As recently as the first half of 2007, the idea of an American victory in Iraq seemed like a fantasy to just about everyone, including me. General David Petraeus surged additional troops to Iraq, however, and he transformed the joint American-Iraqi counterinsurgency strategy into what nearly all observers now acknowledge is a remarkable and unexpected success. Few bother to argue otherwise anymore. What remains ambiguous and contested is the definition of an American victory.
It’s slightly tricky for a couple of reasons. Pinpointing the exact date when a counterinsurgency ends – not just in Iraq, but any counterinsurgency – is impossible. There are no final battles. There can’t be. And if we don’t know when the war is over, it can be difficult to figure out what over even means in the first place. So how will we know if we’ve won?
Part of the problem here is that the war in Iraq is usually thought of as a single war in Iraq. But there have been at least three wars in Iraq since 2003 – the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party regime, the civil war between Sunni and Shia militias, and the insurgencies against government and international forces waged by a constellation of guerrilla and terrorist groups. All three wars are distinct from each other, and two of the three are already over.
The war against Saddam Hussein and his government ended when the regime was overthrown and what remained of its army was disbanded. You might say it didn’t officially end until he was captured in December of 2003, but he effectively lost when he was demoted from absolute dictator to fugitive. No matter what else might happen, Saddam Hussein will never be considered victorious.
I make the same response to this as I made a few weeks ago when the topic of, "Is it over?" came up:
Victory is an end condition. We therefore cannot determine who won, or to what degree, until it's over. And it's not over until two things happen:
1) An agreement, or at least a framework, for the disposition of American troops in Iraq, between the governments of the United States and Iraq, and
2) An agreement between the governments of the United States and Iran as to the security and disposition of the Iraqi government and country.
On technicalities, that second could be achieved by us bombing Iran into submission, or us giving up and going home. In principle, neither of those will happen, and so there will be-- eventually, before the elections or after, this year or five from now-- an under the table agreement between the States and Iran.
Then, cynically, both sides will declare victory. It won't be everything I hoped for, but it will probably be enough for me to feel like a victory, because if we can't take down Iran, fer Chrissakes, in the next ten to fifteen by cultural conquest, we need to find a new national strategy.
But don't bother asking who won until it's over, and don't tell me it's over before the agreements are hammered out.
Marcus,
You're mixing up two different things here: the achievement of political objectives and the resolution of an armed conflict.
Hammering out an agreement with Iran may or may not ever happen, but if/when the insurgents are beaten they will have lost either way. If they lose, the counterinsurgents win by definition.
Achieving all our political objectives is, of course, impossible if we lose the war. But if we only accomplish, say, half our objectives, that will not mean Saddam Hussein or the insurgents were the winners.
Michael,
I really don't think that I am. I consider these inherently linked, for several reasons.
First, a military victory with a political, or geostrategic, loss, isn't a victory by anything but a narrow, technicality. It's a feel-good definition that loses sight of the whole point of the exercise, a definition bereft of context or consequence, and as such worthy of discussion only in the counter insurgency textbooks of 2013.
And the geostrategic definition of victory, here, has to include the stability and disposition of Iraq. At a minimum, it must be stable and independent of Iran and other unfriendly governments. Aiming for a higher goal, it should remain a viable platform for our influence in the region, as troops in South Korea and Germany have been in their respective regions for decades. (It had been the great hope of 2003 and 2004 that this influence would be predominantly military; that's been ratcheted back-- or should be-- to the lower expectation of minimal military but strong cultural influence. It will be enough.)
But second, on the pragmatic level, I simply do not believe that we can force a comprehensive, self-sustaining stable government in Iraq without at least the acquiescence, if not co-operation, of the Iranians. We seem to have that acquiescence for the moment. It is too easy for them to cause trouble from across the long, leaky border, and then melt back across for this to be otherwise. There are, as I take great pains to point out whenever I can, more diplomatic contact with Iran, and at higher levels, than there has been in decades. The diplomacy is happening, and the big decision seems to belong to the Iranians, right now: Make the deal now, or re-shuffle the deck and gamble on the election?
The question is hard to answer because it doesn't apply. There is a continuum of conditions that will or can develop over time which go in constructive or dangerous directions; the last year has seen a preponderance of constructive developments, but there is no point at which a treaty will be signed or a surrender accepted.
In my view, never was it so clear that war is the prosecution of diplomacy by other means, or "merely the continuation of politics by other means" as Clausewitz had it. And to diplomacy and politics there is no end.
Marcus:
That Iran is a factor is undeniable; that it must be accommodated, and its "co-operation" obtained, especially with the current government in place, does not follow. Particularly since its goals are inimical with either local or world peace and constructive stability. Iran's Hezbollah tutored the Mahdi Army. That's the way the Mullahs play the game.
Which will win, the rhetoric of 2002/3, or the rhetoric of today?
