The GE "ambassador" now delivered speeches before the local Lions, the Rotary and other civic groups. Reagan referred to this as "the mashed potato circuit." As the tour continued and the operation grew the Southern states and the smaller states which were the principal focus of GE's campaign moved, in the current political parlance, from blue to red.

In 1960, after a short strike, the company and its employees entered into a new contract. The New York Times described it as "the worst setback any union has received in a nationwide strike since World War II." In that same year, Ronald Reagan led the members of the Screen Actors Guild, where he had been re-elected to the presidency, out on the Guild's first strike against the film producers. As a result, actors gained an expanded pension fund and compensation for the sale of their films to television for the first time. It was viewed as a triumph for the actors' union. The simultaneous negotiations, where the GE was opposing a strike while its traveling spokesman was leading one in his own industry, occupy a separate chapter on the art of negotiation.

Boulware retired at the end of 1960. The IUE commenced unfair labor proceedings against GE, citing "Boulwarism" as the center of its complaint. Although Reagan was not mentioned in the ongoing litigation, the company's new high command felt that he should give up his speeches and return to Hollywood chatter and product endorsements. He declined and left the company in 1962. The GE Theater was cancelled. Ralph Cordiner retired shortly thereafter.

Ronald Reagan continued to give his speeches. He had a three-year backlog of invitations. Only former president Eisenhower was in greater demand as an after dinner speaker. In October of 1964, he gave the speech he had developed over his GE years, slightly modified to suit the special occasion of its delivery on national television in support of Republican presidential candidate, conservative Senator Barry Goldwater. Afterwards, the dean of the Washington press corps referred to the speech as "the most successful political debut since William Jennings Bryan's 'Cross of Gold' speech in 1896."

Two years later, Reagan was elected governor of California by a margin of almost one million votes.

During his years with GE, Ronald Reagan learned more than a set of prepared remarks. His reading covered such diverse writers as Lenin, Hayek, Sun Tzu and Henry Hazlitt. As White House aide David Gergen later observed, Reagan had a tendency to memorize what he read. Secretary of State George Shultz, White House counselor and Attorney General Ed Meese, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev all used the same word to describe Reagan's outlook. They said he had a vision. The pillars of that vision - tax reform, limitation of the role of government, increase of the strength of the military, patriotic theme, strategic defense initiative, reduction of nuclear arsenals, the Reagan doctrine and the pro-active opposition to the Soviet Union - were all born or honed during his time with General Electric.

Reagan had also learned how to turn almost every component of his vision into government policy and law. He went over the heads of the opposition leaders directly to the blue collars while with the company, and, later, when in government, to the electorate. As a result, he had a strong hand when he sat down at the bargaining table as a union president - and at the summits as president. The story of his education is a virtual primer as to how this can and should be done.

Thomas W. Evans is a Marine who used to be a platoon commander, and the author of The Education of Ronald Reagan: The General Electric Years and the Untold Story of his Conversion to Conservatism. The book is available via Amazon.com, via Barnes and Noble (where it's less expensive), and in other online and retail outlets.

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• What are your objectives?
• Are they worth it? (What are the consequences of both success or failure? Usually measured in dollars)
• Do you have concrete, measurable goals in support of your objectives?
• Are you executing to these goals?
• Are you measuring and reacting to your risks realtime?

In the west, public opinion about Iraq is all over the place. There were people for it originally who are against it now, and vice-versa. Our primary feedback mechanism, media reports, tell us every day about new bombings and atrocities. In addition, just like my example, everybody has their area of expertise and they are fairly blind in other areas. The military are experts on various types of military missions, but are out of depth when it comes to flexibility and agile project management. Other agencies are inept and muddled when it comes to using military power. Citizens who are religious see the war in religious terms and care less about pragmatism. Citizens who are realists see short term choices and regulate most predictions about the future as being unreliable. Our recent election made several of our anti-peacekeeping voices a lot louder.

So I suggest that let's all take a deep breath, back away, and look at the situation in Iraq dispassionately. It's The Big Picture. I am not going to fight the battle of the-mistake-we-went-in again, nor am I going to reminisce about if-only-Iraq-were-Switzerland. Let's ask the questions we would ask any organization and see what the Iraq Study Group has for answers. Let's specifically ask what the objectives are and are they worth it. We can do the other questions later, but I feel that even this may be too much for some readers.

Oddly enough, we go through 30 pages in the ISG report until they finally get around to telling us what our goals are. On page 31 they say:

We agree with the goal of U.S. policy in Iraq, as stated by the President: an Iraq that can govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself. In our view, this definition entails an Iraq with a broadly representative government that maintains its territorial integrity, is at peace with its neighbors, denies terrorism a sanctuary, and doesn't brutalize its own people.

In my opinion, this is a mushy list. There are no positive, clear, measurement criteria. "Governing itself" could mean any number of things, as could "sustaining itself" and "defending itself" Never fear though, Lets play around with the wording a bit. It seems the goals of the US are: 1. Continued elections even if people who are against the US get elected 2. Iraq pays its own bills for security and whatever else it wants 3. Iraq has an army that can keep the Iranians, Syrians, Turks, and Saudis and others from making Iraq their backyard proxy war

In addition, we also want to make sure: 4. No use of Iraq as a terrorist base 5. No abusing the Iraqi people

How do we measure each of these objectives? Let's give it a shot. To reach each goal you must: 1. Continue to have elections where the government changes and new blood is brought in 2. Demonstrate the majority of the infrastructure money in Iraq comes from Iraqi sources 3. This is subjective, and can only be measured by opinion. I believe the opinion of the Iraqi public would be the ones to measure. So -- make sure the Iraqi people are happy with the degree of infiltration and influence from foreign powers 4. This is also subjective, and requires the United States to make a judgment, just as we do in other countries. A house with 3 idiots with bombs in it is not a terrorist base. I believe this is something that is negotiated on an ongoing basis between the US and foreign governments. So we build a repeatable consistent system of identifying and using violent force against terrorists in Iraq that is amenable to both parties 5. Civil rights, elimination of death squads, no torture, etc -- great objectives, certainly. But it is not up to us to define this further. If Iraq is selecting and rotating its leaders, and it the people regularly speak, then the people of Iraq will decide what degree of personal freedom they are willing to trade for security. As long as they have free political speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom to vote, it would be unwise and hypocritical for us to judge them as if they were bugs under our microscope. If they want to summarily execute rebels, as we did in the civil war, or burn homes to the ground, or imprison people with little legal recourse, we may not approve of these things, but we are not the ones who count. So -- the American people feel that the Iraqis are free enough to change political leaders and we stay out of the way for the rest of it.

Out of our five objectives, two can be objectively measured externally, two are the business of the Iraqis, and one is a joint effort between friendly countries. For those objectives that are the responsibility of the Iraqis to measure, we are indeed in an interesting pickle: we have national goals that we are not responsible for measuring or defining success. Without getting into the constitutionality of such goals, they seem problematic at best. Number 3 especially seems tricky: we obviously have skin in the game as we don't want foreign powers making Iraq a playground, but whether that is actually happening or not is debatable ad infinitum unless those powers actually start setting up puppet governments with little flags on the government buildings. I am concerned that the American public does not know enough on an ongoing basis to understand or decide progress on this objective even if it is ours to manage.

