Dan Nexon, who is among other things an assistant professor at Georgetown, asked some very interesting questions as to whether or not there is an organized terror network. As an advocate of this position, I feel inclined to answer them and hope that others will agree.
Also, my summary of Cordesman on Iraq will continue at some point. Really.
Dan writes in the comments of this thread:
Dan may be right, or he may be wrong. But conclusive evidence either way? We lack that - at least in the public domain - in spades.
Ah, but do we? I don't think so and neither does Michael Scheuer, the man who once headed up the CIA's bin Laden unit. Regardless of one's opinion of his views on other issues, I think that we can definitely agree that Scheuer is in a position to know on these topics and one of the reasons he wrote Through Our Enemies' Eyes was to demonstrate to other CIA analysts the value of open-source information in intelligence analysis. Like its successor Imperial Hubris, Through Our Enemies' Eyes definitely supports the idea that there is an organized terror network, as does Richard Clarke's Against All Enemies if one desires another insider account. Other statements and court documents issued by European anti-terrorism judges as Baltasar Garzon and Jean-Louis Bruguiere likewise support this opinion. Newsweek even took the administration to task for assuming otherwise in an August 2004 article entitled "Like Clockwork" that includes the following statement:
But criminal charges outlined in a July 30 Swiss prosecutor’s report—obtained by NEWSWEEK—seem to confirm the worst fears of many U.S. counterterrorism officials: that, despite a concerted assault by Western intelligence and law-enforcement agencies, Osama bin Laden’s organization has maintained a resilient operational structure that has a global reach, even larger than had been previously suspected.
He continues:
Indeed, the very pattern suggested in the article is one of greater decentralization. Sending "emissaries" to suggest attacks and then leaving it to up local groups to autonomously plan attacks suggests exactly what the "dencentralization" advocates believe: that we are looking at connected but operationally autonomous cells.
Indeed, but the examples cited in the article include the following:
Saudi officials said the interrogation of terrorism suspects in that country, as well as intercepted electronic communications, show that bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman Zawahiri, dispatched cell organizers to Saudi Arabia in 2002 and weighed in on basic strategic decisions made by the local al Qaeda affiliate. The al Qaeda leadership also gave direct orders to attack specific targets in the kingdom, Saudi officials said.
That strikes me as the classic definition of command and control, at least as it applies to a terrorist organization. It's certainly pretty much the same as, say Meshaal has over Hamas cells in the West Bank or Gaza Strip or Mughniyeh has over the far-flung Hezbollah cells. Moreover, I don't see the idea of a decentralized network of autonomous terrorist cells as being at odds with the idea that there is an organized global terrorist network. Indeed, I will once again repeat Rohan Gunaratna's theorem of what al-Qaeda is:
Al Qaeda's organizational and operational infrastructure differs markedly from other guerrilla or terrorist groups ... Al Qaeda is also characterized by a broad-based ideology, a novel structure, a robust capacity for regeneration and a very diverse membership that cuts across ethnic, class and national boundaries. It is neither a single group nor a coalition of groups: it comprised a core base or bases in Afghanistan, satellite terrorist cells worldwide, a conglomerate of Islamist political parties, and other largely independent terrorist groups that it draws on for offensive actions and other responsibilities. Leaders of all the above are co-opted as and when necessary to serve as an integral part of Al Qaeda's high command, which is run via a vertical leadership structure that provides strategic direction and tactical support to its horizontal network of compartmentalized cells and associate organizations ...
... Al Qaeda's structure enables it to wield direct and indirect control over a potent, far-flung force. By issuing periodic pronouncements, speeches and writings, Osama indoctrinates, trains and controls a core inner group as well as inspiring and supporting peripheral cadres. In addition to exploiting Al Qaeda's relations with Islamist groups, parties and regimes, Osama also seeks to influence their thinking and behavior.
The constituent groups of Al Qaeda operate as a loose coalition, each with its own command, control and communication structures. The coalition has one unique characteristic to enhance its resilience and allows force to be multiplied in pursuit of a particular objective: whenever necessary, these groups interact or merge, cooperating ideologically, financially and technically.
To further advance the Islamist project, in 1998 Al Qaeda was reorganized into four distinct but interlinking entities. The first was a pyramidal structure to facilitate strategic and tactical direction; the second was a global terrorist network; the third was a base force for guerrilla warfare inside Afghanistan; and the fourth was a loose coalition of transnational terrorist and guerrilla groups.
