I hate even making this comparison because I don't believe that Iraq has anything in common with Vietnam except that Americans are fighting it, but to the extent that this problem is indicative of a weakness in the American approach to war its worth reminding people that this problem (comprehensively) is EXACTLY what Norman Swartzkoph ascribed as the reason we lost Vietnam in his autobiography.

The American way of war fighting is bizarre in that simultaneously America has a culture that the lives of soldiers are everything, and material is valueless - because we have a war machine driven by our economy not our manpower - and yet simulateously we always act as if the center of the war effort is our technology and material and not our fighting men. This is what screws up our procurement process. Likewise, the fact that we've got wars run by bean counters makes us simultaneously the most dangerous fighting force in the world (because every professional knows that logistics and not tactics is the most important arena of conflict), but also one of the most bloated and bureaucratic military institutions which spends far too much time trying to make the bean counters comfortable rather than making soldiers into good bean counters (or good bean counters into fighting soldiers). And the treatment of the native fighting man, not as the center of gravity in this war which they are, but rather as something deserving only of derision is risible and dangerous as well. The quality of force that the South Vietnamese put into the field deteriorated over the course of the conflict precisely because we Americanized the conflict rather than seeing our job as being to get the South Vietnamese to the point that they could handle the conflict themselves. Yes, the Iraqi's have major cultural hurdles preventing them from being an effective fighting force, but if we don't overcome that then the war is pointless anyway.

The American "Baskin-Robbins ice cream stores on big bases" approach to war fighting, is not new to this conflict. In Vietnam we could get virtually any sort of material to the infantry in the field - except a rifle that actually worked. And we were so busy paving over South Vietnam with runways, that we forgot why we were in the country in the first place.

I think I have to defend the military, a bit, on this one. I concede without reservation that if the shooters — both ours and the Iraqis — are not getting what they need, there is a problem and it needs to be solved. But there are three factors that the linked article, and Joe and Celebrim's commentaries, do not address, that I would like to address.

The first is a structural defect of the article itself. I will be blunt, which should not be taken as lack of respect for either Mr. Morris or for Charlie. Soldiers in every war throughout human history have b*tched about their commanders, supplies and situation in general. Part of it is a defense mechanism, and part of it is that militaries are very, very inefficient creatures. But there is a difference between efficiency and effectiveness, and while we would like both, I will take effective and inefficient over the reverse.

The second factor that needs to be addressed is that the US military is an all-volunteer force. If the volunteers aren't happy, they don't re-up. Putting some of the comforts of home, including Baskin Robbins ice cream stores, internet connections, and the like, keeps the soldiers happier and less stressed — and thus more likely to reenlist — than they otherwise would be. You send a bunch of young people, almost all men, into a very dangerous situation, deny them porn, prostitutes and alcohol as relief, crack down on most relationships with the few women who are there, and then complain that they have Baskin Robbins? If there is a problem with the MiTTs not getting what they need, that should be fixed; but it should not be fixed by denying troops the few stress relievers, the small slice of normality, available to them.

Third, I know that two of the problems that we have had in supplying the Iraqi forces are graft and their own unreadiness to handle some of what they need. The first problem is common to most militaries, even sometimes ours, as note the Israeli problems with reserve units opening their warehouses and finding all manner of supplies had been sold off. But Arab armies raise graft to an art form, comparable to that of Communist nations. And given that Iraq was, until 3 years ago, an essentially Communist Arab nation, a lot of stuff supplied to the Iraqi army just goes missing. As to not being ready to accept some things, the Iraqi army is still fairly inexperienced, and they do not do well at some things. One of these is taking care of equipment like radios, vehicles and sensors. They are better with their small arms and ammunition, apparently. But there are many Iraqi units that cannot even adequately take care of their personal gear, and it's important to know which kind of unit this was. There is no evidence in the article.

I'm not denying that there may very well be problems, here. In particular, I certainly agree with Mr. Morris that the MiTTs, being at the center of our strategy to make Iraq military self-sufficient, should be near the top of the priority list, and if they are not, and this is not an isolated incident, then that needs to get fixed. But part of fixing a problem is correctly identifying it, and I'm reasonably certain that the amenities on the FOBs are not the problem.

I second #1; in this respect Iraq IS like Viet Nam. A large base is one thing, Little America is another. You can have recreation (sports gear, music, ice cream) but a bloated bureaucrat, lobbyist heaven is un-military in a certain sense.

One partial excuse may be this is what it takes to get civilian contractors to go there. We have a family friend who is there; she sleeps in a trailer, goes about in a helmet and flak jacket in the heat and has said that, if it weren't for some of the luxuries of home, she couldn't take it. But, then, she's a middle-aged civilian female pounding a computer all day.

