you seem to have failed to consider the most likely possibility....

Chirac found his pro-war position untenable as the inspections process that was happening in Iraq revealed that all the "intelligence estimates" asserting the Iraq was producing and maintaining WMD arsenals were proving to be false.

Unlike the US, France was not eager to go to war in Iraq, but it was willing to support the US if, as it initially assumed, Saddam represented a genuine threat to Mid-east stability.

Blix's January 9th report to the security council, and the circumstances surrounding that report, probably played a major role. In that report, Blix said...

I now turn to the role and results of our current inspections. Evidently if we had found any ‘smoking gun’ we would have reported it to the Council. Similarly, if we had met a denial of access or other impediment to our inspections we would have reported it to the Council. We have not submitted any such reports.

Blix however went on to emphasize that none of this "proved" that Saddam didn't have WMDs --- giving a great deal of importance to the fact that Iraq still had not accounted for all of the WMDs it claimed to have destroyed in the early 1990s.

It is important to note that a few days prior to this report by Blix, the media was reporting that Blix's assessment would be far more positive toward Iraqi compliance. Then, Condi Rice demanded, and got, a meeting with Blix, and the next day Blix came out with a far more "negative" assessment than had been anticipated.

Its also highly likely that Chirac was getting information from his military and intelligence people that the US was planning to go to war regardless of what happened with the inspections process. France was willing to go to war if necessary, and only if necessary , to disarm Saddam.

People throughout Europe (and Americans who read the European press) knew well before the war started that the rationale for the war was a pack of lies --- unfortunately, the American media hid that fact from the American people quite sucessfully (see http://www.williambowles.info/media/massing_media.html for a study of print media coverage leading up to the war).

By mid-January 2003 Chirac, and the vast majority of the Security Council, were beginning to understand that this war had nothing to do with "the war on terror", and "terrorism" was simply a pretext for the US to find a place to permanently station troops in the Mid-East. (On January 18th, reports started appearing that made it clear that Saudi Arabia was going to close the US bases there --- doubtless the French intelligence services got wind of this earlier as weill.)

In other words, the likeliest explanation is the one that you choose to ignore --- that in January 2003 it became obvious that there was no need for an invasion of Iraq, and as a result Chirac started changing his tune.

Sidenote, the U.S. got a brand new base in Qatar before it even left the one in KSA and invading Iraq would have been a helluva big price to pay for basing rights. Plus, even if basing rights were the true reason for the invasion, they could have been achieved far easier in Iraq after the invasion. After the regime was toppled the U.S. could have handed over the country to the existing Sunni power structure (sans the Husseins) and NOT have disbanded the Iraqi Army in exchange for some garrisoned troops and bases in the south. The existing Sunni elite would have acquiesed to this in order to remain on top. Indeed, that is why so many sheiks wined and dined with SF troops right at the begining of the war, they didn't really believe any of the democracy retoric coming out of Washington and thought they were to remain in power. Only when they realized the American's intentions to kick over the apple cart in Iraq did the non-jihadist insurgency really start to pick up.
I think France's change in attitude was precipitated by a realization that the American goal wasn't simply to topple Hussein and set up some bases, but to really stir up the hornets. It didn't matter whether or not they believed the WMD stuff, what mattered most to France was the stability of the region and of the country of Iraq (AND, it might be added the honoring of the sweethart Oil deals that French oil companies had inked with Sadam).
Once they realized that the American goals were counter to theirs the French would look for alternatives. They didn't have to be so anti-war, they could have been neutral, but doing so gave them new standing in the Arab world and drove a wedge between the U.S. and Alemania.

One slight alternative may be that the French didn't actually think we planned on invading, that it was just an exercise in intimidation and once they realized we were serious, they did their best to put the brakes on.

I'm pretty sure that if France can project several thousand troops to the Ivory Coast that they can also do so with respect to Iraq.

They might not have wanted to send troops to the Gulf without the support of the de Gaulle. But the de Gaulle is floating radioactive cheese: At 27 knots it's slower than a non-nuclear carrier, and former crew members are suing the government because the underpowered reactors bleed radiation at five times the safe level.

It might not have looked good if "The Mightiest Warship in Europe" crawled to the Gulf only to throw its propellors again, or suffer a reactor accident that forced it to be evacuated.

after the russians had safley moved the wmd to the bekaa, france retreated to the anti-war side.

lukasiak:

I don't consider it unlikely, I simply doubt that Chirac would have implemented such a drastic and major policy shift on the basis of a single (and by no means final) report by Hans Blix.

Chirac found his pro-war position untenable as the inspections process that was happening in Iraq revealed that all the "intelligence estimates" asserting the Iraq was producing and maintaining WMD arsenals were proving to be false.

Except that French intelligence also supported those conclusions, which is why any French troops that would be sent to Iraq were going to be outfitted with protection in the event of a chemical attack. Even Blix himself on ABC News during the actual war stated point-blank that he thought that Saddam Hussein had chemical arms ready for use.

Unlike the US, France was not eager to go to war in Iraq, but it was willing to support the US if, as it initially assumed, Saddam represented a genuine threat to Mid-east stability.

I agree they might not have been necessarily eager to go to war, but war (and French participation therein) seems to have been a foregone conclusion judging from the survey of the French press at the time period in question.

Its also highly likely that Chirac was getting information from his military and intelligence people that the US was planning to go to war regardless of what happened with the inspections process. France was willing to go to war if necessary, and only if necessary , to disarm Saddam.

Yes, but do you think that this was exactly a lightning bolt revelation between January 7 and January 20? The fact that France was sending generals to committing to take part in an invasion force while the inspections had only just started would seem to indicate that they were more than willing to forego the inspection/diplomatic process at some future date in favor of military action, as had occurred back in the late 1990s.

People throughout Europe (and Americans who read the European press) knew well before the war started that the rationale for the war was a pack of lies --- unfortunately, the American media hid that fact from the American people quite sucessfully (see http://www.williambowles.info/media/massing_media.html for a study of print media coverage leading up to the war).

I agree that the European media was quite successful at persuading the general population of the Continent that the US harbored ill or duplicitous motives with respect to Iraq, a position you seem to agree with and hence support it being disseminated to a large audience. You'll forgive me if I decline to endorse the latter position.

By mid-January 2003 Chirac, and the vast majority of the Security Council, were beginning to understand that this war had nothing to do with "the war on terror", and "terrorism" was simply a pretext for the US to find a place to permanently station troops in the Mid-East. (On January 18th, reports started appearing that made it clear that Saudi Arabia was going to close the US bases there --- doubtless the French intelligence services got wind of this earlier as weill.)

If a majority of the Security Council felt as you say, France would have had no need to actively lobby against the US there.

Also, all of the claims you listed had been around for literally months if not years prior to France's shift - the Saudi stuff goes at least as far back as August 2001, for example. That still doesn't explain why Chirac would deliver a major speech to French troops telling them to be ready for action, only to flip around a couple of weeks later.

I don't consider it unlikely, I simply doubt that Chirac would have implemented such a drastic and major policy shift on the basis of a single (and by no means final) report by Hans Blix....Yes, but do you think that this was exactly a lightning bolt revelation between January 7 and January 20?

the assumption you make is that Chirac was 100 percent behind Bush on January 7th, and had neither doubts nor reservations at that point. Its far more likely that Chirac's position and beliefs were far more nuanced throughout the entire period.

In the summer of 2002, the US appeared to be willing to unilaterally invade Iraq. Tony Blair interceded, and got Bush to go to the UN in September to demand inspections. Part of that deal may well have been that France would provide full support for the inspections process, and make it clear that Iraq had to co-operate.

Thus, although Chirac may have had grave reservations, he was willing support an invasion if the demands for cooperation inspections by UNMOVIC and IAEE were not met. The period of Jan 7 - January 20 did not require a "lightning bolt"....just a "last straw" to break the back of the camel.

I also think that you misrepresent the extent of France's change in position. Villepan's January 20th statement was a refusal to support a resolution to use force at that time .

At that time, the US was trying to get a new resolution passed authorizing Bush to decide on behalf of the UN to use force at its own discretion. France wasn't going to go for it, because it was becoming increasingly doubtful that force was necessary --- and increasingly obvious that the US wanted an invasion regardless of whether it was necessary.

Villepan's pronouncement clearly signalled that France had changed positions --- but the public change was not as radical as you suggest (unless you see a failure to do whatever the US wants a country to do as a radical change in positions. I don't --- France never gave up its sovereign rights to determine what it would do based on circumstances as they developed.)

What I think is most telling is that this whole "France betrayed us" line is based on "revelations" found in a book by a wingnut named Kenneth Timmerman. Timmerman claims that

A U.S. diplomat involved in the exchanges told me candidly that there was never any misunderstanding between Paris and Washington over the eventual need to use force against Saddam Hussein. "The French knew exactly what our thinking was. But until January 20, we had thought they were totally with us."

In essence, IF THIS IS TRUE, it is an admission that Bush lied to the UN, and the American people, throughout the fall of 2002 and winter of 2003. It also places Tony Blair in a completely untenable position, because he claims that his actions were not based on the "eventual need to use force", but were an effort to prevent the need to use force.

What is far more likely is that Timmerman is lying and/or getting spun by someone like John Bolton. If France agreed that force will be necessary if it was required to disarm Iraq or even if it was proven that Saddam was producing and maintaining WMD stockpiles and both side assumed at the time the agreement was made that this would happen, there is really no "betrayal" by France. French support was contingent upon assumptions shared by both France and the US --- when it became obvious that those assumptions were extremely dubious, France changed its position --- and it was perfectly reasonable to do so.

I also think that you are misreading/misinterpreting much of what you presented. A "unified front" with Germany was not so much a French "power play" as you suggest, as it was a smart defensive maneouvre once it became clear what was happening. And although the threat of Islamic terrorism in France can not be negated as a factor, the fact is in the absence of a compelling reason to invade Iraq, French participation in the attack would increase the threat of terrorism exponentially. France, as is much of Western Europe, does have to worry about how it is perceived among Arabs and Muslims far more than the US does, and is thus far more sensitive to the concerns of Arabs and Muslims. (If some Panamanians terrorists attacked France, the US would be equally reluctant to participate in an occupation of Guatamala by French forces based on some trumped up reason for a war, because of its large Hispanic populations. )

In sum, I think that you are engaged in an exercise to justify the demonization of France, rather than considering all the possible legitimate reasons that on January 20th France would refuse to comply with the US demand that Bush be given the sole power to decide whether an invasion of Iraq had a UN endorsement. It is clear in hindsight that circumstances did not justify that authorization, and for those of us who had serious doubts about the war from the very beginning, it was equally clear in January that France's position was fully justified.

Sidenote, the U.S. got a brand new base in Qatar before it even left the one in KSA and invading Iraq would have been a helluva big price to pay for basing rights. Plus, even if basing rights were the true reason for the invasion, they could have been achieved far easier in Iraq after the invasion. After the regime was toppled the U.S. could have handed over the country to the existing Sunni power structure (sans the Husseins) and NOT have disbanded the Iraqi Army in exchange for some garrisoned troops and bases in the south.

a couple of points...

the single base in Qatar is far smaller than the numerous bases the US had (and was building) in Saudi Arabia. Qatar's geographic position makes it completely unsuitable for moving large numbers of troops to occupy oil fields --- everything would have to be moved by air or sea, rather than over land.

As to your latter point.... hell, the US probably could have talked Saddam Hussein himself into hosting US bases if it changed its policies. And although your suggestion may well have been possible, it is based on premises that are completely inconsistent with the assumptions of the Bush regime with regard to how the people of Iraq would see an invasion, and thus not really worthy of serious consideration at this point.