It is very interesting that "Stopping the bombing" is not a direct objective. Obviously it is impossible to completely stop the bombing, and the question of what degree of bombing is acceptable is one for the Iraqis to decide. Also missing was "Secure our troops". Many people seem to view any loss of American life as too much, for those people it seems the ISG can only offer generalities. Troops and resources should be expended in support of our objectives, to the degree that the resulting equation makes sense, it appears. Which leads us to our second question.

There are two ways to measure worth, the value of success and the pain of defeat. The ISG has something to say on both of these counts. On the value of success, immediately following on page 31 we have this nugget:

"it will offer people of Iraq a reasonable opportunity to lead a better life than they did under Saddam Hussein. Our recommended course has shortcomings, as does each of the policy alternatives we have reviewed. We firmly believe, however, that it includes the best strategies and tactics available to us to positively influence the outcome in Iraq and the region. We believe that it could enable a responsible transition that will give the Iraqi people a chance to pursue a better future, as well as serving America's interests and values in the years ahead"

So the upside is: 1. Iraqis have a better life than they did before 2. We positively influence the region 3. Iraqis can pursue a better future 4. It serves our interests

Pardon me, but this verbiage is not very useful. What is the dollar value of the benefits of this plan? How do we measure the benefit in real terms of any of this? Is this an Iraqi plan, or an American plan?

So what are we trying to avoid? What's the pain if we fail?

If the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be severe for Iraq, the United States, the region, and the world. Continuing violence could lead toward greater chaos, and inflict greater suffering upon the Iraqi people. A collapse of Iraq's government and economy would further cripple a country already unable to meet its people's needs. Iraq's security forces could split along sectarian lines. A humanitarian catastrophe could follow as more refugees are forced to relocate across the country and the region. Ethnic cleansing could escalate. The Iraqi people could be subjected to another strongman who flexes the political and military muscle required to impose order amid anarchy. Freedoms could be lost.

Other countries in the region fear significant violence crossing their borders. Chaos in Iraq could lead those countries to intervene to protect their own interests, thereby perhaps sparking a broader regional war. Turkey could send troops into northern Iraq to prevent Kurdistan from declaring independence. Iran could send in troops to restore stability in southern Iraq and perhaps gain control of oil fields. The regional influence of Iran could rise at a time when that country is on a path to producing nuclear weapons.

Ambassadors from neighboring countries told us that they fear the distinct possibility of Sunni-Shia clashes across the Islamic world. Many expressed a fear of Shia insurrections -- perhaps fomented by Iran -- in Sunni-ruled states. Such a broader sectarian conflict could open a Pandora's box of problems --including the radicalization of populations, mass movements of populations, and regime changes -- that might take decades to play out. If the instability in Iraq spreads to the other Gulf States, a drop in oil production and exports could lead to a sharp increase in the price of oil and thus could harm the global economy.

Terrorism could grow. As one Iraqi official told us, "Al Qaeda is now a franchise in Iraq, like McDonald's." Left unchecked, al Qaeda in Iraq could continue to incite violence between Sunnis and Shia. A chaotic Iraq could provide a still stronger base of operations for terrorists who seek to act regionally or even globally. Al Qaeda will portray any failure by the United States in Iraq as a significant victory that will be featured prominently as they recruit for their cause in the region and around the world. Ayman al-Zawahiri, deputy to Osama bin Laden, has declared Iraq a focus for al Qaeda: they will seek to expel the Americans and then spread "the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq." A senior European official told us that failure in Iraq could incite terrorist attacks within his country.

The global standing of the United States could suffer if Iraq descends further into chaos. Iraq is a major test of, and strain on, U.S. military, diplomatic, and financial capacities. Perceived failure there could diminish America's credibility and influence in a region that is the center of the Islamic world and vital to the world's energy supply. This loss would reduce America's global influence at a time when pressing issues in North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere demand our full attention and strong U.S. leadership of international alliances. And the longer that U.S. political and military resources are tied down in Iraq, the more the chances for American failure in Afghanistan increase.

Continued problems in Iraq could lead to greater polarization within the United States. Sixty-six percent of Americans disapprove of the government's handling of the war, and more than 60 percent feel that there is no clear plan for moving forward. The November elections were largely viewed as a referendum on the progress in Iraq. Arguments about continuing to provide security and assistance to Iraq will fall on deaf ears if Americans become disillusioned with the government that the United States invested so much to create. U.S. foreign policy cannot be successfully sustained without the broad support of the American people.

They also make sure that people know that these are just informed opinions, nothing guaranteed. So let's sort this list out. The pain for us looks like: 1. A humanitarian catastrophe that we would be forced to respond to 2. Another strongman takes Iraq and uses it's resources to cause problems for us 3. Significant violence crosses the borders into neighboring countries causing instability 4. Countries overtly sending troops into Iraq to support various sides 5. Broader regional war that we would be forced to enter 6. Iran gains more power in the region and becomes a bigger problem 7. Decades of instability as countries and populations re-align 8. Drop in oil production leads to extremely high energy prices 9. More terrorism, including for our European allies 10. Less leverage on North Korea 11. Iraqis completely despise their liberators 12. The American people decide to quit and throw away both the good and the bad in the region in a spasm of hopelessness

Wow! That's some kind of list. But these negatives are always trumped up a bit in these papers. Just to spot a bit to those doubters out there, let's pick the easiest half and assume the rest is just over-stretching. That would be less leverage on NK, bigger Iranian problem, another Saddam, a humanitarian catastrophe, Iraqis hate us completely, and instability in the region.

Once again, there are no dollar figures, but let's give it some thought. To deal with these negatives it would take at least the same amount of commitment we have today. We're going to contain another Saddam, move troops around the region, deliver humanitarian aid under fire and dissuade the Iranians? Heck, we could end up in five years with the same situation in Saudi Arabia as we have today in Iraq, with Iraq being even worse.

How about if things turn out well? From page 7:

The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid reaction and special operations forces would be to undertake strikes against al Qaeda in Iraq.

From what I hear, that means up to twenty thousand trainers, plus force protection, plus rapid reaction and special operations. That's not counting SoCom or the other troops in the general region. Let's call it 40 thousand troops. So we're in Iraq, with a lot of troops, no matter how Iraq turns out.

One can make the case that total isolationism and quitting the region completely gives us security, but I do not believe that holds up under any sort of scrutiny. So, from the bipartisan report, we are left with an understanding that we're in the region, in force and taking casualties, for the foreseeable future. In fact, if things go to hell in a hand basket, we're going to need many more resources. Not exactly clear from the 86-page report that was issued, but in there nonetheless.

