For many of us, the unrest in Haiti and the dispatch of combat forces are something of a sideline item on the nightly news. X happens, we do Y in response, nothing to see here just move along please....
Ever wonder what's actually involved in a mission like this? Or the planning and requirements that lie behind the dispatch of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) there?
Maj. Donald Sensing (ret.) discusses Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) like Haiti, and explains how they differ from other military operations, who is in charge, and some of the elements. He also notes that:
bq. "Contingency plans for Haiti have been among the most continually updated on the DOD inventory for many years. The country was of near-constant concern when I was assigned to XVIII Airborne Corps...."
For more, see reader Chris Pastel's remembrances and additional background re: "Air Alert Battalions" et. al. in the Comments section.
Meanwhile, Phil Carter at Intel Dump chimes in with some lessons learned from the last Haiti excursion. Is it time to begin considering the development of expeditionary nation-building capabilities?
Personally, I'm wary of that last concept. There's no doubt that we need many aspects of that capability within the military, if we're serious about addressing the potential issues around failed states. Nor is there any question in my mind that forces of this type could make a positive difference; indeed, this is a model I've argued for myself. It's just that calling them "expeditionary nation-building forces" bespeaks a certain level of arrogance and blindness to limitations that makes me uneasy. I'd rather give them most of the capabilities, and use a humbler term like "paramilitary aid forces" instead.
In the final analysis, no one can really build a nation except the people living there - and if fixing failed or dysfunctional states was as easy as sending in troops, most of them would have been fixed long ago.
You want to know what's involved in sending the Marines into Haiti this time? I'll tell you what I can surmise based on my own experiences.
At Camp Lejeune, there is always one infantry batallion designated as the "Air Alert Batallion." This batallion is on 24-hour standby for a designated period, usually 3 months. Within this batallion is one rifle company that is on 2-hour standby. That is the initial force of 200 Marines that went immediately into Haiti. The company is ready to roll within two hours and stages probably to the airstrip at New River, adjacent to Camp Lejeune. There the company is airlifted via the Air Force to its destination. The rest of the batallion is moved 24 hours later, along with whatever command elements have been activated if a MAGTF has been formed. I once was part of a batallion sent on an independent training operation and we didn't have a MAGTF command element, and that's a scenario I wouldn't wish on anyone. (I used to wonder exactly what the MAGTF staff did, and now I know--they keep the BS from rolling downhill and interfering with the people who really get the job done. And they handle most of the coordination with higher HQ and adjacent units.)
Exactly what the units do when they land in Haiti depends on the mission, but the overall movement out of Camp Lejeune has been regularized for years. (I was part of the air alert batallion back in the '70's.) It's a massive effort, but it's been well planned and rehearsed.
> In the final analysis, no one can really build a nation except the people living there ...
I couldn't agree more Joe.
Not only are the people living there the only people who can do it, you need to measure the time frame in generations, not in months or election cycles.
Even after getting through the hard thinking required to get one to the point of justifying an intervention, there is still the problem of determining if any long term good will come of it.
Nation building, or any long term societal change, in my view, cannot be successful if the military is the only tool used and the time frame is as short as the 'west's' attention span.
This, of course, assumes that long term good is the objective when it seems more likely that containment of negative consequences for the sponsor of the intervention is the objective of the more powerful countries and the UN.
Yup. There's no question that we can help, Kevin, esp. if we start using the Cuban aid model. Containment of negative consequences can be justifiable in and of itself, "small wars" are on the rise again, and strategic considerations may even force us to try nation building in areas of vital national interest. So, we need to have the structure and capabilities in place.
But as soon as we start talking about "nation building expeditionary forces," it seems to me that we're talking ourselves right into the kind of blithe overconfidence of which real disasters are made.
Equally serious is the fact that in the long run, I think language like this actually talks us into a reprise of colonialism, without learning from any of the mistakes made last time around.
I've discussed doctrines of (to use Lee Harris;' term) neo-sovereignty here before, and the contrasting visions re: how that might be enacted. I truly believe that's where things are headed, which is why I'm so sensitive to potential "tipping points" re: the quality and nature of our civilizational response to the "New World Disorder".
Yes, of course containment of negative consequence can be justified. Isn't that what armed forces are for? I didn't mean to imply they were not but to distinguish between the motivations.
I'm not sure I get the Cuban aid model reference but I sense the sarcasm. Perhaps you thought I was advocating inaction as a solution?
My point, if it wasn't clear is: (1) yes only the people who live there can build a nation; (2) nation building takes several generations; (3) military force alone can't build nations; (4) there does not seem to be any nation or group of nations today that has the motivation, capacity, and staying power to effectively build nations so the world seems to stagger from containment to containment.
Further to point 4 the US is the closest to having this capability but surely it is an unfair burden. Why should we expect one nation to act out of something other than self-interest when the others will not?
"...the quality and nature of our civilizational response" is something that many of us are sensitive to. A different way of ordering our inter-nation affairs is required if we want to see solutions different from those used in the past.
As regards "development of expeditionary nation-building capabilities?"
The USMC has been doing that (and other functions) for over a hundred years. Not always loudly, not always with fanfare, but the job is getting done.