I still think that's probably the best description of what the group is, though that's nowhere near short enough for sound byte in the Washington Post or the New York Times.
Dan then continues:
Finally, the nature of the evidence points out how difficult this guessing game is: in either a decentralized, franchised model or a centralized model we would expect to see actors with ties to the core al-Q leadership operating between autonomous cells.
Indeed, but those are analytical paradigms, each of which can be made to fit the evidence at hand depending on the amount of influence you want to attribute to the guys who are tied to or part of the core al-Qaeda leadership. That's quite different, however, from the analysis du jour that has appeared in the press of late in which al-Qaeda is described only in terms of ideology or brand name or Jason Burke's stated belief that bin Laden's followers are no more organized or directed than are Elvis fans. That's quite a different thing from arguing that al-Qaeda is either completely centralized or has splintered into relatively autonomous chunks, both of which as I said strike me as being eminently reasonable positions to hold to.
Dan then says:
But the "movement" position - which I've been championing - need not be placed so much at odds with the "centralized" model; the key, as I suggest, is that we would see broadly similar patterns of inter-movement connectivity. The question becomes how much that connectivity represents operational centralization and how much of it is an artifact of "small world" features of the al-Qaeda movement.
If this made any sense :-), I'd say the jury is still out. I actually think the decentralized model may be, in the long-term, more dangerous.
I agree that the two are not as opposed to one another as some have been arguing, though I disagree with the idea that a decentralized terror network is more dangerous than a centralized one. At this stage in human technology, you still need quite a bit resources and infrastructure to develop any kind of unconventional weapons capacity. A scattered, decentralized terror network may well prolong the number of terror attacks and be difficult, but it will never develop the kind of capacity for mass murder that, say, Aum Shinrikyo was planning for Tokyo during the 1990s. Moreover, a completely decentralized terror network removes the enemy's capacity to escalate the conflict or coordinate something on the order of 9/11 or even Bali. For instance, Jemaah Islamiyyah, which was far more centralized than its parent al-Qaeda network, has been reasonably effectively taken apart at the leadership level in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia over the years and you'll notice there's been nothing on par with Bali since then.
If al-Qaeda hasn't significantly mutated after Afghanistan, that implies that it remains vulnerable to decapitation and that it is not as likely to adapt if it is successfully decapitated.
I think it was insulated against decapitation in Afghanistan since at least 1998, which is why Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Hambali, and other key operatives were safely out of the country in the aftermath of 9/11. That said, it's certainly evolved since, with most of the training infrastructure being farmed out to the Lashkar-e-Taiba and a sizeable chunk of the leadership having sought refuge inside Iran. Separating the training facilities from the leadership provides even more redundancy to the global network, as does dispersing its training camps not only to Pakistan but also to Georgia, Somalia, the Philippines, and other countries. Still, someone is still paying for the infrastructure and all of these terrorist attacks are not simply springing forth through spontaneous generation, which I think is one of the strongest arguments for the idea that global direction, if not command and control is put in place. The information in the Milan wiretaps indicates that as of mid-2002 this was certainly the case and I don't think that enough damage has been inflicted against the network since as a means of altering that situation.
Very interesting stuff; clearly I need to become better versed in the specifics of the "organized" vs "disorganized" argument that's making the rounds. I tend to come at this from a specific perspective; in consequence, I'm not sure that my gut instinct about how to interpret recent developments is not all that different from what the "organized" position is claiming. Put differently, these positions are less exclusive than some might assume.
A quick point: if one is chiefly concerned with single incident of high-value attacks, then an organized network is a very bad thing. If one is concerned with the long-term durability of that network and to its ability to put constant geostrategic pressure on US interests, there are reasons to fear a more diffuse movement. As with any network structure, there are pros and cons associated with a more centralized or a more decentralized pattern.
Glad you enjoyed the post, I'd recommend Rohan Gunaratna's Inside Al-Qaeda and Jason Burke's Al-Qaeda: Casting A Shadow Of Terror if you want to fairly decent representations of the two schools of analysis. I agree with you that the distinctions are not as exclusive as some like to make out and would even go as far as saying that al-Qaeda may exhibit the characteristics of both schools of thought periodically depending on the situation.
Agreed with your point at the end, though I would note that the death toll from a sustained terrorist campaign is likely to result in far less casualties long-term than one that involves a successful mass casualty attack. 9/11, for instance, easily trumped the entire Intifada in terms of body count and if we are to take the Jordanian government at its word the chemical plot Zarqawi wanted to launch against Amman would have resulted in more net deaths than the whole of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the insurgency depending on which Iraqi casualty count one subscribes to. A couple of nukes detonated in major cities certainly would.