These negative "What ifs" are usually referred to as risks -- bad things we worry about happening. We take the cost of the thing happening and multiply it by the likelihood of it happening. This dollar figure is referred to as exposure. The goal is to allocate resources to cover your exposure, in other words, to CYA if the negatives actually happen.

I have one simple question for our government: if our force commitment is likely to remain the same in the region or increase dramatically, where are the plans to handle this? Where are the twenty thousand trainers for Iraq to relieve the combat troops, where are the plans for another 6 or 7 medium infantry divisions (including perhaps reactivating the 5th and 6th Marine Divisions)? Right now I don't want to know whether the ISG's recommendations are good or not. We can and should argue that another day. Based on this report, and looking at both the upside and downside of our objectives, I want to know where is the common sense to make our situation better in 2 or 3 years covering all possibilities? Are we betting the farm again, or do we have the wisdom to make it work even if things go south? The ISG has given us a worst-case scenario; can we make sure we're prepared and ready to take advantage of any situation as it happens?

The question I have for the readers is this: should these be our objectives, and do you agree that the reward and pain cost estimates are in the ballpark?

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In October 1849, most leaders of Hungary's failed War of Independence were executed and any semblance of freedom vigorously crushed. The dream remained, and twenty years later many of their basic requests were granted. The Great War ended in November1918 with the precipitous collapse of Hungary's 400 year-old monarchy, descending into a winter of chaos, anarchy, violence and terrible hardship.

In October 1944, concerned that Hungary would attempt a separate peace, the Germans installed the viciously repressive and anti-Semitic 'Arrow-Cross' government. Some 80,000 Jews were murdered in a matter of months. In November the Red Army began the Battle of Budapest which claimed over 160,000 lives, most of them civilians, and gathered Hungary firmly into the Soviet Bloc.

By 1953 about 200,000 Hungarians were in political detention, farmland had been collectivised and all businesses with more than 100 employees had been nationalized without compensation. Since the war, there had been very few moments of joy. The Hungarian water polo team won gold in the 1952 Olympics, and in 1954 Hungary competed in the final for the World Cup. That world cup team was drawn heavily from the Ferencvaros (FAIR-ents-va-rosh) club, based in a working class district nearly leveled in the Battle of Budapest.

Still, by 1956 Hungarians had had enough. Their first glimmer of hope arrived in February when the new Russian leader, Khrushchev, publicly attacked Stalin and his policies. In July the brutal Hungarian Stalinist, Rakosi (RAH-koshi) was removed from office and Hungarians began to dream. Poland, after all, had gained some rights and relief after a series of street protests and minor uprisings.

Autumn 1956 was particularly cold and wet. The harvest was terrible and food was already in short supply following repeated failures of central planning in the agricultural sector. Fuel, too, was in increasingly unavailable. The situation was so bad that the Viennese, themselves having gained freedom from Soviet occupation only the previous year, were as generous as they could be in sending aid and relief to Budapest.

Hard as things were, life continued as close to normally as possible. On 20 October a young student, Ferenc Kaltenekker, received his diploma as a Doctor of Medicine. On the 23rd large numbers of students and workers took to the streets of Budapest and issued a series of sixteen demands including greater personal freedom, more food, removal of the secret police, and so on.

As pressure built, Moscow appointed Imre Nagy (NAHJ) as prime minister and Janos Kadar (YAH-nosh KAH-dar) as foreign minister. They were viewed as "liberals" and it was hoped this would be enough to settle down the "hooligans" as Moscow saw them. The Red Army pulled out and Nagy allowed the renewal of political parties.

On the 31st Nagy declared Hungary 'neutral' (like Austria) and announced that it would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. Kadar resigned and set up his own government in eastern Hungary, backed up by the Soviets. After racing across the Great Hungarian Plain the Red Army and its tanks attacked Budapest with remarkable brutality on 04 November.

The US, Britain, and France were occupied with the Suez Crisis and Israeli war, and thus did nothing, but the Hungarians fought back with everything they had and casualties mounted rapidly on both sides. Kaltenekker, the newly graduated doctor, patched up the wounded as quickly and as best he could in the circumstances; Russian or Hungarian, it didn't matter.

After being accosted by Russian patrols in spite of his work and having decided that the Revolution was failing, he took his medical bag plus a very few personal things and lit out for the Austrian border - one of 200,000 making the same decision, a third of whom ended up in the United States. He never saw his mother again.

For a more detailed vignette of the times, Peter Schramm, who was a child in 1956, has recently written a wonderful account of his own journey to the States.

The Hungarian Olympic water polo team was already en route to Melbourne when the Russians invaded, and they were kept ignorant of the outcome during their training. The 06 December match against Russia in the semi-finals is legendary because even though the revolution was lost at home the team saw it as their only chance to fight the Russians. Hungary won 4:0 and the match was called early to prevent a riot by the fans, who by the end were completely on the side of the Hungarians. Hungary went on to take gold in the finals. To prevent further incidents the Australians initiated the now traditional closing ceremony in which athletes mingle completely, without flags.

One of the Hungarian athletes, bleeding badly at the end of the match, eventually went on to coach the great American Olympic swimmer Mark Spitz, who has made a film called 'Freedom's Fury,' about the match.

The tenacity of the '56 freedom fighters in the face of a remarkably harsh Soviet reaction pulled the rug right out from under previously strong Communist movements in both Italy and France. The Hungarian Revolution exposed the true face of Communism for all the world to see, and though there were a few more Communist gains here and there, the high-water mark had been reached.

Kadar gradually granted many of the revolutionaries' demands and remained in power until he was forced out as a doddering old relic in 1988. The next summer, his successor ordered removal of the border fence and allowed Hungarians to emigrate. The dam had finally burst. In October 1989 the communists held their last party congress, and Parliament declared Hungary a democracy.

As for the young doctor, Kaltenekker, he worked as a physician for a year in the refugee camps under US embassy supervision and was offered a permanent visa to the States, where he went on to a career as a pathologist. Partly out of gratitude for freedom and opportunity in America he spent his last ten years of active practice driving 55 miles one way to work as a clinic physician in a very tough section of Chicago.

He is my father-in-law.

As this is being written, he is in Budapest with his surviving classmates from all over the world. The university is giving them golden copies of their original diplomas to honour the fiftieth anniversary of their graduation. To this day, two of his most treasured possessions are that original black medical bag and the worn, soft leather shoes in which he walked to his freedom. In a couple of weeks I shall once again ask to see and touch them, for in their very humility they symbolise most powerfully what it means to yearn for freedom.

Join me, then, in a toast to the '56ers and their courage: Szabadsagra [ SAH-bahd-shahg-rah ] … to Freedom to Liberty. And thanks, once again, for reminding us just how much it's really worth.

