iirc we didn't go into Afghanistan with the primary goal of nation-building. We went in to remove an organization that was a demonstrable threat to our country and a pseudogovernment that provided it support. In a Realpolitik sense as long as a further threat to us does not arise there, we don't care. Wouldn't want to be accused of budding imperialism now, would we?

Having said all that, if we do try to make things 'better' for the inhabitants it should be understood that our historical track record speaks volumes in terms of our actions towards former enemies that we've beaten and our intentions for the future.

The US abandoned Afghanistan to its own devices after the USSR pulled out in the early 1980's and the Taliban appeared and filled in the gap. Afghanistan appears to be on the brink on the same process all over again, with Taliban: the Next Generation, in production.

"In a Realpolitik sense as long as a further threat to us does not arise there, we don't care."

the US tried this tactic 15 years ago.
the result was the arose of an imminent and lethal threat. you should not try to repeat this tactic.

Let me chime in: J.S., for God's sake review how the Taliban came to power in the first place.

In a Realpolitik sense we don't care if the Taliban come to power again, as long as they don't constitute an imminent threat to our security at home or in the region. Recent reports have suggested the US has opened talks with the Taliban, at least to the extent of setting the terms of a truce (e.g. no Mullah Omar). And even the Taliban may be able to play a role in bringing needed stability, which is why the Clinton administration made its infamous overtures in the 1990s. (Then as now they have virtually only one card to play: handing over Osama bin Laden at the time, and laying down their arms today.)

It's also untrue that we simply abandoned Afghanistan. That didn't happen immediately; it only happened after the government had fallen for the third or fourth time and, IIRC, Hekmatyar had taken to shelling Kabul. We gave them some help but when they couldn't get it together we concluded that our efforts were better spent elsewhere. (It was, to be sure, a busy period, with democracy blooming everywhere from Eastern Europe to Latin American and even Southeast Asia. One couldn't be faulted for the optimism that it would eventually spread even to remote backwaters.) It was only after this that Pakistan mounted its concerted efforts to turn Afghanistan into a client state, for "strategic depth" with India, and backed the Taliban. At the time, Pakistan was working, to some extent, on our behalf: we hoped they would succeed.

Today, I think the same holds true. We can't confuse our ideals with our interests. We would like Afghanistan to bloom into a nascent mountain democracy, but our interests do not require it. They only require that we retain enough influence to prevent a renewed rise of al Qaeda.

Also, it's important to consider the value of strategic instability. I have a number of thoughts along those lines. Hmm. Perhaps a guest blog?