I'm back from hiatus, but one of the things that crossed my mind when reading this post about the situation in Bosnia was the way in which the discussion was framed. I've been fairly critical in the past about the way that our intervention in Bosnia is understood by the majority of the American public post-9/11, but one of the things that I think needs to be understood about just about any country that is now threatened by the rise of Islamic extremism, whether Iraq or Bosnia, is that in either case if the extremists win it's going to be bad for everyone, not just whichever political party initiated US intervention there. It is precisely this kind of infantile foolishness with regard to emphasizing our domestic politics before issues of international security, if you want my opinion, that led to everyone being so completely unprepared as far as to how powerful and widespread al-Qaeda was on 9/11.
In the case of Bosnia as Joe noted, it's still in the crapper economically, has serious issues with regard to ethnic segregation, and has a small but influential force of Wahhabi fighters left over from the Kateebat al-Mujahideen fighters that bin Laden dispatched to fight as the 7th Battalion of the Bosnian Third Army from 1992-1994. Dr. Gunaratna summarizes most of the connections between the al-Qaeda fighters in Bosnia and their Wahhabi NGOs on pages 131-134 of Inside Al Qaeda back in the spring of 2002 and near as I can tell, while terrorist operations have been disrupted and some NGOs shut down, very little has actually been done to disrupt the al-Qaeda node in the country due a combination of institutional inertia and the fact that the US political class, Democrats and Republicans alike, seems distinctly uncomfortable when it comes to revisiting the issue of Bosnia.
While I certainly don't blame them for this given the kinds of unsavory characters that it can now be shown as demonstrably true that the US aligned itself with in order to defeat Milosevic and his allies both in Bosnia and later in Kosovo, the utter failure of the US to discuss this stuff has been a major problem of mine for awhile now and the 9/11 Commission's shameful whitewashing of the whole event helped early on to solidify my view that nobody on Capitol Hill wants the situation in Bosnia to be scrutinized too carefully at this time. Going back to the issues discussed in the above paragraph, I think that Bosnia can be characterized as more or less a successful venture even with a bad economy and ethnic segregation - here again, I think that a lot of people who think it's possible to turn another country, particularly one in as volatile a region as the Balkans, into a complete Western liberal democracy overnight seriously misunderstand what all is actually required when you get into the long-term business of nation-building, particularly under the kinds of political constraints that real world nation-builders now have to operate under. The continued presence of Islamic terrorists loyal to bin Laden in the Balkans and the use of the region to this day as a training ground (for those interested in following this issue in-depth, I'd recommend Evan Kohlmann's excellent Al-Qaeda's Jihad in Europe as one of the best primers available on the subject) is an issue of concern that the US is going to have to address at some point, but it is worth noting that prior to 2001, as far as most Westerners were concerned (and some more naive ones still are) these terrorists were our allies, having most recently helped us in Operation Allied Force against Serbia over Kosovo.
For instance, as this FAS primer last updated in May 1999 reveals:
The Kosovo Liberation Army is alleged by Serbia to include about 1,000 foreign mercenaries from Albania, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Muslims) and Croatia. Among the mercenaries it is alleged that there also British and German instructors. Most of these mercenaries are said to be Albanian nationals, especially former Albanian army officers, policemen and members of the state security forces.
We can more or less ignore the involvement of Albanians, but who exactly do you think the Saudis, Yemenis, and Afghans were? I should also add that many of the British and German instructors mentioned above were Muslim citizens of both countries, usually of Pakistani descent or dual citizenship in the case of the British. If you ever see reference to various Pakistani jihadi groups sending fighters to assist in the Balkans jihad, it is these individuals who are being referenced above.
As for the failure to catch Karadzic and Mladic, I haven't followed this stuff nearly as closely as some, but it long struck me as fairly obvious that both men were being actively supported by their old allies in the Serbian military and the Bosnian Serb community. As with bin Laden and his followers in various parts of the world, a fair number of Serbs seem to regard both Karadzic and Mladic if not as heroes then certainly as leaders who did what was necessary during a difficult and chaotic time. I say this not to justify either man but rather to the same point that Porter Goss made not too long ago, namely that when you have dangerous men with established sanctuaries inside foreign states it is extremely difficult to apprehend them. Now in the case of Karadzic and Mladic, they aren't terribly high up any of the major powers' priority list at the moment since while the two of them are unquestionably monsters, there doesn't appear to be any immediate danger of them resuming their old activities. That isn't the case with regard to people like bin Laden or his lieutenants, so obviously the US and other European security services are placing a much greater emphasis on tracking them than they are two Serbian war criminals.
So provided we can take care of the terrorist threat inside its borders, it looks to me like Bosnia will continue functioning as a viable and peaceful (if poor and with a strong ethnic divide) state for the immediate future. And if Bill Clinton is remembered as a great man for bringing lasting peace to the Balkans, I'm fine with that regardless of my own opinions of the man because we will have accomplished our goal with respect to that region, even if we didn't realize that it wasn't such a good idea to let the Wahhabis run the show until quite late in the game. That's more or less a victory by any reasonable standard, with alternative being that you set the standard for nation-building so high that it cannot occur as a practical matter of policy. And just to draw this all back to Iraq, if we achieve something there parallel to what we have in Bosnia (though I think Iraq is destined to be better off economically under the same situation simply as a matter of resource distribution), I'll be more than happy to call that a victory. When you're dealing with issues of nation-building, the perfect is the enemy of the good.