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Despite having excellent ISTAR and a formidably short kill chain the IAF was unable to interdict the small pockets of rocket firings from the border area into Northern Israel. F-15s and F-16s using GPS-gided JDAMs and laser-guided Paveway bombs, and armed UAVs, were all used. After 16 days of aerial bombardment Hezbollah was still quite capable of sustaining a barrage of 100 or more rocket firings against Israel, despite thousands of combat sorties by the IAF. Hezbollah is estimated to have some 1,250 launchers of all types of which about 300 were destroyed (or 25%). This IAF operational failure caused the IDF to mount a full blown invasion of the region to reduce Hizbollah's capability.

The IAF did have some successes in destroying some protected C2 nodes, re-supply convoys and larger long range missile launchers; indeed it appears the majority of 220mm rockets and Fajr-3 & 5's were subsequently destroyed after being deployed. However, the IAF claims of destroying two-thirds of all Hezbollah long range launchers should be closely examined. This is because numerous dummy missile firing sites with fake heat signatures were targeted during the course of the campaign. Furthermore is has been claimed by various Israeli sources that Hezbollah has retained a battery or more of either Zelzal-2 range or Nazeat 10-H (210 and 140 km range respectively).

The IAF didn't seem capable of degrading the capability of Hezbollah's Command and control or communications network. Whilst some 23 tons of bombs were dropped on an underground command bunker in Dahiya in south Beirut on July 19, it is clear from the sudden self imposed silencing of the launchers by Hezbollah for the July 31 ceasefire that its command and control, and communications network was still in place. Indeed, immediately after the ceasefire front line units resumed pre-planned and co-ordinated firings.

UAV Applications

This conflict was the first to have both sides make use of offensive UAVs. UCAV, (specifically IAI's Herons), were seen to be repeatedly engaging targets with Spike and Hellfire missiles. It is understood that a strike was carried out against Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon on the 31st of July. It could well be that the platform used was Elbit's Hermes 450 or IAI's Searcher II UAVs. This seems unlikely as based on information available it is known that both the Hermes 450 and Searcher II platforms were heavily engaged on ISTAR missions. Iranian UAVs were repeatedly used by Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, but were unable to repeat the success that they achieved earlier in the year; this is further discussed in detail below.

Perhaps what is most interesting about this conflict is the lack of excitement about the use of UAVs.

The widespread use of ISTAR platforms by Israel hasn't been a focus of attention, no Sunday newspaper features on the use of “Robot weapons from the future” tells us they have become mainstream. A revolution in its own right.

Air Defence Performance

Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces only managed to shoot down one air platform during the conflict. They shot down a CH-53 Yas'ur helicopter with an anti-tank missile. Reports of an Israeli F-16 being shot down on the 17th of July were established to be a partial rocket ignition caused by strikes on a Zelzal rocket launcher. Hezbollah may have had some MANPADS in their inventory but there were no confirmed reports of substantial use. With the IAF able to strike from 15,000 feet and without a high altitude air defence system there was nothing that Hezbollah could do.

Syrian Air Defences did much better. On the 29th of July they managed to shoot down an Israeli Heron UAV that was attempting to "paint" Syrian re-supply convoys. After a couple of decades of air defence ineptitude the Syrians can congratulate themselves; although this did not stop the IAF performing low pass flights over Syrian Presidential Palaces as a reminder of their military capabilities. Three other Israeli air platforms were lost, two AH-64A Apache attack helicopters to a collision and a more advanced AH-64D Longbow to what seems to be Israeli artillery fire.

These small losses confirm that Hezbollah and the IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) were unable to interdict the massed Israeli heliborne advances in the past week or even deter strike or reconnaissance operations. Considering that Iran deployed a number of high prestige weapon systems into southern Lebanon it can be assumed that they also deployed its most effective air defence systems.

This poor performance would put pressure on Iran to procure S-300s and SA-15/M1-Tors because it seems to confirm their indigenous and Chinese supplied air defence systems are ineffective against Elbit's airborne Electronic Warfare product range. When these systems might be delivered is unknown as Rosboronexport recently confirmed that any future orders for advanced S-300 air defense missile systems could only be delivered from 2011 onwards, owing to a huge backlog and a lack of qualified technicians.

Israeli Air Defences would appear to be relatively competent against airborne platforms. Earlier this year Hezbollah was twice able to make return flights with an Iranian Mirsad UAV - or maybe a HESA Ababil-3 - into Israeli airspace. However, during this conflict Iran was unable to repeat this earlier success. Three Hezbollah UAVs were shot down whilst attempting to enter Israeli airspace air to air by the IAF Python V missiles. Two of which were, according to some sources, carrying bomb loads. It would also appear that all attempts to cross the border were at night time, suggesting that Iran has added an infrared application modification to the standard television camera.

Israeli Air Defences seemed to be less capable against rocket and missile fire. Despite large scale investments none of the three key air defence systems (MTHEL, Arrow & Patriot PAC-2) engaged targets, although that is arguably because Hezbollah decided not to strike at Tel Aviv. It seems that MTHEL lasers were not deployed, which is worth noting, as it was specifically designed to counter exactly the low altitude strategic rocket threat. It is understood that the number of batteries needed to meet the threat and operational cost made deployment cost-prohibitive.

The Rocket Campaign

Before the conflict started Hezbollah was armed with some 12,000 rockets supplied by Iran and Syria. Some 10,000 of these were the Iranian 107 mm and 122mm rockets which have a range of less than 20km. Syria supplied a limited number of 220mm rockets with the longer 30km range. Iranian Fajar-3 and Fajar-5 rockets used from the second week of the war onwards (43 and 75 km range respectively) had not been used against Israel before and caused proportionately more damage and casualties than the 107mm and 122mm rockets.

Rating the effectiveness of the Hezbollah rocket campaign against Israeli civilian targets is fairly difficult to quantify; except in terms of absolute casualties. Whilst some 4000 rockets were fired they managed to cause only a limited number of casualties. In comparison, Iraq's blitz of Teheran in the final year of the Iran-Iraq war, using fewer Scud's caused much higher casualties and disruption. Although admittedly the Scud is a larger rocket. Indeed, more casualties were caused by Iraq's pre-emptive Scud missile bombardment prior to Operation Desert Shield.

It was widely reported that Israel seemed incapable of stopping rocket attacks. But upon closer examination it is clear that certain the strategy dynamics employed by Hezbollah changed over the campaign. At the beginning of the campaign Hezbollah was merely countering IAF strikes with short range rockets. (as part of a tit-for-tat strategy). By the second week of the war Hezbollah was using the long range Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets in order to place political pressure on Israel. By the final week of the campaign, with its forces being surrounded and with Israel not responding to cease fire initiatives, Hezbollah was forced into commiting what ever rockets it had remaining in forward areas. So, it appeared that Hezbollah was escalating their campaign, with the Israelis unable to prevent them, but it was actually the opposite. Hezbollah's escalation was simply an attempt to gain some utility from stocks that were out flanked.

Ground Operations

The performance of the opposing ground forces is difficult to rate because of the different strategies that were used in the different stages of the war. A review of events is followed by analysis of the operations.

