Effectiveness and visibility of the Iraqi military, police, and security forces

• Much depends on coalition and Iraqi success in creating effective Iraqi forces that can serve as the visible element of security operations in both the Sunni areas as well as those that most Iraqis interact with on a day-to-day basis.

• The absence of visible Iraqi forces and the fact that US forces possess military superiority in every area over their Iraqi counterparts and still dominates day-to-day security issues reinforces the image of the US military as foreign occupiers.

• Coalition and Iraqi tactical victories have in many cases produced political and military backlash that serves to create new insurgent recruits for every one that is killed or captured. The lack of popular support for existing insurgents means that they must either dispense with their weapons and supplies during flight or bury them for later retrieval.

• Many Iraqis see US and coalition forces as occupation forces, allowing their continued visibility to serve as a source of enemy propaganda and conspiracy theories. Real and imagined civilian casualties, collateral damage, and the impact on civilians and mosques during clashes with the insurgency remain a consistent problem. All of these reinforce the need to create a larger and more effective Iraqi force that can take over force protection and counter-insurgency duties as soon as possible.

• As a result of Saddam's legacy, many Iraqis do not want their own military to be a constant presence on the streets, with most of the population seeing organized crime as much more of a day-to-day threat than the insurgency. As a result, efforts by the coalition and new Iraqi government to develop effective police and security forces are critical the process of nation-building, giving the new government popular legitimacy, and creating a stable civil society.

• One of President Talabani's first initiatives after taking office in April 2005 was to offer an insurgent amnesty, following up on an earlier offer by interim Prime Minister Allawi in 2004. Such acts of amnesty and political inclusion by providing insurgents a way out are as critical to the Iraqi success as creating effective Iraqi forces.

• This raises the issue of how the new Iraqi military, security, and police forces should behave in relation to their own people. There are indications that some Iraqi commando units have utilized torture and other far harsher methods of interrogation than are permitted by coalition forces. There are also indications that some coalition commanders permitted them to do this, in effect using them as proxies for actions they are legally unable to perform themselves. At minimum, US and other coalition commanders have stood by and allowed such activities to take place. The US State Department's human rights reporting notes that Iraqi forces operate in an extraordinary climate of violence and extremism on the part of their opponents and have consistently made the protection of Iraqi civilians their primary mission. However, it also noted in December 2004 that there were reports of arbitrary detention, torture, poor prison conditions, government corruption at all levels, a dysfunctional judiciary with some branches subject to external influence, limited labor rights due to violence, unemployment, and extra-judicial killings carried out by local government agents.

• In December 2004, Basra police reported that officers of their Internal Affairs unit were involved in the extra-judicial killings of 10 Baathists as well as a mother and daughter who had been accused of prostitution. While Basra intelligence chief was removed of his office as a result of these allegations, he retained control of the Internal Affairs unit. An Interior Ministry investigation also uncovered evidence of an inicident in October 2004 in which Baghdad police arrested and then killed 12 kidnappers after they admitted to have kidnapped 3 policemen.

• Human Rights Watch interviewed 90 prisoners from August-October 2004 who claimed they had been tortured or mistreated, including beatings with cables and horsepipes, electric shocks, food and water deprivation, and overcrowding. The Baghdad Major Crimes, Criminal Intelligence, Internal Affairs units are believed to have been responsible for cases of arrest without warrant, arbitrary detention, and denial of contact with family or legal counsel. Most of these detainees were suspected criminals, though some belonged to Muqtada Sadr's Mahdi Army. There were also instances of illegal treatment of detainees, including the arrest and beating of two interpreters working for US forces who required medical treatment upon their release. In another case, the Commission on Public Integrity gathered enough evidence to prosecute 6 Baghdad policemen for raping and torturing female detainees: 2 were sentenced to prison terms and the other 4 were demoted and reassigned.

• In November 2004, a foreign national in Kufa was detained and beaten during a trip to the police station to file a claim on another matter after he witnessed a police beating and raised questions about the treatment of detainees.