Dan
Your putting your reputation and honor in the shithouse. That the Jihadist's took advantage of the situation in Bosnia is not in dispute but to overlook the policy of ethnic cleansing in driving Bosnian Muslims to anyone whom would protect them is criminal. You need to rewrite this post otherwise you are aiding and abetting a vast amount of stupidity for starters.
Whuh? I now have to put up a statement at the beginning of every post on al-Qaeda and Bosnia condemning ethnic cleansing by Milosevic and Co? That's like saying you can't talk about issues of terrorism relating to Ansar al-Islam in Iraq without a lengthy statement at the beginning about how Saddam gassed the Kurds. We know the ethnic cleansing occurred in the Balkans, just like we know that Halabja occurred, and we don't have to rehash every time we talk about the subject.
I don't begrudge the Bosnian Muslims in accepting help from anyone who would provide it - I've said as much on several occasions in explaining to people why bin Laden is so popular in the Muslim world. Re-read the above and you'll see that I mention that the vast majority of Bosnian Muslims are not Osamanauts. If I get any Slobo apologists trying to reinvent their leader, I'll be more than happy to tell them as much too.
We know the ethnic cleansing occurred in the Balkans
MEEP Ethnic cleansing did not just occur in the Balkans. Name the names. Fact is that in a specific region of the Balkans, i.e. Bosnia-Hercegovina, there was a Bosnian-Muslim majority as of 1991, a smaller Bosnian-Croatian population, and a Bosnian-Serbian minority. The Bosnian civil war in the 90's also did not just occur, but was deliberately started by Bosnian-Serbs with help from former Yugoslav military and paramilitary troops, and the foremost victims were the Bosnian-Muslims, while the foremost perpetrators of war crimes in Bosnia were Bosnian-Serbs and Bosnian-Croats.
I think within 7 paragraphs there must be some room for these details, don't you think?
On another note, did you know that Usama Bin Laden holds a Bosnian passport?
Niko:
Here again, I don't disagree with any of that. This post wasn't intended as a primer on Bosnia or al-Qaeda's role in the conflict. My point was that in terms of nation-building versus Iraq, if we can dismantle the terrorist activity in Bosnia, I'd consider it to be pretty much a success as far as our objectives there are concerned given the region in which it's located and its history. If Iraq ends up much the same over a similar period of time, I will be quite pleased. That was the point of the post, which is why I didn't do a more thorough primer on the conflict.
I am indeed aware of bin Laden's ownership of a Bosnian passport. B. Raman, Michael Scheuer, and Rohan Gunaratna among others (including I think even the 9/11 commission) have all noted that he traveled there at least once during the early 1990s while he was based in Sudan to inspect the process of his followers there.
Right on that count - that Bosniacs got the help that just happened to come their way, not the help they necessarily wanted to get. With the cooling of the jihad in Afghanistan and the civil war in Lebanon, there was a surplus of experienced personnel who were willing to fight and die once asked. As for the continued presence of these jihadists in Bosnia, it makes as much sense for them to have been in Bosnia as London at the time of the end of the war. Bosnia simply allowed them to stay because many (or most) were persona non grata anywhere else; some assimilated, others did not. Those who did not tended to keep alive their little prayer circles and initiate communities based on them. This is why there are pockets of these crazies in Bocinja Donja, Zenica, Maglaj, and the like. An influx of Saudi money, obviously encouraged during the various donors' conferences that have kept Bosnia afloat (but which was used mainly to build mosques and Islamic schools, much to the chagrin of many Bosniacs initially), has contributed more to the radicalization of the landscape (or any feared "spread" of radical ideology in the country) than the mere presence of these remaining foreign fighters.
The ultimate truth about Bosnia, though, is historical in nature. The area has always been a backwater - geographically, culturally, politically. Marshal Tito even based Yugoslavia's strategic defense on Bosnia's inherent hostility and divided groups - who would want to follow a retreating army past Belgrade and Novi Sad into that place? That the place is unstable, divided, and maybe even uncontrollable by outsiders makes it perfect for al-Qaeda to use it as a base. It appears, then, that the challenge to combat terrorism in Bosnia runs concurrently with the "nation-building" project that was begun a decade ago by NATO and the UN. Allowing this issue to become confused by debates raging in isolated Washington, D.C. bullrings only makes it less likely that we can ever succeed.
And actually there was some support for a happy outcome in one of the linked articles:
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At the faculty of Islamic studies in Sarajevo, Professor Ahmed Alibasic rejects "concerns voiced by the press" and insists "Wahhabism is not a problem in Bosnia."