Rather, the French political/diplomatic leadership saw in Schroder's policy, and the political dynamics behind it, a major opening for one of the prime objectives of French foreign policy from the 1960's, and especially since 1989: driving a wedge between the US and Germany.

I suspect that is also the reason driving the otherwise senseless repeated picking of quarrels by France over Iraq-related issues since: to keep the rift open between Berlin and Washington. France wants to make the split permanent; for Paris the ideal oucome would be the complete collapse of NATO.

I'm not sure that explains the sudden change in policy any better than fear of terrorism or oil-for-food scandals. France has been anti-NATO since de Gaulle, and the same goes for trying to build Europe up as an alternative power-base to the U.S. That's been French policy for a long time now, and it doesn't ring true that they suddenly remember a week before the UN vote. The alternative to that is that the French were pretending to be willing to back up the U.S., which doesn't ring true either.

I agree that the European media was quite successful at persuading the general population of the Continent that the US harbored ill or duplicitous motives with respect to Iraq, a position you seem to agree with and hence support it being disseminated to a large audience. You'll forgive me if I decline to endorse the latter position.

I guess it all depends on how you define "ill and duplicitous motives." Colonialists (and neo-colonialists) tend to believe that by colonizing other nations, they are bringing them the benefits of their "superior civilization" to "the natives". Unfortunately, "the natives" don't always see eye to eye with regard to the nature of "superior civilizations", and all hell breaks loose as a result and everybody loses.

I've absolutely no doubt that the architects of this occupation believe that if only everyone did whatever America wanted them to do, everyone would be much happier. Hell, if everyone thought that their happiness depended upon making me happy, they'd be much happier --- because I'd be more than willing to let everyone do their best to make me happy.

Personally, I think that killing lots of people in order to impose your way of life on those that survive is a really lousy way to make people happy, and constitutes "ill and duplicitous motives". Your mileage may vary.

If a majority of the Security Council felt as you say, France would have had no need to actively lobby against the US there.

when the US was using threats and bribes to gain support for policies that most of the security council was opposed to, "lobbying against the US" becomes necessary. The US "lost" in the Security Council not merely because it did not make its case, but because it was inflexible in its demands. When the "non-aligned" nations attempted to broker a compromise, the US rejected it out of hand --- basically forcing the non-aligned nations to side with the anti-war group.

Also, all of the claims you listed had been around for literally months if not years prior to France's shift - the Saudi stuff goes at least as far back as August 2001, for example. That still doesn't explain why Chirac would deliver a major speech to French troops telling them to be ready for action, only to flip around a couple of weeks later.

as I noted earlier, the "flip" was not as extreme as you suggest. Furthermore, the stuff that had been around for "months if not years" was being confirmed in December and January, rather than simply being "reported".

Lukasiak: Personally, I think that killing lots of people in order to impose your way of life on those that survive is a really lousy way to make people happy ..

Personally, I find the idea that democracy and civil liberty are alien ideas that we "impose" on "natives" is a profoundly racist idea.

And personally, I find the flippery about our people killing Iraqis and turning the survivors into Americans to be as insulting as it is ignorant.

And finally, although you have created an entire religion based on forged Texas Air National Guard documents, I find you even less interesting than Elron Hubbard.

Colt:

France has been anti-NATO since de Gaulle, and the same goes for trying to build Europe up as an alternative power-base to the U.S. That's been French policy for a long time now, and it doesn't ring true that they suddenly remember a week before the UN vote. The alternative to that is that the French were pretending to be willing to back up the U.S., which doesn't ring true either.

I tend to agree with you on both counts, though that still leaves the issue of "Why?"

lukasiak:

Clearly, you regard the whole Iraq war as being colonialist or neo-colonialist in nature. I don't, and I don't think that any amount of debate is going to persuade you otherwise on this one.

As to the more substantive matter ...

when the US was using threats and bribes to gain support for policies that most of the security council was opposed to, "lobbying against the US" becomes necessary. The US "lost" in the Security Council not merely because it did not make its case, but because it was inflexible in its demands. When the "non-aligned" nations attempted to broker a compromise, the US rejected it out of hand --- basically forcing the non-aligned nations to side with the anti-war group.

How can most of the Security Council oppose US policies if the US convinces the Council members, whether by hook or crook, to support its initiatives. You can castigate the US all you want for using its leverage to enact the policy it desired at the Security Council, but then you'd be hard-pressed to defend France for doing more or less the exact same thing.

As far as not making its case is concerned, I don't honestly know what else you could call Secretary Powell's presentation. You are quite free to argue that it was, as I believe you termed it earlier, a pack of lies, but I think it's disingenuous to argue that no case was made.

as I noted earlier, the "flip" was not as extreme as you suggest. Furthermore, the stuff that had been around for "months if not years" was being confirmed in December and January, rather than simply being "reported".

I tend to regard a pledge to commit 15,000 French troops to the war effort to being vehemently opposed to any form of military action as a pretty dramatic shift.

Moving in reverse order for a moment because it seems I missed your earlier post:

the assumption you make is that Chirac was 100 percent behind Bush on January 7th, and had neither doubts nor reservations at that point. Its far more likely that Chirac's position and beliefs were far more nuanced throughout the entire period.

Indeed, but as we have no telepath available to peer into the inner workings of Chirac's mind I think we have to go on the available evidence, which was that the French government was behind the US up until Villepin's comment on January 20. If you don't believe Cogan on this one, let me recommend Chirac contre Bush: l'Autre Guerre by Thomas Cantaloube and Henri Vernet.

In the summer of 2002, the US appeared to be willing to unilaterally invade Iraq. Tony Blair interceded, and got Bush to go to the UN in September to demand inspections. Part of that deal may well have been that France would provide full support for the inspections process, and make it clear that Iraq had to co-operate.

Thus, although Chirac may have had grave reservations, he was willing support an invasion if the demands for cooperation inspections by UNMOVIC and IAEE were not met. The period of Jan 7 - January 20 did not require a "lightning bolt"....just a "last straw" to break the back of the camel.

I think you're mistaking Chirac for disconcerted members of the British Labour Party here. As Cogan notes, today French diplomats and officials cite a variety of explanations for their behavior, not one of them being enthusiasm for the inspections process.

I also think that you misrepresent the extent of France's change in position. Villepan's January 20th statement was a refusal to support a resolution to use force at that time .

At that time, the US was trying to get a new resolution passed authorizing Bush to decide on behalf of the UN to use force at its own discretion. France wasn't going to go for it, because it was becoming increasingly doubtful that force was necessary --- and increasingly obvious that the US wanted an invasion regardless of whether it was necessary.

Villepan's pronouncement clearly signalled that France had changed positions --- but the public change was not as radical as you suggest (unless you see a failure to do whatever the US wants a country to do as a radical change in positions. I don't --- France never gave up its sovereign rights to determine what it would do based on circumstances as they developed.)

I'm not arguing for the abolishment for French sovereignty here, merely trying to understand why they did what they did. As for your claim that France was increasingly doubtful that force was necessary just 2 weeks after Chirac told his troops to be ready for action, I think you're engaged in a bit of retroactive history there and applying what we know now about Iraqi WMDs with what we knew at the time. Going into the war, every intelligence agency on the planet assumed that Saddam had them and indeed, this was the stated rationale for why France wanted the inspections to begin with. Recognizing that undercuts your second assertion concerning the necessary nature of the invasion as French policy-makers had understood it circa December 2002 and early January 2003.

With respect to Timmerman, I haven't read his book on the subject so I can't speak to its veracity. What appears to be the case by 3 respected individuals (Cogan, Cantaloube, and Vernet) is that the French wanted to support the US in its war against Iraq up until January 20 and that the assumptions you are extrapolating (and here again, I think you're mistaking Chirac with disconcerted British Labourites) such as the qualified nature of prior French support are not being made by French officials, most of whom now strive to deny any indication that France was prepared to assist the United States militarily against Iraq.

I also think that you are misreading/misinterpreting much of what you presented. A "unified front" with Germany was not so much a French "power play" as you suggest, as it was a smart defensive maneouvre once it became clear what was happening.

At what point did that become clear, exactly? The Blix report you mentioned didn't convince him that Iraq had disarmed, let alone any intelligence agencies. They also don't appear to have convinced Uday Hussein, whom if you read the Duelfer report attempted to use chemical weapons against US forces during the war.

And although the threat of Islamic terrorism in France can not be negated as a factor, the fact is in the absence of a compelling reason to invade Iraq, French participation in the attack would increase the threat of terrorism exponentially. France, as is much of Western Europe, does have to worry about how it is perceived among Arabs and Muslims far more than the US does, and is thus far more sensitive to the concerns of Arabs and Muslims. (If some Panamanians terrorists attacked France, the US would be equally reluctant to participate in an occupation of Guatamala by French forces based on some trumped up reason for a war, because of its large Hispanic populations. )

There is sensitivity and then there is fear, and how most French regard their Muslim population is almost certainly the latter mixed in with a healthy dose of hatred. Certainly this sensitivity has not led to any desire to treat them as anything other than a source of cheap labor, nor has it led to any shift in French policy towards North Africa where most of these Muslim immigrants are from.

In sum, I think that you are engaged in an exercise to justify the demonization of France, rather than considering all the possible legitimate reasons that on January 20th France would refuse to comply with the US demand that Bush be given the sole power to decide whether an invasion of Iraq had a UN endorsement. It is clear in hindsight that circumstances did not justify that authorization, and for those of us who had serious doubts about the war from the very beginning, it was equally clear in January that France's position was fully justified.

Short of having access to a time machine, you can't use what we know now about Iraq to justify French policies then. None of the rationales you've provided strike me as being particularly persuasive to this effect, since most involve projecting your own belief with respect to such things as the impact of such things as Blix's report to an extent that even Blix himself did not draw the same conclusions you do during the time frame you laid out. You are also extrapolating a number of conditions that existed regarding French military participation against Iraq, conditions that no one has thus far laid out. These conditions, which clearly did not exist with respect to military participation by other coalition states such as Spain, Italy, Poland, etc. may well have been sincerely held by prominent individuals in the British Labour, would be hard-pressed to be found in Paris during the period in question.

As far as not making its case is concerned, I don't honestly know what else you could call Secretary Powell's presentation. You are quite free to argue that it was, as I believe you termed it earlier, a pack of lies, but I think it's disingenuous to argue that no case was made.

pssst...your provincialism is showing! :)

although the American media went all ga-ga over Powell's presentation, the rest of the world's media was considerably less impressed. And those of us who were actually paying attention to the reports that cast doubt on the Bush regimes' claims regarding WMDs were left entirely unconvinced by Powell's presentation. There was too much that we KNEW was bullshit to put much faith in those sections of Powell's report that we might have otherwise considered credible. (My personal "this is bullshit" moment was when he held up a vial of dry Anthrax and talked about its horrifying potential, as if there was any reason to suspect that Iraq had the capability of producing dry Anthrax, let alone had the means to distribute it in a manner that could come close to realizing the potential described by Powell---geez, anyone with a clue knew that the "potential" cited by Powell was impossible to achieve short of forcing individuals to inhale a single microbe...)

The reality was that it was a good "prosecution case"....but that the American people were never allowed to hear the case for "the defense." And, insofar as the primary source of the defense case (Iraqi spokemen) weren't exactly the personification of credibility themselves, you had to make an effort to figure out who was "being economical with the truth" about which allegation.

ultimately, Powell was the foreign policy equivalent of O.J. Simpson's defense lawyers. Now, if you want to go around praising the Simpson defense for being effective, go ahead. Personally, I think they are scumbags.