• The Iraqi National Guard (ING) has also been the subject of complaints. In November 2004, the ING raided a house in southern Baghdad, arresting 4 suspected insurgents and then burning down the house. A doctor at the al-Kindi hospital in Baghdad was beaten after he refused to treat an injured ING soldier in deferrence to more serious cases. Fallujah residents have also alleged that the ING looted and then burnt down their houses during the November 2004 attack on the city. ING officials have stated that disciplinary measures are in place to deal with these abuses and that a number of ING soldiers were fired in 2004 for violating regulations.

• There has been substantial improvement in the Iraqi Corrections Service (ICS) since the Baathist era, but as a result of their inheriting prison facilities from the former regime many ICS locations do not conform to international standards. The Iraqi government generally allows international observers to visit its detention facilities and the Iraqi Ministry of Humans Rights now has a permanent office at the infamous Abu Ghraib prison.

• After the fall of Saddam, prison functions were consolidated into the Ministry of Justice and the ICS was transferred from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs to the Ministry of Justice. ICS now confines civilians under the rule of law and a valid confinement order is required from a judge beforehand, with confinement not connected to military or intelligence operations or operating under the aegis of military detention functions.

• Allegations of ICS abuse have continued in 2004, though nowhere to the extent they did in 2003. ICS's Internal Affairs unit states that it conducted a full investigation of all reported cases and took appropriate action was taken if the circumstances warranted. Less than 10 cases were investigated from July-December and an individual with access to human rights complaints has alleged that hundreds of cases accusing ICS officers of prisoner abuse or torture are being stonewalled by the bureaucracy, though no information had surfaced to support or debunk these allegations by the end of 2004. As of December 2004, ICS was investigating 8 cases involving pre-detention abuse and torture by the authorities. Prison overcrowding as a result of the fighting in Sadr City and An Najaf has been a problem, with prison riots reducing the number of available prison beds by 1/3.

• Detainees are usually retained while in custody pending the outcome of a criminal investigation, with individuals generally being arrested openly after a warrant has been issued with sufficient evidence despite the numerous cases of arbitrary arrest and detention. Due to both the insurgency and the high crime rate as well as limited police training, innocent civilians have sometimes been detained and arrested erroneously.

• After the fall of Saddam, the Iraqi police essentially disintegrated outside of the Kurdish regions. A large police recruitment and training program was established after April 2003 that included the rehiring of Saddam-era officers. Throughout 2003, Emergency Response (SWAT equivalent) and Public Order (crowd and riot control) battalions were created alongside emergency response units. Over 1,500 Iraqi police were killed by insurgents in 2003 alone.

• There is a widespread belief that some police make false arrests for the purpose of extorting money, making families pay bribes for their loved ones' release rather than bringing them before a magistrate. In Baghdad, some suspects were held without a warrant in excess of 30 days despite the new 24 hour rule.

• In September 2004, 150 ununiformed police led by 4 Interior Ministry officials surrounded the Iraqi Institute of Peace after hearing a rumor that a prominent Baathist leader was hiding inside and used heavy weapons to blast their way in through the doors, looting the building of telephones and hard currency. The incident ended with no serious injuries but also no judicial follow-up.

• In August 2004, members of an Iraqi ministry who wished to acquire real estate currently being used by a political party caused the party members to be arrested and held for 60 days without charges or trial. The party members were released after 60 days, but the minister who ordered the raid has refused to appear a judge to explain his actions and remains in control of the party's real estate.

• Coerced confessions and interrogations continue to be a favored method of interrogation for many of the police and there were hundreds of torture cases pending at the conclusion of 2004. There have also been arrests of suspected torturers and administrative punishments have been handed out to police in cases where torture allegations are believed to be substantiated.

• Corruption remains a problem with the police, with the CPA investigating police abuse cases involving unlawful arrests, extortion, beatings, theft of valuables from the homes of detainees, and the use of Saddam-era procedures and methods by many policemen. The CPI has established internal affairs capability, mentoring, and accountability training in an effort to address these problems. Efforts to increase the capacity and effectiveness of the police by the ICG remain ongoing.