Another may be that there isn't the R&R of the old days in places like Hong Kong, Bangkok, Subic Bay, Honolulu, etc. I may be wrong on this.

But whatever the possible justification, it all has to be secondary to spare parts, sufficient ammo and gear, and all the other things the grunts need. This goes double for our allied troops if we expect them to take over from us.

Jeff raises some good points, but look more closely at the article.

The complaint wasn't that the Iraqi army was poorly supplied (which it is, in part because of the inherent issues Jeff notes), but that the American MiTT training forces were consistently poorly supplied. They're either the priority or they're not, and right now "Charlie" seems to feel from personal experience that they're a long way from that. That's really bad.

The problem with the Iraqis was things like showing up wounded at US medical facilities with US advisers in tow and being told they don't treat Iraqis. Also really dumb.

Both come down to leadership, directives, and priorities... and the big bases, despite the arguments in their favour, are sending very much the wrong signals in these areas. To the US soldiers, and to the Iraqi soldiers and people as well.

Speaking as a Fobbit, 1 tour with 2d Marine Aircraft Wing and another coming up, I find the assertion that fobbits contribute nothing to the war effort insulting. As an air intelligence officer, there is not a lot of opportunity to go outside the wire. Many of my enlisted analysts wanted to go outside the wire, in fact volunteered to go on patrols and convoys, etc. I generally refused their requests (or opposed my superiors when overruled) because combat is not a tourist activity and a Marine who is not part of the team is more of a hindrance than a help. Marines in combat don't need to be babysitting random intel weenies. That being said we contributed to the war effort. We do provide people to MITT (and Police Training Teams and Border Training Teams) to the detriment of our intelligence mission. But check A/C loss in MNF-W during OIF 04-06 if that means anything to you. We lost only one A/C during our year in Iraq, flying in some of the worst areas of Iraq, partly due to good tactics, partly due to task organized intelligence. You can't prove that we helped prevent aircraft loss, but compare our stats to the Army (who does things a lot different). We twice provided intel which led to the elimination of cells which fired rockets at our base. So don't ever tell me that my Fobbits don't contribute.

That being said we could probably reduce the number of troops in Iraq. Many of the fobbit jobs, like mine, could be done nearly as well from the rear. With modern comms and a small forward det in Iraq, we could just as easily do the 24 hour ops from Cherry Point, NC or wherever. Then replace us with more trigger pullers and support troops. Where would they come from though? Already our grunts and logisticians are stretched thin. Wouldn't this increase resentment among those who did have to go forward? What about the "deployed mindset"? Would I still be willing to sit in front of a computer reading intel reports for 14-16 hours a day for a year if my family was nearby? So what's the solution? Maybe an OIF support base in the middle of nowhere like 29 Palms without family distractions, but without the deployment to Iraq. Already UAVs are flown from the states, would this work for other support functions? Don't know.

While I admit to being a little embarrased by the PX, the ice cream, the coffee shop, Burger King, Pizza Hut, etc, etc. (While I'm at it, a lot embarrassed by the third class treatment of the Iraqis (the Ugandans, the Turks, Jordanians, et al are the second class citizens)) I'm not sure how to change this situation for the better either. These places also provide a small morale boost to grunts and logistics types coming to the big bases. #2 made good points. Volunteers don't re-up with repeated year deployments in a shithole. Marine UAV squadrons for example have been doing 7 months forward and 5 back (at a minimum) for over 3 years, and while they live at (relatively) plush Al Taqaddum, reenlistment rates suck. The brass takes away our families, and many of our stress relievers and substitutes ice cream, burgers and freakin salsa lessons. The equation doesn't balance.

I guess what I'm trying to say is that while it is unconscionable that any grunt goes without anything at anytime, pointing the finger at the Fobbits as a group calling them parasites and saying that whatever relative luxury they have is depriving the grunt paints an inaccurate picture.

Anyway, I've rambled enough. I know I don't have the answers, but I do know that this is something we need to do to the best of our abilities. Liberal democracies don't grow overnight and Iraq won't be one for a long time to come. We need to make this work.

Regards,
Snowflake

By the way, I disagree with Celebrim's comment that the quality of Vietnamese troops declined as the war went on. Read about the Vietnamese Marines during the Easter Offensive in 1972 if you have any doubts. Certain divisions of the ARVN also were high quality units. The RVN Air Force likewise performed well. South Vietnamese troops successfully held off the NVA until we betrayed them and cut off their funding and supplies.

Regards,
Snowflake

The issue is always logistics. Keep the bases lean and filled with what is needed to fight the war.

Modernization was supposed to make the US forces into a lean mean fighting machine. JUdging by the article it seems as if we will never get rid of the camp followers.