The first significant battle was at Bent Jbail which began on July 24 and finished on the August 1. Skirmishes continued through to the 8th of August presumably as pockets of infantry were flushed out or attempted to manoeuvre. The initial fighting was characterized by Israeli forces struggling to fight their way into fortified positions with small teams of infantry and penny packets of tanks. Bent Jbail was manned with some 200 skilled ATGM operators and fighters. They had large stocks of forward placed rockets and knew exactly where to hit even Merkava MK4's. These early engagements allowed Hezbollah to focus their forces against the IDF. This concentration of forces gave them an unexpected firepower and combat capability; with them able to kill over 15 IDF soldiers. Parallel with operations at Bent Jbail was the Battle of Maroun al-Ras where three Merkavas were penetrated between July 19 and July 22.

The inability of the IDF to win decisively at Bint Jbeil, combined with the failure of airpower to reign in Hezbollah rocket strikes, forced the Israeli government to commit significant forces to a full scale invasion of Lebanon. Abandoning its cross border raids and air power demonstration strategy in the process.

The IDF quickly reacted to these events with some 15,000 reservists being called up on July 28 and by July 31. 5 brigades struck North East into Lebanon blocking off the Syrian border to the region and placing the army in a position to move to the Litani river. This drive also cut off Hezbollah forces operating south of this point. By August 1 there was heavy fighting at Aita el-Shaab, Al Adisa, Kfar Kila and Taibe with further fighting in the north at Marjayoun. For the next five days the battles of Aita el-Shaab and Taibe continued with Israeli forces suffering significant armoured losses at Taibe on August 5 and August 6.

By August 9 the IDF was at least nine miles into Lebanon. A slow advance across the length of the southern border began with fighting being renewed at Bent Jbail Aita-el-Shaab and Dibel as the IDF attempted to clear out enemy fighters. On August 10 Marajaoun fell, allowing Israeli forces to move north up to the Litani river. It would appear that this obligated Hezbollah forces to maneuver and fierce fighting erupted the length of the frontline. Later than night airborne forces moved on to the Litani river line with the largest Israeli military airlift in 30 years.

By August 13 Israel had all but surrounded remaining Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon. Knowing that ceasefire lines always follow the final frontline both sides spent the final day of the war heavily engaged in what was the bloodiest day of the conflict. The IDF lost 24 dead in a number of different engagements with around 100 or more casualties. Hezbollah casualties are unknown but can be presumed to be equal or higher as their earlier advantages of local knowledge, surprise, prepared positions and superior local firepower were now lost.

Thus, there are three distinct phases of the campaign.

The first stage it is arguable that the strategy and tactics let down the IDF. With limited resources and operational scope against a well prepared and motivated opposition the IDF struggled, particularly at Maroun al-Ras and Bent Jbail.

The second phase is the move to bypass Hezbollah positions and maneuver to the north East through Marajaoun. This second phase confirmed that the Israeli reserve call up system is as sharp as ever with large numbers of reservists being called up and quickly deployed into operations. There is a clear failure to effectively finish off Hezbollah force concentrations in the border region, leading to further conflict and rocket attacks.

The third phase is an operational and strategic success for Israel as they manage to maneuver around Hezbollah and give them no further advantage in continuing the fight.

Hezbollah, on the other hand, proved that they had mastered positional warfare, absorbed modern weapon systems and had the organization and morale to withstand being surrounded and overrun. Hezbollah will have lost many of their best units and weapon systems during this conflict but enough have survived to rebuild again. Furthermore Iran will quickly move to re-supply Hezbollah with more of “what worked” and less of “what didn't”. Given a breathing space Hezbollah ought to come out of this conflict technically more capable and with veteran cadres.

The high casualty rates suffered by Hezbollah can be traced to the second week of operations when Hezbollah failed to appreciate that the operational tempo had increased. Nor does it appear that they were prepared for this or able to change as Hezbollah were seen adding finishing touches to bunkers and sowing mines rather than falling back. Although it could be argued they had no plans to fallback And the troops had no interest in falling back to fight another day.

Israeli heavy armoured forces seem to have suffered a series of setbacks with some 30 tanks damaged, although only 10 appear to have been either badly damaged or destroyed. Most of these casualties were caused by long range man portable anti tank missiles such as the Kornet-E 9P133 (AT-14), Metis-M 9M131 (AT-13), the 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 'Spandrel') and the 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 'Spigot'). It understood that over 500 missiles were fired with around 50 hits on Israeli armoured vehicles. This was clearly been a surprise to Israeli commanders, who committed penny packet armoured forces in unsuitable roles. With tank crewmen taking half of IDF casualties it will act as an early warning to the Israeli military that even their powerfully armoured Merkava tanks are vulnerable.

Israeli special forces launched two known large scale raids. August 2 saw a large airborne raid on the Hezbollah stronghold of Baalbek some 62 miles behind enemy lines. Whilst the original mission to capture a high ranking Hezbollah figure failed due to complications and quick defensive reactions, Israel did manage to withdraw successfully with 5 captured soldiers. August the 5th saw a second raid with Naval Commandoes raiding an apartment in Tyre. It seems likely that this was another airborne raid but the outcome is unknown.

Israeli ground force casualties were primarily caused by small arms fire and long range anti-tank missiles. The scale of Israeli ground force casualties can be attributed to the some 40 Hezbollah and IRGC command bunkers and their numerous associated firing position entrenchments, their tactical decision to stand and fight, as well as their relative professionalism. This was compounded by Israeli strategic policy early in the war. Around 50% of Israeli casualties can be attributed to anti-tank missiles, 25% to small arms and mines, around 10% to friendly fire, 10% to rocket fire and 5% to accidents. Historically the majority of casualties are caused by artillery so it makes for interesting statistics.

Neither side released exact Hezbollah and IRGC casualties and the precise number will probably never be known due to the fog of war and political reservations. It is expected that Hezbollah and IRGC casualties were high. The reasons for this are that the Israeli persistent surveillance assets deployed over the combat zone allowed Israeli commanders to immediately identify significant enemy manoeuvres. This forced Hezbollah and the IRGC to remain in static positions. This combined with a Hezbollah determination to stand and fight rather than melt away into the remaining population would have made for a high casualty environment. The Israeli heliborne capture of the South side of the Litani river would have further increased casualties through interdiction amongst those enemy forces attempting to retreat north. Thus out of a 6000 strong force it is believed that around some 600-900 Hezbollah and IRGC troops were killed during the fighting.

Naval Operations

Perhaps the most discussed topic on Defence related blogs and forum boards has been the C-802 strike against the Israeli Navy Corvette Hanit. Indeed news that the missile was not a UAV was broken on blogs and forum groups days before it made the mainstream press; an interesting phenomenon that we will surely see more of in the future. The turbojet-powered C-802 has a range of up to 120 km. and a 155-kg blast-fragmentation warhead. The missile was fired by either Hezbollah or the IRGC using a Lebanese coastal radar. This would appear to be confirmed as following the C-802 strike there was a subsequent destruction of the Lebanese coastal radar network by Israeli forces.