While acknowledging their influence on local Islam through Arab humanitarian organisations, Alibasic assures that Bosnia's Islamic Community, the leading religious Muslim body, "completely controls the situation".
"In Chechnya and Dagestan local Islamic authorities were weak and that is why 'foreigners' took over control," he stressed in a reference to conflicts in two of Russia's Caucasian republics in which Arab mujahedin take part.
"Extremists exist, of course, and it is necessary to fight against terrorism, but we should avoid generalising at any price," said Alibasic, for whom Bosnia's future lies within the European Union.
"The Islamic community rejects violence, extremism, intolerance, and an overwhelming majority of Bosnian Muslims follows this path," he said.
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Praktike, one hopes so, but Wahabbi money has a way of altering that dynamic over time. Bangladesh and Indonesia offer useful cases in point. That, to me, was the most significant reminder in the Bosnia-related links I put up - and also the most significant conclusion.
#2 was the part in the link re: Mladic and Karadzic that noted their location had been pinpointed exactly for quite a while, but a combination of unwillingness to risk a firefight (!?!) and possible collusion by some of the IFOR countries on the ground. The whole thing makes for very dispiriting reading - classic pre-9/11 "is this concept of 'action' a sick joke, or what?" stuff. But it does make the point that if arrest warrants are one's method of choice for dealing with monsters and terrorists, don't be shocked when stuff like this becomes the norm.
#3 was the exquisite irony of the French press suddenly focusing on all the issues that afflict France right now in a very noticeable way, with a flurry of articles on... Bosnia. The stuff Gabriel Gonzalez had just written here from Paris about the French media was really thrown into sharp relief by that.
Like many neocons, I supported the intervention in Bosnia (noting that fact, and the converse opposition among both the Left and his traditional right-wing enemies, was the beginning of Christopher Hitchens' political rethinking).
Overall, I still do, despite the difficulties and the fact that the USA ended up being there long, long after President Clinton promised they would be gone. My expectations for such things tend to be temppered with realism, and expecting everyone to sing "Kumbaya" together wasn't on my list. None of the stuff I linked to surprised me, and having the whole thing run by the UN/NGO set doesn't inspire confidence in either the effectiveness or the urgency of their efforts.
Plus, there were unexpected upsides from Clinton's intervention. The good news that resulted in comparison to what life was like before matters. So did some unexpected stuff like the US military's performance in Iraq being improved by the soldiers who had honed local action and nation-building skills in Bosnia with IFOR.
I do believe, however, that Bosnia needs to be a European project going forward. The moral issue that prompted intervention is now dead, its usefulness to the US military has expired, attention is required elsewhere, and the Europeans have the ability and wealth to handle this and more if they choose. Given that it's their continent and their immediate interests at stake, they ought to do so.
"#2 was the part in the link re: Mladic and Karadzic that noted their location had been pinpointed exactly for quite a while, but a combination of unwillingness to risk a firefight (!?!) and possible collusion by some of the IFOR countries on the ground. The whole thing makes for very dispiriting reading - classic pre-9/11 "is this concept of 'action' a sick joke, or what?" stuff. But it does make the point that if arrest warrants are one's method of choice for dealing with monsters and terrorists, don't be shocked when stuff like this becomes the norm."
I'm sure it's been pointed out to you that Bin Laden, az-Zawahiri, az-Zarqawi, etc. remain at large? And that most of the guys we captured were the result of intelligence liaison work?
I found the comparison of Iraq and Bosnia helpful to get some perspctive on what can reasonably be hoped for in these endeavors. The Balkans may be the more intractable of the two given the Christian/Muslim divide there which is probably bigger then the Sunni Shia split in Iraq. And the Iraqis have oil and seem to be willing businessmen. Mostly it is the morale in Iraq - the determination of the voters and the Iraqi security forces - that makes me believe that a national identity exists in Iraq along side the religious/ethnic and tribal as bloggers like Zeyad of Healing Iraq insist.
"I'm sure it's been pointed out to you that Bin Laden, az-Zawahiri, az-Zarqawi, etc. remain at large? And that most of the guys we captured were the result of intelligence liaison work?"
That is so. But many of those we chased out of Afghanistan with our military. The Pakistanis wouldnt have had much success arresting them if they were still in Taliban camps. And those are captures. We have killed a large number in Afghanistan and Iraq. Bill Rogio could tell you their names. Especially lately we have killed off a string of AQ field leaders that have been coaxed out hiding to come to Iraq. I dont think there is any question if they were in Iraq getting killed they would be elsewhere doing things far less amendable to our interests, to put it mildly.
Well, my Croatian family lives in a predominantly Muslim part of Northern Bosnia. They have a saying about the purported Islamification (and Islamic proselytizing) of Bosnia.
"If they demand we pray five times a day for Mecca, that's ok. If they demand we cover our women, that's ok. But our liquor and our music, that they can't take away."
That pretty much sums it up for me. Sure the Romans and the Ottomans and the Westerners left some traces in Bosnia, but none have been able to wipe away the stubborness, or shall I say, cheerfulness of Bosniaks. They just don't like being ruled.