A very fine job as usual, Dan.
Mr. Darling, I largely agree with with your arguments, and those of Mr. Gunaratna. However, I feel there's something missing here. Mr. Nexon is surely correct when he says, "Put differently, these positions are less exclusive than some might assume." Sometimes Al Qaeda (or IIF - International Islamic Front as the Indians call it, which I believe is really a better term, but Al Qaeda is the popular term...) appears to be well-regimented, with a distinct command pathways, and other times it appears quite limp.
It is as though we are studying an animal that seems to change phylum, depending on which behavior we observe. Sometimes this animal is a chordate, sometimes not. Why does al Qaeda appear this way?
In the main, the behaviors we observe from al Qaeda come from its offensive actions. This is when we see al Qaeda revealed - both in the commission of these acts, and in the pursuit by authorities. There are occasional things we learn about al Qaeda from attacks on it - the Golden Chain list came from a raid on a "charity" office in Bosnia. But we learn the most about Al Qaeda when bombs go off.
I submit (and I think you'll mostly agree) that not all of the attacks we see come from the same "root command" shall we say. It's difficult to find proper language to describe this... Although I believe al Qaeda maintains a central command and control, not all attacks that al Qaeda carries out directly serve the core goals of the organization.
I beleive there are three different types of attack, each type characterized by the level of central organization behind it.
1. An attack launched by an al-Qaeda affiliate. This type of attack is launched without the direct authorization or maybe even knowledge of al Qaeda's leadership. This attack is launched for local reasons; fundraising, e.g. an Abu Sayyaf kidnapping; propaganda/psywar, e.g. assassination of van Gogh; target of opportunity in active combat zone, e.g. IED or sniper attack Iraq, Chechnya.
This kind of attack, though horrible in its own way, does not present a challenge to the existence of a state. In most cases, these affiliate organizations by themselves are no more than an irritant to a government.
2. An attack launched by an al-Qaeda affiliate or cell with affiliate support. This type of attack is launched on the explicit orders of the central leadership. This attack is launched to advance the cause of al Qaeda's central leadership i.e. re-establishing the Caliphate and expanding Islam into the Dar al-Harb. A good example of this would be the 2002 Saudi attacks cited above.
An attack of this type will be much more serious than the first type of attack, especially if the security organiztions of the target country do not have the situation in hand shortly after. Such an attack may well be dangerous to a government's survival where large sections of the population are already oppposed to the government and in favor of Al Qaeda. I'm thinking in particular Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
I believe that Al Qaeda would like a central headquarters again, instead of spreading out training camps and command shuras piecemeal. Such a headquarters country would not only ease operations, but also start the road to re-establishing the Caliphate. In Sudan, and then Afghanistan, bin Laden made himself and his organiaztion indespensible to the rulers of those lands. This provided a degree of security for Al Qaeda, and also put some of the levers of state power in Al Qaeda's hands - coining money, making passports, diplomatic pouches. Bin Laden would never become the de jure leader of any state, but his aim may be de facto leader. The terrorists eat the state from within the government, rather than the reverse.
Turabi may have seen the danger, and the US ultimatum provided the excuse he needed to show bin Laden the door. When bin Laden became Mullah Omar's right-hand man, bin Laden found the benefits of coopting the Taliban government were not as fruitful. That government wasn't widely recognized, and Omar didn't show much interest in events outside Afghanistan.
3. An attack launched by a state, using al Qaeda as a contractor. This type of attack is launched on the orders of a sponsor state. The central core makes its own cells, support organizations, and affilliates available for the operation. The state will augment al Qaeda's command and control with its own. The state will also supplement al Qaeda with some of the state's own covert resources for the operation.
This type of attack is the most highly organized, and the most perilous. It can topple governments and pose a danger to entire societies. As Mr. Nexon writes, "...if one is chiefly concerned with single incident of high-value attacks, then an organized network is a very bad thing."
The true high-value attacks are indeed backed up by an organized network, but it is a network that is not wholly organic to Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda "purists" (as I call them) like Mr. Bergen or Mr. Gunaratna see only bin Laden and his band of Merrie Men at the heart of each bombing. Ms. Mylroie sees the hand of Iraq (or Iraqi Former Regime Elements) in every attack. Mr. Ledeen sees Iran's nefarious finger pushing the buttons. They're all wrong and they're all right. Bin Laden wants to persue his own goals -- his Golden Chain backers contribute to advance his agenda. But he's not strong enough to do it on his own. So he must cooperate with states. Spectacular, one-time attacks are costly. None more so than 9/11, but at least he's got a fair bit of street cred out of it.