I tend to regard a pledge to commit 15,000 French troops to the war effort to being vehemently opposed to any form of military action as a pretty dramatic shift.

I would too...but that is not what happened on January 20th. The pledge to commit 15,000 troops was contingent upon war being necessary, and although the pledge may have been made under the assumption that war would be necessary, circumstances made the validity of that assumption invalid. Secondly, Villepan's statement on the 20th was not "vehemently opposed to any form of military action" at any time, it was opposition to approving the use of force at a point when its necessity was in doubt.

I think you're mistaking Chirac for disconcerted members of the British Labour Party here. As Cogan notes, today French diplomats and officials cite a variety of explanations for their behavior, not one of them being enthusiasm for the inspections process.

I don't think I ever said that the French were enthusiastic about the inspections. But they weren't enthusiatic about war either --- and given the choice, as long as the inspections were working, and there was no evidence that Saddam was producing or maintaining WMD stockpiles, inspections were preferable.

Going into the war, every intelligence agency on the planet assumed that Saddam had them and indeed, this was the stated rationale for why France wanted the inspections to begin with.

the second clause of your sentence is true, but the first is false. By the time the war started, the only thing that made people suspect that Iraq had WMDs was that the Bush regime was insisting that it was true, and no one imagined that Bushco would express such certainty unless it knew for a fact that they existed, despite the failure of the inspections process to find any evidence suggesting that they did exist.

What appears to be the case by 3 respected individuals (Cogan, Cantaloube, and Vernet) is that the French wanted to support the US in its war against Iraq up until January 20 and that the assumptions you are extrapolating (and here again, I think you're mistaking Chirac with disconcerted British Labourites) such as the qualified nature of prior French support are not being made by French officials, most of whom now strive to deny any indication that France was prepared to assist the United States militarily against Iraq.

My "extrapolations" are an attempt to consider all the facts within their proper context in an effort to find a reasonable, non-paranoid-conspiracy explanation for French behavior. The fact that you do not consider the context in which certain statements were made --- especially with regard to Villepan's January 20 statement, tells me that you are not looking to understand what happened, merely to come up with a reason to demonize France.

Blix report you mentioned didn't convince him that Iraq had disarmed, let alone any intelligence agencies.

Blix was not "convinced" because officially he could not be convinced until all the outstanding questions were answered---and he was well aware of Saddam's history of deception. Hell, when the war started I even thought that SOMETHING of substance would be found --- again because it was so hard to believe AT THAT POINT that the Bush administration would still be claiming that Saddam had WMDs despite all the evidence to the contrary. (and as for the Duelfer Uday story, its clear the Duelfer went to great lengths to spin what little he had to provide an ex poste facto justification for his own support of the invasion. Uday obviously didn't know where there were any chemical weapons, because there weren't any --- the fact that he grasped at straws is really not all that significant.)

These conditions, which clearly did not exist with respect to military participation by other coalition states such as Spain, Italy, Poland, etc.

please don't cite the participation of the coalition of the bribed as if it was indicative of any evidence that WMDs existed in Iraq.

The bottom line is that all of the intelligence services were well aware, at the time the war began, that

1) there was absolutely no evidence that even suggested that Saddam had taken any measures to produce nuclear weapons since the end of inspections in 1998 (despite claims of certainty by US officials)

2) any stockpiles of WMDs manufactured by Iraq prior to 1991 (with the possible exception of mustard gas, which is not terribly lethal absent relatively long-term exposure) would be useless.

3) there was absolutely no evidence that suggested that Iraq had manufactured any WMDs subsequent to 1991.

in other words, "the evidence" that Iraq still had WMDs consisted solely of statements made by defectors whose statements should have been checked against the information that came out of the inspections process prior to the beginning of the war. When EVERYTHING that you suspect is true turns out to be false when you have the chance to examine the facts, the prudent thing to do is go back and figure out why you got so much wrong already----and how much else you might have gotten wrong.

The United States was committed to war regardless of what the evidence showed. Most of the rest of the world --- including France --- was not. The reason that France chose NOT to support an authorization for the use of force on January 20th is easily explainable simply by considering the fact that NOTHING had been found that everyone thought would be found until that point---and absent some PROOF that war was justified, it was not going to be authorized.

France may have believe Iraq had WMDs, but by January 20th they knew enough to know that the basis of their belief was not as solid as they had thought. This is the "common sense" explanation, and is all the reason France needed to demur from authorizing force.

Personally, I find the idea that democracy and civil liberty are alien ideas that we "impose" on "natives" is a profoundly racist idea.

yawn. The american way of life isn't about "democracy" or "civil liberties", its about hedonistic consumerism. Less than half of eligible americans bother to vote in most elections, and most american's can't even tell you what freedoms are guaranteed by the first amendment, let alone care about them. (Its really tough to argue that America is some sort of civil liberties paradise when a brief flash of Janet Jackson's tit leads somehow becomes a huge issue.)

And it is that consumer driven, souless, materialistic culture that people don't want imposed on them. The US did everything in its power to delay elections in Iraq.....while simultaneously trying to allow Iraq's natural resources and infrastructure to be sold to the highest bidder.

So you can take your racist accusation and shove it up your ass, okay?

Personally, I find the idea that democracy and civil liberty are alien ideas that we "impose" on "natives" is a profoundly racist idea.

Civil liberty is a very recent idea in the US. 50 years ago blacks were seperated, womens right was the right to be a hausefrau and not much more and gays didn't exist back then. I don't think you can say that civil liberty is an idea that is imposed by liberals on Americans but it is close. It is certainly not yet totally embrassed by all Americans.
Religion is in this especially a problem because it is rare to find one that doesn't discrimenate on religions, is pro womenrights & doesn't find gay bad. I thus find it strange that Americans claim that they bring democracy and womens right to Iraq as they are mutual exclusive for deeply religious countries.

Spain and Italy didn't participate in the invasion. IIRC only USA, UK, Australia, Poland and the Czech Republic helpt (officially) in the invasion and the latter two only with anti chemical warfare units.

lukasiak:

pssst...your provincialism is showing! :)

I try.

although the American media went all ga-ga over Powell's presentation, the rest of the world's media was considerably less impressed. And those of us who were actually paying attention to the reports that cast doubt on the Bush regimes' claims regarding WMDs were left entirely unconvinced by Powell's presentation. There was too much that we KNEW was bullshit to put much faith in those sections of Powell's report that we might have otherwise considered credible. (My personal "this is bullshit" moment was when he held up a vial of dry Anthrax and talked about its horrifying potential, as if there was any reason to suspect that Iraq had the capability of producing dry Anthrax, let alone had the means to distribute it in a manner that could come close to realizing the potential described by Powell---geez, anyone with a clue knew that the "potential" cited by Powell was impossible to achieve short of forcing individuals to inhale a single microbe...)

The reality was that it was a good "prosecution case"....but that the American people were never allowed to hear the case for "the defense." And, insofar as the primary source of the defense case (Iraqi spokemen) weren't exactly the personification of credibility themselves, you had to make an effort to figure out who was "being economical with the truth" about which allegation.

ultimately, Powell was the foreign policy equivalent of O.J. Simpson's defense lawyers. Now, if you want to go around praising the Simpson defense for being effective, go ahead. Personally, I think they are scumbags.

I would submit that there was absolutely nothing Powell could have said or showed you at the point when he showed up at the UN in February 2003 that would have convinced or even shifted your opinion with respect to military action against Iraq. Regardless of the veracity of Powell's claims (retroactive or otherwise), you said that the US didn't make the case at the UN Security Council and I held up a counter-example. Whether it was a good case or an ethical case (to follow-up on your OJ analogy) is beside the point insofar as the issue of whether or not a case was made.

To follow-up on your court analogy, the Iraqi regime was given more than sufficient regard to defend itself against the US allegations with respect to WMD. That was the whole entire point of their December 2002 declaration, which UNMOVIC itself was less than impressed with as far as addressing the concerns that made the whole inspection process necessary to begin with. Retroactively, we know from the Duelfer report that senior figures within the Iraqi regime (Uday Hussein) thought they had WMDs, specifically chemical weapons, which would seem to indicate that the regime never intended to be up-front on such matters to begin with.

I would too...but that is not what happened on January 20th. The pledge to commit 15,000 troops was contingent upon war being necessary, and although the pledge may have been made under the assumption that war would be necessary, circumstances made the validity of that assumption invalid. Secondly, Villepan's statement on the 20th was not "vehemently opposed to any form of military action" at any time, it was opposition to approving the use of force at a point when its necessity was in doubt.

Villepin stated that there was no cause for military action, whereas Chirac had told his troops just two weeks ago that they were to be ready for action. At the December 2002 meetings at the Pentagon, French generals told their US counterparts that they would be ready to back them up with 15,000 troops in the event of war. Here again, this strikes me as a pretty dramatic shift, and had the French position been as nuanced as you describe it I think that the US would have been far less surprised by the abrupt turn from their earlier position.

I don't think I ever said that the French were enthusiastic about the inspections. But they weren't enthusiatic about war either --- and given the choice, as long as the inspections were working, and there was no evidence that Saddam was producing or maintaining WMD stockpiles, inspections were preferable.

At that time, France and other European states assumed (as did the US) that they had good evidence that Iraq was producing or maintaining WMD stockpiles and were far from enthusiastic about the ability of UN inspectors to uncover them. Hans Blix himself believed that the Iraqi regime had at least chemical arms at the onset of war, as apparently did senior Iraqi figures themselves. Moreover, there was a general opinion among a number of agencies that the Iraqis had an elaborate system in place to conceal such arms from UNMOVIC.

Statements like this by Blix on January 27, for example, only served to reaffirm the belief that Iraq had something to hide:

The document indicates that 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1988, while Iraq has declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during this period. Thus, there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs. The amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in the order of about 1,000 tonnes. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these quantities are now unaccounted for.

The discovery of a number of 122 mm chemical rocket warheads in a bunker at a storage depot 170 km southwest of Baghdad was much publicized. This was a relatively new bunker and therefore the rockets must have been moved there in the past few years, at a time when Iraq should not have had such munitions.

The investigation of these rockets is still proceeding. Iraq states that they were overlooked from 1991 from a batch of some 2,000 that were stored there during the Gulf War. This could be the case. They could also be the tip of a submerged iceberg. The discovery of a few rockets does not resolve but rather points to the issue of several thousands of chemical rockets that are unaccounted for.

The finding of the rockets shows that Iraq needs to make more effort to ensure that its declaration is currently accurate. During my recent discussions in Baghdad, Iraq declared that it would make new efforts in this regard and had set up a committee of investigation. Since then it has reported that it has found a further 4 chemical rockets at a storage depot in Al Taji.

I might further mention that inspectors have found at another site a laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor.

As stated above, Blix himself was of this view at the onset of the war.

the second clause of your sentence is true, but the first is false. By the time the war started, the only thing that made people suspect that Iraq had WMDs was that the Bush regime was insisting that it was true, and no one imagined that Bushco would express such certainty unless it knew for a fact that they existed, despite the failure of the inspections process to find any evidence suggesting that they did exist.

I don't believe that's true, but I honestly don't know because I am unaware of any significant post-war releases or declassifications of French intelligence with respect to Iraq. On the issue of US and British intelligence, there have been multiple reviews of pre-war intelligence that have now been released that you can access online. The declassified material is several hundred pages long and shows how US intelligence analysts came to the conclusions that they did with respect to Iraqi WMD. If you haven't already read them, I would very much recommend you do as they go through exactly how US officials came to the conclusions that they did.

