Sunni nationalist vs. Sunni Islamists?

• Opinions differ as to what degree the Sunni groups that make up the insurgency unite and subdivide. Many analysts believe that the Baathists and their formerly Salafist and Kurdish enemies have found a common cause with foreign al-Qaeda fighters. There are reports of fighting between the more secular Iraqi insurgents and foreign al-Qaeda insurgents as well as cases of executions of Islamists by the more secular groups but the level of cooperation and communication between the various movements remains unclear.

• The inability to characterize many Islamist movements and the fact that most of the successful suicide bombings and insurgent attacks have a major political and media impact even if they serve little military purpose illustrates the fact that the foreign al-Qaeda must be measured in terms of effectiveness rather than in size or numbers. In practice, they can choose the the time and place of attacks, focus on targets with key political and media impact, and have an effect even if they fail to achieve the purpose of their attacks but still manage to create visible explosions or kill civilians.

• Insurgents often have excellent intelligence from spies within the Iraqi government, military, industry, and other groups supporting the US and the new government that enables them to locate soft targets, hit key points in terms of the Iraqi economy and aid projects, time their attacks to points of exceptional vulnerability. In practice, this enables them to pick off weak and vulnerable elements of the Iraqi military, security, and police forces in attacks that result in significant casualties. At the same time, in many areas they can use intimidation, threats, kidnappings, and selective assassinations to paralyze or undercut nascent Iraqi units. As a result, a relatively small number of insurgents can bypass or attack the developing Iraqi forces with considerable success.

• Al-Qaeda and allied insurgent groups pose a special threat because they have no clear boundaries that limit them to Iraq and few restraints on the limits or types of violence they are willing to employ. From their perspective, Iraq is simply a theater of combat for broader operations. Their core beliefs are based on a vision of Sunni Islam that rejects Shi'ites and Sunnis alike who dissent from their extremist views. Thus far, these groups have been very careful to avoid any open claims of a split with the Iraqi Shi'ites and some have cooperated with Sadr and the Mahdi Army. They have also, however, carried out mass bomb attacks against Shi'ites and have repeatedly shown that they place few limits on the means of violence against those they regard as enemies of Islam. They stand to gain the most if the Sunni and Shi'ite communities splinter, if Iraq becomes the continuing scene of violence between the US and Sunni Arabs, if the US is tied down, or if their actions create as much regional instability as possible.

• Sunni insurgents and in particular al-Qaeda have made the Iraqi political process a target both before and after the January elections, which insurgents feared would cement Shi'ite dominance in Iraq and signal the demise of both al-Qaeda and Baathist visions for the future of Iraq. From December 2004 onward, Ansar al-Sunnah, Jaish Islami fi Iraq, and Zarqawi himself declared their intention to carry out attacks on Iraqi polling stations, with Zarqawi denouncing democracy as a whole as an infidel ideology. This extremism is "justified" in frequent appeals to real and imagined US actions that are characterized as dehumanizing Muslims, such as the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib and US strategic writings on the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and claims are made that this dehumanization makes the use of chemical and biological weapons against American civilians or the use military in Iraq.

The uncertainty of the Shi'ites

• As with their Sunni bretheren, Iraqi Shi'ites favor a united Iraq with a strong central government according to public opinion polls. These polls also show Iraqi Shi'ites to be strongly religious in that they view Iraq as an "Islamic" as well as an Arab state, but do not show popular support for anything resembling the Khomeinist model that governs Iran. With the exception of Muqtada al-Sadr, no leading Iraqi cleric advocates anything resembling the Iranian belief in the rahbar or a supreme leader wielding both religious and secular powers. Grand Ayatollah Sistani strongly opposes the Khomeinist concept of direct clerical participation in politics in general and in government in particular.

• Key Shi'ite political parties in the ruling United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) coalition such as the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Dawaa have a strong religious character but are largely secular in their political goals and actions. While both parties relocated to Iran and operated from there from 1980 to 2003, they remain Iraqi nationalists and their gratitude to Iran is extremely limited because of the Iranian tendency to utilize both groups in an optimistic manner and then leave them out to dry. Dawaa members are often critical of Iran in private and members of both groups resent Khomeini's attempts to coerce them into recognizing his authority as rahbar.