It will be painful for the pro-war remnant to give up on the former, the Chalabi-inspired nonsense of the secular, democratic, pro-American, pro-Israeli Iraq. (For one thing, admitting to having been swindled by a con man probably working for Teheran is a start.) Much diminished as the victory conditions of 2008 are, at least they have some relation to reality. The rights of women in most of the country are reduced, the Christian population is unlikely to return, and by all accounts there are millions of refugees in Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Neo-victory doesn't tend to mention them. The political goals that George Bush himself mentioned in his announcement of The Surge, specifically including an oil-revenue law, have not, for the most part, been attained. But it is true that the AQI insurgents have failed, in part because of their own fanaticism, and the Iraqi polity has calmed down. It would not be correct to say that the internecine battles are over, but there at least their current death toll is small. And, of course, we were phenomenally successful in the destruction of Saddam's fearsome WMD arsenal, about which we once heard so much.
War is not the great adventure our President and Vice President imagined, taking their cues from movies and television. It is a negative-sum game, and now we begin to reckon our own minuses.
Brian H, #4:
Marcus:
That Iran is a factor is undeniable; that it must be accommodated, and its "co-operation" obtained, especially with the current government in place, does not follow. Particularly since its goals are inimical with either local or world peace and constructive stability. Iran's Hezbollah tutored the Mahdi Army. That's the way the Mullahs play the game.
Co-operation, or tacit acquiescence is necessary when we throw out the extreme outlier cases of invading them or leaving-- which has been my starting point for this discussion. We're not going to invade; we should not leave; we're left with a broad range of middle options.
Absent those rather pathological conditions, one must have the Iranians on board in some degree, passively at least, if not actively. You say it yourself-- they trained the Mahdi army. That's how they play. How that co-operation is obtained, through bullying, through threats of destabilization, through horse-trading, etc, (all of which are various forms of "diplomacy" which either the left or the right will choose to ignore) is material to the details of implementation but not material to the actual requirement.
#5 from Andrew J. Lazarus at 5:09 pm on Jul 27, 2008
Well said.
Especially:
It will be painful for the pro-war remnant to give up on the former, the Chalabi-inspired nonsense of the secular, democratic, pro-American, pro-Israeli Iraq.
I always think of this as the All We Have To Do do is Throw the Nylons and Candy Bars from the Tanks view that the Neo Cons were spouting. We don't hear too much about that or Chalabi any more.
This view only makes sense when, as you so aptly put it, an administration takes "their cues from movies and television." in formulating a strategy.
Andrew, it's interesting to hear you suggest that war is "a negative-sum game". I'd be interested in hearing you expand that a bit - my gut reaction is to disagree, but I'd love to hear you expand the claim before I react.
A.L.
And Andrew - what's taking shape in Iraq is arguably the most pro-American, secular, pro-Israel Arab country after Jordan. Can you think of another?
A.L.
A.L., it's late so I'll take the easy one.
So far what's taking shape in Iraq isn't yet a state. Get back to me after the political goals of the Surge are attained, even partially. I'll outsource the details to former PM Ayad Allawi (h/t ObWi)To extrapolate, however, I'm not aware of any particular commitment to secularism. I would be very surprised if, once American forces have left the country, its policies are more congenial to the United States than to Iran. (The neocon plan to locate forward bases isn't looking too promising.) And I'm not familiar with any evidence that outside Kurdistan, Iraqis at any level have sympathy for Israel, and the suggestion otherwise was Chalabi's master stroke. (Always tell the mark what he wants to hear.) I'd put up Tunisia, Morocco, and perhaps Qatar as less hostile to Israel than Iraq. As for the pro-US quantum, I wouldn't expect much, although if we scrap the bases and trim our embassy down to size, so it doesn't look like the power behind the throne it was intended to be, something might be salvaged.Fair cop on the Gulf States - I always forget about them, dammit...more on the rest from the airport tomorrow.
A.L.
Andrew Lazarus: I'd put up Tunisia, Morocco, and perhaps Qatar as less hostile to Israel than Iraq.
Definitely.
And Jordan isn't really pro-Israel or pro-American anyway. The government is, sort of, but the people most certainly aren't. The last public opinion survey I saw from that country (which admittedly was years ago) said 99 percent (!) of the population had a negative opinion of the United States.
Kuwait is the most pro-American country in the Arab world, followed by Lebanon. (Ignore Hezbollah's bullshit propaganda about themselves and their popularity.)
The Kurds of Iraq, though, are at least as pro-Israel as Americans are, and more pro-American than Americans are. So if you count the Kurds as part of Iraq (which they sort of are and sort of aren't), then that changes what I wrote above. I've been to Kurdistan three times, and I still sometimes forget it's part of Iraq.
Good post on this from Eric Martin - over at Obsidian Wings
You'll have to go read - hard to summarize here, without copying all the argument.
Michael, the kurds are not arabs are they?
pro-American, secular, pro-Israel Arab country