My "extrapolations" are an attempt to consider all the facts within their proper context in an effort to find a reasonable, non-paranoid-conspiracy explanation for French behavior. The fact that you do not consider the context in which certain statements were made --- especially with regard to Villepan's January 20 statement, tells me that you are not looking to understand what happened, merely to come up with a reason to demonize France.

Yes, but in doing so I think your projecting a number of policy positions, particularly those that were held by a number of British Labourites, onto Chirac and his government. I have no desire to "demonize France" as you put it, I simply disagree with your extrapolations for the reasons I laid out above. You are more than free to disagree with my reasoning, but please don't project motivations onto me.

Blix was not "convinced" because officially he could not be convinced until all the outstanding questions were answered---and he was well aware of Saddam's history of deception. Hell, when the war started I even thought that SOMETHING of substance would be found --- again because it was so hard to believe AT THAT POINT that the Bush administration would still be claiming that Saddam had WMDs despite all the evidence to the contrary. (and as for the Duelfer Uday story, its clear the Duelfer went to great lengths to spin what little he had to provide an ex poste facto justification for his own support of the invasion. Uday obviously didn't know where there were any chemical weapons, because there weren't any --- the fact that he grasped at straws is really not all that significant.)

I believe Duelfer was something of a skeptic regarding at least some of the WMD claims, but okay. The reason I brought up Uday Hussein is because it demonstrates (and here again this has been noted in various intelligence reviews) that there were a fair number of senior Iraqi officials who were under the impression that they had WMDs regardless of the actual evidence. Both Kay and Duelfer discuss this - it isn't "spin," the Iraqis in question believed it, and their intercepted communications on the subject were factored into US intelligence analyses.

please don't cite the participation of the coalition of the bribed as if it was indicative of any evidence that WMDs existed in Iraq.

I think you would be extremely hard-pressed to describe any bribery in either case as the term is commonly understood. Moreover, I am not arguing that there were WMDs in Iraq, I am arguing that the US was hardly alone in the assumption that there were.

In response to your evidence:

1) There was what was regarded as evidence by the US that Saddam was trying to reconstitute his nuclear program, though it was not widely regarded as credible in the intelligence community.

2) There was a universal belief that Iraq had maintained as much of its pre-1991 arsenal.

3) There was a universal belief that Iraq had sought to conceal and maintain its WMD production post-1991. This was the main rationale behind Clinton's late 1990s aerial attacks on Iraqi facilities in Operation Desert Fox, which occurred with the full support of the Western European powers.

in other words, "the evidence" that Iraq still had WMDs consisted solely of statements made by defectors whose statements should have been checked against the information that came out of the inspections process prior to the beginning of the war. When EVERYTHING that you suspect is true turns out to be false when you have the chance to examine the facts, the prudent thing to do is go back and figure out why you got so much wrong already----and how much else you might have gotten wrong.

Do you believe that statements by Iraqi defectors were the sole basis for US/UK belief that Iraq had WMDs. If so, you really need to read those intelligence reviews ...

The United States was committed to war regardless of what the evidence showed. Most of the rest of the world --- including France --- was not. The reason that France chose NOT to support an authorization for the use of force on January 20th is easily explainable simply by considering the fact that NOTHING had been found that everyone thought would be found until that point---and absent some PROOF that war was justified, it was not going to be authorized.

France may have believe Iraq had WMDs, but by January 20th they knew enough to know that the basis of their belief was not as solid as they had thought. This is the "common sense" explanation, and is all the reason France needed to demur from authorizing force.

Except that France did not simply opt for a position of neutrality as say, Canada or China did. They actively sought to lobby against the US with respect to the Security Council, which you have acknowledged, as well as with respect to key allies like Turkey. I find it somewhat hypocritical that you regard the US attempting to persuade other states to support its position as threats and bribery and presumably objectionable but regard the exact same behavior when practiced by France as being praiseworthy.

France did not simply demur in authorizing force against Iraq or disengage itself from the military aspect of the campaign - they actively sought to adopt an adversarial position to the US on the UN Security Council, a fact that both nations freely acknowledge.

a:

Spain, Italy, et al. didn't participate military in the invasion in a combat capacity, but they provided support and other forms of non-combat military assistance, as did other states such as those of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Lukasiak: So you can take your racist accusation and shove it up your ass, okay?

I hope you don't kiss Mary Mapes with that mouth.

In your previous rants here, you've accused at least half the people in my soulless, consumer-driven country of being racists and white supremacists, so excuse me if you're part of the 5% that is not.

You talk casually about genocide, colonialism, seizing oil fields, selling Iraq to the highest bidder, etc. All of this stuff is considered very cute at Indymedia, or at the racist and anti-Semitic libertyforum.org, but in my opinion it does not rise above trolling here.

I find it very funny that you accuse Dan Darling of being provincial, when you talk like someone who's been locked in a windowless room for ten years with nothing to read but old Christic Institute pamphlets.

My respect for your opinions, in short, is equal to the respect you have for the men and women who have bled and died to make possible those Iraqi elections that you weirdly claim we tried to stop.

I would submit that there was absolutely nothing Powell could have said or showed you at the point when he showed up at the UN in February 2003 that would have convinced or even shifted your opinion with respect to military action against Iraq.

you're probably right, because by that time I was convinced that the whole "war on terror" rationale for the war was a charade, and that the Bush regime would say and do whatever it felt like, regardless of the facts.

And I would submit that there was absolutely nothing that anyone who was opposed to the war could have said to you that would have convinced you at that point that the rationale for the war was just a charade --- that Saddam represented no threat, and that there was no Iraq-al Qaeda connection.

Because its clear that even in hindsight, knowing that there were no WMDs, knowing that the Bush regime was flat out lying about the evidence when it wasn't spinning the meager facts at its disposal, knowing that the intelligence community did not think there was any significant connection between al Qaeda and Iraq, knowing that over 1500 Americans, and countless (and I use that term deliberately, because the Bush regime has so little regard for Iraqi lives that it won't even keep track of the number of people who are dying) Iraqis dead, and knowing that the war would cost out children $300,000,000,000 and counting (we aren't going to pay for it...god forbid we raise taxes to pay for our wars), and knowing that American credibility and position of leadership in the international community has been destroyed....knowing all of this, you still support the invasion.

So yeah, I may have made up my mind early, but I was right. What's your excuse? :)

I would submit that there was absolutely nothing Powell could have said or showed you at the point when he showed up at the UN in February 2003 that would have convinced or even shifted your opinion with respect to military action against Iraq.

the US tried to persuade other nations, but its arguments didn't work, so it resorted to threats and bribes. I'm unaware of any threats made by France in reaction to the US's heavy-handed "diplomacy", although I'd not be surprised to hear that certain nations were "reassured" economically by France.

The fact is that the US needed 9 votes to authorize the use of force, and France, Russia, China, Germany, and Syria were all opposed to authorizing it, while the US had four votes. France's ability to "bribe" or "threaten" the six other nations was severly limited...especially as it concerned nations in the Americas. To suggest that the US failure to get the support of these "neighbors" because of threats by France is pure nonsense.

p --

Saddam's anthrax program had been the cause of considerable embarrassment for all concerned in the aftermath of inspections following Gulf War 1. Hence Powell's holding it up. Indeed, Iraq was assumed to have had NO nuclear program prior to it's invasion of Kuwait, post Gulf War 1 inspections revealed a systematic, organized, and well funded attempt to produce nuclear weapons. As we know from the Duelfer Report, the intellectual capital and blue prints from that effort were retained, though Saddam largely postponed his attempt to build nuclear weapons until after sanctions were lifted.

Saddam could have avoided war up till October 2002, simply be letting inspectors in without any restrictions. He did not do this, as we know now from the Duelfer Report, because he felt his regime's survival depended on bluffing Iran and the US that he did indeed HAVE WMDs. He felt the Schwarzkopf, for example, was refused permission to march to Baghdad because of fear of chemical weapons. Saddam could not afford to have the truth come out, hence his refusal of the inspectors.

However, Saddam's refusal to allow inspectors in alone made most conclude he had something to hide, otherwise he would have simply allowed inspectors in and achieved the hat trick: no war, lifting of sanctions, and no oil embargo.

As for "imposing" democracy, the US substituted a horrific and unstable tyrant who'd be succeeded by someone even worse (Uday or Qusay, whoever killed the other first) with something along the lines of consensual government. Europeans and Leftists generally prefer the autocratic strongman, the stability of a Mussolini who makes the trains run on time, as long as he is anti-American (they deplore the pro-American kind). Saddam's Iraq was unstable because it completely depended on the whims of one man who had no constraints at all on his behavior. The majority Shia were locked out of any power, and brutally suppressed. Saddam's Iraq was in some ways WORSE than Afrikaans Apartheid because there existed within Iraq no possibility for change for suppressed minorities (Kurds) AND the majority of the population (60% Shia). Saddam's Iraq depended solely on the making of Mass Graves to kill enough of 75% of the people (Shia/Kurds) to allow the Tikriti mob to act as his goons. Criticizing removing Saddam is like saying New York City would be better off ruled by John Gotti, or that the various kleptocracies such as Indonesia or the Sudan or or Egypt or Saudi or the Phillipines serve their people.

France essentially made itself into the strategic opponent of the US, taking steps to put it's thumb in the eye of GWB's Administration. Comparing France's behavior to say, Russia or China, which also opposed any War with Iraq or any effort to force Iraq to comply with inspections, yet left the matter there. Both of those nations decided that future business with the Bush Administration and the prospect of a Bush Victory for re-election dictated prudence. Moreover there is nothing in Chirac's history (he sold Saddam a nuke program in the late Seventies, the Israelis bombed Osirak in 1981) to suggest he is a pius global tribune for peace, offended by Chimpy McHitler Bush. Something happened to change France from lukewarm endorsement of War to fervent opposition in the space of two weeks, with the huge risk that came with that fervent opposition.

Chirac may have calculated that he could position France as the alternate Western Power and act as the traditional mercantilist opponent of the leading Western Powers, as France did in the 1500-1800's, aiding Islamic Ottoman sultans against Austria, England, and Russia. His speech in Vietnam offering France as a bulwark against American culture and language and commerce suggests this may have been a motive. It's consistent with French history opposing the Hapsburgs and England, but doesn't explain the deep risk he took in the space of a few weeks.

I think the likeliest explanation is that Chirac deeply misunderstood the probability of a GWB re-election, projecting France's domestic political scene onto America's (which is bad as the other way round). He probably thought that any opposition by France would cause the American electorate to reject decisively for generations GWB and his Party, offering a risk-free opportunity to position France as the American alternative. Certainly the limp noodle Clinton foreign policy could have given that impression, as did the lack of understanding of how much 9/11 changed American political culture.

At the end of it all, France now has it's own costs. Chirac took a huge risk without much payoff. He now has the Bush Administration, Republican Party, and large portions of public opinion in the US against him and France. It's a gamble that makes about as much sense as Saddam Husseins (that France could deep-six any War and avoid inspections).

p.lukasiak:

bq. you're probably right, because by that time I was convinced that the whole "war on terror" rationale for the war was a charade, and that the Bush regime would say and do whatever it felt like, regardless of the facts.

I appreciate the up-front admission, though it does somewhat make me wonder as to the purpose of continuing this discussion is since, unless your conviction has wavered since, that means there is nothing that I can say change your opinion on these matters.

And I would submit that there was absolutely nothing that anyone who was opposed to the war could have said to you that would have convinced you at that point that the rationale for the war was just a charade --- that Saddam represented no threat, and that there was no Iraq-al Qaeda connection.