• The risk of civil war in Iraq is limited but cannot be dismissed off-hand. Iraqi Shi'ites resent the US occupation, but most recognize that they make up 60% of the population and will be able to establish themselves as a major force inside Iraq if the country becomes a successful democracy. Not all, however, are willing to recognize the need to include Sunnis in the new government or the military in light of their past treatment at the hands of Saddam's regime.

Muqtada al-Sadr

• Currently, al-Sadr appears to be participating in the Iraqi political process and opposing any major outbreaks of sectarian violence. His Mahdi Army did, however, pose a major threat to coalition and Iraqi government forces in An Najaf, the Sadr City area of Baghdad, and other Shi'ite areas during the summer and early fall of 2004, when US forces were facing up to 160 attacks a week in Sadr City between August and September 2004. As a result of al-Sadr's decision to turn away from armed struggle, these attacks have dropped between 0-5 a week in 2005 after al-Sadr sided with the UIA and his supporters now play a role in both the Iraqi National Assembly and other branches of the new government.

• General Abizaid stated in March 2005 that the US had not seen the last of Muqtada al-Sadr and while Iraqi forces have been able to enter Sadr City, the cleric's movement continues to play an important role there and in other poorer Shi'ite areas. Al-Sadr supporters sponsored demonstrations calling for US withdrawl in April 2005 and Sadrists involved in the National Independent Bloc (NIB) warned Ibrahim Jaafari that unless he listened to their demands, released some of the 200 Sadrists who had been arrested during the earlier fighting, and dropped all charges against their leader they might well break with the UIA and join the opposition.

• Al-Sadr has been able to skillfully exploit the political weaknesses and divisions in other Shi'ite movements in the south and their lack of experience in governing as well as the fact that a number of hard-line Islamists won significant numbers of seats in the local governments of key cities like Basra. Al-Sadr's Council for Preservation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice launched at least one attack against students in Basra for holding a mixed gender picnic.

• Al-Sadr has also revived the Mahdi Army and it has become openly active again in Basra, Amarah, An Nasiriyah, Kut, and even An Najaf. While the US believes that the movement was significantly weakened by the 2004 fighting, it has begun holding parades again and still has access to hidden arms depots that were established last year. By the late spring of 2005, the Mahdi Army was the largest armed non-government force in Basra, played a major role in policing Amarah, and had negotiated an agreement with the An Nasiriyah police to assist them in carrying out their duties. Unlike most Iraqi paramilitaries, the Mahdi Army is seen as more "legitimate" because it commands the approval of the son of one of Iraq's most beloved clerics and most Sadrists are strongly supported by Muqtada. A major reason for the rebirth and expansion of the Mahdi Army is the lack of effective action by the new Iraqi government - for instance, the number of police in An Nasiriyah was only 5,500, well short of the 8,000 needed to effectively police the city.

Other Shi'ite Factions

• SCIRI and its Abdul Aziz al-Hakim faction still maintain sizeable paramilitaries and have occasionally been accused of carrying out attacks against Iraqi Shi'ites. Dawaa, the Badr Corps, and the Iraqi Hezbollah remain potential security threats and many Sunnis in particular feel threatened by the Badr Corps due to its long history with Iran. Yet Shi'ite-Sunni tensions stretch beyond sectarian militias and both interim Iraqi president Ghazi al-Yawwar and King Abdullah of Jordan warned of the risk of Shi'ite dominance following the Iraqi elections and possible Iranian influence. These warnings are likely exaggerated, as Iraqi Shi'ites are nationalists rather than Iranian pawns and that no Iraqi clerics save al-Sadr support the Khomeinist model of politics, yet no one can predict how stable the new Iraqi political structure will be in the wake of the January elections.