Modernization was supposed to make the US forces into a lean mean fighting machine. JUdging by the article it seems as if we will never get rid of the camp followers.

US forces have never been "lean mean fighting machines." Not, at least, since 1860. They have always traveled on mountains of ordnance and food.

This is probably because they are democratic armies, and citizens do not relish living as Spartans when it is not necessary.

This is one of those things which our military and political leaders should simply, after a few dozen decades, come to terms with.

#7:

A few more camp followers of the sexworker sort might actually improve the re-enlistment rate. But there'd be far too much political fallout once they were found out.

You will know that the Pentagon is treating MiTTs seriously when they treat a MiTT tour the same way they treat a command tour. ie, a captain who served in a MiTT is given credit as if he has commanded a line company in combat. Or more credit.

This bureaucratic incentive would mean that the Pentagon is taking MiTTs seriously.

This is a great article, and a lot of great comments. I have many mixed feelings here. I've done my share of talking about "what should we be doing better" and I've certainly b$%#ed and moaned about the service when I was in.

The question is simply: what is the strategic mission of our forces in the middle east. Tactically, we're there for Iraq. But strategically? Are we really? Where is the money going? Boots on the ground or nice bases and weapon systems?

There is a school of thought that says that Department of Defense is about as interested in Iraq, institutionally, as they are about opening up a chain of pizzerias. It just doesn't fit into their "bigger, better, smarter" war philosophy. Individually, of course, that is not the case. But institutionally, there is no doubt where the money is going, and it ain't for short term nation-building. In fact, some officers might admit, as they did in Vietnam, that they're not about to "ruin" their service by tearing it apart to support low-level warfare.

This is why I would never want to have Rummy's job. For years, generals have asked for trillions of dollars in order that we could fight a two-front war simultaneously. They assured Rummy that Iraq would go down without a hitch (I exaggerate, but for a point). Once we're in, the complaining starts. Not enough people, no strategy, etc.

I don't blame the civilian leaders. They ask simple questions that presumably the military is able to answer. Strategically and structurally, however, we weren't geared for the mission we have now. Somebody smart, somebody with stars on their collar, somebody in charge of all of that money, should have spoken up. Instead they were probably waiting for retirement.

Sorry for being so cynical. I don't believe this is a problem of individuals (although I think more could have spoken up) but a systemic one. And no, I'm not trying to provide political ocver for the Republicans. The voters can and should punish them if they fail to live up to the promises. The civilian leadership, on the other hand, had better be willing to fire some folks until they get a more responsive system -- something I haven't seen happening in some time in the world of defense spending and strategy. Far too long.

Iraq and Afghanistan are more like Cambodia than Vietnam, at least as far as the corruption goes...we used to pay for soldiers that never existed and we all know how well that turned out!!!
Its kinda amazing how some things NEVER change. during Vietnam there where approxiamtely 10-12 soldiers doing logistical work for every grunt in the field..and it seems that ratio is about the same. So, at the outside we have 13, 000 soldiers/marines actually on the ground doing the fighting..that is not a recipe for success given the poor performance of most Iraqi security forces.

In April, there was a long article in The New Yorker by George Packer that touched on the subject of this post. Actually, most of Packer's piece was an account of the counterinsurgeny tactics of Col. HR McMaster, commander of the Army's 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in al-Anbar, particularly concerning the fight for Tal Afar. Packer's account squares pretty well with analyses on the subject written by Bill Roggio (now, again, at The Fourth Rail ). It also squares with private correspondence with a relative in the 3ACR in Tal Afar.

For Packer's contrast of McMaster's approach with the Army's "standard" tactics, scroll down to the section captioned "“A GOOD-ENOUGH SOLUTION”. It is in line with the description of Taqqadum base that David J. Morris provides on Charlie's blog.

OK, since I just learned how to search for other blogs that link to mine, I'm coming into this late. To Mr Medcalf, who tells us that we need the Baskin-Robbins ice cream on Al Taqaddum to keep our re-enlistment rates up, I will tell you that you frequently see the highest espirit-de-corps among units that don't have those luxuries. The fact that they see other units enjoying those luxuries is what crushes their morale. There is not one member of either the MTT or ANGLICO teams that would have traded our jobs in order to have access to Baskin-Robbins and Salsa Night.

Snowflake, I won't apologize for my views, I've seen enough of the disparity between grunts and the rest in my short career to feed a lifetime of bitterness. However, I'll acknowledge that there are plenty of FOBbits who make meaningful contributions. There are also plenty of them that don't, and those are the people that need to be removed from theater.

Don't forget that the "insurgents" must operate in this type of environment.