That would depend first and foremost as to just how shrill such individuals came across in conversation, their ability to refute arguments made by Ken Pollack on the issue of the WMD threat and Anonymous (Michael Scheuer, in his first book) on the al-Qaeda connection, among others. While I found many anti-war polemicists quite eloquent as to the former, I was thoroughly unconvinced as their answer to the latter, which generally involved either the straw man argument of disproving that Iraq was behind 9/11 or claiming that any and all belief that Iraq could have been tied to al-Qaeda is lies, lies, lies. These didn't lead to much in the way of persuasion at the time, nor does it still in the latter case from its shriller exemplars.

Because its clear that even in hindsight, knowing that there were no WMDs, knowing that the Bush regime was flat out lying about the evidence when it wasn't spinning the meager facts at its disposal, knowing that the intelligence community did not think there was any significant connection between al Qaeda and Iraq, knowing that over 1500 Americans, and countless (and I use that term deliberately, because the Bush regime has so little regard for Iraqi lives that it won't even keep track of the number of people who are dying) Iraqis dead, and knowing that the war would cost out children $300,000,000,000 and counting (we aren't going to pay for it...god forbid we raise taxes to pay for our wars), and knowing that American credibility and position of leadership in the international community has been destroyed....knowing all of this, you still support the invasion.

Be careful, you might start a fire with all those straw men lying around. At the risk of repeating myself, read the US and British reviews of both nations' pre-war Iraq intelligence. It's long, I know, and it might take some of the force out of your jeremiads against the administration, but I think it might be every bit as worthwhile and might I say more productive for your arguments in the long run than all the hard work you've clearly put into the president's national guard records.

the US tried to persuade other nations, but its arguments didn't work, so it resorted to threats and bribes. I'm unaware of any threats made by France in reaction to the US's heavy-handed "diplomacy", although I'd not be surprised to hear that certain nations were "reassured" economically by France.

Interesting how when the US attempts to use its economic power to achieve its policy objectives it's a bribe, but when France does it it's economic reassurance. As far as threats are concerned, you need look no further than Turkey.

The fact is that the US needed 9 votes to authorize the use of force, and France, Russia, China, Germany, and Syria were all opposed to authorizing it, while the US had four votes. France's ability to "bribe" or "threaten" the six other nations was severly limited...especially as it concerned nations in the Americas. To suggest that the US failure to get the support of these "neighbors" because of threats by France is pure nonsense.

I agree, which is why I didn't say that. The US was able to secure the necessary 9 votes for a second UN Security Council resolution, it was the Frence veto threat that brought an end to the diplomatic process. China and Russia were both going to abstain on the issue, while neither Germany or Syria have veto power on the Security Council. That doesn't change the fact that during the period leading up to the voting process, France attempted to actively lobby the 6 "swing" votes against the US by every diplomatic tool available (this is a key aspect of the Cantaloube-Vernet book). They ultimately failed, which is why France pulled out its veto as a last resort.

Jim Rockford:

I think the likeliest explanation is that Chirac deeply misunderstood the probability of a GWB re-election, projecting France's domestic political scene onto America's (which is bad as the other way round). He probably thought that any opposition by France would cause the American electorate to reject decisively for generations GWB and his Party, offering a risk-free opportunity to position France as the American alternative. Certainly the limp noodle Clinton foreign policy could have given that impression, as did the lack of understanding of how much 9/11 changed American political culture.

At the end of it all, France now has it's own costs. Chirac took a huge risk without much payoff. He now has the Bush Administration, Republican Party, and large portions of public opinion in the US against him and France. It's a gamble that makes about as much sense as Saddam Husseins (that France could deep-six any War and avoid inspections).

That's certainly possible, but the speed of the shift is one of the things that has me curious. One of the things that just struck me was whether during the planning sessions at the Pentagon the French generals learned that the US actually was planning to go forward (and let's not get into the post-war planning problems) with its plans for democracy in Iraq post-war and relayed it to their superiors, who might have then opted for a policy shift.

The problem, near as I can tell, is that none of the options we've laid out so far really explain the speed of the shift. The Chirac speech, near as I can tell, was taken by everybody from his own party to the opposition to the international media as a sign that France was getting ready to dispatch its troops to fight alongside the US against Iraq. World leaders simply don't make statements of that nature without careful consideration beforehand and having already made their decision on the policy issues - the speeches are supposed to lay the groundwork for the action, not the other way around. So for Chirac to make a major speech like that only to flip around in 2 weeks implies to me that something happened during that period that led him to spin right back around and become an active opponent of the US. I don't think that it's conspiratorial (to answer a criticism made earlier in the thread) to think so, it merely acknowledges that something happened and seeks to come up with options as to what.

#11 Dan:

I tend to agree with you on both counts, though that still leaves the issue of "Why?"

Maybe someone tipped them off that the WMD were being moved out of Iraq?

In the meantime:

The Eid of Liberty
I don't think I need to tell you how close is the 9th of April to my heart. And now, after two years happiness is still the same for me; one person among millions who were freed on that great day.
The 9th of April had turned one of the darkest pages in our history and opened the door wide before the people and their dreams, just as when the idol was knocked down, fear and oppression were knocked down as well.

No day matches you, my brightest day. We will keep reaping your fruits while the entire neighborhood follow your light and wait for other days like you to sweep away the remaining rotten idols.

The 9th of April has proven that the free world now has the guts and the required determination to make the change and throw the legacy of the past century behind its back; dictators shall be endorsed no more and the struggle will continue until humanity is freed from its dark nightmare that lasted way longer than it should have.

From ITM

Course to the likes of our foil capped Bushitler moonbat, Mohammed. is just another CIA bushco operative.

Gotta love the french eh ?

Their active undermine is unforgivable, they made a threat to turkey about their EU memebership prospects, and held up half our forces that was supposed to enter thru turkey.

This left the north open and allowed those long truck trains to move all that stuff into syria, now said to be in the beka valley.

Its one thing to vote against us, its another thing to activly lobby against us, its even yet another level that it played such a large part in denial of the 4th ID's entry into the north of Iraq.

That is direct aid to Saddam, guilty of crimes against humanity, where there are mass graves of kids, tortured to death kids, Kids used for sex toys and live tiger food.

France aided that, against the USA

We wont be forgetting that any time soon.

Saddam's anthrax program had been the cause of considerable embarrassment for all concerned in the aftermath of inspections following Gulf War 1. Hence Powell's holding it up.

disinformation. Powell tried to imply that Iraq's anthrax was "dry" which is far more dangerous than the "wet" anthrax actually produced by Iraq. Iraq never had, and never came close to having, the kind of technology necessary to produce dry anthrax.

Indeed, Iraq was assumed to have had NO nuclear program prior to it's invasion of Kuwait,

false. Iraq was assumed to have a nuclear program prior to the Gulf War (I mean, only an idiot doesn't know that Israel bombed the Osirik reactor in 1981 because it suspected that Iraq was working on a bomb 10 years before the Gulf War.) Inspectors were surprised, however, by how much progress had been made by Iraq in their nuclear program.

As we know from the Duelfer Report, the intellectual capital and blue prints from that effort were retained, though Saddam largely postponed his attempt to build nuclear weapons until after sanctions were lifted.

False. The fact that Saddam didn't slaughter everyone who ever worked on his nuclear programs is not "evidence" that he was maintaining "intellectual capital" with the purpose of starting up a nuclear program. There is no evidence that any attempt was made to maintain the paperwork associated with a nuclear weapons program after 1995. A very small part of what would have been needed was found buried in someone's backyard---by the conclusion is that this was an isolated incident of the materials having been forgotten by the regime, rather than part of the far larger effort to maintain the "knowledge base." The IAEE concluded unequivocally that there was no Iraqi nuclear program, and no evidence of any intention to restart a nuclear program, as a result of its inspections in 2002-2003.

please go back and familiarize yourself with the facts, because your efforts to rewrite history make intelligent discussion impossible.

Minor points: The base in Qatar is solely an airbase and command center and that is all it was meant to replace. As for invasion and taking over oilfields, if that were our policy, our pre-positioned equipment and bases in Kuwait made for the perfect staging ground for going north to Iraq or South to the KSA oilfields in the east of the country. Much better than some bases in the middle of Arabia.

Although the assumption of the Bush administration at the runup to the war for not for simply toppling Saddam and setting up garrisons, it is quite possible that the French and some Arab leaders expected that, simply because all previous allusions to democracy by others was not followed through.

Or, it could have been just our naked grab for oil to feed our hedonistic consumer lifestyle before the Chinese get it all.
As soon as the prisoner camps are ready we'll go for KSA, Iran and Venezuela, too. Plus, we'll probably bomb France because we're racist pigs and would find it fun.

GAZE.

#8 Colt:
"France has been anti-NATO since de Gaulle ... and it doesn't ring true that they suddenly remember a week before the UN vote."
Yes. I would ascribe the shift to a gradual realisation of the opportunities opened by Schroder's campaign rhetoric.
Why the delay between September and January?
This has been bugging me. Some possible explanations (hypothesis alert!):
- Bureaucratic inertia.
- Internal struggle on this between Villepin and the French foreign ministry professionals and attepts to sway Chirac (unless of course Chirac was behind it in the first place).
(This would fit with reports of French officers expecting to join US in Iraq, if they were being briefed on those line by French foreign ministry.)
- Time needed for diplomacy between France and Germany AND Russia to form an alliance on this issue and agree tactics.

Anyone aware of anything relating to Russian policy shifts in this period?

I appreciate the up-front admission, though it does somewhat make me wonder as to the purpose of continuing this discussion is since, unless your conviction has wavered since, that means there is nothing that I can say change your opinion on these matters.

the fact that I could not have been convinced that the war was justified has little or no impact on the question of France's motivation behind its 'change of heart.'

At the risk of repeating myself, read the US and British reviews of both nations' pre-war Iraq intelligence. It's long, I know, and it might take some of the force out of your jeremiads against the administration, but I think it might be every bit as worthwhile and might

I've read the British stuff, and read enough about the American reports, to know that there is a fatal flaw in both accounts. Simply put, although the errors in the analyses that were being issued in the fall of 2002 were understandable, there is no justifiably explanation for having maintained faith in their conclusions when there was an enormous amount of contrary evidence by March 1, 2003. The intelligence professionals were well aware that their conclusions were not based on "hard" evidence, but on assumptions about the character and intentions of Saddam Hussein, combined with circumstantial evidence, with the foundation of the whole ball of wax being the statements of defectors of questionable credibility. When you find out that everything you assumed was true that could be checked out proved to be false, the prudent thing to do --- especially before undertaking the invasion and occupation of a nation on the other side of the world --- is take a good hard look at basis of the rest of what you think you know. This was not done; instead, we got stuff like Colin Powell's UN presentation which ignored all of the proof that US assumptions were incorrect, and concentrated solely on those "issues" that remained unresolved at that point in time. Those of us who had been paying attention to the facts recognized Powell's presentation for what it was --- an intellectually dishonest attempt to sway American public opinion.

Additionally none of the reports deal with the fact that the US and GB had a long term policy of "containment" of Iraq (not to mention the US's need to justify the presence of military bases in Saudi Arabia) and how that policy probably influenced the way in which intelligence was evaluated. IMHO, intelligence had been consistently evaluated in a manner that was "prudent" and consistent with the containment policy -- there was little "downside" in error on the side of caution when the policy was "containment." But over the years, the "err on the side of caution" approach yielded a foundation of assumptions that wound up being regarded as "facts" which created a distorting lens through which subsequent intelligence was evaluated. Everyone wound up "knowing" that Saddam had WMDs because for years it had been consider prudent to assume that he did have them. Thus, while wholly circumstantial evidence was regarded as further "proof" of what was known, contrary evidence was simply ignored.