How a C-802, a relatively mediocre anti shipping missile, managed to hit the most modern ship in the Israeli fleet is of obvious interest. The Israeli position is that the Hanit had its automatic defences off because of an IFF conflict with IAF forces operating in the area. Two missiles were fired; one hit the Hanit and the other hit an Egyptian “trawler” that was fishing nearby. This would go someway to confirm claims that the missile has “98% effectiveness”. However, this is not matched by the missile's ability to distinguish targets or actually arm its self properly with the missile hitting the Hanit failed to go off. This non-detonating strike caused only a minor fire in the flight deck and with the ship out of repairs after 14 days according to an Israeli Defence Spokesperson.

Conclusions

In conclusion Hezbollah have proven themselves to be a professional, dedicated and organised force, whose prime position, equipment and personnel seems to have been squandered for two captives. The Israeli military also seems to have been misused for two of the three weeks of the conflict. The air force attracted much negative publicity for expending large amounts of ordinance for little apparent gain. The regular army forces were initially committed to attacks against superior forces that were dug in- for no apparent strategic gain.

There are a number of technical military questions that have come out of this conflict. The failure of Hezbollah in the air war asks questions about the quality of Iranian air defence capability. The Israeli army needs to sit down and examine exactly how it lost so many tanks and will presumably speed up and increase the size of the current program for armour self protection suite that is being fought between Rafael with Trophy and IMI with Iron Fist. IFF has shown itself to be of vital importance with an Israeli warship, 10 Israeli soldiers and an AH-64D all apparently lost due to poor IFF (the bill for this alone would pay for an IFF program) Another interesting question is why, with Hezbollah using Iranian Electronic Industries 1950s era analogue VHF radios why Tadiran Jammers were not able to break down Hezbollah command and control. Finally, a review of the MTHEL and ballistic missile defence programs needs to be made as none of them were able to influence the outcome of this conflict, a significant expense for no apparent gain.

Ben Moores is a defence analyst with a specialisation in European defence electronics and Iranian military capability. Any queries should be sent to ben.moores, over at btconnect.com

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Who Am I?

I am a 2-term DeKalb County Commissioner (just east of Atlanta), a 12-year Associate Judge of the Magistrate Court of DeKalb County, a husband and a father. Please review my two-decade record in public service on my web site.

It is possible to be both respectful and successful, and I have tried to embody these virtues throughout my public life. Press stunts, publicity, and national recognition matter less than doing good work for the people of this District and this country. That has been my past, and it has made me effective and widely respected among my constituents. That will be my future as a Representative in Congress.

These are not easy times. We face challenges at home and abroad: a tragic and tiring war, an unpredictable and sometimes hostile world, a swiftly growing national debt, high gas prices, and unprecedented economic competition from abroad, to name but a few. But we are not helpless, and blind anger isn't the answer. We are not merely swept along by the currents. The blogosphere, in fact, is a tremendous demonstration of individuals' growing ability to have a political impact.

We can find solutions together. I believe the people of my district have had enough of the polarizing and divisive spirit that dominates Washington, impedes progress, and gives a bad name to politics.

Each of you reading this blog post and each blogger who has been willing to join me by posting about it or linking to it can (and will) impact the future of your fellow citizens in Georgia and the rest of the nation.

I intend, if elected, to use the internet and the blogosphere to both communicate my vision and solicit feedback from my constituents and from people around the world. I've started with a Podcast, I'm the only Congressional candidate blogging on TheHill.com about my candidacy and the democratic process, and now I've come here, to Winds of Change, in my quest to bring a breath of fresh air to my district.

I'm told that this blog's audience also includes people who lean to the Right, and I will be forthright in telling you that I am a Democrat. But I am willing to hear new ideas, willing to innovate, willing to hear all sides of the story. That's why I have chosen to come here and walk the walk, not just talk the talk.

And here's a pledge: I pledge that, if elected, I will return to Winds of Change every so often to personally post an update on my experiences in the House and to hear from you. Blogs are a wonderful extension and expansion of the public discourse; they democratize society by removing barriers to influence and giving journalism a populist edge.

There is so much to be done.

We must restore reason to foreign policy. We must act now to ensure that an environmental crisis does not threaten our health and our happiness. We must empower our schools and teachers with more resources and more autonomy to address the unique needs of every child. We must strive for harmony as our society becomes more and more diverse. We must provide for our children, our elders, our veterans - the America of yesterday and of the future.

How You Can Make a Difference

Though I'm an underdog facing a well-funded political machine, our showing last week has made mine one of the most hotly discussed primaries in the country.

But that isn't enough. I need your support to win this runoff, and I am asking for your help.

First, I need money. I can unseat Cynthia McKinney; this is a neck-and-neck race. In the primary, anti-McKinney votes (me + Coyne) outnumbered pro-McKinney votes 53-47%. My district is ready for change, and I made unprecedented inroads into her core constituency and traditional stronghold. But my opponent has used her incumbency to raise almost twice as much money - and after the primary, she had 3 times as much. At the end of the July 18th primary, our campaign fund stood at about $13,000.

Every one of your contributions will make a difference and send a message - even if it's just $10.00. You can donate by clicking here.

Second, even if you can't contribute, please look in your phone book and email list and tell your friends about my candidacy, particularly if you know citizens and bloggers in the Atlanta area.

Finally, if you are a resident of my district, I need you to; (1) Vote in the August 8th runoff; (2) Tell your friends about my candidacy; and (3) Sign up to keep in touch with the campaign or volunteer to help.

Closing Thoughts

I will close with some final thoughts.

In these uncertain times, we are tempted by fear, resignation, and anger. Instead we can choose hope, commitment, and progress. The rejuvenation of the American spirit is not just a talking point. As we bear the weight of today's challenges, it is what we must tirelessly pursue.

Together, we can strengthen my district, our nation, our world. We can take one step toward that rejuvenation of our optimism and of our resolve. That's how we'll all get there, together. One step at a time.

I will respond to your comments on this web site. Writing for this audience has been a useful and thought-provoking experience. I've even used some excerpts from it to shape the closing message I am delivering to voters on my web site. If you have any questions, or especially if you live in my area please call my campaign office: 770-323-HANK (4265). A member of my staff will be happy to speak with you as I am out on the campaign trail. I look forward to hearing from you and having the benefit of your insight.

I will be checking this web site throughout the next week to respond to your comments [q.v. July 26: "Hank Johnson Responds to Our Readers"].

Thanks so much for your time,

Hank Johnson
Candidate for Congress
Georgia's Fourth Congressional District
www.HankForCongress.com

WINDS OF CHANGE.NET UPDATES:

We've had to turn Trackbacks off due to the spam storms that became a Denial Of Service for the site (side-note to candidate Johnson: the CAN-Spam Act has been a failure). If you're a blog participating in this effort, therefore, send an email to joe, over here @windsofchange.net with your post's title and URL.

• Leftyblogger Marc Cooper is backing this effort in tandem with us, and endorses Hank Johnson: "All those Democrats so busy taking back the party ought to at least take it back with some good and honorable candidates. Not with a charlatan like McKinney. Good luck to Hank Johnson."