• Lengthy pre-trial detention continues to be a problem due backlogs in the judiciary and slow criminal investigations. There are currently ~3,000 inmates in pre-trial detention and another 1,000 held post-trial. Corruption is still a problem in the criminal justice system.

• US and coalition training efforts must make a major effort to give the new Iraqi military, security, and police forces the kind of human rights training needed to win hearts and minds that are vital to the coalition success. The same is also true of NATO training efforts being conducted in other countries. While human rights training is not always effective and acts of brutality and mass murder by al-Qaeda in Iraq have sometimes provoked their Iraqi adversaries to extremes, it must still be carried out in the interest of success in the counter-insurgency. There are also units like the 5,000-strong Special Police Commandos that are Iraqi recruited and trained who have been highly effective in performing their duties while being far from an upstanding model of respect for human rights.

• Counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations are necessarily brutal and violent - war is war. They are also, however, battles for the hearts and minds of where the war is fought as well as of the enemy. The effectiveness of the new Iraqi forces is heavily dependent on winning the Iraqi public's support and not mirroring the actions of Saddam and his regime. As US abuses at Abu Ghraib demonstrated far too clearly, excessive force and interrogation methods are counter-productive whatever their short-term results. The political dimension and impact of military, security, and police operations is not one that US or Iraqi leaders can afford to ignore in the heat of battle. The primary purpose of operations in Iraq is as much to forge a nation as it is to defeat the insurgency.

Cordesman's Zarqawi Primer

• Born Ahmed al-Khalayleh on October 20, 1966. Father was a tribal leader and Zarqawi grew up poor with his 9 siblings.

• Dropped out of high school in 1983 and is remembered in Zarqa as a short-tempered petty criminal and a gangster.

• Traveled to Afghanistan in 1989 to fight the USSR and met bin Laden. Served as a reporter for a jihadi magazine after the Soviet withdrawl.

• Returned to Jordan in 1992 and was arrested, tried, and convicted of illegal weapons possession and conspiracy to overthrow the monarchy. Devoted himself to studying the Qu'ran while in prison and was released in 1999, after which he fled the country. First identified in connection with Abu Zubaydah's Millennium Plot to attack Western targets in Jordan.

• Sought refuge in Europe and established a terrorist cell in Germany made up of Jordanian Islamists who didn't want to join al-Qaeda.

• Arrived in Afghanistan in 1999, renewed his ties to bin Laden, and set up a training camp for the manufacture and use of poisons and gases near Herat.

• Fled Afghanistan for Iraq at al-Qaeda's behest after 9/11 and established leadership over Ansar al-Islam. Masterminded the assassination of US diplomat Laurence Foley in Jordan from Iraq, for which he was later tried and sentenced to death by the Jordanian authorities.

• Traveled to Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey in addition to Iraq after fleeing Afghanistan. Claimed by US officials to have sought refuge in Baghdad.

• Ordered the assassination of SCIRI leader Ayatollah Bakr al-Hakim in An Najaf in August 2003 in the single bloodiest attack at that point in the insurgency.

• The US released a letter from Zarqawi to the al-Qaeda leadership requesting assistance in starting a sectarian war in Iraq in February 2004.

• Has kidnapped and personally beheaded US, South Korean, and Bulgarian hostages since May 2004.

• Declared allegiance to al-Qaeda in October 2004.

• Declared a "war on democracy" during the run-up to the Iraqi elections.

• Narrowly escaped capture by US forces in April 2005.

Dan's Comments:

That wraps it up for Cordesman (at least until he updates!) and I think he does a pretty good job of taking a look at the problems that currently exist in the new Iraqi security and police forces that we cannot afford to ignore. It also helps to underscore the issue of transplanting both military and police professionalism in a society that until recently had none, though I think that it also needs to be stated that the abuses Cordesman meticulously documents courtesy of the State Department are by far an improvement from how things were during the Saddam era.

At any rate, that's the end of my summary and I hope it was as helpful to those seeking to learn more on the subject of Iraq as it was to me in summarizing.