For instance, one of the chief sources used by the US in determining the nature and extent of Iraq's WMD program's prior to 1991 was Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel. Kamel was considered a completely authoritative source on those programs, and Saddam's efforts to hide their true nature and extent...except that one key point made by Kamel was consistently ignored in all of the analyses. The effort to hide Iraq's biological weapons program, and elements of the chemical weapons program, included unilaterally and secretly destroying all the evidence that the 'hidden' programs had ever existed (while maintaining a cache of key documents to preserve the knowledge base)

There was unequivocal evidence that this destruction had taken place, but because the effort to hide the programs necessitated not documenting the destruction of its components, Iraq was incapable of "accounting for" most of what it had destroyed. (One glaring example -- Iraq claimed to have melted down thousands of rockets capable of carrying WMDs. Iraq was able to provide the ingots that resulted from this process, and when they were tested they were found to be meturallogically identical to similar rockets that had been surrendered to inspectors. However, because there was no "proof" that the ingots were, in fact, melted down rockets, all of those rockets were listed as "unaccounted for" by UNSCOM in its 1998 report.)

And although the British have made a stab at looking at how the intelligence analyses were used politically (one of the most telling documents is the ORIGINAL intelligence draft analysis examining the "threat" posed by Iraq -- Blair and his people rejected the cautious and equivocating approach taken in that draft), no such effort has been undertaken in the US. The most egregious example of this is how the term "unaccounted for" as it was used in the UNSCOM report was completely decontextualized in public pronouncements. UNSCOM was well aware that massive quantities of WMDs and precusors had been dumped, but because it was impossible at that point to quantify how much had been dumped, ALL of it was considered "unaccounted for" in the 1998 report. But the Bush regime used the fact that stuff was "unaccounted for" to imply (and occasionally, directly state) that these quantities of materials still existed, and were being hidden by Saddam.

While I found many anti-war polemicists quite eloquent as to the former, I was thoroughly unconvinced as their answer to the latter, which generally involved either the straw man argument of disproving that Iraq was behind 9/11 or claiming that any and all belief that Iraq could have been tied to al-Qaeda is lies, lies, lies.

you were requiring the critics to prove a negative. The "case" for an al Qaeda-Iraq connection was extremely dubious at best, and (unlike with WMDs) the world's intelligence communities never believed there was one. It is difficult to accept your argument that the war was justified because (at one point, six months before the war) "everyone" thought Iraq had WMDs when you reject the collective wisdom of those same intelligence communities when it came to an Iraq-al Qaeda connection.

The "argument" was based on an entirely flawed premise that "terrorism" is monolithic, and "support" for "terrorism" in any instance translates to support for all terrorists. Under that premise, the US was far more guilty than Iraq ever was of an al Qaeda connection. Indeed, if one were to examine the evidence of a Bush administration connection to al Qaeda under the same "standards" used to show an Iraq -- al Qaeda connection, you would conclude that the Bush regime was infinitely more supportive of al Qaeda prior to 9-11 than was Iraq.

For instance, a great deal of emphasis is placed on the fact that Abu Nidal lived in Iraq. But when you look at that evidence, what you find is that he RETIRED to Iraq, that there is nothing that connects him to subsequent terrorist acts. Most intelligence analysts believe that Abu Nidal was pretty much given sanctuary/exiled in Iraq under the condition that he cease staging attacks on Israel. (One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter, and the US has supported terrorism and provides safe haven to terrorists whose goals it approves of.)

The bottom line on disproving the Iraq -- al Qaeda connection is that people who bought into the theory had already bought into a myth that required extraordinary leaps of logic. There was no rational "argument" that pointed to such a conclusion....there was only a conclusion, and an assortment of unrelated facts that could be stretched to fit that conclusion.

I agree, which is why I didn't say that. The US was able to secure the necessary 9 votes for a second UN Security Council resolution, it was the Frence veto threat that brought an end to the diplomatic process.

I believe that you have your facts wrong, and narrative confused. At no point did the US ever have nine votes. The "uncommitted" nations clearly did not want to authorize force at any point, otherwise, they would have not made an effort to broker a compromise between the US and those who opposed an immediate force authorization. Remember, Blix was asking for mere MONTHS to complete his task, and the IAEE had all but finished its task, and given Iraq a clean bill of health on nuclear issues. Nations do not take their sovereign rights lightly, and absent a compelling need to authorize the violation of Iraq's sovereignty, were not about to endorse an invasion. Iraq clearly did not represent a threat that required an immediate authorization for the use of force, and the rest of the world knew this.

The fact is that the French veto made it "safe" for other nations to support the US, rather than discourage that support, because a vote with the US would have no effect if France vetoed the resolution. I'm sure that you recall that Bush promised a vote in the UN Security Council despite the threat of a French veto --- and then reneged on that promise because not only did he not have the necessary nine votes that would provide a "moral" authorization, he didn't even have the eight votes needed for a majority. (And Blair reneged on a similar promise made to parliament.)

Frances refusal to support the authorization of the use of force on January 20th was doubtless a "calculated" move that considered all of the various benefits and downsides of that decision. Perhaps had the auxilliary benefits that arose from France's decision not existed (i.e. improved relations with Germany and status as a leader of the EU, enhanced favorably opinion in the Arab/Muslim world and a reduced threat of islamic terrorism aimed at France, etc.) and there had been much greater costs involved, France would have chosen to remain silent.

But the most logical explanation for France's actions is the one that was stated publicly by Villepan on January 20th....

http://www.info-france-usa.org/news/statmnts/2003/vilepin012003.asp

The choice is to continue, in accordance with the options we took, on the path of cooperation. The other choice is to move forward on the path of military intervention because we are impatient with the situation in Iraq. We believe that nothing today justifies envisaging military action. The inspectors have been working on the ground fewer than 60 days. In the past two months we believe that the implementation of inspections and the work they have generated—more than 300 inspections a month—are satisfactory....we’re saying that so long as cooperation can go forward this path, which was adopted, should be continued....

The second question we’d ask is about the effectiveness of intervention. Because it is one thing to intervene militarily in Iraq, even to attack Saddam Hussein’s regime and get him to leave. (...) It’s another to have a united Iraq, to have the Middle East a stable and safe region. What are the consequences, moreover, for the international community in terms of security? What new divisions would we see emerging on the international stage? What frustrations and feelings of injustice would be fuelled?

Our sense is that such intervention, in terms of being effective, takes us down a path where we would have no control at any time over the gains and benefits. Consequently the choice is simple. Either we continue patiently but with the conviction that at the end of the road, through cooperation, we will disarm Iraq. That is France’s stated conviction and the conviction of the inspectors. We will see their report on January 27. Or one considers there’s a military short-cut and by taking it one may hope to move more quickly to the objective. ...We’re saying let’s be prudent,

France’s stance in the event of a second resolution or if the US decided to pursue its path, as we’ve said from the outset, as President Chirac has said: we will not join in military intervention that did not have international support, UN support. Moreover, we believe that military intervention would be the worst solution, and that the use of force can only be a last resort, implying that all other avenues have been exhausted.

It is important to remember that prior to Bush deciding to make Iraq an issue, there was a great deal of support in the international community to extensively "liberalize" the sanctions regime, if not lift the sanctions entirely. In other words, the international community took a giant step toward accomodating the US when it supported Bush's call for new, unconditional inspections. The international community was willing to support military action against Iraq if it proved necessary , but on January 20th there was no such proof.

To interpret France's "militaristic" statements prior to January 8 as a commitment to use force is to ignore how the US was insisting that the threat of force be used to ensure Iraqi cooperation. Public statements telling military units that they "must be ready" for deployment need to be seen within the context of presenting a unified threat of force . When the US started making premature noises about actually authorizing the use of force, France---and the rest of the world---said "let the inspections process work."

That's certainly possible, but the speed of the shift is one of the things that has me curious.

Perhaps the "speed of the shift" in the public sphere by France was the result of the "speed of the shift" of the US position --- from urging an international effort to force Saddam to disarm through inspections to insisting that force was necessary and should be authorized forthwith.

One of the things that just struck me was whether during the planning sessions at the Pentagon the French generals learned that the US actually was planning to go forward (and let's not get into the post-war planning problems) with its plans for democracy in Iraq post-war and relayed it to their superiors, who might have then opted for a policy shift.

This is a possibility, especially in light of Villepan's concerns (see link above) as stated on January 20th, where he expressed significant concern about what would happen after an invasion. If France was aware of the US's bizarro-world intentions to install a puppet regime headed by Chalabi (is how you define "democracy"?) it would certainly have given France pause, especially since the French were not basing their post-war analyses on neo-con fantasies, and were probably thinking more along the lines of the US State Department experts whose good advice was categorically rejected by the Bush regime.

But ultimately, such considerations likely played little impact on France's decisions (unless, of course, France had tried to explain why the US post-war plans were unrealistic, and got told to shove it.).

Kuwait is tiny. It took Saddam 6 hours to conquer it. So it maybe smack in the middle were you want to be but it would be overrun if you didn't post a sizable military force there and that is very expensive. You can not do it pre-positioned equipment

they made a threat to turkey about their EU memebership prospects,

I always taught that it was highly unpopular in Turkey, especially with kurdistan. But this makes perfect sense. You do know that Turkey needs Britain's vote too to be alowed in the EU?

p.lukasiak, you asume that there where planning problems but look at the facts and just interpreted history in the same way Dan is doing. How would Iraq look like if the occupation was planned succesful. They would have kept the army, wouldn't try to privatage the oil industry and would have held elections as soon as possible. Iraq would be at this moment ruled by Shiite religious people, who would be for high import barriers, national industry, anti Israel, expensive oil and a big army so they wouldn't need American (Israel loving) bases. Everything the US doesn't want to see. Now it is "ruled" by Shiite religious people but because of the trouble the country is de-industrializating, they don't have a big army and they can't ask America to leave. This is so much better for the Americans than the other posibility that i think you can say that the planning was a succes. They didn't plan for order but for disorder.

p.lukasiak:

the fact that I could not have been convinced that the war was justified has little or no impact on the question of France's motivation behind its 'change of heart.'

No, it doesn't. However, this discussion has widened considerably since its inception so I figured it was worth noting.

I've read the British stuff, and read enough about the American reports, to know that there is a fatal flaw in both accounts. Simply put, although the errors in the analyses that were being issued in the fall of 2002 were understandable, there is no justifiably explanation for having maintained faith in their conclusions when there was an enormous amount of contrary evidence by March 1, 2003. The intelligence professionals were well aware that their conclusions were not based on "hard" evidence, but on assumptions about the character and intentions of Saddam Hussein, combined with circumstantial evidence, with the foundation of the whole ball of wax being the statements of defectors of questionable credibility. When you find out that everything you assumed was true that could be checked out proved to be false, the prudent thing to do --- especially before undertaking the invasion and occupation of a nation on the other side of the world --- is take a good hard look at basis of the rest of what you think you know. This was not done; instead, we got stuff like Colin Powell's UN presentation which ignored all of the proof that US assumptions were incorrect, and concentrated solely on those "issues" that remained unresolved at that point in time. Those of us who had been paying attention to the facts recognized Powell's presentation for what it was --- an intellectually dishonest attempt to sway American public opinion.

