"...establishment of a contact group on the region authorized by the UN Security Council. This contact group, including the five permanent members and perhaps others (NATO, Saudi Arabia), could promote dialogue between India and Pakistan about their respective interests in Afghanistan and about finding a solution to the Kashmir dispute; seek a long-term political vision for the future of the FATA from the Pakistani government, perhaps one involving integrating the FATA into Pakistan's provinces, as proposed by several Pakistani political parties; move Afghanistan and Pakistan toward discussions on the Durand Line and other frontier issues; involve Moscow in the region's stabilization so that Afghanistan does not become a test of wills between the United States and Russia, as Georgia has become; provide guarantees to Tehran that the U.S.-NATO commitment to Afghanistan is not a threat to Iran; and ensure that China's interests and role are brought to bear in international discussions on Afghanistan. Such a dialogue would have to be backed by the pledge of a multiyear international development aid package for regional economic integration, including aid to the most affected regions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, particularly the border regions."

I never fail to be amazed at the lying temerity of people who call themselves "realists," and then serve up stuff like the above. Going down the line...

• Kashmir is not going to be solved. There are reasons reason it hasn't been for over 40 years, and they go to the core of each state's self-definition. Unless you can explain what makes any current attempt different, from the points of view of India and of Pakistan, you're wasting our time. They do not offer that explanation.

• Pakistan is not capable of handling a fully integrated FATA, or making that stick, as it would mean war. That's why the tribal areas aren't integrated now. A UN resolution doesn't change that, and Europeans who can't commit 20 helicopters to a UN mission in Afghanistan aren't going to step in to make it happen.

• India is not going to become "transparent" re: the activities of its RAW intelligence agency per the authors' suggest elsewhere; and if by some miracle they did, Pakistan would never believe them.

• Tehran's meddling in Afghanistan is about to expanding its influence, and these days about securing a cut of the opium proceeds. Similar to its takeover of Lebanon. Tehran also knows that there are no valid outside reassurances re: whatever threats they perceive or fantasize from the USA, and will continue to work to export terrorism and keep the USA and others busy on general principle. Both pragmatic and religio-ideological principle. Iran also has quite a few senior al-Qaeda under its wing, which would change its relationship with a re-Talibanized Pashtunistan/Afghanistan.

• Russia won in Chechnya, and believes it would be able to win elsewhere in its Central Asian satellites using the same methods. They're probably correct. Unless and until that belief changes, Afghanistan is a step toward their vision of a weakened USA and NATO - not a threat to Russia.

Rubin and Rasheed's article is much stronger when they do return to realism in the correct sense of the term. For instance, they make a powerful case for Afghanistan's long-term inability to support the military required to secure itself from Pakistan's jihadis. Like the fact that the annual financial resources required to support its currently envisioned military will exceed total annual state revenues for at least the next decade. And it's not at all certain that a military of that size will be enough.

Pakistan is at something of a crossroads right now. The Mumbai Massacre could be a positive tipping point, if it forces the government to realize that the Pakistani state must either fight to win, or abandon control of the country's destiny to the jihadis it has so carefully fostered. But I'm a subscriber of the "Moneyball" theory of politics - and the past record of the current crew says they'll take payoffs from al-Qaeda, do nothing, then try to lie through their teeth about it.

Which is why Rubin and Rashid have a point about taking steps to isolate and pressure Pakistan, and engage other countries to amplify that pressure, as the main thrust of our opening strategic moves. Their most promising suggestion by far is to involve China more deeply in Pakistan's internal affairs, an outcome that would be strategically positive on several levels.

I would actually be inclined to try everything that Rubin and Rashid propose. Some of their suggestions do make sense, and as for the others... hey, every lottery has a winner, right?

What I wouldn't do is depend on any of their "brilliant ideas" actually coming to pass and making a difference. Their proposals are just a set of opening moves to develop the situation here in the midgame, and scope out the roles each of the surrounding players really intend to play.

At which point, it will be time for Plan B. I get no indications that Rubin and Rashid have one. But someone had better.