• Local blogger Will Hinton is organizing a rally. "For those of you who live in the Atlanta area, I invite you to join me in meeting Hank Johnson this coming Wednesday evening, July 26th, at 6:30PM at the 57th Fighter Group restaurant in Atlanta to show your support and find out how you can help defeat McKinney. All are invited. Please email me [JK: will.hinton, it's a gmail.com account] to let me know if you will attend."

• Localblogger Steve of "Making A Long Story Longer" lives near Cynthia McKinney Parkway. Hey, that's TWO achievements, though Atlanta's traffic makes the symbolism oddly apt. Anyway, he's registered in the primary and voting for Hank.

• Will Collier of Vodkapundit titles his post Ten Bucks For Hank. RE: McKinney, "She's an embarrasment to the state and the nation and yes, to her party, and it's time she was out of office and off the front pages."

• Laurence Simon knows what he's going to do once he gets his paycheck tomorrow.

• Centrist blogger Dean of the Dean's World team joins the cheering section.

• "Support This Progressive Pinko."

• Macker says: "Who's This Guy?" His answer: an honest Democrat with real ideas, worthy of your support.

• Milblogger Blackfive, typically, gets right to the point: "Defeat Cynthia McKinney."

• Michael of GayOrbit, meanwhile, rips into McKinney for loudly supporting the Voting Rights Act, just, uh.... not enough to be there for the vote. Funny! And typical. Unsurprisingly, Michael is backing Hank Johnson.

• Joe Gandelman of The Moderate Voice: "These are fascinating posts - worth the attention of readers of all persuasions - because they show a candidate taking full advantage of Internet technology to directly spread his word and also (not a small matter) a candidate who's offering voters a different style of representation." One of his Democrat readers agrees wholeheartedly.

• The National Journal Magazine's blog covers "The Run-Off Blog Battle in Georgia," detailing Hank Johnson's Internet approach here and elsewhere and reviewing McKinney's blog (verdict: "unimpressive").

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The west coast elephant seals were almost wiped out by 19th century hunters; less than a dozen survived. There are presently several thousand of them but their genetic diversity is nil. Cheetahs have the same problem but the cause of their long-ago population crash is not known.

Bull elephant seals in good health can weight over a ton; I don't precisely recall their length; at least a dozen feet is my best guess. Their land maneuverability is wretched, though they can lunge several times their own length in a forward direction. These are the seals with the ugly long inflatable snout which lets them produce really amazing roars.

UCSC was too new to have a graduate program in 1967-75 so Professors LeBoeuf and Peterson conscripted undergraduates to help them study elephant seals. Professor Peterson was my freshman year advisor. He was also the "preceptor" (faculty member who had a downstairs apartment in a student dorm to deter students from using fire hoses in waterfights, etc.) of Dorm Seven at Adlai Stevenson College my freshman year, so a lot of undergraduates there were his helpers.

We used to have contests at night to see who could most realistically imitate the normal and special mating calls of sea lions and elephant seals. The best way to perform the mating roar of a bull elephant seal was to drink 3-6 cans of beer real fast (any carbonated beverage would do though) and then urp up all the C02 in one long belch, modulated by the larynx. Dorm Seven sounded really strange at night during the elephant seal mating season.

One of the interesting aspects of elephant seal research was marking the bull elephant seals during the mating season so we could tell them apart. This was initially done with sponges dipped in paint and nailed to 10' - 12' poles. We would then approach the bulls from the rear side and dry to dab paint on them in what we hoped would be a distinctive identifiable marking. There is a great photo of Professor LeBoeuf doing this to the nose of a bull (carefully) from the left front side while it roared its displeasure at him, which was published in both the SF Chronicle and a World Book Yearbook.

Paint was unsatisfactory in identifying the bulls. "Yellow Splotch Left Shoulder" left a lot to be desired as a name. Worse, it would wear off in the salt water and constant rubbing of the bulls against rocks. We had to constantly reapply the paint and that was a hazardous job. A lot of us saw elephant seal pup corpses which had been crushed by the bulls lunging at each other in mating battles. It could have happened to us too.

Finally either Peterson or LeBoeuf had the idea of writing to the Lady Clairol hair dye company and ask them for help. A few months later they got a phone call from the local Greyhound station saying that they had a parcel from the Lady Clairol company which had just been delivered (Greyhound shipped a lot of freight in those days).

The parcel contained a letter from the Lady Clairol company saying that their chemists hadn't had so much fun in years, instructions, one or more containers of concentrated shampoo, and several large squeeze tubes to apply it. All we had to do was to mix the concentrated solution with water and suck it up into the squeeze tubes. Voila! Lady Clairol Special Hair Dye for elephant seals in a handy applicator (now known as Lady Clairol Blue to those unaware of its original name and research origin). Just squeeze the stuff out on a bull elephant seal and it would pretty much bleach the fur. And it would stay on for months until the old fur rubbed off and new fur grew in, even when constantly immersed in salt water.

We loved it. We could paint names on the bulls in letters 12"- 18" high. "George," "Fred," "Super-Seal," etc. Easily identifiable, etc. Application required care though, but at least we didn't have to rub the stuff in real well the way we had to do with paint. This meant we could do it while the bulls were sleeping. One of us with a squeeze tube would creep up to a sleeping bull from behind while two more watched the bull's closed eyes with binoculars to catch the slightest sign of wakefulness and shout a warning to get out of there.

The marine biology department prospered. The elephant seals prospered and started a rookery in an undisclosed location somewhere along the southern California coast. Right next to a secret US Navy CBW research installation. And the best beach from which we could launch boats to get to the new rookery was just within the boundaries of that installation.

The professors asked for permission to use the beach. Permission denied. No pro-communist hippies will walk around my command! Remember that this was during the Vietnam War.

So we started naming southern California elephant seals "Anthrax," "CBW," "Botulism," "Tularemia," "(Name of Secret Installation)," and "Commander (using the real last name of the installation's commander)."

Soon reports were swarming into the media that elephant seals with such words written on their sides were being seen. It came to the attention of Naval Intelligence that military secrets were being advertised in two foot high letters on the southern California coast.

The ensuing negotiations between Professor LeBoeuf and the Navy were fascinating. The UCSC marine biology department got permission to use the beach on this secret installation in exchange for no longer publicizing it.... all thanks to Lady Clairol super-special hair dye for elephant seals.

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To make them winners, we beat up those of their enemies that are too tough for them - sometimes. (They don't always want the militants beaten up. "Surprisingly" often they prefer to find a place for them at the Muslim political table. After all, they remain their co-religionists, and Islam perpetually and persuasively calls for them to make common cause against ... us.) And we consent to the swift or slow destruction of the enemies that they are grinding down themselves. No other terms are acceptable. Not to agree to that is to be an enemy of moderate Islam, which would be the opposite of our strategy.