I would recommend you read a great deal more of the US reviews (the actual documents, not what you've read about them) and I think you will see that you vastly overstate the role of defectors in the US formulating its conclusions with respect to WMD as well as other points of contention that you have. To accuse Powell of presenting an intellectual dishonest presentation without reading the review of what went into it strikes as itself intellectually dishonest because you haven't read the review of the material that went into it.

Additionally none of the reports deal with the fact that the US and GB had a long term policy of "containment" of Iraq (not to mention the US's need to justify the presence of military bases in Saudi Arabia) and how that policy probably influenced the way in which intelligence was evaluated.

That is not the case. The US policy with regard to Iraq has been one of regime change for some time now.

IMHO, intelligence had been consistently evaluated in a manner that was "prudent" and consistent with the containment policy -- there was little "downside" in error on the side of caution when the policy was "containment." But over the years, the "err on the side of caution" approach yielded a foundation of assumptions that wound up being regarded as "facts" which created a distorting lens through which subsequent intelligence was evaluated. Everyone wound up "knowing" that Saddam had WMDs because for years it had been consider prudent to assume that he did have them. Thus, while wholly circumstantial evidence was regarded as further "proof" of what was known, contrary evidence was simply ignored.

For instance, one of the chief sources used by the US in determining the nature and extent of Iraq's WMD program's prior to 1991 was Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel. Kamel was considered a completely authoritative source on those programs, and Saddam's efforts to hide their true nature and extent...except that one key point made by Kamel was consistently ignored in all of the analyses. The effort to hide Iraq's biological weapons program, and elements of the chemical weapons program, included unilaterally and secretly destroying all the evidence that the 'hidden' programs had ever existed (while maintaining a cache of key documents to preserve the knowledge base)

There was unequivocal evidence that this destruction had taken place, but because the effort to hide the programs necessitated not documenting the destruction of its components, Iraq was incapable of "accounting for" most of what it had destroyed. (One glaring example -- Iraq claimed to have melted down thousands of rockets capable of carrying WMDs. Iraq was able to provide the ingots that resulted from this process, and when they were tested they were found to be meturallogically identical to similar rockets that had been surrendered to inspectors. However, because there was no "proof" that the ingots were, in fact, melted down rockets, all of those rockets were listed as "unaccounted for" by UNSCOM in its 1998 report.)

And although the British have made a stab at looking at how the intelligence analyses were used politically (one of the most telling documents is the ORIGINAL intelligence draft analysis examining the "threat" posed by Iraq -- Blair and his people rejected the cautious and equivocating approach taken in that draft), no such effort has been undertaken in the US. The most egregious example of this is how the term "unaccounted for" as it was used in the UNSCOM report was completely decontextualized in public pronouncements. UNSCOM was well aware that massive quantities of WMDs and precusors had been dumped, but because it was impossible at that point to quantify how much had been dumped, ALL of it was considered "unaccounted for" in the 1998 report. But the Bush regime used the fact that stuff was "unaccounted for" to imply (and occasionally, directly state) that these quantities of materials still existed, and were being hidden by Saddam.

You seem to be arguing that either intelligence was politicized or that it suffered from a "groupthink" problem, both of which are discussed in detail in various US intelligence reviews. In particular, you might want to look into the section from the most recent review that explains that the most alarmist intelligence on Iraq well predated the current administration.

you were requiring the critics to prove a negative. The "case" for an al Qaeda-Iraq connection was extremely dubious at best, and (unlike with WMDs) the world's intelligence communities never believed there was one. It is difficult to accept your argument that the war was justified because (at one point, six months before the war) "everyone" thought Iraq had WMDs when you reject the collective wisdom of those same intelligence communities when it came to an Iraq-al Qaeda connection.

No, I ask you to refute the arguments, quite a different thing. As far as the world's intelligence agencies not believing that there was a connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda, here again I would suggest that you read the SSIC review of pre-war Iraq intelligence with respect to Iraq's links to terrorism as well as its review of the terrorism portion of Powell's speech.

The "argument" was based on an entirely flawed premise that "terrorism" is monolithic, and "support" for "terrorism" in any instance translates to support for all terrorists. Under that premise, the US was far more guilty than Iraq ever was of an al Qaeda connection. Indeed, if one were to examine the evidence of a Bush administration connection to al Qaeda under the same "standards" used to show an Iraq -- al Qaeda connection, you would conclude that the Bush regime was infinitely more supportive of al Qaeda prior to 9-11 than was Iraq.

I very much doubt that you could demonstrate US support for al-Qaeda under this administration akin to that claimed by Ibn Sheikh al-Libi, Moammar Ahmed Yousef, and others. Moreover, you are setting up straw man arguments in both this instance and with respect to Abu Nidal, since neither claim was made by the administration or Secretary Powell to begin with.

The bottom line on disproving the Iraq -- al Qaeda connection is that people who bought into the theory had already bought into a myth that required extraordinary leaps of logic. There was no rational "argument" that pointed to such a conclusion....there was only a conclusion, and an assortment of unrelated facts that could be stretched to fit that conclusion.

This is not the case nor was it at the time, as the SSIC review of US intelligence makes quite clear. Your dismissal of this information and assertion that anyone who disagrees with you is behaving in an irrational manner leaves no room for dialogue or persuasion, which was one of my points in so far as there is nothing that Powell, myself, or anyone else could say so as to change your mind.

To briefly address your other points:

• The US has assurances of support from the "swing six" nations with respect to a Security Council vote. Maybe they said so because they knew France was going to veto it, we don't know and I think you are extrapolating ad absurdium to place the US in the worst possible light and France in the best.

• No vote was held on the issue primarily due to UK legal and political considerations with respect to what would happen if France vetoed a second resolution.

• None of Villepin said on the 20th was unknown by France or anybody else prior to that point.

• As a minor point, the US never intended to install Chalabi as a puppet despot. I know you won't believe me on that one, but I just figured I'd say it.

• Still, your argument that it was US post-war intentions that made France shift its support for the war, perhaps in conjunction with other issues, has at least some merit to me.

#25 John Farren

I would ascribe the shift to a gradual realisation of the opportunities opened by Schroder's campaign rhetoric.

On January 7th, Chirac told the French military to prepare for anything. 13 days later, his foreign minister said France opposed the use of force.

- Internal struggle on this between Villepin and the French foreign ministry professionals and attepts to sway Chirac (unless of course Chirac was behind it in the first place).
(This would fit with reports of French officers expecting to join US in Iraq, if they were being briefed on those line by French foreign ministry.)

De Villepin, the Quay d'Orsay and Chirac have long been pro-Arab, which complicates things further. I expect they didn't like the prospect of going to war with Iraq, but if officers were being briefed, they figured it would probably happen. I suppose its possible France intended to bushwhack Bush all along.

- Time needed for diplomacy between France and Germany AND Russia to form an alliance on this issue and agree tactics.

They didn't leave it kinda late?

On a general note, the dramatic policy switch should put to rest the notion of France's "principled" stance against the war. I see from the comments above that it has not.

p --

Considering that the IAEE missed Saddam's considerable nuclear efforts post-Osirak, and Libya's, AQ Khan's network, much of North Korea's, and that Mohammed El-Baradei has supported the idea of the "Islamic Bomb" their conclusions in 2002-3 which run directly counter to the Duelfer Report, are not very credible. Numerous scientists were told to keep paperwork concealed, and efforts were made directed by Saddam personally to retain them. Saddam in one meeting quizzed his people on how long it would take to restart weapons production. He was told six months for the chemical component, a year for the bioweapons, including ANTHRAX, and ten years for nuclear weapons.

It is true that the Saddam regime had always had problems weaponizing Anthrax, they were never able to solve the problem of the artillery shells or bombs not destroying the anthrax organisms but simply dispersing them. However, to say that Saddam had no intention of creating a sustained WMD program is deny the words out of his own mouth and the accounts of many former regime officials.

The importance that Saddam held to WMD is shown by the fact that he PERSONALLY ran these programs. From the Duelfer Report (Nuclear Key Findings):

"Nevertheless, after 1991, Saddam did express his intent to retain the intellectual capital developed during the Iraqi Nuclear Program. Senior Iraqis—several of them from the Regime’s inner circle—told ISG they assumed Saddam would restart a nuclear program once UN sanctions ended.

• Saddam indicated that he would develop the weapons necessary to counter any Iranian threat.
• Starting around 1992, in a bid to retain the intellectual core of the former weapons program, Baghdad transferred many nuclear scientists to related jobs in the Military Industrial Commission (MIC). The work undertaken by these scientists at the MIC helped them maintain their weapons knowledge base.
  * The Regime prevented scientists from the former nuclear weapons program from leaving either their jobs or Iraq. Moreover, in the late 1990s, personnel from both MIC and the IAEC received significant pay raises in a bid to retain them, and the Regime undertook new investments in university research in a bid to ensure that Iraq retained technical knowledge."

Note: sections were cut for brevity.

The problem with the pre-war intelligence is that the US and other agencies after Saddam executed his sons-in-law, relied solely on technical intelligence, electronic intercepts and photo recon. No one had substantial human sources detailing what Saddam was doing or thinking, leaving a huge black hole in our knowledge. Since everyone had been spectacularly wrong before the defectors revelations about the scope and details of Saddam's programs, it was a safe bet to err on the side of caution. There was no independent sources to check on assumptions and fabricators such as "Curveball."

Moreover, you don't take into account the global context of the Saddam-Bush political struggle post 9/11. For Bush to back down and allow Saddam a victory (essentially, lifting sanctions with a Saddam facing down the US) would have encouraged the very thinking (the US was a weak, paper tiger that it was safe to attack) that had encourage bin Laden in the first place. Prior to 9/11 it was safer to not push the issue, as Clinton had done, with bombing only campaigns such as Desert Fox 98-99. Post 9/11 weakness only invited other regimes to aid Al Qaeda and this perception of risk seemed to drive the confrontation.

Saddam essentially picked the fight, since any number of moves he made were needlessly provocative: 1. Official celebrations of 9/11. 2. Abu Nidal not offered on a platter to the US in a conciliatory gesture. 3. No turning over of Abdul Rahman Yassin, a 1993 WTC bombing plotter given sanctuary and protection in Iraq. 4. Low level Al Qaeda operatives given shelter in Iraq (would have required Saddam's personal approval given his regime) and Richard Clarke's fear that Osama would find refuge in Baghdad.

Containment of Saddam was dead shortly after 9/11, everyone knew it except Saddam. What is strange is Chirac's extraordinary gamble. He took a huge risk (alienating the GWB regime and any Republican successor regime) for very little payoff. What has Chirac gained?

Has he usurped American business opportunities in China or Russia? No. Has he usurped America's pre-eminent position in the Gulf as protector against Iran? No. Has he obtained sweetheart oil deals or any other payoff that would make sense for his financial backers? No. Given the short time frame from lukewarm acceptance to vehement opposition with huge risks and no commensurate payoff (swinging freely for a bunt, in other words) nothing makes sense. Note that long after Iraq is a dead issue, Chirac has needlessly provoked the US again and again. Thus I'd argue you can rule out blackmail of any sort (since it would no longer be operative and France, Chirac, and his backers have financial interests to consider wrt the US. Airbus comes to mind.)

To me this is reminiscent of Saddam's view that he was the triumphant victor of Gulf War 1, and would inevitably triumph like his idol Stalin. Chirac seems to have convinced himself in a few weeks, and continues to this day, that he is the Charles de Gaulle inheritor, standing aside the Anglo-Saxon triumph like Horatio at the bridge. This makes no sense whatsoever but never underestimate the power of self-delusion.