If our Iraqis are corrupt it is probably worse for the enemy. They are part of that culture. A culture of Tribalism.

America is not immune. Dem Rep. Murtha sells votes to Republicans in exchange for pork.

Fixing Things

There is no Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Shop on TQ. The DFAC's serve Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream at lunch and supper, in the back near the exit, out of three, sometimes four tubs. Ice cream in DFAC's is hardly a new, decadent luxury.

All this sounds like typical airborne bitching about legs, jarheads bitching about pogues, field troops bitching about REMF's, not much different than what has gone on for the last century, at least. Some people are always going to have it cushier than others. Aviators are always going to live better than grunts. Loggy toads are always going to live better than killers.

Deal with it.

Charlie,
I'm not asking you to apologize, acknowledgement that useful Fobbits do exist is enough. I'm all about support, we exist to help you and those like you. Stay safe.

On another note, I've recently discovered my "new" job is one of those that Charlie derides in his original post. I'll basically be the classified Dan Rather for an O6 (who doesn't even control anyone operationally) during the next rotation. This sucks. Not only do I have to go for a year, but it won't even be a meaningful year. Hell, getting on a couple of good distros would probably satisfy this guy's curiosity. I am going to have to find someone to support or a new job.

Regards,
Snowflake

Great posts.

In my younger years I was a team guy up until my last tour. We rolled outside the wire every day.

This tour though I'm a Fobbit - my rank as a Senior NCO as well as my job position puts me inside the wire 90% of my time. I see some of you guys when you come back from your FOBs to the main base here; chips on your shoulders, full of hate and saying stupid things.

Here's something to keep in mind, just because you hate the FOBBITS and talk trash about them doesn't make you a warrior.

From time to time I hear one of the less intelligent Fobbit haters spouting off about how we don't need all these people here, how they all need to be put in the field as infantry blah blah etc. etc..

Let me ask you "geniuses" who want to put everybody in the field a question. Do you like getting your pay? How about fuel in your vehicles? Supplies? Do you want to get your medals and ribbons? How about retirement points and personnel file issues? Do you have a frigging clue how much maintenance is required to keep the planes in the air? How much CAS do you think you'll get with no gas in the plane dimwit. Who is going to fly the medevac bird if it doesn't get maintenance? Do you like getting mail? I could go on but I think that you get the point.

Only a complete moron would suggest we collapse all of this down and put everybody in the field. How long do you think you'd last without supplies? What do you think your already fragile sissy boy morale would be like if you KNEW you weren't getting paid properly, your 201 file was a disaster and you weren't going to get your medals, ribbons and badges? Do you think all of this just materializes? Idiots.

I used to just ignore you cry babies who came back to the main base here with your little chips on your shoulders. Now I make a point of rubbing your little whiney faces in the fact that I do have it better than you. I eat three hots a day, sleep on a mattress, have air conditioning. I have a television set AND internet in my hooch as well as a small refrigerator and a microwave (bought with my money of course).

I have a vehicle to get around on the post but I usually walk. I used to go out of my way to give the guys a ride who just came in from the field but got tired of the chips on your shoulders and your petty whining about how everybody else has it better than you. When I was a team guy we considered it unmanly to complain like that, I guess it's a "new" Army now though. When I was a team guy I knew how the Army worked and appreciated these "Fobbits" for what they are; the people that gave me the support my team and I needed to get our job done. I guess that's the difference though, I'm a professional warrior and you are a cry baby not fit to wear the uniform of a warrior.

I have a pretty girl that works out with me and I have meals with other pretty girls. I love to watch how you "interact" with them. You ogle them but are too chicken to actually talk to them so they know what you are. You are a loser and a creep and women can not stand a "man" that whines and cries like you do.

I get up at 0500 and spend two hours in the gym every day. I'm bigger than you, stronger than you and have more time in combat or a parachute harness than you have in the military. I will kick your ass if you even try something but you never take me up on it because you are just cry baby whiners. Smart off to me jackass and I'll show you that your having a bad attitude is not the same thing as being a bad ass.

I eat well, sleep well and guess what! I get combat pay just like you, tax free just like you and I already have my CIB and Combat medals from my previous tours. On top of that I'll get a medal for being here because I work very hard and do superb work. I work hard because I'm a professional and even though you don't deserve it I'll still give you 100% support. Don't come back here and talk down your nose to me or lecture me about "well, it's okay if you are a FOBBIT just give me full support".

When we get home, I'll be a veteran just like you with the same entitlements that you have.

Bottom line is this, hating a Fobbit don't make you a tough guy it just shows us that you are a cry baby and a whiner. Take a lesson from the real soldiers out there with you and quit whining about everybody else, you are an embarassment to the real Soldiers.