• Shi'ite and Kurdish militias have been accused by Iraqi Sunnis of launching assassination and intimidation campaigns against them, an issue that accquired new urgency in June 2005 in which President Jalal Talabani praised the Kurdish peshmerga and the Badr Organization, the political wing of the Badr Corps. Talabani and SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim also appeared at al-Hakim's headquarters to celebrate the Badr Corps' anniversary where he praised the militia's contributions to the new Iraq and addressed complaints that had been made against it, declaring the Badr Organization a "shield" protecting the new Iraq. Militias like the Badr Corps were supposed to have been abolished under guidelines set up by the interim Iraqi government and nominally operate under the auspices of the ministries of Defense and Interior and Kurds have long vowed to maintain the autonomy of the peshmerga as a means of guaranteeing Kurdish security.

• Many questions still surround the Badr Corps, which is vehemently condemned by many Sunnis. Created by SCIRI and trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, Badr is claimed by Sunnis to have been responsible for the assassination of senior members of the Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami despite denials from the coalition. Sunnis also opposed the appointment of Bayan Jabar as Interior Minister because of his membership in SCIRI and have claimed that Abdul Walid's Wolf Brigade has also engaged in assassination campaign against Sunnis despite the absence of evidence.

• While it would hamstring the new Iraqi government to alienate these and other militias, maintaining their old command and control within the new Iraqi military and security forces only increases the chance that these units will continue to maintain ultimate allegiance to the Badr Corps or the Kurdish leadership rather than to Iraq as a whole. Thus, the new security forces could be divided by factionalism, decreasing their effectiveness and leading to their disintegration if Iraq does descend into a civil war.

Insurgent Pressure Towards Civil War

• While the successful January elections initially dealt a major blow to the insurgency, many of the post-election attacks have targeted Shi'ite clerics, politicians, civilians, and institutions, particularly attacks on key religious holidays like Ashura. While most Shi'ite leaders have resisted calls for collective reprisals or mobilizing the peshmerga and the Badr Corps against Iraqi Sunnis, there have been incidents of Shi'ite-on-Sunni violence.

• Shi'ite schisms remain possible, as are sectarian or ethnic divisions. Moreover, few Iraqi Shi'ites forget that Muqtada al-Sadr is believed to have been responsible for the murder of al-Khoei just after the fall of Saddam Hussein and is alleged to have been behind the killing of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim's brother Mohammed in August 2003. Shi'ite divisions could put burdens on the new Iraqi forces and paralyze or divide elements of the new government. It is not clear the al-Sadr and the other Shi'ite elements in the UIA will hold together or that other political splits will not occur before the end of 2005. Iraq must deal with drafting and approving a constitution and moving towards a general election by the end of the year without any clear picture of what leaders, parties, and power-sharing arrangements will emerge at the end of the process.

• The risk also exists that Kurds and Shi'ites might schism in ways that could lead to a civil war or that Shi'ites factions may soon begin retaliating more violently against the constant tide of Sunni bombings and attacks rather than seeking to draw Sunnis into the political process. Shi'ite leaders have avoided the temptation to lash out thus far, but the sectarian preaching in mosques is growing more polarized and popular tension is growing in the wake of attacks like the December 20 bombings in An Najaf and Karbala. Some Baathist and al-Qaeda insurgents are certain to continue to try to provoke a sectarian civil war using any means necessary no matter how costly or violent.

The Kurds and Other Minorities

• The Kurds represent a new faction that is now considerably more powerful in relations to their peers as well as in porportion to their 15% of the population. Iraqi security and stability depends on finding a power-sharing arrangement that gives the Kurds incentives to be part of the political process as much as it does Sunni Arabs. There are no basic political or economic reasons why such a compromise cannot be found, but Iraq has a long history of not making such compromises on a lasting basis and Saddam's legacy has left many areas where Kurds were forcibly expelled and their property given to Sunni Arabs.

• The two major Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Masoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani, continue to retain large militias collectively known as peshmerga whose total strength is difficult to estimate and some elements are currently fighting alongside US forces, but the Iraqi Kurds could probably field and support an army of upwards of 10,000 fighters with varying levels of training and equipment.