On January 7th, Chirac told the French military to prepare for anything. 13 days later, his foreign minister said France opposed the use of force.

you keep leaving out two key details.

1) Telling someone to be "prepared for anything" is not the same thing as actually committing troops. Troops are placed on "alert" all the time without their actually being deployed in military action.

2) On January 20, Villepan said that France was opposed to AUTHORIZING the use of force AT THAT TIME, and did so because (in Villepan's words) "In the past two months we believe that the implementation of inspections and the work they have generated—more than 300 inspections a month—are satisfactory....we’re saying that so long as cooperation can go forward this path, which was adopted, should be continued...."

your presentation of selective facts gives a thoroughly distorted view of the sequence of events as they occurred.

Considering that the IAEE missed Saddam's considerable nuclear efforts post-Osirak, and Libya's, AQ Khan's network, much of North Korea's, and that Mohammed El-Baradei has supported the idea of the "Islamic Bomb" their conclusions in 2002-3 which run directly counter to the Duelfer Report, are not very credible.

considering the fact that there were no intrusive inspections in Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, or North Korea of the kind that were undertaken by the IAEE in 2002-2003, your point is quite irrelevant. The most significant impediment to non-proliferation has always been the refusal of nuclear states to allow the kind of intrusive inspections of their programs that would be required to accurately assess whether other nations are involved in developing weapons--- why should Libya or Iraq allow such inspections, when the US will not allow the same kinds of inspections?

Of particular note is that you refrain from stating precisely WHEN Saddam did certain things. It is readily acknowledged that Saddam had every intention of resuming his WMD programs prior to 1995. There is scant evidence that he remained committed to those programs after that date. And the real question is not what Saddam may have wanted to do, but whether he could be discouraged from doing so. Saddam Hussein had demonstrated a willingness to do what the US wanted him to do until the first US-Iraq war, and I would suggest that he would have been willing to withdraw from Kuwait had the US offered him an opportunity to save face. Saddam was however, about as likely to allow himself to be completely humiliated as someone like George W. Bush is --- Saddam preferred to be beaten in battle than to be humiliated by the US.

Since everyone had been spectacularly wrong before the defectors revelations about the scope and details of Saddam's programs, it was a safe bet to err on the side of caution.

This, I'm afraid, is categorically false. UNSCOM knew that Iraq was not co-operating with the inspections, and that there was far more to Iraq's pre-1991 programs than had been reported. The problem was not that the inspections process didn't find programs and weapons cache's that existed prior to 1995 because after 1991 those programs had been abandoned, and all the weapons and precursors (almost all) evidence of such programs had been destroyed.

What is not false is that it was a good idea to err on the side of caution. But "erring on the side of caution" means more than just "not trusting Saddam", it means "not doing anything stupid just because you don't trust Saddam."

There was no independent sources to check on assumptions and fabricators such as "Curveball"

I hate to sound like a broken record, but although this statement was true in September 2002, it was simply no longer true by March 1 2003. The inspections process provided the means to check the claims of people like Curveball --- and to determine that they were completely unreliable.

This is a peculiarly categorical statement. Have a look at this page from the Duelfer report, and the frequency with which "dry agent" and "dry anthrax" are mentioned.

And do you have any thoughts about the genesis of the anthrax letters?

This is a peculiarly categorical statement. Have a look at this page from the Duelfer report, and the frequency with which "dry agent" and "dry anthrax" are mentioned.

I saw nothing that comes close to suggesting that my statement was incorrect.

The key technology necessary for producing weaponized "dry anthrax" was the milling process that would allow anthrax spores to maintain their potentcy yet be small/light enough to act as air-borne pathogens. Iraq never had, and never came close to having, this technology.

One of the more interesting aspects of the Duelfer report is that it comes across as two completely separate reports --- if you just read the "bold" parts, you would get the impression that there was a threat....but when you read the accompanying "unbolded" parts, they usually contradict the impressions one would draw from the "bold" sections.

There are two other significant things that this excerpt shows

1) When a source makes statements consistent with presumptions that cast Iraq in a bad light (i.e. when someone discusses the nature and extent of the programs) they are generally uncontested. But when that same source makes statements that "mitigate" the presumption that Iraq maintained weapons/programs and/or the capacity and intention to continue them (i.e. when someone discusses the destruction of things like "seed stock"), those statements are generally qualified by citing the lack of "proof" for the truth of those statements.

2) Duelfer plays fast and loose with the facts. One glaring example is his reference to "Some seed stocks were retained by another Iraqi official until 2003 when they were recovered by ISG."

The fact is that these "seed stocks" were bovine "anthrax", which no one has ever been able to use as a biological warfare agent, and which the experts on biological warfare agree that is not capable of such use. Simply put, it doesn't kill humans. The scientist who kept them had them in his refrigerator---where his children could get to them---and had refused to store human pathogens when he was requested to do so. In other words, describing bovine anthrax seed stock within the context of "biological weapons" is simply inappropriate.

Moreover, there is simply no evidence that even suggests that this "seed stock" was meant to be maintained. The scientist who turned it over got them in 1991 (or 1992) and there is no evidence that anyone connected with the bioweapons program was aware of it. The bottom line on this stuff is that it was useful only for legitimate non-weapons related research, and that it the scientist retained it because although it fell under the overly-broad definition of prohibited materials, it was not dangerous, and not adaptible for use in prohibited programs. Duelfer's failure to explain all of this --- and his deliberate attempt to suggest that this "seed stock" was in fact part of a biological weapons program, demonstrates the need for skepticism when reading his report.

Another strange statement. In cows and in humans, anthrax is caused by the same bacterium, Bacillus anthracis. I would have thought that bovine anthrax was "bovine" because the victim was a cow, not because the pathogen was different. In any case, the Ames strain, which killed 5 humans in 2001, was originally cultured from a Texas cow. So what you are saying makes no sense from any angle. Where did you get your "information"?

The key technology necessary for producing weaponized "dry anthrax" was the milling process that would allow anthrax spores to maintain their potency yet be small/light enough to act as air-borne pathogens. Iraq never had, and never came close to having, this technology.

Duelfer says they were able to dry the anthrax simulant Bacillus thuringiensis, producing particles of size 1 to 10 microns, which is small enough. I would guess that the final step is to optimize the chemical and thermodynamic conditions of the milling process, requiring trial and error but not requiring further basic technology.

mitch p. I would have thought that bovine anthrax was "bovine" because the victim was a cow, not because the pathogen was different.

That's right. In humans it's called occupational anthrax, and (apart from bio-warfare) it always comes from contact with animal products infected with bovine anthrax.

If that brilliant scientist (or his unfortunate children) had handled those spores, they could have contracted the most common form of occupational anthrax, a cutaneous infection with an approximate 15% mortality rate (much lower if treated). If they had ingested or inhaled it, they would not be alive now to tell us how harmless bovine anthrax is.

Containment of Saddam was dead shortly after 9/11, everyone knew it except Saddam. What is strange is Chirac's extraordinary gamble. He took a huge risk (alienating the GWB regime and any Republican successor regime) for very little payoff. What has Chirac gained?

If you look at Chirac's history you could have predicted that he would do the right and not the smart thing. And he did.

oops...My Bad.....
the "seed stock" that was recovered from the scientists refrigerator in discussion was not anthrax but a form of botulinum that was not useful for weapons creation....

From an interview with Hans Blix in January 2004...

David Kay also talked about this vial of botulinum toxin that was found. How significant is that, do you think

From what I understand, it is not at all significant. In the first place, it was a vial that had been sitting in the refrigerator in the private home for about ten years. He also had lots of other vials of biological material, which was perfectly legitimate apparently for a biologist to have. The botulinum that he had there was of a strain that was not really convenient for biological warfare.

But the scientist who gave him that strain had given him others which he refused to keep, presumably because they were dangerous. Surely that is worrying. What happened to those strains?

I think that Kay said that they had been buried somewhere or disappeared, and the inspectors would be told where they were. But they had not at the time of the report been taken there, so that question is still open. If they find it, then they find it, but we have not seen any evidence of that so far. So I think you cannot hang a biological weapons program on that particular issue, no.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/wmd/interviews/blix.html

also see....

http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1057558,00.html

I apologize for misremembering which toxin was involved, but my point still stands IMHO. Duelfer attempted through innuendo to suggest that biological weapons seed stock had been recovered, and that simply is not the case.

___________________________

Duelfer says they were able to dry the anthrax simulant Bacillus thuringiensis, producing particles of size 1 to 10 microns, which is small enough.

actually, Duelfer doesn't say that --- although he wants you to believe it. What he actually says is:

Sources are generally consistent in their assertion that the B. thuringiensis was never intended or tested for aerial application. Although the information available suggests Iraq successfully dried B. thuringiensis and produced the 1-10 m particle size applicable for efficient BW agent dissemination....

This is based apparently on a single (unnamed) source. There is no documentation, no confirming witnesses, and not a single word that suggests that any of the equipment necessary to mill the spores that small was found.

(Note that multiple sources do claim that spores were produced through the drying process that were "too small" for use as biopesticides. But the drying process does not produce particles small enough for "weaponization" alone.

__________________

as to the question asked earler about the Anthrax letters --- given that it is possible to trace the spores that were used to a specific laboratory, and given that access to weaponized dry anthrax is available to a very small number of people, it is difficult for me to believe that the US government doesn't know who was responsible.

The problem with the thesis that France radically changed its position in a two week period is that it isolates too small a time frame.

Prior to Bush's push for additional inspections, France favored significantly modify the sanctions against Iraq --- and did so despite apparently "believing that Saddam had WMDs".

Bush was initially publicly saying that the deployment of US forces to the Gulf was NOT in preparation for an inevitable invasion, but to establish a credible threat of force that was necessary to ensure that Iraq fully complied with the sanctions.

As the reports of the inspections started coming in, showing that nothing of significance was being found despite the claims of the US, US and British rhetoric promoting the need for war increased rather than decreased.

The various pronouncements of the French government used to claim that France was committed to military action regardless of circumstances do not, in fact, say that. Instead, they are statements regarding the need to be prepared for military action.

Villepan's January 20th statement does not contradict any of the previous statements --- there is no order to "stand down", and no suggestion that preparations for possible/eventual military action be abandoned. Instead, it is a statement that urged a continuation of the inspections process as a means of disarming Saddam, rather than a "military shortcut." In fact, Villepan only said that France would not participate in military action unless it was sanctioned by the UN (i.e., he did not say that France would not participate at all.) Perhaps most tellingly, he hedged on the question of the use of France's veto --- there was no direct "threat" or "promise" of a veto on January 20, although Villepan did not rule one out either.

If you look at Chirac's history you could have predicted that he would do the right and not the smart thing. And he did.

Right as selling two nuclear reactors to Saddam?

If Iraq had owned nukes in 1981 the Middle East would have looked differently and not necesary worse. The Iraq-Iran war for one would have ended much sooner (and in all likelyhood less bloody) Also the selling of the nuclear reactors wasn't a decision which only Chirac made. He was back then to junior for that.
I also had not this in mind but more what he did when he was young.

p.lukasiak,

It really looks like an ambush job by Villepan and Chirac seeing themselves and France as EU elite putting the uppity Americans in there proper place. Doing it without any warning made it all that much more delicious!

This observed behavior is right up there in maturity with a frat hazing or prank. It doesn't matter if it was not intended that way or if Chirac was too provincal to understand. The effect was to spit in the face of every American.

It was stronger than that of the dueling days when one publicly slapped the other with a white glove then demanded satisfaction of a duel.

Perhaps as imbicles (the impled EU party line) we should have redirected those troops to a duel with France?