Tony Corn, in Policy Review, September 2006:

"In Iraq as in Afghanistan, real professionals have learned the hard way that - to put it in a nutshell - the injunction "Know Thy Enemy, Know Thyself" matters more than the bookish "Know Thy Clausewitz" taught in war colleges. Know thy enemy: At the tactical and operational levels at least, it is anthropology, not Clausewitzology, that will shed light on the grammar and logic of tribal warfare and provide the conceptual weapons necessary to return fire. Know thyself: It is only through anthropological "distanciation" that the U.S. military (and its various "tribes": Army, Navy, etc.) will become aware of its own cultural quirks - including a monomaniacal obsession with Clausewitz - and adapt its military culture to the new enemy.1

The first major flaw of U.S. military culture is of course "technologism" - this uniquely American contribution to the phenomenon known to anthropologists as "animism." Infatuation with technology has led in the recent past to rhetorical self-intoxication about Network-Centric Warfare and the concomitant neglect of Culture-Centric Warfare. The second structural flaw is a Huntingtonian doctrine of civil-military relations ideally suited for the Cold War but which, given its outdated conception of "professionalism," has outlived its usefulness and is today a major impediment to the necessary constant dialogue between the military and civilians.2

Last but not least, the third major flaw is "strategism." At its "best," strategism is synonymous with "strategy for strategy's sake," i.e., a self-referential discourse more interested in theory-building (or is it hair-splitting?) than policy-making. Strategism would be innocuous enough were it not for the fact that, in the media and academia, "realism" today is fast becoming synonymous with "absence of memory, will, and imagination": in that context, the self-referentiality of the strategic discourse does not exactly improve the quality of the public debate."

He has some good points, and is spot-on re: flaws #1 & 2. It's a wide ranging essay that goes far beyond Clausewitz as Corn asks, again and again, what Karl #2 has to contribute to key questions surrounding the war. Here's the link again. Sub-headers include:

-- Clausewitz in Londonistan
-- Clausewitz in America: Prussian fantasies, French realities?
-- The Revolution in Guerrilla Affairs
-- "Virtual States" and "Nonlinear Wars"
-- "Deep Coalitions" and "Soft Balancing": The Shiite crescent and the SCO
-- The "Permanent Campaign" and the "Long War"
-- "Lawfare": Clausewitz or Carl Schmitt?
-- Soldier, Statesman, Scholar: The lost battles of Clausewitz
-- Beyond Clausewitz and 4GW