• There are serious tensions between Iraqi Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrian Christians, as well as between Kurds and Arabs. At a local level, there are many small tribal elements and long histories of tensions and feuds. Even if Iraq never divides along national fracture lines, some form of local or regional violence remains quite possible. Tensions between the Kurds, Arabs, and other minorities are particularly critical in major cities like Kirkuk and Mosul where the Kurds claim territory owned by other Iraqi ethnic groups, claiming that it had been seized from by Saddam Hussein during his anti-Kurdish campaigns from 1975-2003. Over 220,000 Kurds were driven from their homes by Saddam during this period and 120,000 Arabs imported to replace them. The Kurds see control of Kirkuk as their one chance to have control over a large portion of Iraqi oil reserves, but Kirkuk is currently 35% Kurd, 35% Arab, 26% Turkmen, and 4% other, making any attempt to consolidate Kurdish control of the city impossible save through violence. There has been some fighting between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen, as well as struggles over "soft ethnic cleansing" in northern Iraq and many experts believe that the only reason Kirkuk has been relatively peaceful is due to both the presence of a representative government and the fact that the Kurds are not numerous enough to seize control of the city unilaterally.

• Kurds also face the problem that they have no control over Iraqi oil resources or revenues, access to any seaports, or lines of communication that are not to Iraqi, Turkish, or Iranian interdiction. They also have an uncertain economic future since the overthrow of Saddam ended the lucrative monopoly they enjoyed under the UN oil-for-food program and Iraq can now legally export oil as through Syria as easily as it can Turkey and there is far less incentive to smuggle oil through the Kurdish regions now that trade is possible across any Iraqi border.

• Iran, Syria, and Turkey continue to view any steps towards Iraqi Kurdish autonomy or independence as a threat due to the threat from their own Kurdish minorities.

• Kurdish unity has always been problematic and the KDP and the PUK have clashed on a number of occasions, including during the civil war from 1993-1995. PUK forces assumed control of Irbil in 1994, putting an end to the first attempt to create a unified Kurdish government that had begun in 1992, while the KDP allied itself with Saddam, who sent a full corps against the PUK enclave. Tens of thousands of Kurds and anti-Saddam activists fled the area and the US was not successful in brokering a settlement between the two Kurdish groups until 1998. The current KDP-PUK alliance has not unified the Kurdish regions of Iraq and political divisions could create future problems for both Kurdish political unity and any agreements on Kurdish autonomy.

• In the course of the struggle for control of Kirkuk, there are allegations that KDP and PUK members kidnapped hundreds of Iraqi Arabs and Turkmen, transporting them to prisons deep inside Kurdish territory. While most of these abductions took place in 2004, there appears to have been some attempt to revive the process after the January elections that solidified Kurdish control of the region. A State Department cable leaked in June 2005 claimed that the abducted were taken to prisons in Irbil and Sulaymaniyah run by Kurdish intelligence without the knowledge of the Iraqi ministries of Defense or the Interior, but sometimes with the knowledge of US commanders. The Kirkuk Emergency Services Unit, an elite Kirkuk police unit, was closely tied to most of the abductions and worked extensively with US forces, as did the Asayesh Kurdish intelligence service. Kirkuk governor Abdul Rahman Mustafa has denied allegations that either the police or the intelligence services were involved in any kidnappings, but the leaked State Department cable indicated that the US 116 Brigade Combat Team was aware of the practices and had told the Kurdish parties to stop.

• Kirkuk police chief General Turhan Yusuf Abdel Rahman has stated that 40% of the city's 6,120 officers probably participated in the abductions despite his orders, claiming that they obeyed the instructions of the KDP and PUK rather than that of the police. According to Abdel Rahman, provincial police director Sherko Shakir Hakim refused to retire as ordered by the central government when he learned that the KDP and PUK would back him if he continued to stay on. The major factions in Kirkuk agreed on a compromise civic government in June 2005, but the city remains at the center of possible future conflict.

• The various Kurdish problems are compounded by the rebirth of Kurdish insurgency in Turkey and Turkish pressure on the new Iraqi government to deny the the separatist PKK a sanctuary in northern Iraq, which the Turks sent several division-sized units into Iraq to fight during the era of Saddam Hussein. 6,000 PKK fighters were operating inside Iraq in early 2005, with another 2,000 across the border in Turkey. Moreover, Turkey views itself as the protector of Iraq's Turkmen minority and has pledged to protect it during its political battles with the Iraqi Kurds.