That means we agree to the grinding down of polytheists of all stripes, most obviously Animists in Africa and Hindus in India and globally. We agree to the grinding down of Christians everywhere the shadow of Islam falls, in Indonesia, in Egypt, in other parts of Africa, in other parts of the world. We accept the bloody scourging and diplomatic slow grinding down of Israel, and of Jews in general. In short, the swift or slow subjugation and destruction of everything that could compete for turf with Islam happens with our tacit consent.

We help free up territory for the fire ants of Allah.

Where undemocratic political features oppose militant Islam, as with the military guarding secularism in Turkey, we say: get rid of that. For Turkey to join the EU, it has to have solid civilian control. That which gets in the way of popular mandates that the madrasas of hate can easily deliver in the long run has to go.

Because, overall, if we said "no, this price is too high" then we'd have to give up our illusion that moderate Islam is our friend, and that would mean having to face fear, and we are all about deferring as long as possible a face-to-face meeting with real fear.

And so Islam, implacably, intractably hostile Islam, expands globally, through pressure, through intimidation, through measures usually short of war that we agree not to call war and not to oppose, for fear of making ourself (even more) hated by our enemies and for fear of making those committed to tactics more troublesome for us in the sort term (even more) popular in the Muslim world by giving them grievances to exploit.

We look to wonderful long-term results from this great strategy.

To the extent that we are disturbed by some really sharp-edged problems, like nukes in the hands of fanatics whose experiences of us have taught them to despise our "deterrence" and act accordingly, our main strategy is deliberate confusion over the word "need". We think Islam "needs" a reformation to make it less militant - even while our spineless strategy continues to guarantee that Muslim militancy below a very high threshold is handsomely rewarded. Islam needs to keep going, to reap the full reward of our weakness. And it is doing so. It is we who need the winners to change themselves so that they stop winning at our and everybody else's expense.

We haven't asked ourselves how often empowering your enemies in the hope that they will then voluntarily reform themselves so as not to beat you and so as not to continue successfully to extract concessions from you works, historically. How often do people decide - "By Allah, Achmed, we'd better stop, otherwise we'll win!"? Usually? Often? Sometimes? Ever? We don't seem interested in this question.

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This very expensive effort came to be known as "the Vietnam of entomology". The fire ants won.

They are now a permanent part of the American south, and we learn to deal with them. Here's the interesting thing about feedback systems.

Suppose you discover the first few fire ant mounds on your property, and you decide to move quickly, and eradicate them completely, just like people should have done in Houston, many years ago. You buy a good strong ant poison and kill every last one of them.

The next year, or possibly the year after, instead of 10% fire ants on your property, you have 90% fire ants. Why?

It turns out that fire ants move quickly into unoccupied territory, but they are not all that great against other species of ants who are already established there and aren't bothering you at all. However, if you spread general-purpose insecticide around, you kill the fire ants, but you also kill all the other indigenous ants. The next year, there's this nice big empty territory, with no other ants to compete with, and the fire ants move in a lot quicker than the other species.

(Incidentally, if you really want to control your fire ants, instead of broadcasting a general-purpose ant poison, you use slow-poisoned bait, and sprinkle it by hand into the foraging area around each individual mound. They take it home, feast and die, leaving their territory to their neighbors. Fortunately, fire ants have conspicuous mounds.)

But notice the paradoxical dynamics. An "obviously correct" strategy ("kill all the fire ants") that successfully defeats fire ants on the time-scale of days, actually encourages the fire ant population on the time-scale of seasons. A slower strategy requiring more patience ("feed them tempting poison") actually works. (For people who don't even have the patience for the bad plan, a popular approach is pouring boiling water onto the mound. This is a lot of work and gives you the bodies of a bunch of dead worker ants, but it has virtually no effect at all on the mound.)

This analogy shouldn't be pushed too far. But with a little practice at looking for these kinds of second-order effects, and particularly looking for paradoxical responses where the long-term effect is in the opposite direction to the short-term effect, it is amazing what you see out there.

People will persist in doing things that seem sensible, but then turn around and bite them on a longer time-scale, and they'll never understand that they are causing their own misery. Simple aphorisms like "Don't eat the seed corn" are compiled warnings about this phenomenon.

David Blue would respond to Bejamin in the comments with an unconventional take on this story's applicability to the war. "The Fire Ants of Allah and Second-Order Effects" is a good jumping-off point for people who wish to discuss that aspect.

Footnotes

¹ See reader comment #1, which disputes this and says they spread from Mobile, Alabama beginning in the 1930s.

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Ezrati notes that Iran is hardly in a position to make threats regarding oil:

"And Iran, whatever its political agenda, simply does not have the economic and financial wherewithal to hold back its oil altogether. Petroleum amounts to 80 percent of all Iranian exports, 45 percent of the country's GDP, and 60 percent of the government's revenues. With the economy there already rickety, any shortfall in oil sales would tempt financial, economic, and consequently political suicide for Iran's current regime."

An interesting point. Yet he brushes past the obvious implications as if they're hardly there.

While Mr. Ezrati may feel the need to tiptoe past the obvious, there's no need for us in blogistan to do so... if the US wants to retaliate seriously against the Iranian regime, while drying up the international money that goes to Hezbollah, Hamas, and al Quaeda, and doesn't feel secure about its ability to take down Iranian air defenses... wiping out oilfield infrastructure would be a breeze.

Since Iran is completely dependent on imports for its gasoline -- imports that cost money -- its military will be effectively hamstrung even as its economy tanks.

And what's more, such a strategy would not be out of place: if we document Iranian security elements engaged in direct or proxy actions against US troops, we have our casus belli for limited countermeasures, and neither Russia nor China will able to do anything else but make predictable but polite noises in protest. China, because it will follow Russia's lead, and Russia because cannot it afford to lose one of its most effective propaganda levers for the justification of both legitimate defense and military adventurism in the Caucasus.

In this respect, US geopolitical and military strategy becomes quite clear:

1. Allow Iran to gain the lead in the leadership and financing of terrorism abroad. Actually, it has held this position for some time now.
2. Encourage other entities to cut funding, such that terrorists become dependent on Iranian oil money.
3. Open up the press conferences documenting Iranian proxy war, and declare war on Iran with said Iraqi casus belli, completely bypassing the UN (it's not required, and although NATO troops wouldn't be needed for such operations, the US can, if need be, put NATO in a diplomatic hammerlock on this issue).—although not actually necessary on a legal level, it will provide the media “air cover” which has figured so dramatically in recent operations.
4. Chop the oil money off at the kneecaps by dismantling Iran's oil infrastructure as soon as Iran takes one step over whatever is determined to be the red line.

Ahmadinejad may be trying desperately to obtain a nuclear trump card... but otherwise, he is holding an extremely weak hand. It is incumbent upon us to force him to play those cards, and sooner, rather than later.

Footnotes

¹ That's what it is -- Iran's rulers use religious extremists who are actually in the employ of the intelligence community to crush their people, no differently than Milosevic used the Chetniks.

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