Rory,
Excellent comments. Here's the issue in abstract terms. Let's assume that the al-Q movement has some sort of a core-periphery structure (C = core leadership, P = cells, and O = omegas, i.e., sympathizers, potential recruits, walk-ins):
O-P=C=P-O
(I am not saying this is the structure of the movement, just using it as a hypothetical)
The "organized" vs. "loose" debate that we're having here pivots on the degree of hierarchy found in the P=C=P relationship. In this representation, we're talking about the existence of ties - P=C=P are connected to one another. If the relationship were highly centralized, we'd expect P<-C->P, with C exercising clear hierarchical/operational control over P.
Now it may be that we are not looking at a strict hierarchy but we are seeing the impact of (1) C (core al-Q) being central to the structure, (2) thus being a key broker in the movement, and (3) therefore being able to exercise a strong influence over the activities of P1... Pn. If that's the case, then we would expect al-Q to be at times be "well-regimented" but at other times appear "quite limp."
Just to chime in briefly on one point. While I agree that a mass-casualty attack requires leadership and coordination (different from a less hands-off command and control) which is less desirable than a shallower and less-capable diffuse-yet-degraded network, one thing to keep in mind: fragmentation makes groups/movements more durable -- thus, while the short-term threat is degraded, the long-term threat is that a surviving element(s) that had hived off of the original organization one day generates the capacity for a mass-casualty attack. Sorry for the run-on sentence, just one more analytic point. Interesting discussion.
Mr Nexon,
Any diagram or flow-chart of al Qaeda would certainly be quite convoluted!
I think that "Omegas" sympathizers, potential recruits, etc. are first absorbed into associate organizations, and are invited to join the central core only after an appropriately impressive time there. For an example of this, check out My Jihad by Aukai Collins.
My proposed diagram (within the limits of this medium of course) would also include a "G" for Group - one of the terrorist organizations or guerilla groups. These would be autonomous groups independent of the cells that we hear so much about in our ever-informative news media.
G=G=C=G=G might be a 'normal' state of affairs for al Qaeda. But this may be slightly deceptive. Terrorist and guerilla operations are expensive. Money flows out from the core, from the financial comittee. (Mr. Darling knows much more than I do about that.)
The central core, I believe, controls the cells directly. P<-C->P These include sleeper cells, planted by the core for long-term goals, and sent out to commit specific actions. An example of one of these actions might be the Keynan hotel bombings/ attempted airliner shootdown. When the core wishes to influence a group, a cell sent from the central core is appended to a group.
G=C=G+P<-C (Where G remains more or less autonomous with regard to C, but P is still directly subordinate to C.
Governements (Iraq and Iran) that wish to utilize al Qaeda's assets might attatch their own "Ps" to the al Qaeda core or al Qaeda affilliate groups. For example (ex) members of Unit 999 might attatch themselves to Zarqawi's organization, or Pasadaran might carry out Saif al Adel's orders.
Interesting comments and analysis by all.
One of the main points that needs to be looked at is just how decentralized an organization has to be in order to classify it as a movement and vice versa.
I agree that extreme decentralization is more effective to the long-term survival of any terrorist organization, but consider that extreme decentralization is basically what Hamas has been forced to implement in light of the Israeli penchant for assassinating its leaders and the result (thankfully) is that very few of the attacks planned by Hamas cells are not actually carried out because they keep having to reinvent the wheel.
Al-Qaeda strikes me as being more interested in destruction than durability because they seem to believe (correctly, in my view) that the more destructive they are against the West the more enduring their movement will be because the more it looks to the average Muslim like they're going to win out in the end. Like I said earlier, they easily trumped the entire Intifada with a single attack on 9/11 at the (initial) cost of 19 operatives and about $300,000, so I wouldn't say that a more centralized approach doesn't have its own advantages to the situation.
I think one thing that keep people leaning toward the 'supreme decentralization' side of this is the "vanguard theory" notion applied to al-Qaeda. Decentralization -- in this sense -- is a core component of its agenda; to evolve into a movement. I don't think it's catalyzed a mass movement by any means, but does it have to? I'm not sure. At any rate, I'm increasingly persuaded by Dan's take.